In re: Kittusamy, LLP ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                 FILED
    MAR 10 2017
    1                          NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
    2                                                             U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
    OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    3                  UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
    OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    4
    5   In re:                        )       BAP No. NV-16-1242-LJuKu
    )
    6   KITTUSAMY, LLP,               )       Bk. No. 2:15-bk-13868-abl
    )
    7                   Debtor.       )
    ______________________________)
    8                                 )
    PARTAP INVESTMENTS, LLC,      )
    9                                 )
    Appellant,    )
    10                                 )       MEMORANDUM*
    v.                            )
    11                                 )
    KITTUSAMY, LLP,               )
    12                                 )
    Appellee.     )
    13   ______________________________)
    14                  Argued and Submitted on February 24, 2017
    at Las Vegas, Nevada
    15
    Filed - March 10, 2017
    16
    Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
    17                      for the District of Nevada
    18        Honorable August B. Landis, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
    _________________________
    19
    Appearances:      Samuel A. Schwartz of The Schwartz Law Firm argued
    20                     for Appellant Partap Investments, LLC; Bart Kurt
    Larsen of Kolesar & Leathan, Chtd. argued for
    21                     Appellee Kittusamy, LLP.
    _________________________
    22
    Before: LAFFERTY, JURY, and KURTZ, Bankruptcy Judges.
    23
    24
    25
    26        *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication.
    27   Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may
    have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value.
    28   See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
    1                              INTRODUCTION
    2        Pre-petition, Kittusamy, LLP (“Kittusamy”) defaulted on
    3   payments due under agreements to lease medical imaging equipment.
    4   After an order for relief was entered in Kittusamy’s involuntary
    5   chapter 111 case, the lessor filed a proof of claim asserting a
    6   secured claim of approximately $3.3 million.2    Thereafter, the
    7   lessor was granted relief from stay and foreclosed its security
    8   interest.   The equipment was sold to Partap Investments, LLC
    9   (“Partap”) at a private foreclosure sale; the bill of sale also
    10   transferred to Partap the lessor’s rights under the proof of
    11   claim filed in Kittusamy’s bankruptcy case and Kittusamy’s rights
    12   under a sublease.
    13        Thereafter, Partap filed an application for allowance of an
    14   administrative claim of $917,593.26 based on unpaid postpetition
    15   rent from the petition date through a date six days after Partap
    16   purchased the equipment.   The bankruptcy court disallowed the
    17   administrative claim in its entirety, finding that the leases
    18   were not true leases but were disguised security agreements, so
    19   that the rights transferred to Partap could not have included an
    20   administrative claim for postpetition rent.     Additionally, viewed
    21   through the alternative lens of a secured creditor’s rights, the
    22   bankruptcy court found that Partap had not met its burden of
    23   proving a diminution in value of the collateral for any relevant
    24   period.
    25
    1
    26           Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section
    references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 
    11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532
    .
    27
    2
    Although characterized as leases, the relevant documents
    28   granted lessor a security interest in the equipment.
    -2-
    1        We AFFIRM.
    2                                  FACTS
    3        The facts are not in dispute.     Kittusamy is a Nevada limited
    4   liability partnership.   Prem K. Kittusamy, M.D., and Bhuvaneswari
    5   P. Kittusamy, M.D., are the principals of the LLP.
    6        In 2008 and 2009, Kittusamy and its affiliate, DMP
    7   Equipment, LLC, entered into agreements to lease medical imaging
    8   equipment from Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. (“Siemens
    9   Medical”).   Kittusamy leased one piece of equipment through a
    10   Master Equipment Lease Agreement and Leasing Schedule that set
    11   forth the details of the financing; DMP leased four pieces of
    12   equipment, also via a Master Equipment Lease Agreement and a
    13   separate Leasing Schedule for each item.    DMP then subleased that
    14   equipment to Kittusamy under an Equipment Sublease Agreement
    15   (“Sublease”).
    16        All three parties entered into a Consent to Sublease and
    17   Agreement under which Siemens Medical approved the sublease and
    18   Kittusamy agreed to be bound by the terms of the DMP Master
    19   Lease.   All of the Leasing Schedules provided that Kittusamy had
    20   the option to purchase the equipment for a “Nominal Fixed
    21   Purchase Option Price of $1.00” at the end of the lease term.
    22   Thereafter, Siemens Medical assigned its interests in the Master
    23   Equipment Lease Agreements, Leasing Schedules, and Sublease and
    24   Consent (collectively, the “Lease Documents”) to Siemens
    25   Financial Services, Inc. (“Siemens Financial”).    At some point,
    26   Kittusamy defaulted on its obligations under the Lease Documents;
    27   according to its proof of claim, Siemens Financial accelerated
    28   the amounts due under the Lease Documents on November 4, 2014.
    -3-
    1        On July 2, 2015, an involuntary chapter 11 petition was
    2   filed against Kittusamy; Kittusamy consented to entry of an order
    3   for relief, which was entered August 10, 2015.    Siemens Financial
    4   filed proof of claim no. 23-1 asserting a secured claim of
    5   $3,343,487.18 representing prepetition amounts due under the
    6   leases, including late charges, property taxes, discounted
    7   accelerated balance of future rentals, and attorneys’ fees and
    8   costs through December 10, 2015.    Siemens Financial then moved
    9   for relief from the automatic stay, which the bankruptcy court
    10   granted.   Thereafter, Siemens Financial foreclosed on its
    11   security interest, selling the equipment to Partap for
    12   $924,641.70 plus $75,358.30 in sales tax through an “As Is,”
    13   “Where Is” Bill of Sale and Non-Recourse Assignment dated
    14   March 2, 2016 (“Bill of Sale”).    Siemens Financial also
    15   transferred to Partap “all of Siemens Financial’s rights, title
    16   and interests in any claim Siemens Financial has asserted in the
    17   Kittusamy, LLP Bankruptcy Case No. 15-13868-ABL . . .” and all of
    18   Kittusamy’s and DMP’s “respective rights, titles and interests,
    19   in and to the equipment . . . and sublease[.]”
    20        On March 3, 2016, Partap filed a Notice of Transfer of
    21   Siemens Financial’s claim in Kittusamy’s bankruptcy case.    On
    22   March 9, 2016, Partap filed proof of claim no. 41-1 asserting an
    23   administrative claim of $917,593.26 pursuant to § 507(a)(2) for
    24   Kittusamy’s postpetition use of the equipment.    The amount of the
    25   claim was based on the monthly payments due under the DMP Master
    26   Lease and the Sublease only (not the Kittusamy Master Lease)
    27
    28
    -4-
    1   through March 9, 2016,3 and included more than $300,000 in late
    2   fees.
    3        Kittusamy filed an objection to Partap’s unsecured and
    4   administrative claims; Partap filed an application for approval
    5   of its administrative claim, and an “opposition” to Kittusamy’s
    6   objection to claims.   The bankruptcy court heard argument and
    7   took the matters under submission.       On July 19, 2016, the
    8   bankruptcy court made oral findings and conclusions on the record
    9   and entered written orders (1) sustaining Kittusamy’s objections
    10   to Partap’s administrative and unsecured claims and (2) denying
    11   Partap’s motion to allow its administrative claim.       Partap timely
    12   appealed.   Partap appeals only the bankruptcy court’s
    13   disallowance of its administrative claim.
    14                               JURISDICTION
    15        The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    16   §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(B).   We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    17   § 158.
    18                                    ISSUE
    19        Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion in disallowing
    20   Partap’s administrative claim?
    21                           STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    22        We review the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo
    23   and its findings of fact for clear error.       See Allen v. U.S.
    24   Bank, NA (In re Allen), 
    472 B.R. 559
    , 564 (9th Cir. BAP 2012).
    25
    3
    26           At oral argument, Partap’s counsel asserted that it was
    owed an administrative claim for amounts due through early April
    27   when Kittusamy surrendered the equipment. However, both the
    proof of claim and the application to approve it requested
    28   amounts due only through March 9, 2016.
    -5-
    1        A bankruptcy court’s order allowing or disallowing a proof
    2   of claim, including an administrative claim, is reviewed for
    3   abuse of discretion.    Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Dant & Russell,
    4   Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 
    853 F.2d 700
    , 707 (9th Cir.
    5   1988); Bitters v. Networks Elec. Corp. (In re Networks Elec.
    6   Corp.), 
    195 B.R. 92
    , 96 (9th Cir. BAP 1996).      A bankruptcy court
    7   abused its discretion if it applied the wrong legal standard or
    8   its findings were illogical, implausible or without support in
    9   the record.    TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 
    653 F.3d 10
       820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011).
    11        Questions of contract interpretation are subject to de novo
    12   review unless extrinsic evidence was introduced on issues such as
    13   intent.    Captain Blythers, Inc. v. Thompson (In re Captain
    14   Blythers, Inc.), 
    311 B.R. 530
    , 534 (9th Cir. BAP 2004), aff’d,
    15   182 F. App’x 708 (9th Cir. 2006).
    16                                   DISCUSSION
    17   A.   The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in
    18        disallowing Partap’s administrative claim.
    19        Under § 503(b), the bankruptcy court, after notice and a
    20   hearing, shall allow an administrative expense claim for “the
    21   actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate[.]”
    22   The party seeking administrative priority bears the burden of
    23   proof.    Microsoft Corp. v. DAK Indus., Inc. (In re DAK Indus.,
    24   Inc.), 
    66 F.3d 1091
    , 1094 (9th Cir. 1995).      To keep
    25   administrative costs to the estate at a minimum, the term
    26   “actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate”
    27   is narrowly construed.    
    Id.
        An administrative claimant must
    28   demonstrate that its claim (a) arose from a transaction with the
    -6-
    1   debtor in possession as opposed to the preceding entity, and
    2   (b) directly and substantially benefitted the estate.   
    Id.
     at
    3   1094.
    4        Here, the bankruptcy court made the following findings
    5   relevant to Partap’s administrative claim: (1) the leases were
    6   security agreements under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:1-203(b)4;
    7   (2) the Bill of Sale did not transfer to Partap a right to assert
    8   an administrative claim for the period prior to Partap’s purchase
    9   of the equipment; (3) any administrative claim would be limited
    10   to the actual value of Kittusamy’s use of the equipment, not the
    11   monthly payments under the Lease Documents, and Partap had not
    12   provided sufficient evidence of the diminution in value of the
    13   equipment during the pendency of the case.   The court also noted
    14   that Partap might be entitled to an administrative claim based on
    15   the diminution in value of the equipment from the time Partap
    16   purchased the equipment in March 2016, but that Partap had not
    17   provided any evidence of what that diminution might be.
    18        Partap has not assigned error to the bankruptcy court’s
    19   finding that the leases were disguised security agreements, but
    20   disputes that the Bill of Sale did not transfer to Partap a right
    21   to assert an administrative claim and that any administrative
    22   claim would be limited to the actual value of Kittusamy’s use of
    23   the equipment.   We conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err
    24   in these findings.
    25
    4
    26           The Lease Documents provide that they are to be construed
    in accordance with the laws of the state of New Jersey. The
    27   parties do not dispute that New Jersey law applies to the
    analysis of whether the leases are security agreements. As it
    28   happens, New Jersey and Nevada law are consistent in this regard.
    -7-
    1        1.   The bankruptcy court did not err in finding that Partap
    2             had no right to assert an administrative claim for
    3             postpetition rents based on the Bill of Sale.
    4        As noted above, the Bill of Sale transferred to Partap “all
    5   of Siemens Financial’s rights, title and interests in any claim
    6   Siemens Financial has asserted in the Kittusamy, LLP Bankruptcy
    7   Case No. 15-13868-ABL[.]”   The bankruptcy court found that
    8   Siemens Financial had neither filed an administrative claim nor
    9   transferred any such claim to Partap under the Bill of Sale and
    10   thus Partap was not entitled to assert an administrative claim as
    11   successor-in-interest to Siemens Financial.   Additionally, the
    12   bankruptcy court found that, as a secured creditor, Siemens
    13   Financial would not have been entitled to assert an
    14   administrative claim for the lease payments, but would have been
    15   entitled only to adequate protection for the postpetition
    16   diminution in the value of the equipment.   Importantly, Partap
    17   has not assigned error to this latter aspect of the bankruptcy
    18   court’s ruling.
    19        Partap argues that the bankruptcy court did not consider
    20   page 2 of the Bill of Sale, which provides for the transfer to
    21   Partap of “all of Kittusamy’s and DMP’s . . . respective rights,
    22   titles and interests in, and to the equipment . . . and sublease
    23   . . . described in Schedule 1 hereto . . . , subject to the terms
    24   and conditions hereof.”   Schedule 1 lists the five pieces of
    25   equipment along with “[r]ights, title and interest in and to that
    26   certain Equipment Sublease Agreement entered into between
    27   Kittusamy, LLC and DMP Equipment, LLC regarding the above
    28   equipment.”   Partap contends that the transfer of the interests
    -8-
    1   in the Sublease entitled Partap to assert an administrative claim
    2   against Kittusamy for its failure to make payments under the
    3   Sublease.   Partap points out that contracts should be construed
    4   so as to avoid rendering portions of them superfluous, Penske
    5   Logistics, Inc. v. KLLM, Inc., 
    285 F. Supp. 2d 468
    , 474 (D.N.J.
    6   2003), and argues that the bankruptcy court’s interpretation of
    7   the Bill of Sale renders Schedule 1 meaningless.
    8        Additionally, Partap notes that the Bill of Sale expressly
    9   excludes certain claims that were not transferred to Partap and
    10   argues that if Siemens Financial had intended to exclude the
    11   transfer of its right to an administrative claim it would have
    12   done so; Partap further contends that the fact that Siemens
    13   Financial never filed an administrative claim or opposed Partap’s
    14   application for allowance of its administrative claim is evidence
    15   that the Bill of Sale included the transfer of the right to
    16   assert an administrative claim.
    17        Finally, Partap argues that in fact Siemens Financial did
    18   assert a right to file an administrative claim in its motion for
    19   relief from stay, which stated:
    20        [T]o the extent that the adequate protection to which
    Siemens Financial is entitled proves to be inadequate,
    21        and the value of its interest in the Siemens Equipment
    continues to decline, Siemens Financial asserts that
    22        any claim arising therefrom is entitled to an
    administrative expense claim pursuant to Section 507(b)
    23        of the Bankruptcy Code.
    24   Partap argues that because the Bill of Sale referred to
    25   “asserted” rather than “filed” claims, Siemens Financial’s
    26   reservation of rights in its motion for relief from stay gave
    27   Partap the right to file an administrative claim.
    28        We find these arguments unconvincing.   With respect to any
    -9-
    1   right of a lessor to assert an administrative claim for unpaid
    2   rent, Siemens Financial could not transfer to Partap a right it
    3   did not have.   As noted, Partap does not assign error to the
    4   bankruptcy court’s finding that Siemens Financial was a secured
    5   creditor, not a lessor, and the transfer of rights under the
    6   Sublease did not change the character of the leases as security
    7   agreements.   Where the property in question is not owned by the
    8   lessor but is instead owned by the lessee under a disguised
    9   security agreement, the lessor is not entitled to an
    10   administrative priority claim under § 503(b)(1)(A) for unpaid
    11   post-petition lease payments.   See Williams v. IMC Mortg. Co.
    12   (In re Williams), 
    246 B.R. 591
    , 595 (8th Cir. BAP 1999) (noting
    13   that § 503(b) is not intended to provide an administrative
    14   expense award to a prepetition secured lender based on the
    15   debtor’s postpetition possession and use of collateral, and
    16   citing cases); See also In Re ES2 Sports & Leisure, LLC, 
    519 B.R. 17
       476, 480 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2014).   Further, the payment
    18   obligations under the Lease Documents were incurred prepetition,
    19   not postpetition.   This circumstance alone would have barred
    20   Siemens Financial from asserting an administrative claim.     See
    21   In re Williams, 
    246 B.R. at 594
     (postpetition mortgage payments,
    22   although not due until after the filing of the petition, were an
    23   obligation incurred prior to the creation of the estate, thus the
    24   requirement that the administrative claim arise from a
    25   postpetition transaction was not met).   This conclusion is
    26   bolstered by the fact that Siemens Financial apparently
    27   accelerated the amounts due under the Lease Documents in November
    28   2014, eight months prepetition.
    -10-
    1        The bankruptcy court did not err in finding that the Bill of
    2   Sale did not grant Partap a right to file an administrative claim
    3   for unpaid rent for the period prior to its purchase of the
    4   equipment.
    5        2.   The bankruptcy court did not err in finding that Partap
    6             had not presented sufficient evidence of diminution in
    7             value.
    8        With respect to the transfer of any rights as a secured
    9   creditor, i.e., a right to assert a claim for postpetition
    10   diminution in value of the equipment, Partap asserted in the
    11   bankruptcy court that the equipment had diminished in value by
    12   $525,358.30 before March 3, 2016, the date Partap purchased the
    13   equipment.   Partap contended that the beginning value of the
    14   equipment was $1.45 million, based on Prem Kittusamy’s testimony
    15   at a confirmation hearing on March 18, 2016 regarding
    16   negotiations with Siemens Financial, in which Dr. Kittusamy
    17   stated that the parties had agreed at some point during the
    18   bankruptcy that the equipment was worth between $1.4 and
    19   $1.5 million.   Partap also noted that Kittusamy’s Proposed
    20   Disclosure Statement to Accompany Debtor’s First Amended
    21   Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization filed October 30, 2015 valued
    22   the equipment at $1,397,518.   From $1.45 million, Partap
    23   subtracted the amount it paid for the equipment, $924,641.70,
    24   yielding $525,358.30.
    25        The bankruptcy court found this evidence insufficient to
    26   establish the diminution in value, but did not elaborate on its
    27   specific reasoning.   However, we find no error in the bankruptcy
    28   court’s conclusion.   Even assuming (without deciding) that
    -11-
    1   Dr. Kittusamy’s testimony and/or the disclosure statement were
    2   competent evidence of the equipment value as of the petition
    3   date,5 it is far from clear whether the price paid by Partap to
    4   purchase the equipment reflects its fair market value on that
    5   date.
    6        First, the price obtained at a forced sale does not
    7   necessarily reflect fair market value.   See BFP v. Resolution
    8   Trust Co., 
    511 U.S. 531
    , 537-38 (1994) (noting that market value
    9   is the antithesis of forced-sale value, and that “fair market
    10   value” presumes market conditions that do not obtain in the
    11   context of a forced sale).
    12        Second, as pointed out by Partap, it purchased not only the
    13   equipment but also Siemens Financial’s right to collect on its
    14   claim filed in the bankruptcy case and Kittusamy’s and DMP’s
    15   rights under the Sublease.   Therefore, the purchase price does
    16   not appear to have been based solely on the fair market value of
    17   the equipment.   In short, Partap failed to provide sufficient
    18   evidence from which the bankruptcy court could discern the fair
    19   market value of the equipment and therefore its diminution in
    20   value.
    21        3.   The bankruptcy court did not err in disallowing
    22             Partap’s administrative claim for the period after
    23             March 3, 2016.
    24        The bankruptcy court disallowed Partap’s administrative
    25
    26        5
    Kittusamy notes that Dr. Kittusamy’s testimony was in the
    27   context of describing failed efforts to reach a compromise with
    Siemens Financial to retain the equipment, and that no final
    28   agreement on value was ever reached.
    -12-
    1   claim in its entirety, thus implicitly denying a claim for the
    2   six-day period after Partap had purchased the equipment.    Partap
    3   argues that the bankruptcy court erred in this aspect of its
    4   ruling because, as the owner of the equipment, Partap was
    5   entitled to an administrative claim for Kittusamy’s use of the
    6   equipment after March 3, 2016.
    7        Partap’s argument might make sense had it filed an
    8   application for allowance of such a claim.   Instead, according to
    9   Partap’s application for allowance of its administrative claim,
    10   claim no. 41-1 was based on unpaid postpetition rent from the
    11   petition date through March 9, 2016.    Assuming without deciding
    12   that Partap was entitled to an administrative claim for unpaid
    13   rent accruing after it purchased the equipment on March 3, 2016,
    14   Partap did not differentiate in its application between the pre-
    15   and post-purchase periods or provide any explicit evidence of the
    16   amount due for the period after it purchased the equipment.
    17   Keeping in mind that it was Partap’s burden to prove its
    18   entitlement to an administrative claim, there was a failure of
    19   proof with respect to the amount of any such claim.   Thus, the
    20   bankruptcy court did not err in disallowing the claim in its
    21   entirety.6
    22                              CONCLUSION
    23        For the reasons explained above, the bankruptcy court did
    24   not abuse its discretion in disallowing Partap’s administrative
    25
    26        6
    This is not to suggest that Partap could not seek relief
    27   for Kittusamy’s continued retention and use of the equipment
    after the purchase date. However, any such relief would be
    28   premised upon Partap’s status as the owner of the equipment.
    -13-
    1   claim.   Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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