In re: Charles A. Hamm, II ( 2021 )


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  •                   NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    FILED
    FEB 1 2021
    SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
    U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
    OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
    OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In re:                                       BAP No. CC-20-1132-LGF
    CHARLES A. HAMM, II,
    Debtor.                         Bk. No. 9:18-bk-10785-DS
    CHARLES A. HAMM, II,                         Adv. No. 9:18-ap-01045-DS
    Appellant,
    v.                                           MEMORANDUM
    SHANNA BURCAR; JOHN C. BARLOW;               DISMISSING APPEAL
    NANCY BARLOW,
    Appellees.
    Before: LAFFERTY, GAN, and FARIS, Bankruptcy Judges.
    This is an appeal from the bankruptcy court’s order entered May 19,
    2020, awarding attorneys’ fees to appellees on their claims under
    § 727(a)(4) and § 523(a)(6) (“Fee Order”).
    The Panel has reviewed the Fee Order, the parties’ briefs, and the
    appellate record, as well as the bankruptcy court docket and relevant
    imaged pages.
    After this appeal was filed, this Panel vacated and remanded the
    bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment on the § 523 claim. That
    decision is currently on appeal at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
    The order on appeal is interlocutory because there has not been a full
    and final disposition of the adversary proceeding. Temkin v. Belli (In re
    Belli), 
    268 B.R. 851
    , 855 (9th Cir. BAP 2001) (for purposes of jurisdiction
    over bankruptcy appeals under 
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    (a)(1), finality in adversary
    proceedings does not differ from finality in ordinary federal civil actions
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    ). Appeal of an interlocutory order requires leave of
    the Panel. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    .
    Leave to appeal is appropriate if the proposed appeal involves (1) a
    controlling question of law, (2) as to which there is substantial ground for
    difference of opinion, and (3) interests of judicial economy would be served
    because an immediate appeal may materially advance ultimate termination
    of the litigation or avoid wasted litigation. See, e.g., Lompa v. Price (In re
    Price), 
    79 B.R. 888
    , 889 (9th Cir. BAP 1987), aff’d, 
    871 F.2d 97
     (9th Cir. 1989).
    Those criteria are not met here. Although appellees urge the Panel to
    review the portion of the order that awarded fees under Civil Rule 37, that
    fee award is not easily severable from the portion of the fee award that is
    based on the California anti-SLAPP statute. An immediate review of that
    portion of the order would not materially advance the ultimate termination
    of the litigation because the § 523 claim has not been finally adjudicated.
    2
    Appellant will be able to challenge the Fee Order upon timely appeal
    from a final judgment in the adversary proceeding. See Am. Ironworks &
    Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Const. Corp., 
    248 F.3d 892
    , 897-98 (9th Cir. 2001);
    Baldwin v. Redwood City, 
    540 F.2d 1360
    , 1364 (9th Cir. 1976).
    This appeal is hereby ORDERED DISMISSED as interlocutory. 1
    A certified copy of this order sent to the bankruptcy court shall serve
    as the Panel's mandate.
    1  Appellant filed two motions in this appeal. The first is a Motion to Remand. The
    dismissal of this appeal renders that motion moot. The second is a Motion to Dismiss
    Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action. The Panel has remanded that claim to the
    bankruptcy court. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to grant either motion, and both are
    DENIED.
    3