In re: Joseph L. Wilczak and Judith A. Wilczak ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOV 13 2019
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
    U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
    OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
    OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In re:                                               BAP No. NC-19-1038-FBG
    JOSEPH L. WILCZAK and JUDITH A.                      Bk. No.    15-52365-SLJ
    WILCZAK,
    Adv. No. 16-05022
    Debtors.
    JOSEPH L. WILCZAK; JUDITH A.
    WILCZAK,
    Appellants,
    v.                                                   MEMORANDUM*
    SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.;
    THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, as
    trustee, on behalf of the holders of the
    Alternative Loan Trust 2007-OA10,
    Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
    Series 2007-OA10,
    Appellees.
    Argued and Submitted on October 25, 2019
    at San Francisco, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for
    whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential
    value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
    Filed – November 13, 2019
    Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Honorable Stephen L. Johnson, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
    Appearances:        Joseph L. Wilczak argued pro se; Bryan L. Hawkins of
    Stoel Rives LLP argued on behalf of appellees Select
    Portfolio Servicing and The Bank of New York Mellon.
    Before: FARIS, BRAND, and GAN, Bankruptcy Judges.
    INTRODUCTION
    Chapter 111 debtors Joseph L. Wilczak and Judith A. Wilczak objected
    to the claim of appellees Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”) and The
    Bank of New York Mellon, as trustee, on behalf of the holders of the
    Alternative Loan Trust 2007-OA10, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
    Series 2007-OA10 (“BONY Mellon”) (collectively “Creditors”). The
    Wilczaks admit that the Creditors paid off their prior deed of trust and
    advanced them over $351,000 in cash. They also admit that they made
    payments on the loan for eighteen months. But they argue that someone
    1
    Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the
    Bankruptcy Code, 
    11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532
    , all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules
    of Bankruptcy Procedure, and all “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of
    Civil Procedure.
    2
    forged their signatures on the loan documents and therefore they are not
    obligated to repay the loan. The bankruptcy court held a trial and carefully
    evaluated the evidence. It decided that the Wilczaks’ signatures were
    genuine and valid and overruled the objection.
    The Wilczaks appeal. We discern no error and AFFIRM.
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
    A.     Prepetition events
    The Wilczaks own real property located in Los Altos Hills, California
    (the “Property”). In or around 2007, the Wilczaks dealt with Countrywide
    Bank, FSB (“Countrywide”3) to refinance their existing mortgage.
    On May 21, 2007, the Wilczaks went to a title company’s office to sign
    the refinancing documents. The Creditors claim that the Wilczaks signed a
    loan application, an adjustable rate note for $1,311,000 in favor of
    Countrywide, a deed of trust in favor of Countrywide, a Truth in Lending
    Act (“TILA”) disclosure statement, and a notice of right to cancel. Cindy
    North, an employee of the title company, notarized the documents.
    The refinancing closed shortly thereafter. The existing lienholder was
    paid $950,290.59, and the Wilczaks received $351,206.42 in cash.
    2
    We exercise our discretion to review the bankruptcy court’s docket, as
    appropriate. See Woods & Erickson, LLP v. Leonard (In re AVI, Inc.), 
    389 B.R. 721
    , 725 n.2
    (9th Cir. BAP 2008).
    3
    We use “Countrywide” to refer to both Countrywide Bank, FSB and its
    successor in interest, Countrywide Home Loans.
    3
    The Wilczaks made regular monthly payments on the loan between
    September 2007 and March 2009. After a while, they had difficulty making
    the monthly payments. They unsuccessfully sought a loan modification
    from Countrywide and its successor, Bank of America.
    In or around May 2011, appellee BONY Mellon acquired the note and
    deed of trust. Appellee SPS became the servicer on the note.
    The Wilczaks defaulted on the note. The trustee recorded a notice of
    default in October 2011 and filed a notice of trustee’s sale in January 2012.
    The Wilczaks commenced litigation in state court against BONY
    Mellon and others. For the first time, they asserted that their signatures on
    the 2007 loan documents were forgeries and that they did not sign the
    documents or assent to the loan. The trial court dismissed the Wilczaks’
    complaint, and the state court of appeal affirmed.
    B.    The Wilczaks’ chapter 11 case
    While the state court appeal was pending, the Wilczaks filed a
    chapter 11 petition. They scheduled the Property, valued at $2.7 million,
    but stated that “note and deed of trust contain forged signatures” and
    disputed the amount owed.
    BONY Mellon filed a timely proof of claim (“Claim”) for the amount
    due under the note and deed of trust. It represented that the outstanding
    balance was $1,761,276 and that the loan was $443,085 in arrears.
    4
    C.    Objection to the Creditors’ Claim
    The Wilczaks objected to the Creditors’ Claim (“Objection”). They
    argued that the Claim was invalid because the signatures on the loan
    documents were forgeries. They submitted a report from Nancy H. Cole,
    who examined the signatures and offered her opinion that the signatures
    were forgeries.
    The Wilczaks moved for summary judgment on the Claim and
    Objection. They relied on Ms. Cole’s report and argued that there was “no
    dispute” that the Creditors sought to enforce forged loan documents.
    The Creditors objected to Ms. Cole’s expert witness testimony, in part
    because the Wilczaks had failed to disclose her as an expert witness.
    The Creditors filed their own motion for summary judgment,
    contending that the Wilczaks’ arguments were barred by the Rooker-
    Feldman doctrine and preclusion principles, because the court had already
    ruled against the Wilczaks when granting the Creditors’ motion to dismiss
    two years earlier.4
    The bankruptcy court denied both motions. It also excluded
    Ms. Cole’s expert report because the Wilczaks had failed to comply with
    Civil Rule 26’s disclosure requirements.
    4
    The Wilczaks had previously commenced an adversary proceeding that
    included an objection to the Claim. The bankruptcy court twice dismissed the complaint
    with leave to amend.
    5
    D.    Trial on the Creditors’ Claim and the Wilczaks’ Objection
    The parties proceeded to trial on limited issues relating to the Claim
    and Objection. The court noted that it had already excluded direct evidence
    of experts. But it said that, assuming that Ms. Cole could qualify as an
    expert, it would allow her to testify as a rebuttal witness in response to the
    Creditors’ evidence that the Wilczaks’ signatures were genuine.
    The court also stated that it had received an ex parte communication
    from the Wilczaks in which they apparently sought to terminate their
    attorney, Brian Elley. It cautioned the Wilczaks that, if they chose to
    terminate Mr. Elley, it would not continue the trial. After consulting each
    other in private, the Wilczaks opted not to discharge Mr. Elley.
    The Wilczaks testified that the signatures on the loan documents
    were not theirs and they did not authorize anyone else to sign for them.
    They pointed out discrepancies in the dates of the documents, noted that
    names were misspelled and middle initials looked like they were added
    after the fact, and testified that the signatures did not look like their normal
    signatures. They testified that they never met a notary named Cindy North.
    They stated that they attended a meeting at escrow to sign loan
    documents. They signed some of the documents but realized that the loan
    terms were different than what they had wanted. At that point, they
    stopped signing documents and walked out of the meeting.
    The Wilczaks testified that the lender asked them to come back for
    6
    another meeting, at which the lender’s representatives gave the Wilczaks a
    check for $354,000 and said they would send documents for them to sign.
    They admitted that they received a reconveyance of the deed of trust from
    the original lender in 2007. They also admitted that they made payments
    on the new loan and did not raise the issue of the alleged forgery until
    2011.
    Notary Cindy North testified that she did not have any independent
    recollection of notarizing the Wilczaks’ loan documents in 2007, but stated
    that she would not have notarized the documents if the people purporting
    to be the Wilczaks had not presented her with the proper identification. She
    identified the entry in her notary book that showed that the Wilczaks had
    provided identification, signed the notary book, and marked the book with
    their thumbprints.
    A litigation director at SPS also testified that SPS’s payment history
    records for the Wilczaks’ account showed that they paid the exact amounts
    due between September 2007 and June 2008.
    The Wilczaks next offered the rebuttal testimony of their handwriting
    expert, Ms. Cole. Under voir dire examination by the Creditors, Ms. Cole
    testified that she retired in 2003 and had not thereafter obtained continuing
    education credits, published articles, taught classes, or been qualified as an
    expert.
    The court ruled that it would not qualify Ms. Cole as an expert
    7
    witness. It noted that she had been retired for many years and was not
    active in her field. It stated:
    [T]he Debtors/Plaintiffs here have refuted that these are their
    signatures. There are obvious problems with the way the
    signatures look that even I can see, so I think on balance, her
    testimony, one, I don’t think she qualified as an expert from
    what I’ve heard so far. Furthermore, I don’t think that her
    testimony even if I did admit it would be beneficial to me
    which is the most elementary standard.5
    E.    The bankruptcy court’s decision
    The bankruptcy court issued its order after trial, ruling in favor of the
    Creditors. It found that the Wilczaks had received the TILA disclosures and
    that the loan documents were genuine.
    The court found that the signatures were not forged because
    “[s]ubtantial evidence supports a conclusion that Debtors signed the
    documents and performed under them for more than a year.”
    It found that the Wilczaks sought to refinance their existing loan in
    2007. As a result of the refinancing, they received over $351,000 in cash,
    and the existing loan was paid off. It also found that they received regular
    monthly statements and for over a year made payments that corresponded
    with amounts listed in the TILA disclosure statement.
    The bankruptcy court found that the timing of the forgery allegation
    5
    After the court ruled, Ms. Cole corrected her earlier testimony and stated that
    she retired in 2013.
    8
    was suspect because it coincided with the start of the Creditors’ foreclosure
    efforts. It also found that the Wilczaks wrote to Countrywide and Bank of
    America in 2009 to request modification of the loan. They referred to the
    loan as “our loan” and did not mention any forgery or hint that the loan
    documents were irregular.
    The court also found that the Wilczaks’ version of events was
    implausible and rejected Mr. Wilczak’s testimony that they left the closing
    when they realized the loan terms were not what they had wanted. Rather,
    the court found more credible and convincing Ms. North’s testimony that
    the Wilczaks had executed the documents as reflected in her notary book.
    The bankruptcy court acknowledged that there appeared to be
    irregularities with the dates and signatures on the loan documents.
    However, it found that those irregularities did not necessarily indicate a
    forgery. The court found overall that “[t]he allegations are not credible in
    view of the facts” and concluded that the Wilczaks had not met their
    burden of proof regarding the Objection. It thus overruled the Objection
    and entered judgment for the Creditors.
    The Wilczaks timely appealed.6
    6
    The Wilczaks have filed multiple motions and additional documents and
    arguments for the Panel to consider, most of which were not submitted to the
    bankruptcy court and none of which are authorized by our rules. We will not consider
    these filings. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 986 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
    (stating that appellate courts “will not ordinarily consider matters on appeal that are not
    (continued...)
    9
    JURISDICTION
    The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1334
    and 157(b)(2)(B). We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    .
    ISSUES
    (1) Whether the bankruptcy court erred in overruling the Objection.
    (2) Whether the bankruptcy court erred in declining to accept expert
    testimony from Ms. Cole at trial.
    (3) Whether Mr. Elley breached the “attorney-client relationship.”
    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    We review a bankruptcy court’s factual findings under the clearly
    erroneous standard. See Carrillo v. Su (In re Su), 
    290 F.3d 1140
    , 1142 (9th Cir.
    2002) (“We review the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo and
    its factual findings for clear error.”).
    Factual findings are clearly erroneous if they are illogical,
    implausible, or without support in the record. Retz v. Samson (In re Retz),
    
    606 F.3d 1189
    , 1196 (9th Cir. 2010). “To be clearly erroneous, a decision
    must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must . . .
    strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead
    (...continued)
    specifically and distinctly raised and argued in appellant’s opening brief”); United
    Student Funds, Inc. v. Wylie (In re Wylie), 
    349 B.R. 204
    , 213 (9th Cir. BAP 2006) (“Absent
    exceptional circumstances, this court generally will not consider arguments raised for
    the first time on appeal.” (citations omitted)).
    10
    fish.” Papio Keno Club, Inc. v. City of Papillion (In re Papio Keno Club, Inc.), 
    262 F.3d 725
    , 729 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “Review for clear error is
    ‘significantly deferential.’” Roth v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Roth), 
    490 B.R. 908
    , 915 (9th Cir. BAP 2013) (quoting Baker v. Mereshian (In re
    Mereshian), 
    200 B.R. 342
    , 345 (9th Cir. BAP 1996)). If two views of the
    evidence are possible, the court’s choice between them cannot be clearly
    erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 
    470 U.S. 564
    , 574 (1985).
    “[W]e review a bankruptcy court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
    discretion, and then only reverse if any error would have been prejudicial
    to the appellant.” Van Zandt v. Mbunda (In re Mbunda), 
    484 B.R. 344
    , 351 (9th
    Cir. BAP 2012), aff’d, 604 F. App’x 552 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Johnson v.
    Neilson (In re Slatkin), 
    525 F.3d 805
    , 811 (9th Cir. 2008)). “We afford broad
    discretion to a district court’s evidentiary rulings . . . .” Id. at 352 (quoting
    Harper v. City of L.A., 
    533 F.3d 1010
    , 1030 (9th Cir. 2008)).
    To determine whether the bankruptcy court has abused its discretion,
    we conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) we review de novo whether the
    bankruptcy court “identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief
    requested” and (2) if it did, whether the bankruptcy court’s application of
    the legal standard was illogical, implausible, or without support in
    inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record. United States v.
    Hinkson, 
    585 F.3d 1247
    , 1262-63 & n.21 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
    11
    DISCUSSION
    A.    The bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that the
    signatures on the loan documents were not forgeries.
    The Wilczaks insist that they did not sign the loan documents and
    that their signatures are forgeries. They contend that Ms. North gave false
    testimony and that the court should not have believed her. Finally, they
    argue that the court found that the signatures were forgeries yet
    inexplicably concluded that the signatures were genuine and the
    documents enforceable. We have carefully reviewed the transcript and the
    court’s ruling, and we find no reversible error.
    First, the bankruptcy court properly weighed the conflicting evidence
    regarding the authenticity of the Wilczaks’ signatures. When evaluating
    factual findings, “we give singular deference to a trial court’s judgments
    about the credibility of witnesses. That is proper, we have explained,
    because the various cues that ‘bear so heavily on the listener’s
    understanding of and belief in what is said’ are lost on an appellate court
    later sifting through a paper record.” Cooper v. Harris, 
    137 S. Ct. 1455
    , 1474
    (2017) (citations omitted). An attack on credibility determinations rarely
    succeeds, because “when a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to
    credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has
    told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by
    extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually
    12
    never be clear error.” Anderson, 
    470 U.S. at 575
    .
    On the one hand, the bankruptcy court heard testimony from the
    Wilczaks that they did not sign the loan documents and that the signatures
    on the documents were not theirs. On the other hand, it heard testimony
    from Ms. North that she would not have notarized the loan documents
    unless the signatories had properly identified themselves as the Wilczaks.
    The court simply found more plausible and persuasive the evidence
    offered by the Creditors. It found the Wilczaks’ allegations “not credible,”
    taking into account the suspect timing of the forgery claim, the payment on
    the refinanced loan, their correspondence acknowledging the loan, and the
    financial “impossibility” of the loan they claimed to have wanted. The
    court’s decision to believe the Creditors’ evidence was not clear error. 
    Id. at 573-75
    .
    The Wilczaks argue that the court contradicted itself because it once
    stated that the signatures were not genuine but then found that they were
    not forgeries. The Wilczaks misunderstand the court’s first comment. In
    considering whether Ms. Cole’s expert testimony would be helpful, it
    stated, “[t]here are obvious problems with the way the signatures look that
    even I can see[.]” It was merely stating that the Wilczaks’ point about the
    signatures was obvious from the face of the documents and that the court
    did not need further expert testimony. It never made a finding of fact that
    the signatures were not genuine.
    13
    Moreover, the irregularities do not necessarily imply that the
    signatures were forgeries. The court found that an earlier loan application
    could explain the inconsistent date on the application, that the altered dates
    could have been a “clerical error” that someone corrected, and that the
    middle initials added to the signatures do not amount to a forgery. Rather,
    it found that, despite these irregularities, “substantial evidence . . . supports
    a conclusion that Debtors signed the Refinancing Documents.” This finding
    is not illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.
    Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not clearly err when it found that
    the Wilczaks failed to establish that their signatures on the loan documents
    were not genuine.
    B.    Even if the signatures were altered, the Wilczaks are not entitled to
    the relief they seek.
    The Wilczaks think that, if they establish that the signatures are
    forgeries, then the loan documents are void but they get to keep all of the
    loan proceeds. They are mistaken.
    If the bankruptcy court had found that the loan agreement was
    procured by fraud, it could have rescinded the agreement. But this would
    merely restore the parties to their respective positions prior to the
    transaction:
    Rescission reverses the fraudulent transaction and returns the
    parties to the position they occupied prior to the fraud. It
    restores the status quo ante. Under true rescission, the plaintiff
    14
    returns to the defendant the subject of the transaction, plus
    any other benefit received under the contract, and the
    defendant returns to the plaintiff the consideration furnished,
    plus interest.
    Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei-Chuan Inv., 
    189 F.3d 1017
    , 1031 (9th Cir. 1999)
    (citing Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 
    541 F.2d 1335
    , 1342 (9th Cir.
    1976) (Sneed, J., concurring)) (emphases added).
    Similarly, assuming the bankruptcy court found that the Creditors
    had committed a TILA violation, the appropriate remedy would be
    rescission of the loan, which involves the borrower returning the loan
    proceeds: “Under a TILA rescission, the security interest is dissolved, the
    lender returns the borrower’s payments, and the borrower returns the
    loan proceeds, less any ‘finance or other charge.’” Semar v. Platte Valley Fed.
    Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
    791 F.2d 699
    , 702 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing 
    15 U.S.C. § 1635
    (b)) (emphasis added); see Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 
    329 F.3d 1167
    ,
    1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (“rescission should be conditioned on repayment of the
    amounts advanced by the lender”); LaGrone v. Johnson, 
    534 F.2d 1360
    , 1362
    (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that district court erred in failing to condition
    rescission on borrower’s tender of the net amounts advanced by lender).
    Rescission of a contract does not mean that the victims get to keep the
    benefits of the contract while avoiding their obligations. In other words,
    even if we were to declare the loan documents invalid, the Wilczaks would
    not be entitled to retain the $1.3 million. See Kratz v. Countrywide Bank, Case
    15
    No. CV 08-01233 DSF(OPX), 
    2009 WL 3063077
    , at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21,
    2009) (“The concept that a [borrower] is entitled to a free home or financial
    windfall because a creditor failed to check a box on a notice of right to
    rescind form is an irrational result that fails to recognize the full scope and
    policy behind the TILA’s rescission framework.” (quoting Stanley v.
    Household Fin. Corp. (In re Stanley), 
    315 B.R. 602
    , 615 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004)).
    The Wilczaks would be required to either return the $1.3 million (less the
    payments they made) or keep the $1.3 million but continue making
    payments to the Creditors, possibly under a reformed loan agreement.7 In
    either case, they do not walk away with a free house.
    At oral argument before the Panel, Mr. Wilczak shifted his position
    slightly. He argued that his and his wife’s signatures were altered (when
    someone later inserted their middle initials) and that any alteration of the
    signatures rendered the loan documents unenforceable as a matter of law.
    7
    A trial court might also find that the Wilczaks ratified the forged signatures by
    knowingly accepting the benefit of an allegedly fraudulent loan. “Ratification is the
    voluntary election by a person to adopt in some manner as his or her own an act that
    was purportedly done on his or her behalf by another person, the effect of which, as to
    some of all persons, is to treat the act as if originally authorized by him or her.” Estate of
    Stephens, 
    28 Cal. 4th 665
    , 673 (2002) (citing Rakestraw v. Rodrigues, 
    8 Cal. 3d 67
    , 73 (1972)).
    An agent’s act “may be adopted expressly or it may be adopted by implication based on
    conduct of the purported principal from which an intention to consent to or adopt the
    act may be fairly inferred.” Rakestraw, 
    8 Cal. 3d at 73
    . “[I]t is well settled in California,
    ‘that a principal may ratify the forgery of his signature by his agent.’” 
    Id. at 74
     (quoting
    Volandri v. Hlobil, 
    170 Cal. App. 2d 656
    , 659-660 (1959)). But the bankruptcy court did
    not consider or rule on this matter, so neither do we.
    16
    He did not cite any legal authority for this position, and we are not aware
    of any.
    C.    The bankruptcy court did not err in rejecting Ms. Cole’s expert
    testimony.
    The Wilczaks argue that the court should have considered Ms. Cole’s
    expert report and testimony. We disagree.
    Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert witness may
    offer her opinion if “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
    knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
    determine a fact in issue[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). “[T]he trial court has
    discretion to decide how to test an expert’s reliability as well as whether
    the testimony is reliable, based on the particular circumstances of the
    particular case.” City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 
    750 F.3d 1036
    , 1044
    (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
    Thus, this rule imposes a two-pronged test: (1) the proffered witness
    must have “specialized knowledge”; and (2) the proffered testimony must
    be helpful. The bankruptcy court decided that neither prong was met. First,
    the court observed that the witness’s qualifications were stale; in other
    words, that she no longer had sufficient specialized knowledge. Second,
    the court noted that the features of the signatures that the witness pointed
    out were obvious to the court without the assistance of an expert; in other
    words, that her testimony would not have been helpful to the fact finder.
    17
    The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in making these rulings.
    There is an additional procedural requirement for expert testimony.
    Civil Rule 26(a)(2), made applicable in adversary proceedings by Rule 7026,
    requires certain pretrial disclosures about experts. The bankruptcy court
    ruled, before the trial, that the Wilczaks had not timely made the required
    disclosures about Ms. Cole. Thus, the bankruptcy court acted within its
    permitted discretion when it declined to receive her report and allowed the
    Wilczaks to offer her only as a rebuttal witness.
    D.     The “attorney-client relationship” is not relevant to this appeal.
    Finally, the Wilczaks make a number of attacks against their own
    attorney, Mr. Elley. None of these arguments warrants any relief on appeal.
    They generally argue that Mr. Elley violated the “attorney client
    relationship” by declining to present or highlight certain aspects of their
    case or refusing to undertake the discovery they wanted. They imply that
    he made these decisions because he “sustained severe head trauma.”8
    These arguments are meritless. Any problems with their “attorney-
    client relationship” with Mr. Elley have no bearing on the court’s decision
    to overrule the Objection. Our review of the record indicates that Mr. Elley
    represented the Wilczaks capably. Further, there is no right to counsel in
    bankruptcy proceedings, much less a guaranteed right to effective counsel.
    8
    Mr. Elley had stated during the trial that he suffered a fractured skull. There
    was no indication that his physical condition affected his mental processes.
    18
    Chunchai Yu v. Nautilus, Inc. (In re Chunchai Yu), BAP No. CC-16-1045-
    KuFD, 
    2016 WL 4261655
    , at *7 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2016), aff’d, 694 F. App’x
    542 (9th Cir. 2017).
    The Wilczaks further claim that the court refused to listen to evidence
    of their “problematic” attorney-client relationship and advised them not to
    terminate Mr. Elley. They allege that the court violated their right to due
    process and equal protection.
    The bankruptcy court did not deprive the Wilczaks of due process.
    Rather, it cautioned Mr. Wilczak not to inadvertently disclose privileged
    communication or strategy such that he waived the attorney-client
    privilege. Nor did it compel him to retain Mr. Elley; the court explained the
    Wilczaks’ options, and Mr. Wilczak opted for “No termination.”
    Finally, we will not consider any new evidence that the Wilczaks
    failed to present at trial. In re Wylie, 
    349 B.R. at 213
    .
    CONCLUSION
    The bankruptcy court did not err. We AFFIRM.
    19