McDonald (Paul) v. State ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                  rendered its decision on the other counts. McDonald was acquitted of
    counts 1-3 and was convicted of count 4.
    First, McDonald contends that insufficient evidence supports
    his conviction. We disagree because, when viewed in the light most
    favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond
    a reasonable doubt as determined by a rational trier of fact.    See Jackson
    v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); Mitchell v. State, 
    124 Nev. 807
    , 816,
    
    192 P.3d 721
    , 727 (2008); see also Deueroux v. State, 
    96 Nev. 388
    , 391, 
    610 P.2d 722
    , 724 (1980) ("[C]ircumstantial evidence alone may sustain a
    conviction."). Accordingly, we conclude that this claim lacks merit.
    Second, McDonald contends that the district court abused its
    discretion by denying his motion to dismiss count 4 because the charging
    document did not provide adequate notice of the date he was alleged to
    have committed the crime. We review a district court's decision regarding
    a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. See Hill v. State, 
    124 Nev. 546
    , 550, 
    188 P.3d 51
    , 54 (2008). "The indictment or the information must
    be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts
    constituting the offense charged." NRS 173.075(1). "Unless time is an
    essential element of the offense charged, there is no absolute requirement
    that the state allege the exact date, and the state may instead give the
    approximate date on which it believes the crime occurred."      Cunningham
    v. State, 
    100 Nev. 396
    , 400, 
    683 P.2d 500
    , 502 (1984). Here, the charging
    document alleged that McDonald possessed a firearm between June 3 (the
    date Gomez was shot) and August 1 (the date he was apprehended).
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    2
    (0) 1947A cern
    McDonald concedes that he understood these dates "as potential dates for
    asserting that [he] violated NRS 202.360." We conclude that the charging
    document provided sufficient notice to enable McDonald to defend against
    the charges and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
    denying his motion to dismiss.       See Simpson v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
    Court, 
    88 Nev. 654
    , 660, 
    503 P.2d 1225
    , 1229-30 (1972).
    Third, McDonald contends that the State violated Brady v.
    Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963), by failing to obtain the results of a DNA
    test conducted on the firearm discovered in the vehicle. Relatedly,
    McDonald contends that the district court erred by forcing him to choose
    between the DNA test results and his right to a speedy trial. We conclude
    that no relief is warranted because McDonald fails to (a) demonstrate that
    the State withheld favorable evidence in its possession, see Mazzan v.
    Warden, 
    116 Nev. 48
    , 67, 
    993 P.2d 25
    , 37 (2000), (b) explain how he was
    inappropriately forced to choose between his rights, or (c) establish that he
    was prejudiced by the district court's actions.
    Fourth, McDonald contends that the prosecutor committed
    misconduct by arguing that the jury could consider the evidence presented
    during the first phase of trial when determining whether he was guilty of
    count 4. When considering allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we
    first determine whether the prosecutor's conduct was improper and then
    consider whether the improper conduct warrants reversal.            Valdez v.
    State, 
    124 Nev. 1172
    , 1188, 
    196 P.3d 465
    , 476 (2008). We conclude that
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA                                              3
    (0) 1947A    eo
    this claim lacks merit. The State followed the procedure approved of in
    Morales and its argument did not constitute misconduct.
    Fifth, McDonald contends that the prosecutor committed
    misconduct by arguing that he was guilty of possessing a firearm even if
    he took it from Gomez in self-defense. Because McDonald did not object,
    we review for plain error. Id. at 1190, 
    196 P.3d at 477
    . Even assuming
    that self-defense is a defense to felon in possession of a firearm, McDonald
    fails to demonstrate plain error because the prosecutor simply argued that
    he was guilty of possessing a firearm on August 1 even if he acted in self-
    defense on June 3.
    Sixth, McDonald contends that the district court erred by
    admitting his statements that he would speak with detectives so long as
    the conversation was not recorded because they were more prejudicial
    than probative and unfairly commented on his right to remain silent. We
    review a district court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of
    discretion. Mclellan v. State, 
    124 Nev. 263
    , 267, 
    182 P.3d 106
    , 109 (2008).
    We disagree with McDonald's assertion that admission of these
    statements, and the prosecutor's argument regarding these statements,
    was a comment on his right to remain silent.     See Deutscher v. State, 
    95 Nev. 669
    , 682, 
    601 P.2d 407
    , 416 (1979) ("The established test is whether
    the language was manifestly intended or was of such character that the
    jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the
    failure of the accused to respond." (internal alteration and quotation
    marks omitted)). We also disagree that these statements implied that "not
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    KO) 1947,1/4
    only is [McDonald] a felon but that he has been to prison previously."
    Even assuming that these statements had no probative value, we conclude
    that any error in admitting the statements was harmless because
    McDonald was acquitted of counts 1-3 and substantial evidence was
    presented to support count 4.
    Seventh, McDonald contends that cumulative error entitles
    him to relief. Having considered the appropriate factors, see Valdez, 124
    Nev. at 1195, 
    196 P.3d at 481
    , we conclude that no relief is warranted.
    Accordingly, we
    ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.'
    CA.
    Pickering
    'McDonald's appendix fails to comply with NRAP 30(b) because it
    contains numerous documents which are "not essential to the decision of
    issues presented by the appeal." See NRAP 3C(e)(2)(c) (requiring appendix
    to comply with the provisions of NRAP 30). For example, the appendix
    contains over 500 pages of documents which merely explain the
    qualifications of the State's potential experts. We remind counsel for
    McDonald that brevity in the appendix is required and "the court may
    impose costs upon parties or attorneys who unnecessarily enlarge the
    appendix." NRAP 30(b).
    SUPREME CouFrr
    OF
    NEVADA                                             5
    (0) 1947A    es).
    cc:   Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge
    Law Offices of Martin Hart, LLC
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Clark County District Attorney
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA                                          6
    (0> vs41A