Com. v. Pridgen, J. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S42029-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JAMES MARIO PRIDGEN
    Appellant                 No. 1653 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order September 9, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0003471-1992
    BEFORE: OLSON, J., MOULTON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:                        FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2017
    James Mario Pridgen appeals, pro se, from the September 9, 2016 order
    entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas dismissing as
    untimely his serial petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),
    42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.
    In a previous memorandum, we set forth the history of this case:
    On July 22, 1993, a jury found [Pridgen] guilty of first
    degree murder[1] in connection with a shooting death in
    Lancaster in the early morning hours of November 8, 1992.
    At that time, [Pridgen] became embroiled in an argument
    over drug sales with one of his accomplices. [Pridgen] drew
    a handgun and attempted to shoot the other party, but that
    person evaded the shot, which then struck another of
    [Pridgen]’s compatriots in the head. The young man died
    the following day. Judgment of sentence was imposed
    immediately following the verdict with [Pridgen] receiving a
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).
    J-S42029-17
    term of life imprisonment. This court affirmed the judgment
    of sentence on June 14, 1995, and our [S]upreme [C]ourt
    denied appeal on November 29, 1995.
    On May 23, 1996, [Pridgen] filed his first collateral
    petition pursuant to the PCRA. Counsel was appointed and
    filed an amended petition. On April 10, 1997, a hearing was
    held, and on July 2, 1997, the court denied relief. This court
    affirmed the decision on appeal.       Commonwealth v.
    Pridgen, 
    723 A.2d 235
    (Pa.Super. 1998) (unpublished
    memorandum) appeal denied, 
    557 Pa. 653
    , 
    734 A.2d 866
               (1999).
    Commonwealth v. Pridgen, No. 1962 MDA 2009, unpublished mem. at 1-2
    (Pa.Super. filed Aug. 16, 2010).
    In the following years, Pridgen filed multiple unsuccessful PCRA petitions
    and requests for habeas corpus relief. On July 28, 2016, Pridgen filed the
    instant PCRA petition. On August 11, 2016, the PCRA court notified Pridgen
    of its intent to dismiss without a hearing, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 907. Pridgen responded to the Rule 907 notice on August
    29, 2016.      On September 9, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed Pridgen’s
    petition. On September 29, 2016, Pridgen filed a timely notice of appeal.
    Pridgen raises the following issues on appeal:
    1. Whether the habeas corpus was the proper avenue to
    correct a matter of subject matter jurisdiction which can not
    [be] waived nor forfeited by the courts, because of the due
    process and equal protection clauses, and [E]ighth
    [A]mendment[.2]
    ____________________________________________
    2While Pridgen maintains habeas corpus relief is the proper avenue for
    his claims, the PCRA court properly treated his claims, which request relief
    from an illegal sentence and challenge the criminal information, as a request
    -2-
    J-S42029-17
    2. Whether the trial court committed fraud upon itself by
    securing a conviction on essential elements of an offense
    not made subject in the criminal information[.]
    3. Whether [Pridgen] was provided a[n] actual “judgment of
    sentence order” by the trial court citing the “statutory
    authority” to impose a “mandatory sentence”[.]
    4. Whether [Pridgen] can factually raise a[n] allegation of
    an illegal sentence when there is no “statutory
    authorization” being cited within the sentencing order of
    what sentencing statute was utilized to justify the
    pronounced sentence[.]
    Pridgen’s Br. at iv (some capitalization omitted).
    Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition “is limited to
    examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the
    evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v.
    Ousley, 
    21 A.3d 1238
    , 1242 (Pa.Super. 2011).
    It is well settled that “the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional
    requisite.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    111 A.3d 171
    , 175 (Pa.Super. 2015),
    ____________________________________________
    for PCRA relief. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (“The action established in this
    subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and
    encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same
    purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus
    and coram nobis.”); see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 
    771 A.2d 1232
    , 1235
    (Pa. 2001) (“The plain language of the statute above demonstrates quite
    clearly that the General Assembly intended that claims that could be brought
    under the PCRA must be brought under that Act. No other statutory or
    common law remedy ‘for the same purpose’ is intended to be available;
    instead, such remedies are explicitly ‘encompassed’ within the PCRA.”)
    (emphasis omitted). Further, we addressed this claim thoroughly in our
    August 16, 2010 memorandum, see Pridgen, No. 1962 MDA 2009,
    unpublished mem. at 4-6, and more recently in Commonwealth v. Pridgen,
    No. 2121 MDA 2015, unpublished mem. at 4-5 (Pa.Super. filed Aug. 20,
    2016).
    -3-
    J-S42029-17
    app. denied, 
    125 A.3d 1197
    (Pa. 2015). A PCRA petition “including a second
    or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment
    becomes final.”    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).       A judgment is final “at the
    conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
    Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
    expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
    The trial court sentenced Pridgen on July 22, 1993. On June 14, 1995,
    we affirmed Pridgen’s judgment of sentence.        The Pennsylvania Supreme
    Court denied Pridgen’s petition for allowance of appeal on November 29, 1995.
    He did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme
    Court. Therefore, Pridgen’s current petition, filed on July 28, 2016, is facially
    untimely.
    To overcome the time bar, Pridgen was required to plead and prove one
    of the following exceptions: (i) unconstitutional interference by government
    officials; (ii) newly discovered facts that could not have been previously
    ascertained with due diligence; or (iii) a newly recognized constitutional right
    that has been held to apply retroactively. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-
    (iii). To invoke one of these exceptions, Pridgen must have filed his petition
    within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.          See 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
    -4-
    J-S42029-17
    Pridgen’s PCRA petition failed to plead or prove any exception to the
    one-year time bar. Therefore, because Pridgen’s petition was untimely, the
    PCRA court properly dismissed the petition.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/15/2017
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1653 MDA 2016

Filed Date: 11/15/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/15/2017