Grant Medical Center v. Eric D. Hargan ( 2017 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued September 28, 2017         Decided November 17, 2017
    No. 16-5314
    GRANT MEDICAL CENTER, ET AL.,
    APPELLANTS
    v.
    ERIC D. HARGAN, ACTING SECRETARY, UNITED STATES
    DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
    APPELLEE
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:15-cv-00480)
    Daniel C. Gibson argued the cause for appellants. With
    him on the briefs was James F. Flynn.
    Weili J. Shaw, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was
    Michael S. Raab, Attorney.
    Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, TATEL, Circuit Judge, and
    GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
    2
    TATEL, Circuit Judge: One of our sister circuits, the Sixth,
    ruled that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’
    (CMS) method for counting hospital beds conflicted with the
    plain language of the applicable regulation. CMS amended the
    regulation to permit its preferred counting method but—central
    to this case—applied the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation to
    hospitals located within that circuit until the revised regulation
    took effect. Appellants, hospitals in the Sixth Circuit, challenge
    CMS’ decision to acquiesce to the Sixth Circuit’s ruling. Given
    that obeying judicial decisions is usually what courts expect
    agencies to do, the hospitals face an uphill battle. The district
    court found that the agency acted reasonably, and we agree.
    I.
    Medicare reimburses hospitals for providing inpatient care
    through the Inpatient Prospective Payment System. 42 U.S.C.
    § 1395ww(a), (d). Under that system, Medicare pays hospitals
    a fixed amount for each patient regardless of the actual costs
    incurred. 42 C.F.R. § 412.2(a). In order to account for certain
    differences among hospitals, the reimbursement formula
    includes several supplemental adjustments. See 42 U.S.C.
    § 1395ww(d). Two such adjustments are at issue here: the
    Indirect Medical Education (IME) adjustment, which
    supplements payments to hospitals that train medical residents,
    
    id. § 1395ww(d)(5)(B),
    and the Disproportionate Share
    Hospital (DSH) adjustment, which supplements payments to
    hospitals that serve a disproportionate share of low-income
    patients, 
    id. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F).
    Both adjustments turn, in part,
    on the number of inpatient beds at the hospital. Also, due to the
    particularities of the formulas, hospitals claiming the IME
    adjustment generally benefit when the bed count is lower, see
    42 C.F.R. § 412.105, while hospitals claiming the DSH
    adjustment benefit when the bed count is higher, see 
    id. § 412.106.
                                   3
    Under this “complex and highly technical regulatory
    program,” Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 
    512 U.S. 504
    , 512 (1994) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,
    
    501 U.S. 680
    , 697 (1991)), counting beds is no simple matter.
    A hospital’s bed count is calculated according to an intricate
    formula set forth at 42 C.F.R. § 412.105(b). Prior to October 1,
    2003, that regulation provided:
    [T]he number of beds available in a hospital is
    determined by counting the number of available bed
    days during the cost reporting period, not including
    beds or bassinets in the healthy newborn nursery,
    custodial care beds, or beds in excluded distinct part
    hospital units, and dividing that number by the
    number of days in the cost reporting period.
    42 C.F.R. § 412.105(b) (2002).
    At issue in this case are two types of beds occasionally
    used for inpatient care but unmentioned in section 412.105(b)’s
    express exclusions: “swing beds” and “observation beds.”
    Swing beds, found primarily in small rural hospitals, change in
    reimbursement status depending on whether the facility is
    using the bed for acute care or skilled nursing care. See
    Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient
    Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2004 Rates, 68
    Fed. Reg. 45,346, 45,418–19 (2003). Observation beds are
    short-term beds used for outpatient care when a patient has not
    been formally admitted to the hospital. See 
    id. Even though
    section 412.105(b) did not expressly exclude swing or
    observation beds, the “longstanding policy” of CMS, which
    administers Medicare on behalf of the United States
    Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), was to
    4
    exclude these beds when calculating bed counts. See id.; Joint
    Stipulations ¶ 2.
    In 2001, two Kentucky hospitals that fell short of the bed
    count needed to qualify for the DSH adjustment challenged
    CMS’ interpretation of section 412.105(b). See Clark Regional
    Medical Center v. HHS, 
    314 F.3d 241
    , 242 (6th Cir. 2002). The
    hospitals argued that excluding swing and observation beds
    conflicted with section 412.105(b)’s plain text. In Clark
    Regional Medical Center v. HHS, the Sixth Circuit agreed,
    explaining that “[b]ecause the regulation specifically lists
    certain types of beds that are excluded from the bed count, but
    does not list swing or observation beds, the plain meaning of
    the regulation suggests that it is permissible to count swing and
    observation beds.” 
    Id. at 247.
    In response to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Clark, CMS
    amended section 412.105(b) through notice-and-comment
    rulemaking to expressly exclude swing and observation beds.
    See Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital
    Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2004
    Rates, 68 Fed. Reg. 27,154, 27,205–06, 27,229 (May 19, 2003)
    (notice of proposed rulemaking); 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,470 (final
    rule). CMS explained that, despite its longstanding policy of
    excluding swing and observation beds, “courts have applied
    our current rules in a manner that is inconsistent with our
    current policy and that would result in inconsistent treatment.”
    68 Fed. Reg. at 45,416 (discussing Clark). The effective date
    of the revised regulation was October 1, 2003. 
    Id. at 45,346.
    CMS has taken two additional actions relevant to the issue
    before us. First, to address reimbursement claims for patients
    discharged prior to the effective date of the revised regulation,
    the agency issued Joint Signature Memorandum 109 (JSM-
    5
    109). For hospitals located within the Sixth Circuit, CMS stated
    that it would comply with Clark and include swing and
    observation beds in the total bed count. But for hospitals
    located outside the Sixth Circuit, CMS maintained its policy of
    excluding swing and observation beds from the total bed count.
    Second, in St. Vincent Mercy Medical Center v. Blue Cross
    Blue Shield Association, CMS Adm’r Dec., 
    2008 WL 6468508
    (Nov. 17, 2008), CMS affirmed its commitment to follow
    Clark and JSM-109 for pre-October 2003 reimbursement
    claims at hospitals within the Sixth Circuit. In that case, an
    Ohio hospital challenged CMS’ decision to comply with Clark
    and include observation beds when calculating total beds for
    purposes of the DSH adjustment. The Administrator rejected
    the claim, reasoning that “[g]enerally, when a court determines
    that an agency’s interpretation is inconsistent with the language
    of the regulation, an agency may recognize that court’s
    interpretation and apply the court’s interpretation uniformly,
    thereafter, within the jurisdictional bounds of the interpreting
    court.” 
    Id. at *9.
    This approach, the Administrator explained,
    ensured that “all similarly situated providers are treated the
    same for the applicable cost reporting periods” and facilitated
    “the orderly administration of a complex and time sensitive
    program.” 
    Id. at *10.
    In the years following St. Vincent, CMS
    has continued to apply Clark to reimbursement claims for pre-
    October 2003 discharges filed by hospitals within the Sixth
    Circuit. See, e.g., Clinton Memorial Hospital v. Blue Cross
    Blue Shield Association, CMS Adm’r Dec., 
    2010 WL 5570983
    ,
    at *9 (July 26, 2010).
    Appellants in this case are ten Ohio hospitals (“Hospitals”)
    operating within the Sixth Circuit. For reasons we need not
    probe, the Hospitals would like swing and observation beds
    excluded from their total bed count when calculating
    6
    reimbursements for discharges prior to October 1, 2003. The
    Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB)—the body
    responsible for initially hearing Medicare reimbursement
    disputes—rejected the Hospitals’ claim. See OhioHealth 2004
    Clark Bed Days Group v. BlueCross BlueShield Association,
    PRRB Dec. No. 2015-D1, 
    2015 WL 10739301
    , at *9 (Jan. 29,
    2015). The PRRB explained that the “inclusion of observation
    bed days and swing bed days” for discharges prior to October
    2003 “was correct . . . as all the providers are located within the
    Sixth Circuit and the Clark decision is controlling legal
    precedent.” 
    Id. The PRRB
    also noted that it “concurs with the
    Administrator in St. Vincent that the ‘separation of powers
    doctrine requires administrative agencies to follow the law of
    the circuit whose courts have jurisdiction over the cause of
    action.[’]” 
    Id. at *8
    (quoting St. Vincent, 
    2008 WL 6468508
    , at
    *9).
    The Administrator declined to review the PRRB’s
    decision, and it became final. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1).
    Exercising their prerogative under a venue-choice provision,
    the Hospitals challenged the decision in the United States
    District Court for the District of Columbia. 
    Id. (providing that
    an appeal “shall be brought in the district court of the United
    States for the judicial district in which the provider is located
    . . . or in the District Court for the District of Columbia”). The
    district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
    Secretary, see Grant Medical Center v. Burwell, 
    204 F. Supp. 3d
    68, 71 (D.D.C. 2016), and this appeal followed.
    “Because we apply the same standard of review as the
    district court, we proceed de novo, as if [the plaintiff] had
    brought the case here on direct appeal.” Tenet HealthSystems
    HealthCorp. v. Thompson, 
    254 F.3d 238
    , 244 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
    Thus, we review CMS’ decision under the Administrative
    7
    Procedure Act to determine whether it is “arbitrary, capricious,
    an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
    law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
    II.
    The Hospitals believe that we can disregard the
    acquiescence issue because CMS erred when it calculated bed
    counts under the pre-2003 version of section 412.105(b) rather
    than the revised version promulgated after Clark. Because the
    parties agree that the revised regulation would require
    excluding swing and observation beds—the Hospitals’
    preferred outcome—the Hospitals see this as the simplest path
    to relief. Unfortunately for the Hospitals, this simple solution
    runs into a simple problem: their case concerns reimbursement
    claims for discharges made prior to October 1, 2003, while the
    revised regulation applies only to “discharges occurring on or
    after October 1, 2003.” 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,346 (emphasis
    added).
    Undaunted, the Hospitals advance two arguments to
    circumvent this clear effective-date provision. Neither is
    convincing.
    First, invoking the general rule that a “court is to apply the
    law in effect at the time it renders its decision,” Bradley v.
    School Board of City of Richmond, 
    416 U.S. 696
    , 711 (1974),
    the Hospitals argue that the PRRB should have applied the
    revised regulation because it was the law “in effect” when the
    Board rendered its 2015 decision. See Appellants’ Br. 29. But
    under a contrary presumption, “congressional enactments and
    administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive
    effect unless their language requires this result.” Bowen v.
    Georgetown University Hospital, 
    488 U.S. 204
    , 208 (1988).
    Although our court has grappled with this “apparent
    8
    inconsistency in presumptions,” Gersman v. Group Health
    Association, Inc., 
    975 F.2d 886
    , 889 (D.C. Cir. 1992), this
    ambiguity exists “only in the absence of statutory terms clearly
    directing the choice between retroactive and prospective
    application,” 
    id. at 888.
    Given that we apply a statute
    prospectively when “congressional intent is clear,” Kaiser
    Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 
    494 U.S. 827
    , 837
    (1990), we see no reason why the principle should be any
    different when the agency’s intent is clear in a regulation.
    Next, the Hospitals contend that the PRRB should have
    applied the revised regulation retroactively because it
    “clarified” rather than “changed” the law and because the
    clarification inures to their benefit. This misses the mark in two
    respects. First, even if the revised regulation merely reiterates
    the law outside the Sixth Circuit, it still marks a “change” from
    the interpretation of section 412.105(b) that CMS had
    acquiesced to after Clark within that circuit until the revised
    regulation took effect. Second, the Hospitals have this circuit’s
    retroactivity law backwards: while we have prohibited
    retroactive application of a rule that disadvantages a party by
    “effect[ing] a substantive change from the agency’s prior
    regulation,” National Mining Association v. Department of
    Labor, 
    292 F.3d 849
    , 860 (D.C. Cir. 2002), we never require
    agencies to apply rules retroactively even where it would be
    permissible for them to do so. See Mountain Solutions, Ltd. v.
    F.C.C., 
    197 F.3d 512
    , 520 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Because
    rulemakings are generally prospective, there would appear to
    be no basis for the court to fault the Commission for failing to
    give [appellants] the benefit of its new rule.” (citations
    omitted)). Had CMS decided to apply the revised regulation
    retroactively, it might have sought to justify that decision by
    presenting arguments similar to those advanced here by the
    Hospitals. But CMS chose to apply the revised regulation only
    9
    prospectively, and the Hospitals have given no reason to
    overturn that determination.
    Focusing on the original bed-counting regulation, the
    Hospitals argue that even if the old rule applies, the Sixth
    Circuit’s Clark decision can have no bearing on our analysis of
    whether CMS’ interpretation of the regulation was arbitrary or
    capricious. Instead, they argue, having brought their case in this
    circuit, they are entitled to a ruling based on this court’s
    independent review of the issue.
    This mischaracterizes the question before us. To
    understand our task, we need look no further than the statute
    that gives us jurisdiction, 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1), which
    states that “[p]roviders shall have the right to obtain judicial
    review of any final decision of the Board.” In this case, then,
    we must determine whether the PRRB’s final decision to
    follow Clark when calculating reimbursement claims for
    discharges prior to the revised regulation’s effective date was
    “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, unsupported by
    substantial evidence, or otherwise not in accordance with the
    law.” Sentara-Hampton General Hospital v. Sullivan, 
    980 F.2d 749
    , 755 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and
    (E)). In doing so, of course, we evaluate the reasons CMS gave
    for complying with Clark. But ignoring Clark altogether would
    require us to disregard the context and basis of the very
    decision we are reviewing. See Independent Petroleum
    Association of America v. Babbitt, 
    92 F.3d 1248
    , 1258 (D.C.
    Cir. 1996) (holding that Department of the Interior’s
    interpretation of a rule was unreasonable because it
    “constitute[d] an unexplained departure” from the agency’s
    prior adoption of a Fifth Circuit decision).
    10
    We turn, then, to the issue at the heart of this case: whether
    CMS acted arbitrarily or capriciously when it decided to follow
    Clark by excluding swing and observation beds when
    calculating bed counts at the Hospitals’ facilities.
    The Hospitals argue that the PRRB’s decision to acquiesce
    in this case was arbitrary and capricious because it relied on the
    faulty premise that the agency was required to follow Clark.
    According to the Hospitals, the only rationale the PRRB gave
    for following Clark was that “‘the separation of powers
    doctrine requires administrative agencies to follow the law of
    the circuit whose courts have jurisdiction over the cause of
    action.[’]” OhioHealth, 
    2015 WL 10739301
    , at *8 (quoting St.
    Vincent, 
    2008 WL 6468508
    , at *9).
    Were this characterization of the PRRB’s decision correct,
    we would have to reverse because, in this circuit, an agency
    need not always acquiesce to an adverse ruling. See Johnson v.
    U.S. Railroad Retirement Board, 
    969 F.2d 1082
    , 1093 (D.C.
    Cir 1992) (“Although the decision of one circuit deserves
    respect . . . ‘it need not be taken by the [agency] as the law of
    the land.’” (quoting Givens v. United States Railroad
    Retirement Board, 
    720 F.2d 196
    , 200 (D.C. Cir. 1983))).
    Nonacquiescence may be particularly justified where, as here,
    it occurs in the context of a “broad venue statute [that] often
    forces the agency to act without knowing which circuit court
    ultimately will review its actions.” 
    Id. at 1091.
    The Hospitals, however, take too narrow a view of the
    PRRB decision. Where “an agency merely implements prior
    policy,” as CMS did here by following St. Vincent, “an
    explanation that allows this court to discern ‘the agency’s path’
    will suffice.” WLOS TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 
    932 F.2d 993
    , 995
    (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Hall v. McLaughlin, 
    864 F.2d 868
    ,
    11
    872–73 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). And here, the PRRB’s repeated
    references to St. Vincent make the agency’s path abundantly
    clear. See OhioHealth, 
    2015 WL 10739301
    , at *8 (noting the
    argument that “Providers here are situated similarly to . . . St.
    Vincent Mercy Medical Center and that the Board should rule
    consistently with . . . the Administrator’s decisions in St.
    Vincent”). Our task, then, is to determine whether CMS’
    incorporation of St. Vincent demonstrates that the agency
    properly understood it had no obligation to acquiesce to Clark.
    Reading the PRRB’s decision alongside the CMS
    Administrator’s ruling in St. Vincent, we think it evident that
    CMS’ view is not simply that it was required to acquiesce. See
    Tourus Records, Inc. v. DEA, 
    259 F.3d 731
    , 738 (D.C. Cir.
    2001) (holding that, although a court may not accept appellate
    counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency actions, it may
    consider contemporaneous documents outlining the agency’s
    reasoning). To be sure, the Administrator did state that “the
    separation of powers doctrine requires administrative agencies
    to follow the law of the circuit whose courts have jurisdiction
    over the cause of action,” but the context reveals that the
    Administrator was merely describing the general disapproval
    of intracircuit nonacquiescence. See St. Vincent, 
    2008 WL 6468508
    , at *9 n.21 (describing Johnson’s discussion of “true
    intra-circuit refusal of an agency to recognize adverse
    controlling case law” (citing 
    Johnson, 969 F.2d at 1092
    )).
    Immediately after making this observation, the Administrator
    recognized that the principle of complying with adverse
    judicial rulings “is more problematic when an agency is faced
    with venue uncertainty.” 
    Id. at *9.
    Nonetheless, the
    Administrator explained, CMS “decided to apply the JSM to
    ensure the orderly administration of a complex and time
    sensitive program and despite the venue uncertainty.” 
    Id. at *10
    (emphasis added). Considering both the PRRB’s decision here
    and the Administrator’s decision in St. Vincent that it relies
    12
    upon, we think it clear that CMS recognized its discretion not
    to follow Clark but made a reasoned decision to do so.
    The Hospitals also argue that the PRRB acted arbitrarily
    and capriciously because it failed to give a rational explanation
    for treating hospitals in the Sixth Circuit differently from
    providers located elsewhere. Even if Clark constrained CMS’
    options for counting beds in the Sixth Circuit, the Hospitals
    believe that the better approach would have “treat[ed]
    [providers] similarly based on their common interests vis a vis
    the bed counting regulation (DSH versus IME).” Appellants’
    Br. 64. The Hospitals style this argument as both an arbitrary-
    and-capricious challenge and an equal-protection challenge.
    Appellants’ Br. 15, 17. As they acknowledged at oral
    argument, however, these two versions are “fundamentally
    indistinguishable.” Oral Arg. Rec. 14:17–:27. Accordingly, we
    consider these arguments together, reversing only if “‘the
    agency offers insufficient reasons for treating similar situations
    differently.’” Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 
    708 F.3d 209
    , 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting County of Los Angeles v.
    Shalala, 
    192 F.3d 1005
    , 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); cf. Ursack,
    Inc. v. Sierra Interagency Black Bear Group, 
    639 F.3d 949
    ,
    955 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that where “no suspect class is
    involved” the “equal protection argument can be folded into the
    APA argument”).
    The mere fact that the Hospitals suggest an alternate
    approach hardly means that CMS acted arbitrarily or
    capriciously in choosing the approach it did. To the contrary,
    the existence of different law in different circuits provides a
    perfectly adequate reason for distinguishing between providers
    based on location. As this circuit’s nonacquiescence case law
    establishes, once a court rejects an agency’s interpretation of a
    regulation, the agency is not free to simply ignore the ruling
    13
    within that court’s jurisdiction. Heartland Plymouth Court MI,
    LLC v. NLRB, 
    838 F.3d 16
    , 22 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (noting that
    intracircuit nonacquiescence may constitute bad faith if not
    “clearly asserted and accompanied by a preservation of
    arguments for Supreme Court or en banc review”). Rather, the
    agency must choose between compliance or nonacquiescence
    and, if opting for the latter, it must “specify[] its arguments
    against adverse precedent” and seek further judicial review. 
    Id. Given that
    seeking en banc review or certiorari after Clark was
    unrealistic—after all, CMS could correct the problem simply
    by revising the regulation—it is hardly surprising that the
    agency chose the former: acquiescing to the Sixth Circuit and
    promptly revising the regulation. In explaining its decision, the
    agency stated that complying with Clark would ensure that “all
    similarly situated providers are treated the same for the
    applicable cost reporting periods” and maintain “the orderly
    administration of a complex and time sensitive program . . .
    despite the venue uncertainty in PRRB cases.” St. Vincent,
    
    2008 WL 6468508
    , at *10. Perhaps there were more elegant
    solutions to CMS’ predicament, but our task is not to test
    whether the agency chose “the best solution, only a reasonable
    one.” Petal Gas Storage, L.L.C. v. FERC, 
    496 F.3d 695
    , 703
    (D.C. Cir. 2007).
    As a final matter, although the Hospitals never squarely
    challenge the Sixth Circuit’s reading of section 412.105(b), we
    emphasize that CMS’ acquiescence would have been
    unacceptable had it rested on an unreasonable interpretation of
    the regulation. See Holland v. National Mining Association,
    
    309 F.3d 808
    , 812, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting agency’s
    contention that acquiescing nationwide to an interpretation
    compelled by court order “cannot violate that ‘not in
    accordance with law standard of the APA’”). We would be
    unable to sustain an administrative action that conflicted with
    the applicable statutory or regulatory text just because a sister
    14
    circuit has approved the interpretation or because the agency
    acts out of “administrative concerns, such as the desirability of
    uniformity.” 
    Id. at 818;
    see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
    Railway v. Peña, 
    44 F.3d 437
    , 446 (7th Cir. 1994) (cautioning
    against agency action seeking to ensure that the “applicable
    rule of law be settled [rather] than that it be settled right”
    (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 
    285 U.S. 393
    , 406
    (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))), aff’d sub nom. Brotherhood
    of Locomotive Engineers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
    Railway, 
    516 U.S. 152
    (1996). That, however, is not the case
    here. As CMS explained when it first articulated its
    acquiescence decision in JSM-109, “[t]he regulations’ text was
    silent” on the issue of counting swing and observation beds at
    the time of the Clark decision. Given this ambiguity, CMS
    believed that the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation was permissible,
    even if not required, and we do as well.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment to CMS.
    So ordered.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-5314

Filed Date: 11/17/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/17/2017

Authorities (23)

Clark Regional Medical Center Pattie A. Clay Hospital v. ... , 314 F.3d 241 ( 2002 )

the-atchison-topeka-and-santa-fe-railway-company-burlington-northern , 44 F.3d 437 ( 1994 )

Tourus Records Inc v. DEA , 259 F.3d 731 ( 2001 )

Sentara-Hampton General Hospital v. Louis v. Sullivan, M.D.,... , 980 F.2d 749 ( 1992 )

Eric G. Hall and Hall Enterprises, Inc. v. Ann D. ... , 864 F.2d 868 ( 1989 )

Ursack, Inc. v. Sierra Interagency Black Bear Group , 639 F.3d 949 ( 2011 )

Mtn Solu LTD Inc v. FCC , 197 F.3d 512 ( 1999 )

Petal Gas Storage, L.L.C. v. Federal Energy Regulatory ... , 496 F.3d 695 ( 2007 )

Wlos Tv, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, Mary R. ... , 932 F.2d 993 ( 1991 )

Tenet HealthSystems HealthCorp. v. Thompson , 254 F.3d 238 ( 2001 )

Nancy Johnson v. United States Railroad Retirement Board , 969 F.2d 1082 ( 1992 )

Alan F. Gersman v. Group Health Association, Inc. , 975 F.2d 886 ( 1992 )

Holland, Michael H. v. Barnhart, Jo Anne B. , 309 F.3d 808 ( 2002 )

jack-c-givens-on-behalf-of-himself-and-all-others-similarly-situated-v , 720 F.2d 196 ( 1983 )

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. , 52 S. Ct. 443 ( 1932 )

Independent Petroleum Association of America v. Bruce ... , 92 F.3d 1248 ( 1996 )

county-of-los-angeles-a-political-subdivision-of-the-state-of-california , 192 F.3d 1005 ( 1999 )

Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond , 94 S. Ct. 2006 ( 1974 )

Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital , 109 S. Ct. 468 ( 1988 )

Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno , 110 S. Ct. 1570 ( 1990 )

View All Authorities »