Graceland Care Center of New Albany, LLC v. Teresa Hamlet ( 2017 )


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  •                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2015-IA-01829-SCT
    GRACELAND CARE CENTER OF NEW ALBANY,
    LLC, ADVANCED HEALTHCARE
    MANAGEMENT, INC., KAREN CLAYTON, IN
    HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
    ADMINISTRATOR OF GRACELAND CARE
    CENTER OF NEW ALBANY, W. LARRY
    OVERSTREET AND SHARON WINDHAM
    v.
    TERESA HAMLET, ON BEHALF OF JIMMY
    KINARD, DECEASED
    ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                        11/17/2015
    TRIAL JUDGE:                             HON. JOHN KELLY LUTHER
    TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS:                   T. K. MOFFETT
    ANDY LOWRY
    THOMAS L. KIRKLAND, JR.
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:               UNION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS:                ANDY LOWRY
    THOMAS L. KIRKLAND, JR.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:                  RICHARD SHANE McLAUGHLIN
    NICOLE H. McLAUGHLIN
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                      CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
    DISPOSITION:                             AFFIRMED AND REMANDED - 11/02/2017
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:              08/25/2017
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    EN BANC.
    KING, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.    The motion for rehearing is denied. The original opinions are withdrawn, and these
    opinions are substituted therefor.
    ¶2.    Teresa Hamlet filed a motion for an extension of time to serve process, prior to the
    expiration of the 120-day deadline provided by Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). The
    trial judge granted the motion and signed an order, yet the order was not filed with the circuit
    clerk until the day before the granted extension expired, well after the expiration of the
    original, 120-day deadline. Hamlet served process on three defendants during the extension.
    On the same day the order was filed, Hamlet filed a second motion for time, which the trial
    court also granted. While Hamlet served process on the remaining defendants within the
    second extension period, the order granting the second extension was not filed with the clerk
    until three months after it was signed by the judge.
    ¶3.    The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Hamlet’s complaint, arguing that the statute
    of limitations had run before the court’s order granting additional time to serve process had
    been entered by the clerk of court. The defendants further argued that Hamlet’s suit could not
    be revived by the untimely filed order. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to
    dismiss. Because Hamlet was the only party to the action, we find that the trial judge’s order
    granting her motion for extension of time to serve process became effective once the order
    had been signed and had left the trial judge’s control. Accordingly, we affirm the decision
    of the trial court. However, in cases where more than one party is involved, notice becomes
    essential. Therefore, in cases involving multiple parties, we adopt the holding of the majority
    of states that require the entry of an interlocutory order before it becomes effective.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    2
    ¶4.    Jimmy Kinard died on September 23, 2012.1 On October 17, 2014, Teresa Hamlet,
    Kinard’s sister, filed suit against Graceland Care Center of New Albany, LLC; Advanced
    Healthcare Management, Inc.; Karen Clayton, in her official capacity as administrator of
    Graceland Care Center of New Albany; W. Larry Overstreet; Sharon Windham; and John
    Does 1-10, jointly and individually (collectively referred to as “Graceland”). Hamlet alleged
    that Graceland’s negligence was the proximate cause of Kinard’s death.
    ¶5.    The 120-day deadline to serve process as provided under Rule 4(h) of the Mississippi
    Rules of Civil Procedure would have expired on February 14, 2015. On February 13, 2015,
    Hamlet filed a Motion to Extend Time to Serve Process.
    ¶6.    On February 23, 2015, the trial judge signed an order granting Hamlet sixty days from
    February 14, 2015, to serve process on the defendants. However, the order was not entered
    by the clerk of the court until April 14, 2015, one day prior to the expiration of the sixty-day
    extension.
    ¶7.    Hamlet served three defendants on April 14, 2015. On that same day, Hamlet filed a
    Second Motion to Extend Time to Serve Process, arguing that, while her deadline to serve
    defendants “will run on or about April 15, 2015,” process to defendants remained
    incomplete. On April 16, 2015, the trial judge signed the order granting Hamlet’s second
    motion for extension of time to serve process, allowing Hamlet an additional sixty days from
    1
    Because the issues before this Court are purely procedural in nature, it is not
    necessary to delve into the facts surrounding Kinard’s death.
    3
    April 15, 2015, to serve process on the defendants. The circuit court clerk did not enter this
    order until July 14, 2015.
    ¶8.    The following timeline illustrates the pertinent dates:
    Sept. 23, 2012     Jimmy Kinard passed away (statute of limitations begins to
    run).
    July 25, 2014     Notice of claim sent to Graceland, tolling statute of
    limitations for sixty days per Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36.
    Sept. 23, 2014     Earliest date Hamlet could file suit under Section 15-1-36.
    Oct. 17, 2014     Complaint filed.
    120-day period to serve process begins, expiring February
    14, 2015.
    Feb. 13, 2015     Hamlet files motion for additional sixty days to serve
    process within the 120-day period.
    Feb. 23, 2015     Court grants Hamlet’s motion for an additional sixty days
    to serve process from February 14 until April 15 (“first
    extension order”).
    Mar. 22, 2015      Graceland argues that the statute of limitations expires.
    Apr. 14, 2015      Clerk enters first extension order.
    Hamlet perfects service on Karen Clayton, Graceland Care
    Center, and W. Larry Overstreet.
    Hamlet files second motion for time.
    Apr. 15, 2015     Sixty-day period under the first extension order expires.
    Apr. 16, 2015     Court grants Hamlet’s second motion for an additional
    sixty days to serve process from April 15 until June 15
    (“second extension order”).
    Hamlet perfects service on Advanced Healthcare
    Management, Inc.
    4
    May 15, 2015         Graceland files motion to dismiss.
    July 14, 2015        Clerk enters second extension order.
    ¶9.    Graceland filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the statute of limitations had run
    before the April 14, 2015, order extending time was entered. Graceland argued that Hamlet
    failed to serve timely process within 120 days after filing her complaint, and therefore, the
    statute of limitations resumed after the 120 days. Initially, Graceland argued that Hamlet had
    failed to show “good cause” in her motion for extension, which would have satisfied
    Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h).2 Graceland, however, acknowledged that Hamlet
    likely would contend that, where a motion for time is filed prior to the expiration of the 120
    days, the standard of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) applies. See Cross Creek
    Prods. v. Scafidi, 
    911 So. 2d 958
    (Miss. 2005).3
    2
    Rule 4(h) states:
    If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant
    within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf
    such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not
    made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant
    without prejudice upon the court’s own initiative with notice to such party or
    upon motion.
    M.R.C.P. 4(h).
    3
    Rule 6(b) provides that:
    [W]hen . . . an act is required or allowed to be done at . . . a specified time, the
    court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without
    motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefore is made before
    the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous
    5
    ¶10.   Graceland’s argument against applying Rule 6(b) was twofold. First, Graceland
    argued that Scafidi did not involve the statute-of-limitations tolling rule. Second, Graceland
    argued that Hamlet’s failure to secure an order before the 120-day deadline expired made a
    showing of good cause necessary. Graceland noted that the Scafidi Court did not reveal when
    the trial court entered its order granting an extension of time to serve process. Because the
    120-day deadline had expired without Hamlet securing a signed and filed order extending the
    time to serve process, it averred that there should be a requirement that Hamlet show good
    cause after the 120-day deadline expired.
    ¶11.   In response, Hamlet argued that the Scafidi Court specifically held that motions for
    time filed during the 120-day deadline do not require a showing of good cause. 
    Id. at 960
    (“[T]his finding is specifically limited to those situations where the motion for additional
    time is filed before the deadline.”) (emphasis added). Because she filed her motion for an
    extension of time to serve process within the 120-day deadline, Hamlet argued that a showing
    of good cause was not necessary.
    ¶12.   The trial court held a hearing on the motion, at which Graceland argued that an order
    does not become effective until it is filed with the clerk and all parties are put on notice.
    Graceland admitted this was a case of first impression but likened an interlocutory order to
    order, or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period
    permit the act to be done where failure to act was the result of excusable
    neglect . . . .
    M.R.C.P. 6(b).
    6
    a judgment not being effective until it is filed. Graceland argued that, while a statute of
    limitations could be extended by a court, it could not be resurrected. Graceland also
    contended that the mere filing of a motion for time did not toll the statute of limitations.
    Moments before the trial court’s ruling, Graceland’s counsel stated that “prejudice might be
    relevant to the issue [if] we are [sic] showing good cause[,] but we conceded that it’s not.
    This is an issue of statute of limitations, Your Honor.” Because the statute of limitations had
    run prior to the April 14, 2014, order being filed with the clerk, Graceland prayed that the
    court would dismiss the action.
    ¶13.   Hamlet’s attorney acknowledged that the signed order from the judge “may have spent
    longer in my office than it should have. . . .” However, Hamlet argued that the law did not
    require a party to secure and file an order within the initial 120-day period in order to receive
    an extension. Hamlet stated that Graceland Care Center was served on April 14, 2015, the
    same day the order granting the extension was filed and within the extension allowed by the
    order. Also, Hamlet argued that no caselaw supported Graceland’s assertion that the order
    was not effective until it was entered by the court.
    ¶14.   After considering oral argument and documentary evidence, the trial court confirmed
    with the parties that “[t]he question of reasonableness, good cause shown is not an issue. .
    . .” Neither party objected. The trial court next recognized that no caselaw on point would
    direct him to dismiss this case and that dismissals were not favored. As such, the trial court
    denied the motion.
    7
    ¶15.   Graceland timely filed this interlocutory appeal. On appeal, Graceland raises three
    issues. First, Graceland argues that an order is effective only upon filing with the clerk.
    Second, Graceland claims that a motion filed within the 120-day period under Rule 4(h) is
    insufficient to resurrect the statute of limitations where the order granting the motion is filed
    after the statute of limitations runs. Third, Graceland argues that this Court should reconsider
    and overrule Scafidi.
    ¶16.   Hamlet raises two issues. First, Hamlet argues that an order extending time to serve
    process is effective upon the judge’s signing. Second, Hamlet argues that this Court should
    not overrule Scafidi. For clarity, we will restate and combine the issues on appeal.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶17.   “This Court uses a de novo standard of review when passing on questions of law
    including statute of limitations issues.” Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 
    850 So. 2d
    78, 82 (Miss. 2003).
    ANALYSIS
    ¶18.   In this case of first impression, we are tasked with determining when an order
    becomes effective and ultimately grants the enlargement of time under Rules 4(h) and 6(b).
    Is it when it is announced and/or signed by the judge? Or is it when it is officially entered
    into the record by the court clerk?
    8
    ¶19.   Graceland argued that, in general, an order does not become effective until filed with
    the clerk and all parties are put on notice. The time for service of process in Mississippi is
    governed by Rule 4(h), which reads:
    If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant
    within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf
    such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not
    made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant
    without prejudice upon the court’s own initiative with notice to such party or
    upon motion.
    M.R.C.P. 4(h) (emphasis added). Our courts, however, read Rule 4(h) in conjunction with
    Rule 6(b), which requires only “cause shown” for an enlargement of time when the motion
    is filed before the expiration of the 120-day period. 
    Scafidi, 911 So. 2d at 960
    ; M.R.C.P.
    6(b). Rule 6(b) reads:
    When by these rules or by notice given thereunder or by order of court an act
    is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for
    cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or
    notice order the period enlarged if request therefore is made before the
    expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous
    order . . . .
    M.R.C.P. 6(b) (emphasis added).
    ¶20.   The comment to Rule 79 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
    Rule 79(a) specifies that the docket entries reflect the date on which entries are
    made in the general docket. Since several important time periods and
    deadlines are calculated from the date of the entry of judgments and orders,
    these entries must accurately reflect the actual date of the entries rather than
    another date, such as the date on which a judgment or order is signed by the
    judge.
    9
    M.R.C.P. 79 cmt. (emphasis added). The comment specifically states that the date which
    must be reflected on the docket must be the date the order was entered, not the date it was
    signed by the judge. However, this rule does not specify when the order becomes effective.
    While Rule 58 specifically reads that a “judgment shall be effective only when entered as
    provided in M.R.C.P. 79(a),” neither the rules nor this Court has addressed whether the same
    is true for an interlocutory order.
    A.     Judgments
    ¶21.   Graceland argues the rule for interlocutory orders should be the same as the rule for
    judgments because an order that has been signed but has not been entered and made a matter
    of public record cannot be binding on the parties. It takes the position that, as a potential
    defendant, it was entitled to notice of the order which concerned additional time to serve
    named defendants.4
    ¶22.   Rule 54 defines “judgment” as “. . . a final decree and any order from which an appeal
    lies.” M.R.C.P. 54. This rule does not apply to the orders granting Hamlet’s motions for
    time, for those orders were not directly appealable. Judgments are markedly distinguishable
    from interlocutory orders. Judgments impact more than the rights of the parties. The entry
    and filing of a judgment is necessary to give third parties, such as creditors, lien holders, and
    other interested third parties, notice of the judgment in order to protect their rights. An
    4
    As 
    discussed supra
    , Graceland would not have been notified by the clerk even if
    Hamlet had promptly filed the order. Further, Graceland was not prejudiced here as Hamlet
    sent Graceland a notice-of-intent letter under Section 15-1-36.
    10
    interlocutory order, with limited exceptions, impacts only the parties. In the present case, at
    the time the first order allowing additional time was granted by the trial court, the only party
    was the plaintiff, Hamlet. Although this is an issue of first impression, we are able to look
    to other courts for guidance on this issue.
    B.     Other Courts
    ¶23.   Overwhelmingly, our sister states that have discussed the issue have found that an
    interlocutory order is effective upon entry by the clerk on the court’s docket. In Finley v.
    State, 
    281 Ark. 38
    , 39, 
    661 S.W.2d 358
    , 358 (1983), that Court held:
    The critical act in such cases is when the order is entered not signed.
    . . . Counsel must see that orders are entered on time; merely obtaining a
    signature on an order is not sufficient to extend the time. Counsel must
    anticipate problems of time and be prepared to do all acts necessary . . . and it
    is no excuse or good cause that a judge, clerk, or reporter . . . fails to file an
    order on time. It is not often the case an official refuses to perform a duty;
    invariably in such cases counsel expects the officials to do the work of
    counsel.
    In this case it was the lawyer’s duty to see that the order was entered, not the
    judge’s.
    
    Finley, 281 Ark. at 39
    , 661 S.W.2d at 358–59 (citations omitted). In Bowman v. Richland
    Memorial Hospital, 
    335 S.C. 88
    , 
    515 S.E.2d 259
    (S.C. Ct. App. 1999), that Court held that
    “[a]n order is not final until it is written and entered by the clerk of court.” 
    Bowman, 335 S.C. at 91
    , 515 S.E.2d at 260 (citing First Union Nat’l Bank of South Carolina v. Hitman,
    Inc., 
    306 S.C. 327
    , 
    411 S.E.2d 681
    (S.C. Ct. App.1991), aff’d, 
    308 S.C. 421
    , 
    418 S.E.2d 545
    (1992)). “Until an order is written and entered by the clerk of court, the judge retains
    11
    discretion to change his mind and amend his ruling accordingly.” 
    Bowman, 335 S.C. at 91
    ,
    515 S.E.2d at 260. That Court found that its:
    holding [was] mandated by principles of fairness and equity. The parties to an
    action are not provided with notice of a judge’s ruling at the time the judge
    signs an order. Rather, only after the order is filed with the clerk of court are
    the parties given notice of the order and provided with an opportunity to
    comply with the order.
    
    Bowman, 335 S.C. at 92
    , 515 S.E.2d at 261.
    ¶24.   Numerous other state courts have similarly held. See also In re Trust by Crawford,
    
    20 Neb. Ct. App. 502
    , 510, 
    826 N.W.2d 284
    , 291 (2013); DeHaven v. Hall, 
    753 N.W.2d 429
    ,
    439 (S.D. 2008) (quoting S.D. Codified Laws § 15-6-58 (West 2017)) (“An order ‘becomes
    complete and effective when reduced to writing, signed by the court or judge, attested by the
    clerk, and filed in the clerk’s office.’”); Simpson v. Simpson, 
    377 S.C. 519
    , 525, 
    660 S.E.2d 274
    , 277-78 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008); Hill v. State, 
    281 Ga. 795
    , 799, 
    642 S.E.2d 64
    (2007); In
    re Guardianship of Hollins, 
    114 Ohio St. 3d 434
    , 439, 
    872 N.E.2d 1214
    , 1218-19 (2007);
    Batts v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 
    217 S.W.3d 881
    , 883 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (“Under typical
    circumstances, when a trial judge signs an order or judgment it has no effect until it is entered
    into the record by the clerk.”); Rollins v. Rollins, 
    903 So. 2d 828
    , 833 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004);
    Foley v. Fitzpatrick Container Co., 
    267 A.D.2d 637
    , 638, 
    699 N.Y.S.2d 598
    , 599 (1999)
    (“[A]n order is effective on the date of entry thereof and not on the date a decision is signed.
    . . .”); State v. Shaw, 
    4 S.W.3d 875
    , 878 (Tex. App. 1999); Abels v. Renfro Corp., 126 N.C.
    App. 800, 803, 
    486 S.E.2d 735
    , 737-38 (1997) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1A-1, Rule
    12
    58 (West 2017)); Matter of Scheib Trust, 
    457 N.W.2d 4
    , 10 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990); Rust v.
    Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 
    103 Nev. 686
    , 689, 
    747 P.2d 1380
    , 1382 (1987); Dalton v. Dalton, 
    412 So. 2d 928
    , 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (“An order does not take effect until signed and
    filed. . . .”); Lamb v. Superior Court In & For Maricopa Cty., 
    127 Ariz. 400
    , 403, 
    621 P.2d 906
    , 910 (1980) (“[U]ntil the order is in writing, signed by the court and entered by the clerk
    of the court, it is not effective.”); City of Darien v. Dublinski, 
    16 Ill. App. 3d 140
    , 144, 
    304 N.E.2d 769
    , 773 (1973); In re Montano’s Estate, 
    38 N.M. 355
    , 
    33 P.2d 906
    , 907 (1934);
    Giroux v. Bockler, 
    98 Or. 398
    , 417, 
    194 P. 178
    , 184 (1921); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
    Co. v. Taylor Implement & Vehicle Co., 
    138 Tenn. 28
    , 
    195 S.W. 762
    , 765 (1917).
    ¶25.   At least three states have held to the contrary. See Andrews v. Paramount Parks, Inc.,
    48 Va. Cir. 232 (1999) (“An order is effective as of the date it is signed by the judge.); State
    v. Olsen, 
    540 N.W.2d 149
    , 150 (N.D. 1995) (“Absent a statute or rule to the contrary, a
    written order of the court is entered and effective when it is signed by the judge; filing of the
    order by the clerk is not a prerequisite.”); Cuoio v. Koseris, 
    68 Idaho 483
    , 485, 
    200 P.2d 359
    ,
    360 (1948) (“A memorandum decision is not effective as an order until signed by the trial
    judge or entered in the minutes.”) (emphasis added).
    C.     Mississippi’s New Rule
    ¶26.   Given the vast majority of cases and the logic attached to those rulings, we hold that
    orders are effective upon filing. Such a rule will “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
    determination of every action.” M.R.C.P. 1. A party should be responsible for timely filing
    13
    a motion, ensuring that the judge rules on the motion, and making certain that the resulting
    order is timely filed with the clerk.5
    ¶27.   However, we find an important distinction between ex parte orders and interlocutory
    orders in general. The same reasoning applied in the above-cited cases, which involved
    multiple parties, does not apply here. In this case, the only pertinent party to the motion and
    order was Hamlet. On February 13, 2015, when Hamlet filed her Motion to Extend Time to
    Serve Process, Graceland would not have been noticed had the order been filed because it
    was not yet a party to the action. Thus, the order was meaningless to anyone but the plaintiff
    and her counsel.6 A delay in docketing the order does not affect the trial court’s decision to
    5
    It should be noted that a Rule 6(b) motion that is timely filed within the 120-day
    period under Rule 4(h) tolls the 120-day period until the trial court either grants or denies the
    motion. Rule 6(b) states: “the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . .
    order the period enlarged if request therefore is made before the expiration of the period
    originally proscribed.” (Emphasis added.) Also, “[a] trial court has the authority and indeed
    a duty to maintain control of the docket and ensure the efficient disposal of court business.”
    Venton v. Beckham, 
    845 So. 2d 676
    , 684 (Miss. 2003); see also Moore v. Bailey, 
    46 So. 3d
    375, 380–81 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). Within this duty, a trial court controls the dates that
    are available to a party. A party can file a motion within a deadline—and as long as the
    party does so the motion is timely, but a party cannot control the particular day on which the
    trial court will hear the motion. This situation is similar to the thirty-day period for an
    appeal not running until entry of the trial court’s order disposing of outstanding post-trial
    motions. See M.R.A.P. 4(d) (“If any party files a timely motion . . . the time for appeal for
    all parties runs from the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion outstanding.”).
    6
    This is especially the case here, in a medical-malpractice suit, because Graceland was
    put on notice of the suit when Hamlet served her notice-of-intent letter on Graceland
    pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 15-1-36. Defendants involved in suits which require
    notice prior to filing the complaint are at an advantage as to notice and are aware of potential
    suits more than a traditional defendant. Thus, Graceland cannot claim surprise or prejudice
    regarding the present suit.
    14
    grant an extension of time to service process. Hamlet, as the only party to the action, should
    not be punished for not immediately filing the order. Hamlet timely obtained an extension
    to serve process and timely served process within that extension. Therefore, the statute of
    limitations remained tolled. Because Hamlet was the only party to the action, the trial judge’s
    order granting her motion for extension of time to serve process became effective once the
    order had been signed and had left the trial judge’s control.
    ¶28.   Therefore, in cases involving ex parte motions, such as the present case, we find that
    the order becomes effective upon leaving the judge’s control. Ex parte orders, though, are
    still required to be filed promptly into the record. However, in cases in which more than one
    party is involved and notice becomes essential, we find that an order becomes effective once
    it is entered officially into the record by the court clerk.
    ¶29.   Of course, there are also certain other orders to which this general rule would not
    apply. For instance, temporary restraining orders and other emergency orders (such as
    domestic protection orders) are effective before filing with a clerk. See M.R.C.P. 65(b)
    (“[T]emporary restraining order . . . shall be filed forthwith in the clerk’s office and entered
    of record”). In addition, certain rulings of a trial judge that require immediate action, such
    as those under a judge’s contempt powers, would not be subject to the general rule.
    ¶30.   This rule in no way limits the ability of the trial judge, where otherwise allowed by
    law, to enter an order nunc pro tunc, make an order retroactive or have it relate back for
    15
    enforcement purposes. The purpose of this rule is to effectuate notice to the parties and
    establish some finality as relates to the running of deadlines.
    D.     Scafidi
    ¶31.   We see no need to overrule or distinguish Scafidi as Graceland asks this Court to do
    in its alternative argument. Hamlet timely filed her first motion for an extension and obtained
    a signed order before the statute of limitations ran in this case.7 While Scafidi did not involve
    a statute-of-limitations issue, we find that its holding applies here. Our rules and caselaw
    hold that a court, in its discretion, for cause shown, may enlarge the time period for service
    of process under Rule 4(h) prior to the expiration of the initial 120-day period. M.R.C.P.
    6(b); 
    Scafidi, 911 So. 2d at 960
    -61. There is no requirement for “good cause shown” when
    the motion for extension is timely filed.
    ¶32.   Further, we will not entertain Graceland’s arguments on appeal that Hamlet failed to
    show cause or good cause. This court
    ha[s] been consistent in holding that we need not consider matters raised for
    the first time on appeal, which practice would have the practical effect of
    depriving the trial court of the opportunity to first rule on the issue, so that we
    7
    We also reject Graceland’s argument that Hamlet was required to show good cause
    once she had failed to obtain an order within the original 120-day period. We have
    recognized before that a party need only show cause under Rule 6(b) for an extension based
    on a motion that is timely filed within Rule 4(h)’s 120-day period—even where the motion
    is granted after the expiration of the 120-day period. See Johnson v. Thomas ex rel.
    Polatsidis, 
    982 So. 2d 405
    , 413 (Miss. 2008) (affirming grant of extension for cause on the
    123d day), overruled on other grounds by Fulgham v. Jackson, No. 2016-IA-00570-SCT,
    
    2017 WL 2692933
    , at *3 (Miss. June 22, 2017).
    16
    can then review such trial court ruling under the appropriate standard of
    review.
    Alexander v. Daniel, 
    904 So. 2d 172
    , 183 (Miss. 2005). It is clear from the record that
    Graceland’s counsel framed the issue before the trial court as a legal question concerning the
    application of the statute of limitations. The argument in the motion to dismiss recognizes
    that good cause is not at issue under our holding in Scafidi. In addition, when asked by the
    trial court, Graceland’s counsel responded that it would be correct to characterize the issue
    in the motion to dismiss as a statute-of-limitations issue. He further argued that “[t]his is an
    issue of statute of limitations.” Also, neither party corrected the trial court when it stated that
    “good cause shown is not an issue.” Thus, it is clear that the trial court did not rule on the
    issue of Hamlet’s cause or good cause; as such, there is no factual finding for us to review
    under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See id.; Collins v. Westbrook, 
    184 So. 3d 922
    , 929
    (Miss. 2016) (reviewing a trial court’s good-cause determination under an abuse-of-
    discretion standard).
    ¶33.   We see no reason to overrule or distinguish Scafidi as Graceland asks us. Scafidi
    remains good law today.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶34.   We find that, in general, interlocutory orders are effective upon entry of the order.
    However, because the instant case involved an ex parte order, this Court finds that the order
    became effective upon leaving the judge’s possession. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s
    denial of Graceland’s motion to dismiss.
    17
    ¶35.   AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
    KITCHENS, P.J., MAXWELL AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR.
    COLEMAN, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY
    BEAM, J.    WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., AND ISHEE, J., NOT
    PARTICIPATING.
    COLEMAN, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
    ¶36.   The majority miscasts the issue before the Court today as one of first impression. To
    the contrary, it has long been the law in Mississippi that, in order for orders and judgments
    to be effective, they must be entered or, as stated in our older cases, “appear on the minutes
    of the court.” Evans v. State, 
    144 Miss. 1
    , 
    108 So. 725
    , 726 (1926). Accordingly, I must
    respectfully dissent.
    ¶37.   The Evans Court wrote,
    All the judgments and orders of the circuit courts can be evidenced alone by
    their minutes. It makes no difference how unimportant a judgment of a circuit
    court may be considered, it is of no validity or force whatever unless it appear
    upon the minutes of the court. The court can act in no other manner so far as
    its judgments are concerned. The principle is of universal application. There
    are no exceptions. . . . There must be a perpetual memorial of the judgments
    of circuit courts, not alone of their final judgments, but of all interlocutory
    judgments and orders affecting the rights of the parties, and that memorial is
    the minutes of the courts. There is no other place to go to ascertain what those
    judgments are.
    
    Id. (emphasis added).
    “The rule in this State is that every decree is in the breast of the court
    until entered, and a decree has no validity until written out and signed by the chancellor.”
    Orr v. Myers, 
    223 Miss. 856
    , 862, 
    79 So. 2d 277
    , 278 (1955) (emphasis added).
    18
    ¶38.   The majority follows the law described above as long as more than one party has
    appeared in a lawsuit, but would except cases in which only the plaintiff has appeared. To
    reach its result, the majority engages in something akin to no-harm, no-foul reasoning. The
    majority’s reasoning is flawed and fails to address other concerns. For example, defense
    attorneys, aware of the filing of a lawsuit against their clients, can monitor court filings to
    advise their clients and their insurers regarding the risks of the litigation. When the public
    record indicates that the time for service has passed, the attorney and potential defendant
    make risk assessments and strategic decisions accordingly. To allow them to be surprised
    by condoning behavior that keeps orders of the court secret cannot be considered fair.
    Today’s holding allows plaintiffs in civil litigation and parties in ex parte proceedings
    intentionally to pocket orders to surprise other parties and the public for strategic advantage.
    I cannot concur in such a result. Our courts should exercise their considerable powers in the
    full view of the public eye – not in secret.
    ¶39.   Because the law has long been that both orders and judgments must be entered to be
    effective, I would reverse the trial court’s decision and render judgment in favor of the
    defendants.
    BEAM, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
    19