In re N.B. CA2/5 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 5/18/21 In re N.B. CA2/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
    CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    In re N.B., a Person Coming Under                                    B309191
    the Juvenile Court Law.
    (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. DK08623)
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
    AND FAMILY SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    CRYSTAL B.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Nichelle Blackwell, Judge Pro Tempore.
    Conditionally reversed and remanded, with directions.
    Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
    Assistant County Counsel, Brian Mahler, Deputy County
    Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Children’s Law Center, Nancy Sarinana, for Minor.
    __________________________
    Crystal B. (mother) appeals from orders denying her
    petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388
    and terminating parental rights to her minor child N.B.
    (minor), pursuant to section 366.26.1 Counsel for mother,
    minor, and the Los Angeles County Department of Children
    and Family Services (the Department) have filed a joint
    application and stipulation seeking a limited reversal and
    remand with directions to the Department and the juvenile
    court to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare
    Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).
    Finding that the requirements of Code of Civil
    Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), are satisfied, we
    1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
    Institutions Code unless stated otherwise.
    2
    accept the stipulation, conditionally reverse the order
    terminating parental rights, and remand to the juvenile
    court to permit the parties to comply with the terms of their
    stipulation and to determine ICWA compliance.
    The Department agrees with mother’s contention on appeal
    Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the
    Department did not comply with its duties of further inquiry
    and notice under ICWA and related California statutes. The
    Department agrees that it did not interview known maternal
    relatives following a December 9, 2014 detention hearing,
    and it did not provide requested information after the
    Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma responded to an ICWA notice.
    We agree that there is no evidence that the Department
    conducted the further inquiry required under ICWA or sent
    requested information to the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma.
    The parties’ stipulation meets statutory requirements
    Before reversing or vacating a judgment based upon a
    stipulation of the parties, an appellate court must find “both
    of the following: [¶] (A) There is no reasonable possibility
    3
    that the interests of nonparties or the public will be
    adversely affected by the reversal. [¶] (B) The reasons of
    the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of
    public trust that may result from the nullification of a
    judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated
    reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.”
    (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8).)
    Here, the parties have stipulated that upon remand,
    1. The Department shall make all efforts to interview
    Mother, maternal aunt Christen B., maternal aunt
    Shondaleh B., and the maternal grandfather Eddie B. to
    obtain identifying information about N.B.’s possible Indian
    status. This information is to include the names, current
    and previous addresses, birthdates, birthplaces, and, if
    deceased, the dates and places of death of the following
    individuals: N.B., Mother, the maternal grandmother (Sonia
    B.), the maternal great-grandmother (Ruth H.), and the
    maternal great-grandfather (Bobby E.). The Department is
    only required to make three attempts to reach and interview
    the referenced family members if earlier attempts are
    unsuccessful.
    2. The Department shall contact the four identified
    tribes—the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana, the Choctaw Nation
    4
    of Oklahoma, the Jena Band of Choctaw, and the Mississippi
    Band of Choctaw Indians—and provide the tribes with the
    information obtained from the referenced family members to
    learn whether N.B. is a member of a tribe or eligible for
    membership in a tribe. This contact between the
    Department and the tribes may be in the form of telephone
    and/or email communications.
    3. The Department shall document its further inquiry
    investigation, including its efforts to interview the
    referenced family members, the information obtained from
    those interviews that do occur, its contact with the four
    identified tribes, and the information provided by the tribes,
    and provide said documentation and the results of its family
    members interviews and contact with the tribes to the
    juvenile court.
    4. At a noticed hearing with reappointed counsel for
    Mother, the juvenile court shall review the adequacy of the
    Department’s further inquiry investigation and the
    information provided by the tribes.
    5. If the juvenile court finds the Department’s further
    inquiry investigation was proper and, based on the
    information provided by the tribes, there is no “reason to
    know” N.B. is an “Indian child” as those terms were defined
    5
    at the time of the section 366.26 hearing (see 25 U.S.C.
    § 1912(a); §§ 224.2, subd. (e), 224.3, subd. (a)), the court shall
    reinstate the order terminating parental rights.
    6. If the juvenile court finds the Department’s further
    inquiry investigation was proper and, based on the
    information provided by the tribes, there is “reason to know”
    N.B. is an “Indian child” as those terms were defined at the
    time of the section 366.26 hearing (see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a);
    §§ 224.2, subd. (e), 224.3, subd. (a)), the court shall proceed
    in compliance with ICWA, to include the Department
    providing formal ICWA notice to the tribe(s), the Secretary
    of the Interior, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs containing
    the information that the Department obtained from its
    interviews, the Department filing all ICWA notice forms,
    certified return receipts, and tribal/agency responses in the
    court, and the court holding a noticed hearing with
    reappointed counsel for Mother to determine the ICWA’s
    applicability.
    We conclude that a reversal based upon the above
    stipulation meets the requirements of section 128,
    subdivision (a)(8). First, we find “no reasonable possibility
    that the interests of nonparties or the public will be
    adversely affected by the reversal.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128,
    6
    subd. (a)(8)(A).) The two groups of nonparties who could
    potentially be adversely affected by a stipulated reversal are
    prospective adoptive parents and Indian tribes. There is no
    reasonable possibility that the interests of either group will
    be adversely affected, because the stipulated reversal serves
    to expedite the Department’s compliance with its statutory
    obligations under ICWA. (See, e.g., In re Rashad H. (2000)
    
    78 Cal. App. 4th 376
    , 381 (Rashad H.); cf. In re B.D. (2019) 
    35 Cal. App. 5th 803
    , 820 [denying request for stipulated
    reversal where agency acknowledged failure to alert court
    and parties to problems in minor’s prospective adoptive
    home].)
    Second, the parties’ reasons for requesting a limited
    reversal with directions outweigh any erosion of public trust
    that may result from the reversal, as well as the risk of
    reducing any incentive for pretrial settlement. The reason
    the parties are requesting reversal is to ensure compliance
    with ICWA. The requested reversal therefore enhances
    public trust, rather than eroding it. In terms of the risk of
    reducing incentives for pretrial settlement, “[t]here is no
    evidence that settlement is an option in connection with the
    Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 issues which
    will be addressed upon issuance of the remittitur. Moreover,
    7
    the parties are in agreement that the case will be reversed
    anyway; so there is no risk that a stipulated reversal will
    reduce the incentive for settlement prior to the Welfare and
    Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.” (Rashad 
    H., supra
    , 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 381.)
    8
    DISPOSITION
    The order terminating parental rights under Welfare
    and Institutions Code section 366.26 is conditionally
    reversed, and remanded for the limited purpose of the
    juvenile court ensuring compliance with the Indian Child
    Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related state
    statutes (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1 et seq.). If the juvenile
    court determines there is no reason to know N.B. is an
    Indian child, then it shall reinstate the order terminating
    parental rights. The remittitur shall issue forthwith.
    MOOR, J.
    We concur:
    RUBIN, P.J.
    BAKER, J.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B309191

Filed Date: 5/18/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/18/2021