Pamela D. Stark v. Joe Edward Stark ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                        01/31/2020
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    November 14, 2019 Session
    PAMELA D. STARK v. JOE EDWARD STARK
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
    No. CT-002958-18 Robert Samual Weiss, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. W2019-00650-COA-R3-CV
    ___________________________________
    This is an appeal from an order finding the appellant in civil contempt and ordering her
    incarcerated until she agreed to remove a social media post. The appellant was
    incarcerated for four hours before she purged herself of contempt by agreeing to remove
    the post. On appeal, the appellant challenges the civil contempt finding. Because the
    appellant has purged herself of civil contempt and was released from incarceration, we
    deem the issue moot and dismiss this appeal.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed
    CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN
    STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and KENNY W. ARMSTRONG, J., joined.
    Pamela D. Stark, Memphis, Tennessee, Pro Se.
    Melissa C. Berry, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Joe Edward Stark.
    OPINION
    I.   FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    After a five-year marriage, Pamela Stark (“Wife”) filed a complaint for divorce
    from her husband, Joe Stark (“Husband”) on June 29, 2018. Wife is an attorney and filed
    her complaint pro se. Husband is a sergeant with the Memphis Police Department.
    Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-106(d) states that when a petition for
    divorce is filed and served, the following temporary injunction is in effect against both
    parties:
    (3) An injunction restraining both parties from harassing, threatening,
    assaulting or abusing the other and from making disparaging remarks about
    the other . . . to either party’s employer.
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-106(d)(3) (emphasis added). The parties are permitted to apply
    to the court “for further temporary orders, an expanded temporary injunction, or
    modification or revocation of this temporary injunction.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-
    106(d)(6).
    Husband filed an answer and counter-complaint for divorce. Wife amended her
    complaint to add “interspousal tort” claims against Husband, including battery and
    intentional infliction of emotional distress. Wife alleged that she was injured during a
    physical altercation with Husband days before the complaint for divorce was filed.
    On January 15, 2019, Husband filed a petition for a restraining order. Husband
    alleged that he had recently become aware of a Facebook post made by Wife on
    December 14, 2018, in which she publicly posted allegations regarding Husband and the
    alleged incident of domestic violence between them. Husband claimed that Wife’s post
    also disparaged the Memphis Police Department and its investigation of the incident.
    Husband asserted that Wife’s dissemination of these allegations in a public forum would
    cause him immediate and irreparable injury, including but not limited to loss of
    employment, demotion, or damage to his reputation within the department. As such,
    Husband asked the trial court to enter a restraining order directing Wife to remove the
    Facebook post and to cease and desist from making any future comments, orally or on
    social media, that might jeopardize his employment or impugn his reputation with the
    police department. Husband sought an award of attorney’s fees incurred in bringing the
    petition for a restraining order.
    Wife filed a response to the petition in which she alleged that her post was critical
    of the Memphis Police Department, not Husband. She also argued that the restraining
    order sought by Husband would infringe on her “constitutional rights.” The trial court
    held a hearing on Husband’s petition for a restraining order on February 7, 2019. At the
    outset, counsel for Husband explained that Husband was basically asking the trial court to
    extend the existing statutory injunctions to specifically address public posts on social
    media or communication with Husband’s employer that would have a detrimental effect
    on his reputation or employment. Husband submitted as exhibits the Facebook post made
    by Wife and also an email Wife had sent to the mayor of Memphis about the incident. In
    the Facebook post, Wife claimed to be “a recent victim of domestic violence at the hands
    of a Memphis Police Officer,” and she criticized the handling of the investigation.
    Husband testified that his co-workers at the police department saw the Facebook post
    before he did. He explained that he and Wife have many mutual friends on the social
    media site because Wife worked as a prosecutor. Husband testified that a special
    prosecutor from another city was appointed to conduct an investigation regarding the
    alleged incident of domestic violence involving him and Wife.
    -2-
    Wife’s four-page email to the mayor likewise claimed that she was a victim of
    domestic violence at the hands of Husband and a victim of misconduct by the Memphis
    Police Department. She identified her husband by name and rank and described her
    version of the physical altercation between them and the events that followed. Wife
    asked the mayor to “look into this before it goes further.” Husband testified that the city
    mayor is considered his ultimate boss and employer. He opined that Wife’s social media
    post and email to the mayor constituted harassment and brought his reputation into
    question.
    Wife did not testify but repeated her argument that she had an absolute right to
    criticize the police department. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge informed
    Wife that the problem with her argument was the existence of the automatic injunction
    prohibiting her from “making disparaging remarks about the other [spouse] . . . to either
    party’s employer.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-106(d)(3) (emphasis added). The trial
    judge acknowledged Wife’s “freedom of speech” argument but emphasized that her
    email did not convey some general concern about police corruption but instead was in
    direct reference to Husband. He explained that the references to Husband were “off
    limits.” The trial judge then orally ruled that the Facebook post had to be removed that
    same day and that Wife would not be permitted to make further allegations on social
    media or have communication with Husband’s employer.
    The following exchange occurred between the trial judge and Wife:
    The Court:    That post shall be removed today, and a mandatory injunction
    will go into effect that there will be no communication with
    employers. There is a special prosecutor involved in this
    case. That special prosecutor will deal with this Court.
    Whatever allegations have been made, we’ll deal with that in
    due course. But at this point involving making any further
    allegations in social media is completely inappropriate and is
    being enjoined.
    Ms. Stark:    Well, Your Honor, I will just with all candor to the Court say
    you might as well take me into custody right now. I have
    contacted the FBI as well as having contacted the mayor of
    Memphis to try and get this addressed. I am saying that I am
    a victim of corruption from the Memphis Police Department,
    and I am going to pursue every course of action I have and –
    The Court:    Ms. Stark, are you going to remove that post, yes or no?
    Ms. Stark:    I am not.
    -3-
    The Court:       Officer Houston, take her into custody.
    We’ll stand in recess.
    (Short break.)
    The Court:       Ms. Stark, please stand. Are you going to comply with this
    Court’s orders?
    Ms. Stark:       No, I’m not.
    The Court:       All right. I’m making a finding that you are in direct
    contempt of court by willfully refusing to comply with this
    Court’s orders. You will be held in the -- you will be held in
    custody until such time that you decide that you want to
    change your position and you apologize to this Court. We’ll
    stand in recess until that time.
    Wife was held in custody for four hours before she agreed to remove the Facebook post
    and was released.
    Thereafter, the trial court entered its written order granting Husband’s petition for
    a restraining order. The trial court entered a separate written order finding Wife in direct
    civil contempt. The order states that at the end of the hearing on the petition for a
    restraining order, “in open Court, [Wife] advised that the Court may as well [] find her in
    Contempt as she was not going to take the Facebook post of December 14, 2018 down
    which had just been ordered.” The court noted that it then asked Wife directly whether
    she was going to abide by the court’s order, to which she responded, “No.” As such, the
    order states, the trial court found Wife in direct contempt of court, and she was
    immediately taken into custody. According to the order, Wife was ordered to be held in
    custody until she agreed to remove the Facebook post, and after being held in custody for
    four hours, she agreed to remove the post as ordered. Therefore, the written order states
    that Wife had already purged her contempt. Wife timely filed a notice of appeal.
    II.   ISSUES PRESENTED
    Wife presents the following issues, which we have slightly restated, in her brief on
    appeal:
    1.     Whether the trial court erred by issuing a restraining order involving matters
    which were not subject to adjudication or final judgment in the pending divorce
    and interspousal tort case before the court;
    -4-
    2.     Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient proof under Tennessee Rule of
    Civil Procedure 65.04 to establish either a right or an immediate and irreparable
    injury, loss, or damage to warrant the restraining order;
    3.     Whether the trial court erred in issuing a restraining order without employing the
    proper constitutional analysis associated with Wife’s infringed rights;
    4.     Whether the trial court erred in conducting summary contempt proceedings to
    impose sanctions for direct civil contempt; and
    5.     Whether the trial court erred in imposing contempt sanctions before the court’s
    order was actually violated.
    In his posture as appellee, Husband asserts that Wife’s issues on appeal must be limited
    to those challenging the contempt order, not the restraining order entered in the context of
    the underlying divorce action, which remains pending in the trial court.
    III.   DISCUSSION
    At the outset, we address the issue raised on appeal by Husband. Husband argues
    that Wife has only perfected an appeal from the order of contempt, and therefore, the
    issues she can raise on appeal must be limited to those presenting proper challenges to the
    contempt order. We agree with Husband in this regard.
    “Contempt proceedings are sui generis and are incidental to the case out of which
    they arise.” Baker v. State, 
    417 S.W.3d 428
    , 435 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Doe v. Bd. of
    Prof’l Responsibility, 
    104 S.W.3d 465
    , 474 (Tenn. 2003)). The term “sui generis” means
    “[o]f its own kind or class; unique or peculiar.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
    “The contempt proceeding may be ‘related to the underlying case but independent from
    it.’” Ballard v. Cayabas, No. W2016-01913-COA-R3-CV, 
    2017 WL 2471090
    , at *2
    (Tenn. Ct. App. June 8, 2017) (quoting Green v. Champs-Elysees, Inc., No. M2013-
    00232-COA-R3-CV, 
    2014 WL 644726
    , at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2014)).
    A contempt proceeding “often stems from an underlying proceeding that is not
    complete.” 
    Doe, 104 S.W.3d at 474
    . However, “[a] judgment of contempt fixing
    punishment is a final judgment from which an appeal will lie.” Hall v. Hall, 
    772 S.W.2d 432
    , 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (citing State v. Green, 
    689 S.W.2d 189
    (Tenn. Crim.
    App. 1984)). A contempt judgment “becomes final upon entry of the judgment imposing
    a punishment therefore.” State ex rel. Garrison v. Scobey, No. W2007-02367-COA-R3-
    JV, 
    2008 WL 4648359
    , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008) (citing 
    Green, 689 S.W.2d at 190
    ). The contempt ruling must be appealed within thirty days. Blakney v. White, No.
    W2018-00617-COA-R3-CV, 
    2019 WL 4942436
    , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019).
    “‘It matters not that the proceedings out of which the contempt arose are not complete.’”
    -5-
    Moody v. Hutchison, 
    159 S.W.3d 15
    , 31 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting 
    Green, 689 S.W.2d at 190
    ). “An order that imposes punishment for contempt ‘is a final appealable
    order in its own right, even though the proceedings in which the contempt arose are
    ongoing.’” Ballard, 
    2017 WL 2471090
    , at *2 (quoting Coffey v. Coffey, No. E2012-
    00143-COA-R3-CV, 
    2013 WL 1279410
    , at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013)).
    Here, Wife filed a notice of appeal within thirty days of the trial court’s contempt
    order. Accordingly, she has properly perfected an appeal from the contempt order.
    However, the divorce case in which the restraining order was entered remains pending.
    In considering Wife’s issues, we must bear in mind that this is an appeal from the
    contempt order, not an appeal from the restraining order. See Garrison, 
    2008 WL 4648359
    , at *4 (reviewing the contempt issues presented on appeal separately “as distinct
    from the remainder of the appeal” and dismissing the remainder of the appeal for lack of
    a final judgment).
    Because this is an appeal from the contempt order, Wife is limited in her ability to
    raise issues regarding the restraining order. Wife argues that she can also challenge the
    restraining order, noting that one of the essential elements of a civil contempt finding is
    that the court order alleged to have been violated must have been a “lawful” order.
    Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cty. Hosp. Auth., 
    249 S.W.3d 346
    , 354 (Tenn.
    2008). However, in this context:
    A lawful order is one issued by a court with jurisdiction over both the
    subject matter of the case and the parties. An order is not rendered void or
    unlawful simply because it is erroneous or subject to reversal on appeal.
    Erroneous orders must be followed until they are reversed.
    
    Id. at 355
    (internal citations omitted). For these reasons, we emphasize that the limited
    issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred by holding Wife in civil contempt.
    The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained civil contempt as follows:
    Civil contempt is remedial in character and is applied when a person
    refuses or fails to comply with a court order. [State v.] Beeler, 387 S.W.3d
    [511, 520 (Tenn. 2012)]. A civil contempt action is brought to force
    compliance with the order and thereby secure private rights established by
    the order. Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 480, 
    172 S.W.3d 507
    , 510 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Robinson v. Air Draulics Eng’g Co.,
    
    214 Tenn. 30
    , 
    377 S.W.2d 908
    , 912 (1964)). When a trial court orders
    imprisonment after finding civil contempt, the confinement is remedial and
    coercive in nature, designed to compel the contemnor to comply with the
    court’s order. Consequently, compliance with the order will result in the
    contemnor’s immediate release from confinement. 
    Id. at 511.
    It has long
    -6-
    been said that in a civil contempt case, the contemnor “carries the keys to
    his prison in his own pocket.” State ex rel. Anderson v. Daugherty, 
    137 Tenn. 125
    , 
    191 S.W. 974
    , 974 (1917).
    
    Baker, 417 S.W.3d at 435-36
    .1 “Beyond the ‘civil’ or ‘criminal’ classification, contempt
    is also categorized as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’” 
    Id. at 436
    n.7. “Contempt can be further
    classified as direct or indirect depending on whether the misbehavior occurred in the
    court’s presence.” In re Brown, 
    470 S.W.3d 433
    , 443 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). “Direct
    contempt is based on acts committed in the presence of the court[.]” 
    Id. at 443-44.
    In the case before us, the trial court held Wife in direct civil contempt and ordered
    her incarcerated until she agreed to remove the Facebook post. Wife was in custody for
    approximately four hours before she agreed to remove the post and was released. Thus,
    Wife has purged herself of contempt.
    This Court has repeatedly held that issues raised on appeal regarding civil
    contempt findings are moot if the contemnor has already purged himself or herself of
    contempt by the time the issue reaches this Court. “A case, or an issue in a case,
    becomes moot when the parties no longer have a continuing, real, live, and substantial
    interest in the outcome.” Hooker v. Haslam, 
    437 S.W.3d 409
    , 417 (Tenn. 2014). For
    instance, in Simpkins v. Simpkins, 
    374 S.W.3d 413
    , 417 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012), a husband
    was found in civil contempt for failure to pay health insurance premiums and failure to
    provide proof of life insurance. On appeal to this Court, the husband argued that the trial
    court erred by finding him in civil contempt without finding that he had the ability to
    comply with the orders he allegedly violated. 
    Id. Because the
    husband had already
    “cured his contemptuous conduct” by paying the premiums and providing proof of
    insurance, we held that “the issue of civil contempt is moot.” 
    Id. at 418.
    In Pfister v. Searle, No. M2000-01921-COA-R3-JV, 
    2001 WL 329535
    , at *2
    (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2001), the trial court found a mother in civil contempt and
    ordered her jailed until she delivered the parties’ child for visitation. The mother was
    released when the child was produced the next day. 
    Id. at *4.
    On appeal, the mother
    argued that the evidence did not support a finding that she willfully violated the order
    because it was confusing. 
    Id. We held
    that “because the [mother] complied with the
    court’s order to produce her child, thereby purging her civil contempt, that judgment is
    now moot, and we decline to address it.” 
    Id. at *1.
    “The validity of the trial court’s order
    finding her in civil contempt [was] moot.” 
    Id. at *4.
    See also In re A.G., No. M2007-
    1
    Unlike civil contempt, “[s]anctions for criminal contempt are generally both punitive and
    unconditional in nature, designed to punish past behavior, not to coerce directly compliance with a court
    order or influence future behavior.” 
    Baker, 417 S.W.3d at 436
    . Criminal contempt is often regarded as a
    crime. 
    Id. “[W]hen a
    court imposes a definite term of confinement for conduct constituting criminal
    contempt, the contemnor cannot shorten the term by agreeing not to continue in the behavior that resulted
    in his confinement.” 
    Id. -7- 0799-COA-R3-JV,
    2009 WL 3103843
    , at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2009) (concluding
    that a mother’s challenge to her sentence for criminal contempt was moot when she had
    already served the sentence and it was “unclear what meaningful relief lies within the
    power of this court to give her at this point”); Boggs v. Boggs, No. M2006-00810-COA-
    R3-CV, 
    2007 WL 2353156
    , at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2007) (deeming the
    appellant’s arguments regarding two civil contempt findings moot where the appellant
    paid the amount ordered and was released from custody).
    “Generally, whether a claim is moot involves a question of law that this Court will
    review de novo.” Huggins v. McKee, 
    500 S.W.3d 360
    , 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (citing
    All. for Native Am. Indian Rights in Tenn., Inc. v. Nicely, 
    182 S.W.3d 333
    , 338-39 (Tenn.
    Ct. App. 2005)). “The general rule remains that appellate courts ‘should dismiss appeals
    that have become moot regardless of how appealing it may be to do otherwise.’” 
    Hooker, 437 S.W.3d at 417
    (quoting Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC v. Putnam
    Co., 
    301 S.W.3d 196
    , 210 (Tenn. 2009)). However, even if a case may have become
    moot, “before dismissing it a court should consider whether to exercise its discretion to
    apply one of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine.” 
    Id. The Tennessee
    Supreme Court has identified “a limited number of exceptional circumstances that make
    it appropriate to address the merits of an issue notwithstanding its ostensible mootness[.]”
    City of Memphis v. Hargett, 
    414 S.W.3d 88
    , 96 (Tenn. 2013). Those “exceptional
    circumstances” are:
    (1) when the issue is of great public importance or affects the
    administration of justice; (2) when the challenged conduct is capable of
    repetition and evades judicial review; (3) when the primary dispute is moot
    but collateral consequences persist; and (4) when a litigant has voluntarily
    ceased the challenged conduct.
    
    Id. (citing Lufkin
    v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 
    336 S.W.3d 223
    , 226 (Tenn. 2011)).
    The only exception arguably relevant in this case is “when the primary subject of
    the dispute has become moot but collateral consequences to one of the parties remain.”
    
    Hooker, 437 S.W.3d at 417
    -18. This exception is “applicable in the court’s discretion.”
    
    Id. The court
    “may refrain from dismissing an appeal as moot when collateral
    consequences remain following the dismissal of the appeal.” Hudson v. Hudson, 
    328 S.W.3d 863
    , 865-66 (Tenn. 2010). This exception to the mootness doctrine applies if
    “prejudicial collateral consequences” are shown to exist. 
    Id. at 866.
    “Such collateral
    consequences can include the continued effect of an order that has expired or is invalid.”
    
    Id. In the
    case at bar, members of this Court asked Wife at oral argument why this
    appeal should not be dismissed as moot when Wife had purged herself of contempt and
    been released from incarceration. Wife argued that the issue of contempt was not moot
    -8-
    because (1) the contempt finding was a “blight” on her record, (2) the contempt finding
    might be used against her in the divorce trial, and (3) an issue of attorney’s fees had been
    reserved in the trial court.
    We begin with her argument regarding attorney’s fees. In Dockery v. Dockery,
    No. E2009-01059-COA-R3-CV, 
    2009 WL 3486662
    , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29,
    2009), we considered whether a husband’s appeal challenging his contempt conviction
    was moot when he had already completed his jail sentence. In addition to the jail
    sentence, the husband was also ordered to pay the wife’s attorney’s fees. 
    Id. *2 at
    n.2.
    As such, we held that his “entire appeal” was not moot, but any challenge to the length of
    his sentence was moot because it no longer presented a justiciable controversy. 
    Id. at *2
    n.2, *10. Unlike Dockery, however, the trial court in this case did not order Wife to pay
    Husband’s attorney’s fees in connection with the finding of contempt. As we noted in a
    related appeal of a recusal motion Wife filed in this case, “Following the trial court’s oral
    ruling on the motion for restraining order, Wife essentially invited the trial court to find
    her in contempt after stating that she would not follow the trial court’s order.” Stark v.
    Stark, No. W2019-00901-COA-T10B-CV, 
    2019 WL 2515925
    , at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App.
    June 18, 2019). Thus, Husband never filed a petition for contempt or sought attorney’s
    fees in connection with contempt. The trial court’s order granting Husband’s petition for
    a restraining order reserved a ruling on his request for attorney’s fees in connection with
    his request for a restraining order. As a result, it is not necessary to address the
    contempt finding on appeal due to any outstanding issue regarding attorney’s fees, which
    was present in Dockery.
    Wife’s arguments regarding the “blight” on her record and the possible use of the
    contempt order in the divorce trial are likewise unconvincing.2 Another panel of this
    Court rejected a similar argument in Bradford v. Bradford, No. 86-262-II, 
    1986 WL 2874
    , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 1986). The appellant was no longer incarcerated
    under the court’s contempt order but insisted that the issues on appeal were not moot
    because he “may continue to suffer consequences as a result” of the contempt finding.
    
    Id. The appellant
    argued that the contempt finding might be used against him in a
    custody matter or a subsequent contempt proceeding. 
    Id. We found
    that argument
    “highly speculative.” 
    Id. This Court
    was “not persuaded that the finding of contempt
    may still have ‘some practical effect’ in the future which would keep defendant’s case
    from being moot.” 
    Id. Additionally, in
    State v. Jenkins, No. C/A 157, 
    1989 WL 124950
    , at *1 (Tenn. Ct.
    App. Sept. 13, 1989), an individual was held in contempt for failure to submit to paternity
    blood testing but purged himself of contempt by submitting to the blood test. On appeal,
    we held that “[his] challenges to the contempt order are moot since no meaningful relief
    can be rendered.” 
    Id. Quoting a
    case from Maryland, the dissenting judge in Jenkins
    2
    This was a short-term marriage with no children, and neither party requested alimony.
    -9-
    suggested that the issue was not moot because the contempt order would remain in court
    records “for all to see.” 
    Id. at *2
    . Although recognizing that the contempt order “may
    not ever be utilized” and that its “effect beyond mere existence is not known, and may be
    none,” the dissent took the position that the mere existence of a contempt order was
    enough to give substance to the appeal. 
    Id. However, the
    majority opinion was to the
    contrary. Thus, Tennessee courts have not recognized the type of vague and speculative
    interests asserted by Wife as sufficient “prejudicial collateral consequences.”3
    Absent a showing by Wife of specific prejudicial collateral consequences resulting
    from the trial court’s finding of contempt, we decline to apply the collateral consequences
    exception to the mootness doctrine. See 
    Hudson, 328 S.W.3d at 866
    (dismissing an
    appeal as moot because the father “ha[d] not shown that we should refrain from
    dismissing his appeal as moot” by describing “prejudicial collateral consequences
    necessary to invoke this exception to the mootness doctrine”).
    IV.    CONCLUSION
    For the aforementioned reasons, this appeal is dismissed. Costs of this appeal are
    taxed to the appellant, Pamela Stark, for which execution may issue if necessary.
    _________________________________
    CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE
    3
    We recognize that in some jurisdictions, special exceptions have been created in cases involving
    attorneys held in criminal contempt. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 
    306 Ga. App. 844
    , 846 (2010)
    (explaining the general rule that an appeal of a criminal contempt order is moot upon the contemnor’s
    release from jail, but in Georgia, “an exception to this rule has been made in cases involving an
    attorney”); see also Nakell v. Attorney Gen. of N. Carolina, 
    15 F.3d 319
    , 322-23 (4th Cir. 1994)
    (distinguishing a case involving “a layperson not subject to professional discipline” from one involving
    an attorney who could face possible discipline as a result of a criminal contempt conviction); Matter of
    Betts, 
    927 F.2d 983
    , 988 (7th Cir. 1991) (“In the case of an attorney convicted of criminal contempt of
    court, the conviction may have collateral consequences, such as action by the state attorney registration
    and disciplinary authority.”)
    However, a civil contempt order “does not entail the kind of collateral consequences that a
    criminal conviction entails.” S.E.C. v. Res. Dev. Int’l, 291 F. App’x 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2008); see also
    U.S. v. Johnson, 
    801 F.2d 597
    , 600 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that collateral legal consequences “are difficult
    to establish as to a civil contempt”). The Florida Court of Appeals declined to dismiss an attorney’s
    appeal of a criminal contempt conviction as moot in Keezel v. State, 
    358 So. 2d 247
    , 248-49 (Fla. Dist.
    Ct. App. 1978), recognizing the “adverse legal consequences” flowing from the criminal conviction.
    However, the Court declined to apply the same rule to an attorney who was only found in civil contempt
    in O’Connor v. O’Connor, 
    415 So. 2d 902
    , 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), deeming his appeal moot. The
    Court distinguished Keezel and found its reasoning “not persuasive in this civil contempt matter, wherein
    the appellant is an attorney.” 
    Id. at n.1.
    Here, Wife was only held in civil contempt, rather than criminal
    contempt, and she did not present any argument on appeal regarding the possibility of disciplinary action,
    so we decline to find any collateral consequences based on her status as an attorney.
    - 10 -