In Re: Relinquishment of A.F. Appeal of: J.F. ( 2016 )

J-S58001-16 & J-S58002-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF A.F. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.F., MOTHER
No. 228 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Orphans' Court at No.: A-62 of 2015
IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF D.F. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.F., MOTHER
No. 229 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Orphans' Court at No.: A-63 of 2015
IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF N.F. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.F., MOTHER
No. 230 MDA 2016
J-S58001-16 & J-S58002-16
Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Orphans' Court at No.: A-64 of 2015
IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF T.F. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.F., MOTHER
No. 231 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Orphans' Court at No.: A-65 of 2015
IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF D.F. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: R.F., FATHER
No. 242 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Orphans' Court at No.: 2015-00063
IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF A.F., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
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J-S58001-16 & J-S58002-16
APPEAL OF: R.F., FATHER
No. 243 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Orphans' Court at No.: A-62 of 2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BOWES, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 2016
In these consolidated and related appeals1, J.F. (Mother) appeals from
the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County entered
January 5, 2016, that terminated her parental rights to her daughter, A.F.,
born in August of 2007; her son, D.F., born in March of 2003; her son, N.F.,
born in May of 2006; and her son, T.F., born in March of 2003 (Children).
Also in these appeals, R.F. (Father) appeals from the orders of the trial
court, entered on January 5, 2016, that terminated his parental rights to
A.F. and D.F. We affirm.2
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
This Court consolidated docket numbers 228, 229, 230 and 231 MDA 2016,
sua sponte, on March 11, 2016, and docket numbers 242 and 243 MDA
2016, sua sponte, on March 21, 2016. All six appeals are related because
they pertain to the same parents.
2
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of E.A., the biological
father of T.F. and N.F. E.A. did not appeal those terminations.
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J-S58001-16 & J-S58002-16
The Lackawanna County Office of Youth and Family Services (YFS)
filed petitions to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the
Children on September 24, 2015. The trial court aptly summarized the
events that led YFS to file that petition in its opinion entered March 21,
2016. We direct the reader to that opinion for the facts of this case.
The trial court held a hearing on YFS’ petitions on December 16, 2015.
Testifying at that hearing, in addition to Mother, were YFS caseworker,
Christin Wormuth; Scranton Counseling Center therapist, Joelle Budd; YFS
visitation worker, Catrina Romano; YFS caseworker, Stephanie Herne; and
the Children’s grandmother, M.A. Father was incarcerated at the time of the
hearing; he did not testify. The trial court entered its orders terminating
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) on January 5, 2016. Mother filed her
notices of appeal and statements of errors complained of on appeal on
February 4, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). Father filed his notices of
appeal and statements of errors complained of on appeal on that same date.
The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 21, 2016. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(ii).
Mother raises the following questions for our review:
A. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or
manifestly abused its discretion in determining [that YFS]
sustained its burden of proving the termination of Mother’s
parental rights is warranted under Sections 2511(a)(1),
2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5), and/or 2511(a)(8) of the Adoption Act?
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J-S58001-16 & J-S58002-16
B. Even if this Court concludes [YFS] established statutory
grounds for the termination of Mother’s parental rights, whether
the trial court nevertheless erred as a matter of law and/or
manifestly abused its discretion in determining [that YFS]
sustained its additional burden of proving the termination of
Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the Children?
(Mother’s Brief, at 5) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Father raises the following questions for our review:
A. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or sufficiently
abused its discretion in determining [that YFS] presented
sufficient evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of [ ]
Father’s parental rights under Section 1511(a)(8) [sic] of the
Adoption Act?
B. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or sufficiently
abused its discretion in determining [that YFS] presented
sufficient evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of [ ]
Father’s parental rights under Section 1511(a)(1) [sic] of the
Adoption Act?
C. Even if this Court determines [that YFS] presented sufficient
evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of [ ] Father’s
parental rights under Sections 1511(a)(1) [sic] and/or Section
1511(a)(8) [sic] of the Adoption Act whether the trial court
nevertheless erred as matter of law and/or manifestly abused its
discretion in determining that termination of [ ] Father’s parental
rights is in the best interest of the [C]hild[ren]?
D. Even if this Court determines [that YFS] presented sufficient
evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of [ ] Father’s
parental rights under Sections 1511(a)(1) [sic] and/or Section
1511(a)(8) [sic] of the Adoption Act whether the trial court
nevertheless erred as matter of law and/or manifestly abused its
discretion in determining that the conditions that led to removal
have not been remedied and reunification of parent and child
was not imminent at the time of the hearing[?]
(Father’s Brief, at 9).
Our standard of review is as follows:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our
scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence
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J-S58001-16 & J-S58002-16
presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal
conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will
reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked
competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s
decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we have stated:
Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by
competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court
even though the record could support an opposite result.
We are bound by the findings of the trial court
which have adequate support in the record so long
as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard
for competent and credible evidence. The trial court
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility
determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.
Though we are not bound by the trial court’s
inferences and deductions, we may reject its
conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are
clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s
sustainable findings.
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
Here, the trial court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We have
examined the opinion entered by the trial court on March 21, 2016, in light
of the record in this matter and are satisfied that the opinion is a complete
and correct analysis of this case. Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the
Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County that terminated Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
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J-S58001-16 & J-S58002-16
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/30/2016
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Circulated 09/08/2016 04:14 PM
. - 1
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JN THECOURT OF
.f
C01VIMON PLEAS OF .
LACKA W A.l'Jt'IA.COUNTY -
ORPHANS' COURT
No. A-64-2015.
No. A-62-2015
RELINQtnSHlv.IENT OF N.F., AF., No. A-65-2015
T.F. andD.F. No. A-63-201)
--ME1\10RANDUM
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Bisignani Moyle, .T.
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The present matter was before this Court on December 16, 201. 5 pursuant to a
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Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights (hereinafter "TPR"), filed bv the
:-:--: 11 c. Office of Youth and Family Services (hereinafter "Agency') on September 24, 2015. The •
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t;· . i· .5 .
(j ro.i:ifilr children involved_in this proceeding are T.F., N.F., AF., and D.F. The biological
U)
(1
:·1 pai~nts
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of T.F. and N.F. areJ7i25Ji'la(herejuafter "Mother") and£ In? I. fbe
.i . ·.I
biological parents ~f AF. and D.f. are Mut1....,1. and -~ - . ,:·,
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.- ...
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"F..kther"). Mothe. 811cl Father have appealed the order dated December 23, 2015
. _J
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I terminating .their parental rights. Mr. -- did not attend the proceedings, nor did he
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I take an appeal. As such we will not address any issues relating to Mr. t 53 "ta
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 23, 2013, an Agency caseworker arrived at the_
I and found the three (3) older children home alone1. The Agency had been involved with
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This was the second time, during foe week. ofJuly 23, 2013, the children had been found to be at the
home without adult supervision. Caseworker W .mnuth testified Caseworker Gleason arrived at the home
I and found the minor children alone earlier in the week as Weil, but the minor children Were not removed a,
the time.
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the family since September of 2010 relative issues relating to a lack of parental
_,/ supervision. (N.T. 12/16/15 atp. 12.) On July 23, 2013 the minor children were removed
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from Mother's care. Father was not living with Mother at the time of the removal. Id. at
p._42. His whereabouts were unknown. Id. The Agency twice undertook diligent
searches to find Father: one in August 2013 and the second in July 2014. Id. He was
ultimately located in November 2014, while incarcerated at the Lackawanna County
I Prison, Id. Between January and April 23, ~015, the Agency was trying to establish
I! Father's paternity ofD.F. and AF. -, Id. at p. 56. Because Father had used multiple aliases,
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including dates of birth and social security numbers, the Agency sought a DNA test to
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establish paternity of AF. andD.F .. Agency caseworker Cristin Wormuth testifie~ that
DNA testing was also do:t?-e at the request of Father. Id. at p. 49. On April 23, 2015, the . -
DNA testing established Father to be biological father of AF. and D.F ..
At the time of the filing of the Petition for Termination for Parental Rights, Father-was
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I incarcerated on a parole violation.2 By way of brief background, he-was originally
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arrested in February 2011 for Endangering the Welfare of a Child. On that date, Scranton
I Police Officers responded to the home and forn1d the children home alone: Mother was at _
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I work on that day and consequently was not arrested. She was, however, determined to be: _
an indicted perpetrator by omission because ofthis incident. Id. at p. 32. The children
2
From. the testimony presented it appeared Father absconded from. probation and/or parole and was not
located until he was placed at the Lackawanna County Prison in November 2014. Id. at p. 22. Toe only
testimony presented on this issue was that Father was serving eighteen (18) to thirty-six (36) months. It is
not clear from the testimony if the sentence he is currently serving is for a parole violation or a new
offense. ·
2
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I were placed in foster care at that time and were retumed to Mother approximately two or
I three months later. 3
'
A. ATRER)
Ms. Wormuth was the children's caseworker from July 2014 until March 2015.4
. .
Id. at p. 7. Accordingto her testimony, during her tenure as a caseworker, Father had no
contact with his children.: Id. at p. 14. P~or t_o locating Father, the only goal for him on
the permanency plan was for
.
him,, to contact the Agency. Id._ at p. 16. Wormuth testified
she rated compliance for Father as "none". Id. at p.18. Wormuth testified she sent a
permanency plan to Father's last known address, where Father's mother lived, in __
September 2014. The regular mail was not returned. Id. at p. 53. She later mailed ·a plan
to bim atthe Lackawanna County Prison in November 2014. Id. Father never wrote or
called the caseworker seeking information about his minor children. Id. In fact,
Wormuth first met Father when he was transported to court to attend a Permanency
Review Hearing on January 12, 2015. Id. at p. 55.
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. · Father has not had any contact with the ·cbildren since sometime prior to July 23,
2013, other than seeing them in court at the January 2015 hearing. The children have I
been in foster care continuously since July 23, 2013. At the time of the hearing, they had
. been in placement for thirty (30) months.
3
The caseworker did not offer testimony as to what date the chlldren were returned to Mother. However,
she testified they were returned after two (2) or three (3) months. Id. at p. 46.
4
Wormuth testified the Agency has been involved with the family since 2010. Id. at p. 47. She further
testified Father had knowledge of the Agency's involvement since that time. Id.
3,
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B. OTHER
The Agency called three caseworkers during the December 16, 2015 hearing:
Wormuth, Catrina Romano, and Stephanie Heme. Romano was th~ supervised visitation
'·' .
caseworker from January 15, 2'014 through December 15, 2015. Id. at p.· 101. Heme
replaced Romano as the supervised visitation caseworker and began observing visitation ·
in February of2015 until the time of the hearing. Id. atp. 120.
During the pendency of this action, all of Mother's visits have been supervised at
the Agency. Wormuth testified there were continued concerns about visitation because
Mother did not engage the children. She testified Mother had to be directed to play with ·
her children, and to stop texting on her phone. Id. at p. 18. During visits, Mother would
say inappropriate things in front of the children. --Specifically, she would talk about the
·. case which caseworkers asked her not to do. Id. at p. 19.
Wormuth further testified in her opinion, Mother demonstrated a lack of empathy
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. for the minor children and did not have a good understanding of age-appropriate
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expectations for them. Id: at p. 18. For example; Mother referred to D .F. as "Satan"
I because he was "acting out''. Id. at p. 22. At the time, D.F. was just three (3) years old. I
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I Id. at p. 24. She also told AF. she was a "demon" because she looked like D.F., and they I
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· had the same father. Id. at p. 23. Mother was repeatedly asked to stop calling the children
II
"Satan" and "Demon." Id. Although the children did not express much of a reaction,
they usually ran away. Id. at P: 24.,
Wormuth testified she tried to get Mother to play with the children, but she would
not comply. On one occasion, Mother stood next to the door while the children played in
the yard. Id. On another occasion, Mother told D.F. that she would not visit him
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anymore if he did nof;J;t).(e her. D.F. ran away. Id. Again, he was three (3) years old at
the time.
The next caseworker called to testify was Ms. Romano. Shesupervised weekly
. visits between Mother and the minor children. In total, Romano supervised twenty-seven
· visits. Id. at p. 102. Mother cancelled SL"'{ visitsbecause she was ill. Id. Romano
testified that Mother struggled in the visits because she lacked empathy for her children.
Id. at p. 103. She, too.xlid not have age-appropriate expectations for the children and
struggled with parent-child rol~ reversal. Id. · She often had inappropriate conversations ...
· and involvement with her children. For example, Romano testified that Mother once
discussed her job at a nursing home and how she watched people pass away in front of
her Minor Children. Id. at p. · 104. She also spent one visit making a puzzle by herself.
Id. When Romano suggested she play with her children, Mother indicated she was in the : .
middle of the puzzle. Id. Later, Romano suggested Mother get on the floor and play
blocks with the minor children, but Mother stated that she did not want to get her pants
dirty. Id.
During another visit, Mother sat at a table while the children ran through the
hallways at the visitation center. When Romano asked her where D.F., the youngest
child, was located, Mother said she did not know. Id. Romano expressed the importance
of knowing where her children were at all times, but Mother became upset with Romano .
· Id. .at p. 105. At times during visits, Mother would yell at Romano in front of the
. children, which would cause the children to become upset and cry. Id. The children .
would run to the foster parents and ask them why their Mother was so upset, Id.
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I Mother expressed that she did not want to participate in any services outside of
the Agency. Id. at p. 103-104. 'Ultimately, she agreed to go to the EOTC parenting
program. Id. When Romano asked Mother about her experience with EOTC, she stated
, that she did not learn anything in her parenting program and that all they did was watch .
movies. Id. at p. 104.
Romano testified about an incident that took place in the courthouse on
September 29, 2015. The parties had assembled for a hearing on that date. During the
hearing, Romano was called to testify about how Mother's visits were progressing. Id. at
p. 116-117. After the hearing, Mother was angry and upset and started screaming in the. ·
hallway. Id. She told the minor children it was the~ fault. Id. N.F. became particularly
upset and hid in a closet in the hallway located on the second floor of the courthouse .. Id,
Romano testified it took several hours to coax him out his hiding place. Id. Ultimately..
· the foster mother was summoned to help soothe N.F. 'and was able to persuade him from
the closet. Id. at p. 108. Mother was supposed to have a visit that same day, but it was.
cancelled. Id. at p. 107.
The next witness to testify was the visitation supervisor, Ms. Heme. She
observed twenty-one visits at the visitation center. Id. at p. 121. Mother missed two
visits on September 21, 2015 and October 19, 2015 because of training for her job and
she cancelled two other visits on March 23, 2015 and August 3, 2015. Id. at p. 126. I .
Heme testified Mother never requested additional visits or make up visits. Id. at p. 126-
127.
Heme further testified that Mother did not progress throughout her tenure on the
case. Id. Mother continued to be self-focused and not engaging with the cbildren. For
6
example, when the children started talking about subjects like weekend activities or
homework, Mother redirected the conversations to other topics like her cats, her personal
life, or her new job, which tended to override what the children had tosay. Id. at p. 121.
Heme performed both redirection and modeling behavior for Mother. Id. at p.
122. She explained to Mother that if something was not appropriate for the children, she.
attempted to redirect Mother's conversation. Id. However, Mother did not usually accept
such redirection. Id. at p. 123. For example, Mother continued to question T.F. about
things in bis foster home and doctor's appointments for AF. Id. at p. 122. Heme told
..
Mother it was inappropriate to ask the minor children about issues relating to foster care. '.
Id. Mother also called D.F. "Satan" three different times and referred to AF. as a
"demon child." Id. at p. 123-124. Mother told Heme "it was a joke" and did not accept
Heme's efforts of redirection. Mother told D .F. that she was going to hang him from a
tree "so that I know where you're at at all times." Id. at p. 125.
Overall, Heme's visits were line-of-sight visits. Id. at p. 127. The visits never
progressed from Iine-of-sightto general supervision visits because of Mother's
inappropriate comments, her refusal to accept redirection, her inappropriate expectations • •
and her lack of empathy for the children. Id. at p. 128.
Toe next witness called to testify was Joelle Budd. Budd was employed by the
Scranton Counseling Center as a therapist for adult outpatients. Since Scranton
Counseling Center was a goal/task on Mother's permanency plan, Budd met with Mother
on July 15, 2015 and September 1, 2015 for talk therapy sessions. Id. at p. 74, 76. She
has been assigned as the therapist for Mother since April of 2015. Id. As part of that
therapy, she offers Mother cognitive behavioral therapy. Id. at p. 75.
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• 1 Over a period of fourteen months, Mother was scheduled for fourteentherapy
./ sessions at Scranton Counseliri.g Center. Id. at p. 78 .. However, Mother only showed for
seven of the scheduled visits. Id. at p. 78. Two visits were canceledby Mother prior to
the scheduled appointment. She did not appear for the other five visits. Id. at p. 85. Of
the seven therapy sessions that she attended, two were with Budd. 5 The first was on July
15, 2015 .and the second was on September
.
1, 2015. Id. Mother's first visit with Budd
was designed for them to get to know each other, to discuss why Mother was sent to
therapy and to help develop Mother's necessary skills. Id. at p. 83. Mother was able to
select which skills she wanted to improve. She selected parenting skills and coping with ·.
...
depression. Id. at p. 84. Budd offered Mother anxiety management techniques and they
agreed to work on Mother's anger management. Id. at p. 83. The second visit on .
September 1, 2015 was cut short because Mother said she was in a hurry. Id. at p. 82.
Budd testified that nothing was accomplished, Budd recommended monthly visits, but
Mother only attended twice. As such, Mother was never discharged from Scranton
Counseling Center. Ji
During the two (2) visits Budd had with Mother, Mother stated that she was
forced to come to therapy to work on her pro bl ems so that she could get her children.
back. Id. at p. 82. Mother stated how she got along with her children and she knew how
to behave in her presence. She stated she was the only one who knew how to handle
them. Id. at p. 83. ~other seemed motivated to regain custody of her children but
seemed aggravated to have to attend therapy. Id. atp. 90.
5
Budd did not start working at the Scranton Counseling Center until April of 2015. Id. at n. 86. Some of.
the fourteen (14) visits predated Budd's tenure at the Scranton Counseling Center.
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Wormuth offered testimony about Mother's compliance with Scranton.
Counseling Center. Throughout Wormuth's tenure, . there were periods of time when
Mother would attend counseling. She would see a doctor and 'a therapist. _She was
diagnosed with depression and anxiety but told Wormuth she would not take any
medication. There were times when she would attend her therapist appointments. Other
times, she did not want to attend her appointments. Id. at p. 28 .
. Throughout Wormuth's tenure, she rated mother's compliance at times as
"substantial". Id. at p. 17. There were other times, however, when Wormuth rated her
compliance as moderate because she was not attending Scranton Counseling. Id. .
Mother's progress was later rated as minimal because of continued concerns about
visitation. Id. at p. 18. Mother completed the Incredible Years Program, but Wormuth ..
did not see any correlation with things she may have learned at visitation. Id. at p. 20. In
fact, Mother told different people that she did not learn anything in the Incredible Years
Program. Id. at p. 29. Mother stated that they. "really did not learri anything" and "they
just watch movies during the program." Id. at p. 29. Wormuth testified that this was a
continuing issue throughout the case because, inher opinion, the Incredible Years
program by the EOTC would help Mother make progress and better interact with the
cbildren. Id.
Currently, T.F. and A.F. are placed in the same foster home. They have been in
their current placement since July 7, 2014. D.F. and N.F. are currently placed in kinship
foster care. In Worrnuth's opinion, the minor children continue to do well in their current
placement settings. Id. at p. 10-11. · The placement settings are safe and appropriate and
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continue to be the least restrictive environment. Id. Wormuth also testified that the
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children were calm and comfortable in their settings. Id. at p. 26.
T.F. is doing well in school and A.F. is struggling. A.F.-has struggled with
retaining information and reading. Id. However, AF. was born prematurely. She was
taken to a pediatric neurologist and had early intervention when she was a baby. Id. D.F.
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was also born prematurely. Id. He used to attend Pediatria, which is a daycare for
medically fragile children. He is also diagnosed with asthma. D.F. was eighteen (18)
months old when he was placed _in foster care. Id. He has been in placement for more
than two-thirds of his life.
Romano testified that in her opinion Motherdoes not have a strong bond with her
children. Id. at p. 129. She was focused on what she needed to do, but did not focus on
· the minor children's needs. Id. For example, if the children asked Mother to help with
homework, she would change the subject and redirect it toward herself. Id. at p. 106.
I Romano stated that Mother did not interact with the children in a way that they preferred.·
Id. If they asked her a question, she did not respond to them. Id.
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Heme also testified on the issue of bond. She stated that it appeared that the
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children would like to see Mother, and they appeared attached to her. Id. at p. 129.
However, the minor children seemed more attached to her than she was toward the
children. Id. Heme offered the following example:
[I]nstead of carrying on conversations and hugging the children and kissing the
Minor Children, it's talking about Mother's life, and what Mother is doing outside
of the visits, and what Mother does on holidays, instead of specific questions of
"Tell me about your holidays.", "What have you done?", "What did you get?",
"Vi/hat do you like?".
Id. at p.129.
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DISCUSSION
.r
The statutory grounds for termination of parental rights are set forth in 23 Pa. C.S.
§ 2511, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
"(a) General Rule - The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be
terminated after a petition [isJ filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months
immediately preceding the filing. of the petition either has · evidenced a
. settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.'
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of the
parent has caused the. child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for bis physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent. · ·
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or
under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six
months, the conditions which led to the removal or placementof the child
continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions
. within a reasonable period of tii:o.e, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time
and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or
under a voluntary agreement with an agency, twelve months or more have.
elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the. conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
(b) Other considerations - The court, in terminating the rights of a parent,
shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not
be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if
found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed ... the court shall not consider any effort by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving notice of the filing of the petition."
11
In determining whether to terminate the rights of a parent, both the statute and
Pennsylvania case law require a two-pronged analysis. 23 Pa.C.S. & 2511; In Re .
Adoption of J.M .. 991 A.2d 321, 323 (Pa.Super. 2010). First, theCourt must find, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the parent's conduct warrants the termination of
parental rights. 23 Pa.C.S. § 251 l(a); In Re L.M .. 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Once this burden has been met, the Court must then engage in a "best interests" analysis . ·;
to determine whether terminating the parent's rights would properly serve the welfare and
needs of the child . 23 Pa C. S. § 2511 (b); In Re L.M., 923 A.2d at 511.
In the case at hand, with respect to the first prong, the Agency has alleged Mother's.:
parental rights should be terminated pursuantto 23 Pa.C.S. § 251 l(a),(1).(2),(5), and (8).
The Agency has alleged Father's parental rights should beterminated pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 251 l(a),(1),(2),(5). and (8). Additionally, the Agency has alleged statutory
grounds for termination exist for both parents pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 251 l(b).
· APPLICATION
A. OTHER
This Court finds the Agency has satisfied its burden of proof by establishing, by
clear and convincing evidence, Mother's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to .
. each subsection of23 Pa.C.S. & 25_1 l(a) alleged. The facts in this case clearly support the
Agency's petition. Due to a lack of parental supervision, .the Agency had been involved
in this case since 2010. In February 2011, Scranton Police Officers responded to the
home to find T.F., N.F., B.D,d AF. home alone. 6. At the time, the minor children were
seven (7), four (4 ), and three (3) years of age, respectively. Father was arrested for
6
D.F. had notyet been born.
12
Endangering the Welfare of Children. Mother was found to be an indicated perpetrator
of abuse/neglect and the children were placed in foster care. They were returned to
Mother's care two or three months later. The Agency continuedto provide services to
the family. During the week of July 23, 2013, caseworker Lindsey Gleason made two
unannounced ·visits to the home and found the three older children home alone on both
occasions.' On the second incident, on July 23, 2013, the children were removed and
placed into foster care, where they have remained for the past thirty months.
During the pendency of the ?a.se, Mother was requested to attend Scranton
Counseling Center, attend parenting classes at the EOTC, and visit with her children ..
Unfortunately, her compliance with the Scranton Counseling Center was sporadicat best,
leaving Mother with unaddressed mental health issues contributing to her lack of . ·
progress. Furthermore, while Mother completed the Incredible Years Program, she did
not demonstrate any learned behaviors or skills during her visits.
Mother and the children have been visiting each week at the visitation center for
thirty months. In all that time, Mother's visits have never progressed from anything but
line-of-sight supervision. Three separate agency workers testified about their
observations ofI:vfother's unwillingness to make progress during the visits. Despite
parenting classes, caseworker modeling and redirection, Mother still engages in behaviors ·
that cause caseworkers concern. As required for termination under 23 Pa.C.S. §
251l(a)(2), Mother's actions have evidenced an unwillingness to comply, and her
children have been denied permanency for thirty months. Mother's actions have
demonstrated continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of the parent that have
7
D.F. was eighteen (18) months old at the time and was at day care during the two (2)
unannounced visits.
13
caused the child to be without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary
for the minor child. The conditions which led to the removal or placement of the children .
continue to exist, and as such termination of parental rights wouldbest serve the needs
and welfare of the children. 8
With respect to 23 Pa. C. S. § 2511 (b), this Court finds by clear and convincing
evidence the minor children's best interests would be served by terminating Mother's
parental rights. Mother has not contributed to their developmental, physical, or
emotional needs/ welfare, nor has she effectively remedied such conditions throughout
the pendency of this case.
Romano testified, in her opinion, Mother does not have a strong bond with her
children. Mother was focused on what she needed to do, rather than focusing on the.
needs of the children. Romano stated that Mother did not interact with them in a way that:
they preferred. Heme reinforced Romano's opinion by stating the children appeared
more attached to her than she was toward the children. Wormuth also testified the
children are settled, calm, and continue to do well in their current placement settings.
They respond positively to their foster parents.
The children have been in their current placement since July 7, 2013. (N.T.
12/16/15 at p. 39J The placement settings are safe and appropriate, and they continue to
be the least restrictive environment for the Minor Children. The primary considerations
of the children, including their developmental, physical, emotional needs, and welfare,
8
In order to satisfy its burden of proof, the Agency need only present sufficient evidence
to satisfy one of the four prongs selected. Because we find that have met their burden
under subsection (a)(2), we will riot address the remaining subsections.
14
favor termination of parental rights because of their current relationships with the foster
parents and their progress in the placement settings ...
B. . ..:, .. ~-~ • ·.-.:. . . ' -· ·- - _. . \,.. . .:J. ATHER
The facts in this case clearly establish by clear and convincing evidence Father's
parental rights should be terminated. The Agency has been involved in this family's case
since 2010. Father was living with the family at the time of their initial involvement arid
as such was aware of such involvement. In February 2011, Father was arrested for
Endangering the Welfare of Children for leaving the minor children home alone. The
Agency continued to remain involved. In July 2013, the minor children were discovered .
home alone and again placed in foster care. At that time, Father's whereabouts were
unknown and he was no longer living with the family. The Agency, !despite conducting
I two diligent searches for Father, was unable to locate him. He was discovered at the
Lackawanna County Prison in November 2014. But for seeing the minor children in
passing at a court hearing on January 12, 2015, Father has had no contact, no telephone
· calls, letters, or visits for at leastthirty months. Father's last known contact occurred
sometime prior to their placement on July 23, 2013. Furthermore, Father has been
incarcerated since November 2014 and remains incarcerated. His release date is
unknown. During the entire pendency of the case, Father never once contacted the
Agency to inquire about his children.
As such, the evidence overwhelmingly supports termination pursuant to each of
the subsections in 23 Pa.C.S. § 251 l(a),(1),(2,)(5), and (8).
With respect to· subsection (b), this Court finds it is in the best interest of the
minor children to terminate Father's parental rights. Father has had no contribution to the
15
developmental, physical, or emotional needs/welfare of the minor children; nor .has
Father ever tried to remedy such conditions throughout his life.
the Minor Children have had no relationship with Father as eividenced by the lack
~f any contact for two and a half years. Furthermore, there is no testimony in the record
establishing Father and children have any relationship. D.F. was just eighteen monthsold
when he was placed into foster care, where he has remained for nearly two-thirds of his
life. It is not known if D.F. even remembers his Father since he has not had contact for
such an extended period of time.
· The placement settings remain safe and appropriate, and they continue to be the
..
least restrictive environment for the minor children. The primary considerations of the
children, including their developmental, physical, emotional needs and welfare, favor·
. termination of parental rights because of their current relationships with the foster parents
and their progress in the placement settings.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion; for the above mentioned reasons, it is the Order of this Court that
the parental rights oft . !_JI with respect to T.F., N.F., AF., and D.F are
TERMJNATED. It is further ORDERED and DECREED the parental rights of--
1 vith respect to AF. and D.F. are TERlv1JJ\rATED.
BY Tiffi COURT
\. _~ _ ./·····11t Dn lJ . J.
Honorable lfiargaret Bisignani Moyle
16