Leroy Lewis v. Maximilian Sandor ( 2021 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 4 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LEROY ALBERT LEWIS, Trustee, No. 20-55100
Marsha Stern Nevada Irrevocable
Spendthrift Trust, D.C. No.
2:18-cv-08615-PSG-JEM
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MAXIMILIAN SANDOR, Trustee, Alpha
Beta Gamma Trust; Trustee, Sunland
Financial Services, AKA Joachim
Steingruebner; DOES, 1-10 Inclusive;
GUNTER ZIELKE, AKA Alex Hamlin,
AKA Merlin Silk, AKA Gunter M. Zielke,
AKA Gunter Maria Zielke; PRAPAPUN
ZIELKE, AKA Prapapun Chaiprasert,
AKA Gigi Zielke; CANDACE HOWELL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, Chief District Judge, Presiding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Submitted May 3, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
LeRoy Lewis, as Trustee of the Marsha Stern Nevada Irrevocable
Spendthrift Trust, timely appeals the district court’s order dismissing his quiet title
action with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
The district court did not have diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332because Lewis only sued Maximilian Sandor in his own name, as trustee of two
trusts with purported interests in the subject property, thus destroying complete
diversity. See Demarest v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 920 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir.
2019); see also Americold Realty Tr. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. 378, 383,
136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016, 194 L. Ed. 2d 71 (2016); Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446
U.S. 458, 465–66, 100 S. Ct. 1779, 1784, 64 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1980). The district
court did not err when it rejected Lewis’s speculative assertion that Sandor falsified
his certificate of naturalization. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d
1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). And though litigants may sometimes cure lack of
subject matter jurisdiction by dismissing the party that defeats diversity of
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2 20-55100
citizenship,1 California law requires that the plaintiff in a quiet title action “name
as defendants the persons having adverse claims that are of record or known to the
plaintiff or reasonably apparent from an inspection of the property.” Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 762.060(b); see also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 762.010; Ranch at the
Falls LLC v. O’Neal, 250 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 597–98 (Ct. App. 2019). Finally, even
if the citizenship of the trusts’ beneficiaries, rather than that of their trustees, were
determinative of diversity jurisdiction here, Lewis did not meet his burden of
showing who the trusts’ beneficiaries are. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994). As a
result, the district court did not err when it held that it lacked diversity jurisdiction
over the action.
Likewise, the district court did not err when it determined that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1367(a). The 2008
default judgment is far too removed from the current proceeding to have provided
the district court with ancillary jurisdiction. See Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349,
354, 116 S. Ct. 862, 867, 133 L. Ed. 2d 817 (1996); Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378–80,
114 S. Ct. at 1676. Moreover, supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367 is inapposite
1
See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571–73, 124
S. Ct. 1920, 1924–25, 158 L. Ed. 2d 866 (2004).
3 20-55100
because this proceeding is separate from the prior action that led to the default
judgment. See Peacock, 516 U.S. at 355, 116 S. Ct. at 867.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the action
with prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833
F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). The district court found that Lewis and his attorney
had engaged in bad faith conduct. Those findings were not clearly erroneous. See
United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1259–63 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Because of that bad faith conduct, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing the action without leave to amend and with prejudice. See Sorosky v.
Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 1987).
AFFIRMED.
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