State v. Corwin ( 2017 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    REBEKAH LYNN CORWIN, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 16-0443
    FILED 12-21-2017
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2011-106624-001
    The Honorable Rosa Mroz, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Terry M. Crist
    Counsel for Appellee
    The Hopkins Law Office, PC, Tucson
    By Cedric Martin Hopkins
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. CORWIN
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Patricia A. Orozco1 joined.
    C A M P B E L L, Judge:
    ¶1           Rebekah Lynn Corwin appeals the superior court’s denial of
    her motion for a new trial. She argues the trial court abused its discretion
    by improperly deferring to the jury’s verdicts. For the reasons explained,
    we disagree and affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2             On the early morning of February 6, 2011, a Scottsdale police
    officer, Christopher Matthew, responded to a “check vehicle” call. The
    police had received reports of a white truck parked on the side of Scottsdale
    Road. Officer Matthew activated his overhead lights and pulled behind the
    truck, which was, at that time, parked in a lane of traffic. He approached
    the driver’s window which was down and attempted to talk to Corwin.
    While trying to engage with her, the officer observed three young children
    in the vehicle, one in the front passenger seat and two in the rear passenger
    compartment. The children appeared to be asleep. During this encounter,
    Corwin twice asked to see Officer Matthew’s identification. He verbally
    confirmed he was a police officer, pointed to his badge, and to the
    emergency lights on his patrol vehicle.
    ¶3            Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the
    difficulty communicating with Corwin, the time of morning (5:30 a.m.), and
    the dangerous way the truck was parked, the officer determined it was
    necessary to check on the children. He instructed Corwin to unlock the
    doors so he could check the welfare of the children. He attempted to open
    the door of Corwin’s truck to check the welfare of the children. Corwin,
    1 The Honorable Patricia A. Orozco, Retired Judge of the Arizona
    Court of Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter
    pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.
    2
    STATE v. CORWIN
    Decision of the Court
    however, drove forward approximately 100 yards, ignoring the officer’s
    commands to stop, and pulled into a parking lot.
    ¶4            Officer Matthew followed Corwin and pulled his patrol
    vehicle behind the truck to execute a second traffic stop, but Corwin started
    backing her truck towards his patrol vehicle. Corwin then pulled into a
    bank drive-thru, heading in through the exit. Officer Matthew followed
    Corwin and, this time exiting his patrol vehicle, again attempted to contact
    Corwin and instruct her to stop the truck. Instead of complying, Corwin
    drove the truck directly at Officer Matthew. Officer Matthew pointed his
    gun at Corwin, to no effect. Corwin accelerated towards him, and he
    holstered his gun and rushed out of the way. After striking the officer’s
    patrol vehicle, Corwin pulled the truck back onto the road, continued 50 or
    60 feet and again stopped in a lane of traffic.
    ¶5             Officer Matthew called for back-up and Maricopa County
    deputies responded. Corwin begun driving again, continuing to ignore
    officers’ various attempts to execute a traffic stop. A police chase ensued,
    which generally took place up and down the same road, and involved
    officers from different agencies. Finally, officers deployed “stop sticks.”
    The stop sticks flattened at least one of her tires, but Corwin continued
    driving, crashing through two separate security gates of a residential
    community.
    ¶6             Additional stop sticks were deployed disabling the remaining
    tires on Corwin’s truck. Corwin continued to drive on the wheel rims. An
    officer positioned her large SUV in front of Corwin and attempted to slow
    the truck down by decelerating in an “S” pattern, blocking the truck from
    passing. After initially decelerating, Corwin collided with the officer’s SUV
    twice, and then rammed into the back of the SUV, which pushed it off the
    side of the road. Corwin continued driving down the road, riding only on
    the vehicle rims with sparks flying.
    ¶7           Eventually, the truck came to a stop when Corwin drove into
    a ditch. Corwin got out of the truck and officers attempted to detain her.
    Corwin would not comply with the officers’ commands. A struggle ensued.
    Corwin continued to kick and flail even after officers deployed a Taser.
    ¶8            Officers were eventually able to restrain Corwin and
    transport her to a jail. Upon arrival at the jail, she continued to be combative
    and officers had to use more restrictive methods of restraint. Officers made
    three attempts to obtain a blood draw, but were unsuccessful because
    Corwin struggled the entire time. About three weeks later Corwin
    3
    STATE v. CORWIN
    Decision of the Court
    underwent a five-drug panel hair follicle test, which yielded a negative
    result for drug use.
    ¶9             The case went to a jury trial, and Corwin presented an
    affirmative defense of guilty except insane pursuant to Arizona Revised
    Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-502(A) (“A person may be found guilty except
    insane if at the time of the commission of the criminal act the person was
    afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that the person did
    not know the criminal act was wrong). Specifically, she claimed that she
    had suffered from a brief psychotic episode during the February 6 incident.
    ¶10            She presented supporting testimony by Dr. DJ Gaughan, a
    court-appointed psychologist, and Dr. Wayne General, a psychologist, who
    each separately performed guilty except insane evaluations of Corwin. Both
    testified that Corwin became delusional two days prior to the February 6
    incident, during a gymnastics event she had attended.2 They further
    testified her delusions continued throughout the February 6 incident, in
    which she also experienced disorganized behavior and speech. They
    opined she had behaved in a confused and erratic manner because her
    delusions caused her to believe that the officers were not real officers, and
    she had acted out of fear. Dr. Gaughan and Dr. General both concluded that
    on February 6, Corwin was suffering from “brief psychotic disorder,” a
    mental disease that met the definition of guilty except insane under A.R.S.
    § 13-502(A). Additionally, Dr. Gaughan and Dr. Wayne concluded, based
    on the hair follicle test and lack of history of drug or alcohol abuse, Corwin
    had not been under the influence of alcohol or drugs. See A.R.S. § 13-502(A)
    (mental disease or defect does not include disorders resulting from
    voluntary intoxication or withdrawal from alcohol or drugs).
    ¶11             In contrast, the State presented testimony from its witness Dr.
    James Youngjohn, a neuropsychologist, who evaluated Corwin four years
    after the incident. Dr. Youngjohn concluded Corwin had not suffered from
    brief psychotic disorder on the day of the incident, or any other mental
    illness that would meet the criteria for guilty except insane pursuant to
    A.R.S. § 13-502(A). Specifically, he testified that he believed a hair follicle
    test is not as reliable as a blood draw because it is a less sensitive test. Thus,
    despite the hair follicle test yielding negative results, he could not rule out
    2 This time period includes February 5, 2011, in which, in Pinal
    County, Corwin was charged with unlawful flight from a law enforcement
    vehicle, a non-dangerous offense. Corwin subsequently entered a guilty
    except insane plea, and the court ordered a stay in the Arizona State
    Hospital. Corwin was released after 46 days.
    4
    STATE v. CORWIN
    Decision of the Court
    that she had suffered from a drug-induced psychotic disorder. He further
    concluded that although Corwin exhibited some of the diagnostic
    symptoms of brief psychotic disorder, such as delusions, she did not exhibit
    others—for example, he did not believe her symptoms lasted more than 24
    hours.
    ¶12           The jury rejected Corwin’s affirmative defense and found her
    guilty of: two counts of aggravated assault, dangerous offenses; two counts
    of aggravated assault, non-dangerous offenses; one count of unlawful flight
    from a law enforcement vehicle, a non-dangerous offense; four counts of
    endangerment, dangerous offenses; and one count of resisting arrest, a non-
    dangerous offense. The jury also found the State had proven one
    aggravating circumstance as to counts 2 and 5.
    ¶13           Corwin moved for a new trial pursuant to Arizona Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 24.1(c)(1), and argued the jury’s verdict—in contrast to
    a guilty except insane verdict—was contrary to the weight of evidence. At
    the sentencing hearing the superior court denied the motion, stating:
    So I did read the briefing, and I will tell you that the jury
    weighed the evidence and apparently they decided to go with
    Dr. Youngjohn’s opinion rather than the other two experts’
    opinion. And I’m not going to substitute my judgment for the
    judgment of the jury no matter how sympathetic Ms. Corwin
    is, and so, unfortunately, I’m going to have to deny the
    motion for a new trial.
    ¶14           The court subsequently found several mitigating
    circumstances, including finding that Corwin had a break with reality,
    discussed more below. Infra ¶ 18. The court then ordered mitigated
    sentences on each count, to run concurrently, for a total of 7 years of
    incarceration.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶15           Corwin asks this court to vacate her convictions and sentences
    and remand the matter for the trial court to make a new determination on
    her motion for a new trial. We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion
    for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Fischer, 
    242 Ariz. 44
    , 48,
    ¶ 10 (2017).
    ¶16             The trial court may grant a new trial when the verdict is
    “contrary to law or to the weight of evidence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(c)(1);
    see also 
    Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 48
    , ¶ 11. The trial court enjoys “broad” discretion
    5
    STATE v. CORWIN
    Decision of the Court
    in exercising its power to rule on a motion for a new trial. 
    Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 49
    , ¶ 14; see also City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 
    114 Ariz. 236
    , 238 (1977) (trial
    court “saw the witnesses, heard the testimony, knew the issues, and had a
    perspective on the relationship between evidence and verdict [the appellate
    court] can never achieve by a bare reading of the record”). In exercising its
    discretion, the trial court should weigh the evidence and make its own
    witness credibility determinations. 
    Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 49
    -50, 52, ¶¶ 17, 31.
    “If, after full consideration of the case, the [trial] court is satisfied that the
    verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, it may set the verdict
    aside, even if substantial evidence supports it.” 
    Id. at 49-50,
    ¶ 17 (citations
    omitted).
    ¶17            Corwin argues that the trial court’s statement that it was “not
    going to substitute [its] judgment for the judgment of the jury” and its use
    of the term “unfortunately,” supra ¶ 13, demonstrates that the trial court
    misunderstood its power; specifically, the court felt obligated to forgo its
    own examination of the evidence and to defer to the jury. Here, the court
    received full briefing on its discretionary power to grant or deny a motion
    for a new trial. Thus, we presume that the court understood the law in
    denying the motion for a new trial.3 State v. Lee, 
    189 Ariz. 608
    , 616 (1997)
    (“Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their
    decisions.”) (citations omitted).
    ¶18           We agree with Corwin that under Arizona law in ruling on a
    motion for a new trial, the trial judge “sits as a thirteenth juror” and “must
    be convinced that the weight of the evidence sustains the verdict.” 
    Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 44
    , ¶ 14 (citation omitted); see also Soto v. Sacco, 
    242 Ariz. 474
    ,
    478, ¶ 8 (2017) (recognizing that “a trial judge plays a role akin to a
    thirteenth juror . . . when ruling on a motion for new trial”) (citations
    omitted); State v. Thomas, 
    104 Ariz. 408
    , 412 (1969). But this discretion is
    3Although the State’s briefing incorrectly argued that a motion for a
    new trial should be denied when a jury’s findings are supported by
    “substantial evidence,” in Corwin’s motion and reply she accurately
    appraised the court of the law. We note, however, that despite Fischer’s clear
    statement that the trial court has discretion to grant a new trial even when
    a verdict is supported by substantial or sufficient 
    evidence, 242 Ariz. at 49
    -
    50, ¶¶ 17-18, 21, in its briefing on appeal the State continues to erroneously
    argue that a motion for a new trial should be denied when the jury’s
    findings are supported by “substantial evidence.” We reject the State’s
    position that we should affirm the trial court’s denial on the basis that the
    verdict was supported by substantial evidence. See supra ¶ 16.
    6
    STATE v. CORWIN
    Decision of the Court
    limited and the trial court may not set aside a verdict simply because, if
    acting as the trier of fact, it “would have reached a different result.” 
    Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 50
    , ¶ 20. Here, we are convinced that the trial court weighed the
    evidence and witness credibility, as it was required to do. 
    Id. at 52,
    ¶ 31.
    This is further evidenced by the court’s ruling on mitigating circumstances:
    I’ve sat through the trial. I’ve listened to all of the evidence.
    And while the jury [] did not find that you met the statutory
    definition of guilty except insane, and I do not know why,
    what aspect or anything like that [] I do believe that you did
    have a break with reality for that one day in 2011 from
    February 5th to February 6th, 2011, that you did have [] a
    break in reality. Whether that is sufficient to meet the
    definition of guilty except insane has been determined by the
    jury, and I am not overruling them, but I have taken that into
    consideration, all right?
    ¶19           The court expressly stated that it had taken the psychiatric
    evidence into consideration and it was within the court’s discretion to
    affirm the jury’s verdict, despite its determination that Corwin had a mental
    break with reality. See Joy v. Raley, 
    24 Ariz. App. 584
    , 585 (1975) (trial court
    should not grant a new trial if it concludes the evidence merely balanced on
    its mental scales); 
    Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 50
    , ¶ 20 (“We are mindful that a judge
    considering a motion for new trial did not have the benefit of participating
    in jury deliberations.”).
    ¶20           Accordingly, because we conclude the court acted within its
    discretionary power, we decline to remand the matter to the trial court to
    issue a new ruling.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶21          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Corwin’s convictions
    and sentences.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 16-0443

Filed Date: 12/21/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2017