Cui Li v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 20 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CUI LI,                                         No.    19-71998
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A206-540-699
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted May 4, 2021**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: WARDLAW and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and DONATO,*** District
    Judge.
    Cui Li, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable James Donato, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
    Convention Against Torture. Li claims past and future persecution based on
    violations of China’s family planning policy. Specifically, Li alleges that she was
    subjected to a forced abortion and fears that she will be sterilized if she returns to
    China. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and we grant Li’s petition and
    remand for further proceedings.
    The BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility determination based on the
    following grounds: (1) inconsistences between Li’s testimony, her prior statements,
    and documentary evidence; and (2) Li’s failure to provide sufficient corroborating
    evidence. On review of the record, neither of these reasons is supported by
    substantial evidence. See Iman v. Barr, 
    972 F.3d 1058
    , 1064 (9th Cir. 2020).
    1. The BIA relied on four purported inconsistencies: (1) inconsistences in
    Li’s testimony regarding the symptoms she experienced from an intrauterine
    device (“IUD”); (2) the fact that Li waited over two years to have an IUD removed
    after entering the United States, despite her claim that it caused her intense pain
    and suffering; (3) inconsistences between Li’s testimony and a patient history form
    that she submitted; and (4) Li’s failure to include in her asylum application that her
    mother-in-law was beaten.
    Substantial evidence does not support the IJ’s finding that Li provided
    inconsistent testimony regarding her IUD symptoms. Li testified that family
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    planning officials inserted an IUD against her will on two separate occasions and
    that she suffered different complications following each procedure. Specifically,
    Li testified that she experienced excessive menstrual bleeding after the first, and no
    menstrual bleeding at all after the second. But the IJ lumped this testimony
    together and mischaracterized it as “inconsistent,” failing to appreciate that Li was
    describing the symptoms she experienced from two different IUDs. See Ren v.
    Holder, 
    648 F.3d 1079
    , 1086 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a purported
    inconsistency did not support adverse credibility determination because the IJ’s
    characterization of the petitioner’s testimony was inaccurate). Moreover, the BIA
    itself appears to concede that Li’s testimony on this subject may have been
    “confused or misunderstood.”
    The BIA also relied on a perceived inconsistency between Li’s testimony
    that the first IUD caused her intense suffering as well as gynecological disease and
    her testimony that she waited over two years after arriving in the United States
    before having the second IUD removed. But again, both the IJ and the BIA failed
    to appreciate that Li was twice subjected to a forced IUD and experienced distinct
    symptoms following each procedure. Specifically, Li never testified that the
    second IUD caused her intense suffering. Rather, she testified that she ultimately
    had it removed because she did not have her period.
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    The BIA also noted several alleged inconsistencies between Li’s testimony
    and a patient history form that was completed when Li had her second IUD
    removed in the United States, but these are similarly not supported by substantial
    evidence. For example, the IJ inaccurately found that the form was inconsistent
    with Li’s testimony because she “claimed that she had her first IUD removed in
    China, clearly a surgical procedure.” (emphasis added). But no record evidence
    suggests that removal of an IUD is a surgical procedure. Moreover, Li, who does
    not speak English, explained that the form was incomplete or inaccurate because
    another individual at the doctor’s office, who did not speak Mandarin, assisted her
    in completing it and they struggled to communicate through the language barrier.
    See He v. Ashcroft, 
    328 F.3d 593
    , 598 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[F]aulty or unreliable
    translations can undermine the evidence on which an adverse credibility
    determination is based.”); see also Kebede v. Ashcroft, 
    366 F.3d 808
    , 811 (9th Cir.
    2004).
    Finally, the BIA relied on the fact that Li testified at her merits hearing that
    her mother-in-law was beaten, but she failed to include this detail in her asylum
    application. “[A]lthough an IJ may rely on omissions when evaluating an
    applicant’s credibility, not all omissions will deserve the same weight or support an
    adverse credibility finding.” Iman, 972 F.3d at 1067. Notably, “the omitted
    information concerned ‘adverse consequences for third parties,’” rather than for Li
    4
    herself. Id. at 1068 (quoting Lai v. Holder, 
    773 F.3d 966
    , 973 (9th Cir. 2014)).
    Moreover, we have emphasized that that the “‘mere omission’ of additional,
    consistent details is ‘insufficient to uphold an adverse credibility finding’” where
    the original asylum application omitted a detail and later testimony supplemented
    the petitioner’s account with consistent information. Lizhi Qiu v. Barr, 
    944 F.3d 837
    , 844 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lai, 773 F.3d at 971); see also Iman, 972 F.3d at
    1068.
    2. In upholding the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the BIA also relied on
    Li’s failure to provide specific corroborating evidence. The IJ requested a laundry
    list of documentary evidence, including proof that Li was twice fined 5,000 RMB,
    either through copies of the checks or bank account withdrawals, and an affidavit
    detailing Li’s gynecological disease symptoms.
    However, Li provided “in good faith, meaningful corroborating evidence
    that [happened to be] different than the evidence sought by the IJ.” Jie Shi Liu v.
    Sessions, 
    891 F.3d 834
    , 839 (9th Cir. 2018). For example, rather than a copy of a
    check or bank account withdrawal, Li provided receipts of the payments, thereby
    demonstrating the key fact that the IJ sought to verify: Li was fined 5,000 RMB by
    the Chinese government in 2008 and 2013. The IJ also faulted Li for failing to
    submit an affidavit corroborating her gynecological symptoms. Although Li did
    not submit an affidavit, she provided a signed doctor’s note that described her
    5
    symptoms. This contemporaneous account provided by Li’s doctor—a third party
    who had no reason to misrepresent Li’s self-reported symptoms—is “meaningful
    corroborating evidence” that bolsters her claims, even if it differed from the IJ’s
    precise request. See Jie Shi Liu, 891 F.3d at 838.
    Finally, the IJ’s request for “evidence showing that [the] Chinese
    government will persecute people simply if they do not show [for] a sterilization
    procedure,” is unreasonable given that we have explained that it is inappropriate
    for an agency to request proof of how or why a persecutor intends to act. See
    Singh v. Holder, 
    638 F.3d 1264
    , 1270 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Ge v. Ashcroft, 
    367 F.3d 1121
    , 1126 (9th Cir. 2004).
    In sum, the record demonstrates “that the IJ and BIA have listed all possible
    reasons to support an adverse credibility determination, and they are inadequate in
    law or not supported by substantial evidence.” Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 
    555 F.3d 1089
    , 1095 (9th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, upon remand, the agency must deem
    Li’s testimony as credible.
    We grant Li’s petition and remand to the BIA to determine, taking Li’s
    testimony as true, whether Li is eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    protection under the Convention Against Torture.
    PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED.
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