Justin G. Sandlin v. State ( 2019 )


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  •              In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-18-00340-CR
    ___________________________
    JUSTIN G. SANDLIN, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 9
    Tarrant County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 1503758
    Before Kerr, Pittman, and Birdwell, JJ
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    When does the sound of a honking horn justify an officer’s investigative
    detention? Because, based on the totality of circumstances in this case, we conclude
    that just a couple of honks sufficed, we affirm the trial court’s judgment rendered
    after its order denying Justin Sandlin’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence and
    Sandlin’s later guilty plea to the offense of driving while intoxicated. 1
    Facts Adduced at Suppression Hearing
    Marshall McGee, the officer who stopped Sandlin, testified at the suppression
    hearing that while he was driving on patrol one night at 12:43 a.m., Sandlin drove past
    him, and McGee heard the horn from Sandlin’s car sound twice. No other cars were
    around in the residential neighborhood, so McGee did not think Sandlin needed to
    use the horn for a driving emergency. Nevertheless, McGee turned around to follow
    Sandlin because he thought Sandlin might have been trying to get his attention or
    might have needed his help for some other type of emergency. McGee also believed
    that Sandlin might have violated Transportation Code section 547.501(c) and a City of
    Watauga ordinance prohibiting improper use of a horn. McGee likewise thought
    Sandlin could have engaged in disorderly conduct.
    When Sandlin pulled into a nearby 7-Eleven parking lot, McGee also pulled in
    and stopped. McGee said he did not turn on his overhead lights or sirens. Sandlin’s
    After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, Sandlin pleaded guilty via
    1
    plea bargain. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d).
    2
    sole testimony was that McGee had his overhead lights on when he pulled into the
    parking lot but had turned them off before stopping the patrol car. When McGee
    approached Sandlin, Sandlin had already stepped out of his car. McGee asked Sandlin
    if he needed something and if he had honked his horn. Sandlin twice denied honking
    the horn. McGee noticed that Sandlin’s speech was slurred and his responses were
    delayed. The passenger started to explain to McGee that it was he who had honked
    the horn and why. Sandlin started to walk away, so McGee had him sit down on the
    curb.
    McGee thought Sandlin’s passenger was also intoxicated because he smelled of
    alcohol and had slurred speech. Sandlin’s passenger told McGee he had honked the
    horn because his wife had been standing outside a house on the road on which
    Sandlin had been driving.
    After hearing this testimony and watching the video from McGee’s patrol car,
    the trial judge stated on the record that he accepted the officer’s testimony as true and
    that Sandlin’s denial of honking the horn “which the officer [had] just heard, of
    course, would raise additional suspicion.” The judge pointed out that the officer did
    not have to believe the passenger’s statement that he had honked the horn instead and
    went on to conclude, “So, therefore, the officer was justified in making a brief
    detention for a sufficient period of time to investigate his perception of a violation of
    the law pertaining to operation of a horn in a vehicle for purposes other than safe
    operation of the vehicle.”
    3
    Standard of Review and Applicable Law
    We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
    suppress evidence. Amador v. State, 
    221 S.W.3d 666
    , 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
    Guzman v. State, 
    955 S.W.2d 85
    , 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We view the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the ruling. Wiede v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 17
    , 24 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2007); State v. Kelly, 
    204 S.W.3d 808
    , 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial
    court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed
    in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those findings. 
    Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818
    –19. We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its
    explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal
    ruling. 
    Id. at 818.
    Sandlin does not challenge the evidence to support the trial court’s fact
    findings. Instead, he contends the trial court incorrectly applied the law to the
    undisputed facts. We thus review de novo the trial court’s ruling that McGee’s
    detention of Sandlin was permissible under the Fourth Amendment, the Texas
    Constitution, and article 38.23 of the code of criminal procedure. U.S. Const.
    amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23.
    A detention, as opposed to an arrest, may be justified on less than probable
    cause if a person is reasonably suspected of criminal activity based on specific,
    articulable facts. Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 21, 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 1880 (1968); Carmouche v.
    State, 
    10 S.W.3d 323
    , 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An officer conducts a lawful
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    temporary detention when he reasonably suspects that an individual is violating the
    law. Crain v. State, 
    315 S.W.3d 43
    , 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ford v. State, 
    158 S.W.3d 488
    , 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the
    totality of the circumstances, the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when
    combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably
    conclude that a particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal
    activity. 
    Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492
    . This is an objective standard that disregards the
    detaining officer’s subjective intent and looks solely to whether the officer has an
    objective basis for the stop. 
    Id. McGee Reasonably
    Suspected Sandlin Violated
    Transportation Code Section 547.501(c)
    State law restricts the use of a motor vehicle’s horn: “A motor vehicle operator
    shall use a horn to provide audible warning only when necessary to insure safe
    operation.” Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 547.501(c).
    Sandlin argues that a mere two honks of the horn could not have given McGee
    reasonable suspicion that he had violated section 547.501(c), contending that the
    officer would have had reasonable suspicion to suspect an offense only if he had
    heard excessive honking; overly loud, long honks; or honks indicating belligerence.
    Sandlin relies on three cases for this argument. But the first two––although discussing
    horn honking as catching the officers’ attention and helping provide reasonable
    suspicion––do not hold that those officers had reasonable suspicion based only on
    5
    the type or manner of the horn honking. Instead, the courts in those cases based their
    decisions on the totality of the circumstances, as we must, and determined that the
    officers reasonably suspected that those drivers used their horns for purposes other
    than the vehicle’s safe operation. See Rogers v. State, No. 2-06-345-CR,
    
    2008 WL 3540247
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 14, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem.
    op., not designated for publication) (“Based on [the officer’s] observation [that
    appellant “was leaning forward on the steering wheel, screaming, gesticulating wildly,
    and laying on the horn”], it was reasonable to conclude that appellant’s conduct was
    disorderly and that she was using her horn not to insure safe operation but solely to
    express anger.”); State v. Brabson, 
    899 S.W.2d 741
    , 748–49 (Tex. App.––Dallas 1995),
    aff’d, 
    976 S.W.2d 182
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (noting that appellant had honked his
    horn ten or fifteen times in the drive-through lane at a fast-food restaurant).
    Likewise, the third case Sandlin cites, State v. Guzman, is inapposite because the
    conduct the officer observed in that case could not have constituted an offense.
    
    240 S.W.3d 362
    , 366–67 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding that 3-second
    spinning of one tire was not an exhibition of speed or acceleration because at that
    time the statutory prohibition against that conduct applied only to a drag race, and
    Guzman was not “driving at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under
    the circumstances”).
    6
    Here, honking a car’s horn for a purpose other than safe operation of the car
    can constitute an offense as defined in the transportation code.2 Tex. Transp. Code
    Ann. § 547.501(c). McGee did not know why the car’s horn sounded––whether a
    person in the car had honked it intentionally or accidentally, whether the horn had
    malfunctioned, or whether there was a safety concern McGee could not see. But he
    did hear the horn sound twice and could not see any reason why the honks would
    have been necessary to ensure the car’s safe operation. Thus, he had knowledge of
    specific, articulable facts that allowed him to briefly detain Sandlin to determine why
    the horn had sounded. See Barrios v. State, 
    452 S.W.3d 835
    , 840–42 (Tex. App.––
    Amarillo 2014, pet. ref’d) (holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the
    appellant based on two traffic offenses, one of which was honking his horn an
    unspecified number of times at a neighbor’s residence for an apparent purpose other
    than safe operation of his car). We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err
    by denying the motion to suppress. We overrule Sandlin’s sole issue.
    Conclusion
    Because we have overruled Sandlin’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    2
    It matters not whether we agree with the wisdom of such a statute, as
    expressed by the trial court: “[A]s much as the Court does not like denying the motion
    to suppress in this case, based upon the plain reading of the statute, I’m compelled to
    do so.”
    7
    /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
    Elizabeth Kerr
    Justice
    Do Not Publish
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    Delivered: June 20, 2019
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