People v. Philips CA4/2 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 11/29/22 P. v. Philips CA4/2
    Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E072762
    v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. RIF079858)
    BARBARA LYNN PHILLIPS,                                                   OPINION ON TRANSFER
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Raymond Mark DiGuiseppe and David M. McKinney, under appointment by the
    Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael P.
    Pulos and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    1
    Defendant and appellant, Barbara Lynn Phillips, filed a petition for resentencing
    pursuant to Penal Code former section 1170.95,1 which the court denied. On appeal,
    defendant contended the court erred in denying her petition based on the jury’s true
    finding on a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation. By opinion filed May 26,
    2020, we affirmed.
    On October 19, 2022, the California Supreme Court transferred the matter back to
    us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v.
    Lewis (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 952
     (Lewis) and People v. Strong (2022) 
    13 Cal.5th 698
    (Strong). On October 20, 2022, we ordered our decision vacated and set a briefing
    schedule.
    Defendant argues that pursuant to Strong, the court erred in determining that the
    jury’s true finding on the felony-murder special-circumstance allegation rendered prior to
    the decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 788
     (Banks) and People v. Clark
    (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 522
     (Clark) made her ineligible for relief. Defendant maintains she
    made the requisite prima facie showing and the matter should be remanded for an order
    to show cause (OSC) hearing. The People concede the matter should be remanded for the
    issuance of an OSC and an evidentiary hearing. We reverse and remand the matter for
    reconsideration.
    1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
    Effective June 30, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended
    and renumbered section 1170.95 as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
    2
    I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2
    A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1.)
    The jury also returned true findings on the special-circumstance allegations that the
    murder was committed while engaged in the commission of a kidnapping (§ 190.2,
    subd. (a)(17)(B)) and that the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of
    torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)). The jury further found true the allegation that defendant
    personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a),
    1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) The court sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of
    parole, plus four years on the personal firearm use enhancement. (People v. Phillips,
    supra, E026884.)
    Defendant appealed. On May 8, 2001, this court affirmed defendant’s
    convictions. (People v. Phillips, supra, E026884.)
    On January 7, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under former
    section 1170.95 in the superior court and requested the court to appoint counsel to assist
    her. The People filed a response arguing, in pertinent part, that defendant’s petition
    2  On October 17, 2019, we reserved ruling on defendant’s October 11, 2019,
    request that we take judicial notice of the clerk’s transcript of the written jury instructions
    given at trial and the reporter’s transcript of the oral instructions given and the closing
    arguments. We deny the request as unnecessary to our resolution of the issues on appeal.
    (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
    On November 21, 2019, we reserved ruling on the People’s November 12, 2019,
    request that we take judicial notice of our prior opinion in People v. Phillips (May 8,
    2001, E026884) [nonpub opn.] (Phillips), from defendant’s appeal from the judgment.
    We grant the request. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
    8.1115(b)(1).) We exclude a recitation of the facts here as irrelevant to the issues raised
    on appeal.
    3
    should be summarily denied because the jury’s finding on the torture-murder allegation
    established she had the intent to kill, which meant that she could not make a prima facie
    showing for relief under former section 1170.95. On March 25, 2019, the public
    defender filed a reply to the People’s response.
    The court held a hearing on the petition on April 19, 2019. The deputy public
    defender represented defendant and requested a 90-day stay. The prosecutor stated,
    “It—torture murder, kidnap, special circumstance, LWOP[]. There were CALJICs given
    that required intent to kill.” The court said it was inclined to summarily deny the
    petition; defense counsel objected. The court denied the petition.
    Defendant appealed. We affirmed holding that an error in the instructions on the
    torture-murder allegation was harmless because the evidence clearly showed defendant
    acted with intent to kill.
    II. DISCUSSION
    Defendant argues the court erred in denying her petition, and the matter should be
    remanded for an OSC hearing. The People agree. We remand the matter for a new prima
    facie hearing.
    “Senate Bill 1437 [(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)] significantly limited the scope of”
    theories under which malice is imputed to a person based on that person’s participation in
    a crime “to effectuate the Legislature’s declared intent ‘to ensure that murder liability is
    not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or
    was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference
    4
    to human life.’” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 707-708.) “Senate Bill 1437 also
    created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek
    retroactive relief under the law as amended. [Citations.] Under newly enacted section
    1172.6, the process begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all
    requirements for eligibility are met [citations], including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not
    presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to . . . Section
    188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective date of Senate Bill 1437
    [citation].” (Id. at p. 708, fn. omitted.)
    “When the trial court receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and
    other required information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the
    petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.] If the petition and record
    in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court
    may dismiss the petition.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) “As a general matter, a
    trial court should afford both parties the opportunity to brief the question of a petitioner’s
    eligibility for relief and may extend the briefing deadlines ‘for good cause’ as necessary
    to ensure that such an opportunity is meaningful.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966,
    fn. 4.)
    “While the trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment of
    counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for . . . relief, the
    prima facie inquiry . . . is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas
    corpus proceedings, ‘“the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
    5
    preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
    or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show
    cause.”’ [Citation.] ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on
    credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’” (Lewis, supra,
    11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) “In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this
    preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the
    weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Id. at p. 972.) “[T]he ‘prima facie
    bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’” (Ibid.)
    Where a defendant’s “case was tried before both Banks and Clark, . . . special
    circumstance findings do not preclude him from making out a prima facie case for
    resentencing under section 1172.6.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 721.) A court “err[s]
    in concluding otherwise.” (Ibid.)
    If, instead, a defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief,
    “‘the court shall issue an order to show cause.’” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
    Once the court determines that a defendant has made a prima facie showing, “the court
    must [then] hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of
    proving, ‘beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted
    murder’ under state law as amended by Senate Bill 1437. [Citation.] ‘A finding that
    there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder, attempted murder, or
    manslaughter is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is
    ineligible for resentencing.’ [Citation.] ‘If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of
    6
    proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the
    conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining
    charges.’” (Id. at p. 709.) “Senate Bill 1437 relief is unavailable if the defendant was
    either the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or ‘was a major participant in the
    underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life . . . .’” (Id. at
    p. 710.)
    “[E]ffective January 1, 2022, the Legislature limited use of prior appellate
    opinions, allowing trial judges to ‘consider the procedural history of the case recited.’
    [Citation.] . . . [I]ts specificity indicates the Legislature has decided trial judges should
    not rely on the factual summaries contained in prior appellate decisions when a [former]
    section 1170.95 petition reaches the stage of a full-fledged evidentiary hearing.” (People
    v. Clements (2022) 
    75 Cal.App.5th 276
    , 292; accord People v. Flores (2022)
    
    76 Cal.App.5th 974
    , 988 [“[T]he factual summary in an appellate opinion is not evidence
    that may be considered at an evidentiary hearing to determine a petitioner’s eligibility for
    resentencing.”].)
    Here, the jury rendered the special-murder circumstance findings long before both
    Banks and Clark were decided. Thus, with respect to those findings, “no judge or jury
    has ever found the currently required degree of culpability . . . .” (Strong, supra,
    13 Cal.5th at p. 718, italics added.) Thus, the finding did not, alone, render defendant per
    se ineligible for relief. Therefore, the court below erred in denying defendant’s petition
    on that basis.
    7
    However, we also determined, in reliance on this court’s prior opinion, that any
    error was harmless because the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that
    defendant acted with intent to kill. Thus, we effectively reduced the evidentiary burden
    to the sufficiency of the evidence, from beyond a reasonable doubt, and erroneously
    relied exclusively upon the facts contained in this court’s prior opinion. Therefore, the
    matter must be remanded for a new prima facie hearing. If the court finds defendant has
    made a prima facie showing, the court shall issue an OSC and schedule an evidentiary
    hearing prior to making any factual findings.
    III. DISPOSITION
    The order dismissing defendant’s petition is reversed. The matter is remanded
    with directions to hold a new prima facie hearing. We express no opinion on whether
    defendant is entitled to relief following the hearing.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    McKINSTER
    Acting P. J.
    We concur:
    FIELDS
    J.
    MENETREZ
    J.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E072762A

Filed Date: 11/29/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/30/2022