Com. v. James, W. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S08006-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :      PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                  :
    :
    v.                               :
    :
    WAYNE JAMES,                                 :
    :
    Appellant                 : No. 704 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 7, 2013,
    Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0014092-2011,
    CP-51-CR-0014093-2011, CP-51-CR-0014094-2011,
    CP-51-CR-0014095-2011 and CP-51-CR-0014096-2011
    BEFORE: DONOHUE, WECHT and JENKINS, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.:                          FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2015
    Appellant, Wayne James (“James”), appeals from the judgment of
    sentence   following   his    convictions   for   murder   in   the   first   degree,
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502, and four counts of aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 2702.    James challenges the trial court’s finding that the police had
    probable cause to arrest him and the sufficiency of the evidence in support
    of the murder conviction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    The trial court summarized the relevant factual background of the case
    as established at trial:
    Before midnight on June 25, 2011, [James] entered
    the Genesis Tavern and ordered a bottle of Guinness
    from the bar.6 Notes of Testimony (N.T.) 10/3/2013
    at 47. After having another drink and smoking a
    cigarette at the bar, [James] was asked by the
    security personnel at the Genesis Tavern to leave.
    J-S08006-15
    N.T. 10/2/2013 at 220-21.        [James] refused to
    cooperate; one of the bouncers dragged [James] by
    his upper body while he held “his feet in place on the
    ground so that he would not be walking.” N.T.
    10/1/2013 at 89-90. Jerrell Johnson, one of the
    bar’s patrons, stated, “He was not going out
    willingly.” 
    Id. at 163.
    Once he was removed from the bar, [James] jumped
    in the air and ran off toward a dark-colored car. N.T.
    10/2/2013 at 80. Albert Saboleh, the manager on
    duty that night, noticed that the security personnel
    did not return to the bar immediately after ejecting
    [James]; Mr. Saboleh exited the bar and heard the
    man who had just been thrown out yell, “I’ll be back”
    or a similar phrase. N.T. 10/3/2013 at 113-14.
    [James] then entered his car and sped off, nearly
    crashing into another car. N.T. 10/2/2013 at 80-81.
    Approximately ten to fifteen minutes later, [James]
    returned to the area and opened fire as he
    approached the bar. 
    Id. at 83-84.
    Security guard
    Curtis Aiken was positioned outside of the bar,
    checking   identification  cards,  when     [James]
    returned:
    MR. AIKEN: [W]hen you first came into
    the bar, you had a two-piece dress set
    [sic]. When you came back, you had a t-
    shirt on. When I caught vision of you,
    it’s when the first shot – when the first
    couple of shots case, I ran behind the
    trash compactor. I lifted my head up,
    pow, and I was shot. It’s nothing hard.
    The way – how the corner is shaped, you
    could see. And you have eyes, you could
    see. It’s just plainly in view.
    
    Id. at 113.
    [James] walked through the front door of the
    Genesis Tavern, stood in the doorway and continued
    to fire his gun. 
    Id. at 94.
    “After he delivered the
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    shots, he went in the middle of the street and
    jumped in the air a few [] more times. After he did
    that, he marched up and then he ran back down the
    street to where his car was at.”7 
    Id. at 84.
    As soon
    as [James] reentered his car, Aiken ran into the bar
    to tend to the injured patrons. 
    Id. Inside, Aiken
              found a man, Carl Sharper, between the bar and the
    kitchen, lying on the floor with a gunshot wound to
    the middle of his head. N.T. 10/2/2013 at 85.
    Assistant Medical Examiner Dr. Marlon Osbourne
    determined that the bullet fractured Mr. Sharper’s
    head, passed through his right cerebral hemisphere
    and caused immediate death. 
    Id. at 33-34.
    In addition to Mr. Sharper, at least four other
    individuals suffered gunshot wounds. Inside the bar,
    Aiken found Mr. Saboleh,8 who had suffered a
    gunshot wound to his foot. 
    Id. at 85.
    With help
    from others, Aiken lifted Mr. Saboleh and placed him
    in a police car, which transported him to the
    hospital. 
    Id. at 86.
    Tamatha Robinson, a patron
    inside the bar, suffered six gunshot wounds. N.T.
    10/1/2013 at 93-94. Jerrell Johnson was struck by
    three bullets, one of which shattered his clavicle. 
    Id. at 166,
    177. And, lastly, Charlotte McKee was hit by
    three bullets to her leg and foot. N.T. 10/2/2013 at
    45-46.
    6
    Scott Copeland, Latent Fingerprint Expert from the
    Philadelphia Police Department, compared [James’]
    fingerprints to a print lifted from a Guinness bottle
    found inside the Genesis Bar and found it to be a
    match. N.T. 10/2/2013 at 157.
    7
    Aiken’s identification of [James] as the shooter was
    bolstered by the testimony of Detective James
    Dunlap, a member of the Digital Imagery Response
    Team (DIVRT). Detective Dunlap pieced together
    footage from various security cameras which
    indicated that the person who returned to the bar
    and opened fire was the same person who had been
    ejected earlier. “If you look and watch the wrist
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    right here on the stills, in appears to be very similar,
    the same piece of jewelry on the shooter’s wrist that
    was worn by the male that was previously thrown
    out.” N.T. 10/2/2013 at 223.
    8
    Aiken referred to Albert Saboleh as “Al.”       N.T.
    10/2/2013 at 85.
    Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/2014, at 2-3.
    James fired his court-appointed counsel on the first day of trial and
    demanded to represent himself. The trial court, after cautioning him against
    it, agreed to James’ self-representation, but refused to permit any delay or
    postponement for preparation.      After a three-day trial, a jury convicted
    James of the above-referenced crimes. The trial court sentenced him to the
    mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole.    Newly
    appointed counsel filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied
    on February 27, 2014. This timely appeal followed, in which James raises
    two issues for our consideration and determination:
    1.    The trial court erred in ruling that police had
    probable cause to arrest [James] on July 28, 2011.
    Stated differently, the trial court erred by denying
    James’ motion to suppress a statement James made
    subsequent to his arrest where the arresting officers
    lacked probable cause to arrest him.
    2.    The Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that [James] had the specific intent
    to murder Carl Sharper.
    James’ Brief at 1-2.
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    J-S08006-15
    For his first issue on appeal, James contends that the trial court erred
    in denying his motion to suppress a statement he made subsequent to his
    arrest. James argues that the evidence the Commonwealth presented at the
    June 6, 2013 suppression hearing did not establish that the police had
    probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and that as a result his
    subsequent statement to police should have been suppressed.
    When addressing a trial court's denial of a suppression motion, our
    standard of review is whether its factual findings are supported by the
    evidence presented at the suppression hearing and whether its legal
    conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.     In the Interest of L.J.,
    
    79 A.3d 1073
    , 1088–89 (Pa. 2013). In so doing, we must consider only the
    Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the evidence of the defense as
    remains uncontradicted.     Commonwealth v. Davis, 
    102 A.3d 996
    , 999
    (Pa. Super. 2014).
    The parties agree that the police needed probable cause to arrest
    James.   Probable cause is established when “the facts and circumstances
    which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and
    of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant
    a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or
    is   committing   a   crime.”   
    Thompson, 985 A.2d at 931
      (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
    585 A.2d 988
    , 990 (Pa. 1991). We require
    only a “probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.”
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    Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 235 (1983).       In determining whether
    probable cause exists, we apply a totality of the circumstances test.
    Commonwealth v. Clark, 
    735 A.2d 1248
    , 1252 (Pa. 1999).
    The trial court reached the following factual findings based upon the
    evidence introduced at the suppression hearing:
    [A]round 8:00 PM on June 27, 2011, a male who
    identified himself as Leonardo Waysone approached
    Philadelphia Police Officer Jonathan Switaj and his
    partner, Officer Pierre, as they were conducting a car
    stop on the 4300 block of Wissahickon Avenue. N.T.
    6/6/2013 at 9-13, 98. Mr. Waysone told the officers
    that he had information about the shooting that had
    taken place at the Genesis Tavern. 
    Id. at 15,
    98. As
    Mr. Waysone seemed “kind of nervous,” the officers
    asked Mr. Waysone to reconvene with them behind a
    bus depot, away from the busy street. 
    Id. at 11,
    98.
    There, Mr. Waysone stated that his cousin, [James],
    was the shooter at the Genesis Tavern and that
    [James] lived with his uncle at 10th and Wagner
    Streets in Philadelphia, PA. 
    Id. at 15,
    98-99. Mr.
    Waysone explained to the officers that he saw
    surveillance video of the incident at the Genesis
    Tavern on the news and recognized his cousin from
    that video. 
    Id. at 18,
    102; Exhibit M-5.11
    Detective William Holmes, who had been made
    aware of Mr. Waysone’s statements to police and
    had personally watched the surveillance video from
    inside the Genesis Tavern, asked Detective Derrick
    Jacobs to survey the area near 10th and Wagner
    Streets for a black Volvo.12 N.T. 6/6/2013 at 57, 99.
    Detective Holmes had also provided Detective Jacobs
    with some information about [James] – either a
    physical description or [James’] name along with a
    police photo. 
    Id. at 38,
    60, 100. Detective Jacobs
    traveled to that area of the city and found a black
    Volvo in front of 1114 Wagner Street. 
    Id. at 58,
    99.
    While there, Detective Jacobs observed a man, who
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    appeared to be [James], exit from a silver-colored
    Suzuki and enter the premises of 1114 Wagner
    Street. 
    Id. at 37,
    99-100. Detective Jacobs relayed
    that information to Detective Holmes, who prepared
    a search warrant to search for [James] as well as
    certain items inside of 1114 Wagner Street.13 At 8
    AM, Detective Holmes arrived with U.S. Marshals and
    executed the search warrant. 
    Id. at 63,
    100. Inside
    the residence at 1114 Wagner Street, the law
    enforcement personnel found [James] and took him
    into custody. N.T. 6/6/2013 at 64, 100.
    11
    Although this [c]ourt did not explicitly refer to
    Exhibit M-5 in its findings of fact, this exhibit was a
    source upon which this [c]ourt relied in making
    certain factual findings. Exhibit M-5 was the sole
    source for some facts that this [c]ourt found: that
    Mr. Waysone gave a statement to Detectives
    Spotwood and Mangioni at 9:45 PM on June 27,
    2011; that that Mr. Waysone told officers that he
    saw the surveillance video from the Genesis Tavern
    on the news and, from that video, recognized
    [James] at the shooter. N.T. 6/6/2012 at 98-102.
    This exhibit was moved into evidence during the
    hearing on the motion to suppress. 
    Id. at 89.
                12
    Exhibit M-5 reflects that Mr. Waysone told the
    police that [James] drives a “black four door
    Volvo[.]”
    13
    Since this location was not [James’] known
    residence, a search warrant was required before the
    police could breach those premises to seize [James].
    …
    Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/2014, at 4-5.
    In its written opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania
    Rules of Appellate Procedure, the trial court determined that the tip provided
    by Mr. Waysone provided the police with probable cause to arrest James.
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    The trial court based its decision on four factors: (1) his familial connection
    to James strengthened his identification; (2) the implication of his own
    family member subjected Mr. Waysone to potential legal and/or practical
    consequences; (3) his cooperation with the police; and (4) the content of
    the tip reflected familiarity with James’ affairs.             
    Id. at 7-8.
          On appeal,
    James argues that Mr. Waysone’s tip was not sufficient, as the police
    accepted it without developing sufficient corroborating evidence of the
    information he provided or otherwise inquiring further into his credibility.
    James’ Brief at 16.
    Based upon our review of the certified record, we conclude that Mr.
    Waysone’s tip provided the police with probable cause to arrest James. In
    Commonwealth v. Washington, 
    63 A.3d 797
    (Pa. Super. 2013), this
    Court recently reaffirmed that the police may, in the absence of special
    circumstances,        assume      that    identified      citizens   who     report      their
    observations     of    criminal     activity   are      trustworthy.       
    Id. at 803;
    Commonwealth            v.     Gutierrez,      
    36 A.3d 1104
    ,      1108       (2012);
    Commonwealth v. Hayward, 
    756 A.2d 23
    , 36 (Pa. Super. 2000)
    (“Identified citizens who report their observations of criminal activity to the
    police    are   assumed      to   be     trustworthy,    in    the   absence     of    special
    circumstances.”).      A known informant places himself at risk of prosecution
    for filing a false claim if the tip is untrue, unlike an unknown informant, who
    faces no such risk. 
    Id. When an
    identified third party provides information
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    to the police, we must examine the specificity and reliability of the
    information provided.   Id.;   Commonwealth v. Barber, 
    889 A.2d 587
    ,
    593–94 (Pa. Super. 2005).
    In the present case, Mr. Waysone voluntarily approached the police,
    identified himself, and provided specific information regarding his belief that
    James had committed the crimes at the Genesis Tavern, including his
    identification of James (his cousin) from a video of the shootings he had
    seen on the TV news.       He also provided detailed information regarding
    James, including where he lived and the type of car he drove – which
    information the police corroborated before making the arrest.        Under the
    circumstances, the police could presume Mr. Waysone to be trustworthy,
    and their (albeit limited) independent investigation into the information he
    provided further strengthened their belief in the reliability of his knowledge
    regarding James. No relief is due on James’ first issue on appeal.
    For his second issue on appeal, James challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence presented at trial in support of his conviction for first-degree
    murder. James contends that the evidence shows only that he shot wildly
    while inside the Genesis Tavern without targeting any particular victim, and
    that no evidence established a specific intent to kill Carl Sharper. Instead,
    James argues that the “appropriate conviction for [his] random, reckless,
    indifferent, and cruel act is third-degree murder, not first-degree.” James’
    Brief at 20.
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    Our standard of review when presented with a challenge to the
    sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal defendant's conviction is as
    follows:
    As a general matter, our standard of review of
    sufficiency claims requires that we evaluate the
    record in the light most favorable to the verdict
    winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all
    reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
    evidence.” Evidence will be deemed sufficient to
    support the verdict when it establishes each material
    element of the crime charged and the commission
    thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish
    guilt to a mathematical certainty. The facts and
    circumstances established by the Commonwealth
    need not be absolutely incompatible with the
    defendant's innocence.       Any doubt about the
    defendant's guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder
    unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that,
    as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be
    drawn from the combined circumstances.
    The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by
    means      of   wholly     circumstantial    evidence.
    Accordingly, the fact that the evidence establishing a
    defendant's participation in a crime is circumstantial
    does not preclude a conviction where the evidence
    coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn
    therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence.
    Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment
    for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the
    evidence adduced, accepted in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the
    respective elements of a defendant's crimes beyond
    a reasonable doubt, the appellant's convictions will
    be upheld.
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    J-S08006-15
    Commonwealth v. Franklin, 
    69 A.3d 719
    , 722-23 (Pa. Super. 2013)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Pettyjohn, 
    64 A.3d 1072
    , 2013 (Pa. Super.
    (2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
    To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth
    must prove that the defendant acted with the specific intent to kill, that a
    human being was unlawfully killed, that the accused did the killing, and that
    the killing was done with deliberation.          Commonwealth v. Simpson,
    
    754 A.2d 1264
    ,   1269    (2000),   cert.    denied,    
    562 U.S. 255
       (2000);
    Commonwealth v. Hall, 
    701 A.2d 190
    , 196 (Pa. 1997), cert. denied,
    
    523 U.S. 1082
    (1998). The specific intent to kill distinguishes murder in the
    first degree from lesser grades of murder.          Commonwealth v. Smith,
    
    694 A.2d 1086
    , 1088 (Pa. 1997), cert. denied, 
    525 U.S. 847
    (1998). The
    period of reflection required for premeditation to establish the specific intent
    to kill “may be very brief; in fact the design to kill can be formulated in a
    fraction of a second.      Premeditation and deliberation exist whenever the
    assailant   possesses   the   conscious       purpose    to   bring    about   death.”
    Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
    983 A.2d 1211
    , 1220 (Pa. 2009) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 
    808 A.2d 893
    , 910 (Pa. 2002)).
    The Commonwealth may prove the specific intent to kill with
    circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 
    861 A.2d 898
    , 907
    (Pa. 2004). Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the use of a deadly
    weapon on a vital part of a human body is sufficient to establish the specific
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    J-S08006-15
    intent to kill.   See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Randolph, 582 576, 583,
    
    873 A.2d 1277
    ,   1281   (Pa.    2005);     
    Fletcher, 861 A.2d at 907
    ;
    Commonwealth        v.   McCrae,     
    832 A.2d 1026
    ,    1030   (Pa.        2003);
    Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
    773 A.2d 131
    , 135 (Pa. 2001), cert. denied,
    
    535 U.S. 955
    (2002); Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    656 A.2d 90
    , 95 (Pa.),
    cert. denied, 
    516 U.S. 854
    (1995).
    James argues that the evidence at trial shows that he shot “randomly”
    and “haphazardly” while inside the bar, and thus did not demonstrate a
    specific intent to kill Carl Sharper or anyone else. James’ Brief at 21. Based
    upon our review of the entirety of the certified record, we disagree.             No
    witness testified at trial that James shooting inside the bar was either
    random or haphazard. Instead, all essentially offered the same account –
    that without any warning the bar suddenly exploded in a barrage of gunfire.
    See, e.g., N.T., 10/1/2013, at 91-94 (Robinson); 
    id. at 166-69
    (Johnson);
    N.T., 10/2/2013, at 42-46 (McKee); 
    id. at 89
    (Aiken); N.T., 10/3/2013, at
    47-42 (Kayan); 
    id. at 115
    (Saboleh). No witness testified with particularity
    regarding the nature of James’ actions during the shooting, including
    whether or not he aimed his weapon at specific individuals. James’ current
    description of his firing at the bar patrons as “wild,” “random,” and
    “haphazard” are his own, and are not grounded upon any evidence of
    record.
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    J-S08006-15
    Based upon the evidence presented and given our standard of review,
    it was within the province of the jury to conclude that James, having been
    removed from the bar and then returning with a weapon, had the specific
    intent to kill all the patrons in the bar at whom he directed his fire, including
    Carl Sharper.    See Com. ex rel. McCant v. Rundle, 418 394, 396,
    
    211 A.2d 460
    , 461 (Pa. 1965) (“If McCant, intending to kill, shot into a
    crowd, the resulting crime would be first degree murder even if he had never
    before seen his eventual homicidal victim.”). Moreover, the Commonwealth
    had no burden to prove that James specifically targeted Carl Sharper.
    Instead, as the above-cited cases plainly establish, it was sufficient to show
    that he used a deadly weapon on a vital part of Mr. Sharper’s body – from
    which the jury was entitled to infer that James had the specific intent to kill
    him.
    For these reasons, from the evidence presented, the jury could have
    concluded that James acted with the specific intent to kill Carl Sharper.
    Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain James’ conviction for
    first-degree murder.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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    J-S08006-15
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/13/2015
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