Hemphill v. New York ( 2022 )


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    file://NoURLProvided[1/21/2022 2:44:38 PM]
    (Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2021                                       1
    Syllabus
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
    being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
    The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
    See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 
    200 U. S. 321
    , 337.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
    No. 20–637.     Argued October 5, 2021—Decided January 20, 2022
    In April 2006, a stray 9-millimeter bullet killed a 2-year-old child after a
    street fight in the Bronx. Eyewitnesses described the shooter as wear-
    ing a blue shirt or sweater. Police officers determined Ronnell Gilliam
    was involved and that Nicholas Morris had been at the scene. A search
    of Morris’ apartment revealed a 9-millimeter cartridge and three .357-
    caliber bullets. Gilliam initially identified Morris as the shooter, but
    he subsequently said that Darrell Hemphill, Gilliam’s cousin, was the
    shooter. Not crediting Gilliam’s recantation, the State charged Morris
    with the child’s murder and possession of a 9-millimeter handgun. In
    a subsequent plea deal, the State agreed to dismiss the murder charges
    against Morris if he pleaded guilty to a new charge of possession of a
    .357 revolver, a weapon that had not killed the victim. Years later, the
    State indicted Hemphill for the child’s murder after learning that
    Hemphill’s DNA matched a blue sweater found in Gilliam’s apartment
    shortly after the murder. At his trial, Hemphill elicited undisputed
    testimony from a prosecution witness that police had recovered 9-mil-
    limeter ammunition from Morris’ apartment, thus pointing to Morris
    as the culprit. Morris was not available to testify at Hemphill’s trial
    because he was outside the United States. Relying on People v. Reid,
    19 N. Y. 3d 382, 388, 
    971 N. E. 2d 353
    , 357, and over the objection of
    Hemphill’s counsel, the trial court allowed the State to introduce parts
    of the transcript of Morris’ plea allocution to the .357 gun possession
    charge as evidence to rebut Hemphill’s theory that Morris committed
    the murder. The court reasoned that although Morris’ out-of-court
    statements had not been subjected to cross-examination, Hemphill’s
    arguments and evidence had “opened the door” and admission of the
    statements was reasonably necessary to correct the misleading im-
    pression Hemphill had created. The State, in its closing argument,
    cited Morris’ plea allocution and emphasized that possession of a .357
    2                      HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    Syllabus
    revolver, not murder, was the crime Morris committed. The jury found
    Hemphill guilty. Both the New York Appellate Division and the Court
    of Appeals affirmed Hemphill’s conviction.
    Held: The trial court’s admission of the transcript of Morris’ plea allocu-
    tion over Hemphill’s objection violated Hemphill’s Sixth Amendment
    right to confront the witnesses against him. Pp. 6–15.
    (a) The State’s threshold argument—that Hemphill’s failure to pre-
    sent his claim adequately to the state courts should prevent the Court
    from deciding his federal-law challenge to the state-court decision—is
    rejected. Hemphill satisfied the presentation requirement in state
    court. See Street v. New York, 
    394 U. S. 576
    , 584. At every level of his
    proceedings in state court, Hemphill argued that the admission of Mor-
    ris’ plea allocution violated his Sixth Amendment right to confronta-
    tion as interpreted by this Court. And “[o]nce a federal claim is
    properly presented, a party can make any argument in support of that
    claim.” Yee v. Escondido, 
    503 U. S. 519
    , 534. Pp. 6–8.
    (b) The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides a
    criminal defendant the bedrock right “to be confronted with the wit-
    nesses against him.” In Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U. S. 36
    , the
    Court examined the history of the confrontation right at common law
    and concluded that “the principal evil at which the Confrontation
    Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure,”
    which allowed the “use of ex parte examinations as evidence against
    the accused.” 
    Id., at 50
    . The Crawford Court reasoned that because
    “the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions
    from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts,” the
    confrontation guarantee was “most naturally read” to admit “only
    those exceptions established at the time of the founding.” 
    Id., at 54
    ;
    see also Giles v. California, 
    554 U. S. 353
    , 377. Because “the Framers
    would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a wit-
    ness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify,
    and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination,”
    the Court rejected its previous “reliability approach” to the Sixth
    Amendment’s confrontation right described in Ohio v. Roberts, 
    448 U. S. 56
    , 66, which had permitted the admission of statements of an
    unavailable witness so long as those statements had “adequate indicia
    of reliability.” Pp. 8–9.
    (c) The Court rejects the State’s contention that the “opening the
    door” rule incorporated in People v. Reid and applied here is not a Con-
    frontation Clause exception at all but merely a “procedural rule” lim-
    iting only the manner of asserting the confrontation right, not its sub-
    stantive scope. While the Court’s precedents do recognize that the
    Sixth Amendment leaves States with flexibility to adopt reasonable
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)                      3
    Syllabus
    procedural rules that bear on the exercise of a defendant’s confronta-
    tion right, see, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
    557 U. S. 305
    ,
    327, the door-opening principle discussed in Reid is not in the same
    class of procedural rules. Reid’s door-opening principle is a substan-
    tive principle of evidence that dictates what material is relevant and
    admissible in a case. The State would have trial judges weigh the re-
    liability or credibility of testimonial hearsay evidence, but that ap-
    proach would negate Crawford’s emphatic rejection of the reliability-
    based approach to the Confrontation Clause guarantee. Here, it was
    not for the trial judge to determine whether Hemphill’s theory that
    Morris was the shooter was unreliable, incredible, or otherwise mis-
    leading in light of the State’s proffered, unconfronted plea evidence,
    nor whether this evidence was reasonably necessary to correct that
    misleading impression. Pp. 9–11.
    (d) The Court also rejects the State’s insistence that the Reid rule is
    necessary to safeguard the truth-finding function of courts because it
    prevents the selective and misleading introduction of evidence. The
    Court has not allowed such considerations to override the rights the
    Constitution confers to criminal defendants. And none of the cases the
    State relies upon for support—Kansas v. Ventris, 
    556 U. S. 586
    ; Harris
    v. New York, 
    401 U. S. 222
    ; Walder v. United States, 
    347 U. S. 62
    —
    involved exceptions to constitutional requirements. Pp. 11–13.
    (e) The State’s concern that a reversal will leave prosecutors without
    recourse to protect against abuses of the confrontation right is over-
    stated. “[W]ell-established rules” of evidence “permit trial judges to
    exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other
    factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to
    mislead the jury.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 
    547 U. S. 319
    , 326. Fi-
    nally, the rule of completeness does not apply here, as Morris’ plea al-
    locution was not part of any statement that Hemphill introduced. The
    Court does not address whether and under what circumstances that
    rule might allow the admission of testimonial hearsay against a crim-
    inal defendant. Pp. 13–14.
    35 N. Y. 3d 1035, 
    150 N. E. 3d 356
    , reversed and remanded.
    SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
    C. J., and BREYER, ALITO, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT,
    JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAVANAUGH,
    J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)                                 1
    Opinion of the Court
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
    notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
    ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
    corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 20–637
    _________________
    DARRELL HEMPHILL, PETITIONER v. NEW YORK
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF NEW YORK
    [January 20, 2022]
    JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
    In 2006, a stray 9-millimeter bullet killed a 2-year-old
    child in the Bronx. The State charged Nicholas Morris with
    the murder, but after trial commenced, it offered him a plea
    deal for a lesser charge. The State specifically required
    Morris to admit to a new charge of possession of a .357-mag-
    num revolver, not the 9-millimeter handgun originally
    charged in the indictment and used in the killing.
    Years later, the State prosecuted petitioner Darrell
    Hemphill for the same murder. At his trial, Hemphill
    blamed Morris, and he elicited undisputed testimony from
    a prosecution witness that police had recovered 9-millime-
    ter ammunition from Morris’ nightstand. Morris was out-
    side the United States and not available to testify. The trial
    court allowed the State to introduce parts of the transcript
    of Morris’ plea allocution as evidence to rebut Hemphill’s
    theory that Morris committed the murder. The court rea-
    soned that Hemphill’s arguments and evidence had
    “open[ed] the door” to the introduction of these testimonial
    out-of-court statements, not subjected to cross-examina-
    tion, because they were “ ‘reasonably necessary’ ” to “ ‘cor-
    rect’ ” the “ ‘misleading impression’ ” Hemphill had created.
    2                 HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    Opinion of the Court
    People v. Reid, 19 N. Y. 3d 382, 388, 
    971 N. E. 2d 353
    , 357
    (2012).
    The question is whether the admission of the plea allocu-
    tion under New York’s rule in People v. Reid violated
    Hemphill’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the wit-
    nesses against him. The Court holds that it did. Hemphill
    did not forfeit his confrontation right merely by making the
    plea allocution arguably relevant to his theory of defense.
    I
    A
    In April 2006, Ronnell Gilliam and several other individ-
    uals got into a physical fight near Tremont Avenue in the
    Bronx. Shortly after the fight, someone fired a 9-millimeter
    handgun. The bullet killed a 2-year-old child sitting in a
    nearby minivan.
    Police officers determined that Gilliam was involved and
    that Nicholas Morris, Gilliam’s best friend, had been at the
    scene. Officers searched Morris’ apartment. On Morris’
    nightstand, the officers found a 9-millimeter cartridge and
    three .357-caliber bullets. Three witnesses identified Mor-
    ris as the shooter out of a police lineup.
    The police arrested Morris the next day and observed
    bruising on his knuckles consistent with fist fighting.
    Gilliam then surrendered and identified Morris as the
    shooter. Gilliam later returned to the police station and re-
    canted, stating that Hemphill, Gilliam’s cousin, had in fact
    been the shooter. Investigators initially did not credit
    Gilliam’s recantation; instead, the State charged Morris
    with the child’s murder and for possession of a 9-millimeter
    handgun. After opening statements at Morris’ 2008 trial,
    however, the State decided not to oppose Morris’ application
    for a mistrial to allow the State to reconsider the charges
    against him.
    Approximately six weeks later, the State agreed to dis-
    miss the murder charges against Morris if he pleaded guilty
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)             3
    Opinion of the Court
    to criminal possession of a weapon. But rather than having
    Morris plead to the charge in the existing indictment for
    possession of a 9-millimeter handgun, the State filed a new
    charge alleging that Morris had possessed a .357-magnum
    revolver, a different type of firearm than the one used to kill
    the victim. In exchange for this plea, the prosecution rec-
    ommended a sentence of time served. The State and Mor-
    ris’ counsel agreed that there was insufficient evidence of
    Morris’ possession of a .357-magnum revolver to obtain an
    indictment absent Morris’ willingness to admit to the alle-
    gations. Morris did so, against his attorney’s advice, to se-
    cure his release that day.
    In 2011, the State learned that Hemphill’s DNA matched
    a sample from a blue sweater that police had recovered in a
    search of Gilliam’s apartment shortly after the crime. Eye-
    witnesses had described the shooter as wearing a blue shirt
    or sweater. In 2013, Hemphill was arrested and indicted
    for the murder.
    B
    At trial, Hemphill pursued a third-party culpability de-
    fense by blaming Morris for the shooting. In his opening
    statement, Hemphill’s counsel noted that officers had re-
    covered 9-millimeter ammunition from Morris’ nightstand
    hours after a 9-millimeter bullet killed the victim. The
    State did not object, but later contended that Hemphill’s ar-
    gument had been misleading because officers also had
    found .357-caliber bullets on the nightstand and because
    Morris ultimately pleaded guilty to possessing a .357 re-
    volver.
    Morris, however, was unavailable to testify at Hemphill’s
    trial. As a result, the State sought to introduce the tran-
    script of Morris’ plea allocution to suggest that he had pos-
    sessed only a .357 revolver. Hemphill’s counsel objected,
    arguing that the plea allocution was “clearly hearsay” and
    that Hemphill was being “deprived of an opportunity [for]
    4                     HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    Opinion of the Court
    cross-examination.” App. 107. The trial court deferred rul-
    ing and, in the meantime, allowed the State to put on testi-
    mony regarding the .357-caliber bullets on Morris’
    nightstand. Accordingly, both the State and Hemphill elic-
    ited undisputed testimony from a law enforcement officer
    that a 9-millimeter cartridge and .357-caliber bullets were
    recovered from Morris’ nightstand.
    The trial court then revisited the State’s application to
    introduce Morris’ plea allocution. Hemphill’s counsel ob-
    jected again, citing this Court’s decision in Crawford v.
    Washington, 
    541 U. S. 36
     (2004): “I think it is [a] Crawford
    violation. I think the evidence is being offered to incrimi-
    nate Mr. Hemphill. I’m being deprived of the opportunity
    to examine Mr. Morris, and I don’t see how it would not be
    a Crawford violation.” App. 160.1
    A few days later, the trial court announced its ruling. The
    court relied on People v. Reid, 19 N. Y. 3d 382, 
    971 N. E. 2d 353
    . In Reid, New York’s highest court held that a criminal
    defendant could “ope[n] the door” to evidence that would
    otherwise be inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause
    if the evidence was “ ‘reasonably necessary to correct [a]
    misleading impression’ ” made by the defense’s “ ‘evidence
    or argument.’ ” 
    Id., at 388
    , 971 N. E. 2d, at 357 (quoting
    People v. Massie, 2 N. Y. 3d 179, 184, 
    809 N. E. 2d 1102
    ,
    1105 (2004)). The trial court applied Reid as follows:
    “[A] significant aspect of the defense in this case is that
    Morris, who [was] originally prosecuted for this homi-
    cide, was, in fact, the actual shooter and that as such,
    the defendant, Hemphill, was excluded as the shooter.
    There is, however, evidence contrary to the argument
    ——————
    1 The State responded that Morris’ plea allocution was not testimonial
    because it did not “incriminate or point a finger at all against Mr.
    Hemphill.” App. 160. Before this Court, the State does not dispute that
    the plea allocution was testimonial, and so the Court expresses no view
    on the matter.
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)            5
    Opinion of the Court
    presented by the defense in this case . . . . In my judg-
    ment, the defense’s argument, which in all respects is
    appropriate and under the circumstances of this case
    probably a necessary argument to make, nonetheless,
    opens the door to evidence offered by the [S]tate refut-
    ing the claim that Morris was, in fact, the shooter.”
    App. 184, 185.
    Based on this ruling, the State published to the jury the
    portions of the transcript of Morris’ plea hearing containing
    Morris’ admission to possessing a .357 revolver and his
    counsel’s statements that he was doing so against counsel’s
    advice, without corroborating evidence, in order to get out
    of jail immediately.
    Hemphill premised his closing argument, like the rest of
    his defense, on the theory that Morris was the shooter. The
    State, in its closing, cited Morris’ plea allocution and em-
    phasized that possession of a .357 revolver, not murder, was
    “the crime [Morris] actually committed.” Id., at 356. After
    deliberations spanning multiple days, the jury found
    Hemphill guilty, and the court sentenced him to 25 years to
    life in prison.
    C
    Hemphill appealed. Before the Appellate Division, he ar-
    gued, citing the State and Federal Constitutions, that “[t]he
    court denied Mr. Hemphill his right to confront the witness
    against him where it admitted Nicholas Morris’s guilty plea
    statements . . . because the defense had opened the door to
    this evidence even though counsel had scrupulously fol-
    lowed the court’s in limine rulings.” Supp. App. to Brief in
    Opposition SA107. He added, “the prosecution’s conduct
    here represented the type of overreach the Confrontation
    Clause was enacted to prevent: the production of evidence
    procured by the government without affording the accused
    the opportunity to question its reliability through cross-ex-
    amination.” Id., at SA111.
    6                 HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    Opinion of the Court
    The Appellate Division affirmed. In relevant part, it rea-
    soned that “[d]uring the trial, defendant created a mislead-
    ing impression that Morris possessed a 9 millimeter hand-
    gun, which was consistent with the type used in the
    murder, and introduction of the plea allocution was reason-
    ably necessary to correct that misleading impression.” 173
    App. Div. 3d 471, 477, 103 N. Y. S. 3d 64, 71 (2019). Justice
    Manzanet-Daniels dissented on other grounds, arguing in
    part that the evidence was insufficient to support
    Hemphill’s conviction.
    Hemphill sought review from the New York Court of Ap-
    peals, the State’s highest court. He contended:
    “The Appellate Division’s analysis equates presenting
    a valid, evidence-based third party defense with mis-
    leading the jury, opening the door to testimonial hear-
    say. . . . Such an approach is absurd in the context of
    the Confrontation Clause, the purpose of which is to af-
    ford the accused the right to meaningfully test the pros-
    ecution’s proof.” App. 388.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed. 35 N. Y. 3d 1035, 1036–
    1037, 
    150 N. E. 3d 356
    , 357–358 (2020). This Court granted
    certiorari. 593 U. S. ___ (2021).
    II
    Before proceeding to the merits, the Court must address
    the State’s threshold argument that Hemphill failed to pre-
    sent his claim adequately to the state courts.
    This Court “has almost unfailingly refused to consider
    any federal-law challenge to a state-court decision unless
    the federal claim ‘was either addressed by or properly pre-
    sented to the state court that rendered the decision we have
    been asked to review.’ ” Howell v. Mississippi, 
    543 U. S. 440
    , 443 (2005) (per curiam) (quoting Adams v. Robertson,
    
    520 U. S. 83
    , 86 (1997) (per curiam)). “ ‘No particular form
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)                     7
    Opinion of the Court
    of words or phrases is essential’ ” for satisfying the presen-
    tation requirement, so long as the claim is “ ‘brought to the
    attention of the state court with fair precision and in due
    time.’ ” Street v. New York, 
    394 U. S. 576
    , 584 (1969) (quot-
    ing New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 
    278 U. S. 63
    , 67
    (1928)).
    Hemphill has satisfied this requirement. At every level
    of his proceedings in state court, Hemphill argued that the
    admission of Morris’ plea allocution violated his Sixth
    Amendment right to confrontation as interpreted by this
    Court in Crawford. Before the trial court, Hemphill timely
    objected that admission of the plea allocution would be “a
    Crawford violation.” App. 160. Before the Appellate Divi-
    sion, he argued that the trial court “denied Mr. Hemphill
    his 6th Amendment right to confront the witnesses against
    him.” Supp. App. to Brief in Opposition SA108. And before
    the Court of Appeals, he contended that “[t]he Appellate Di-
    vision’s analysis,” which had affirmed the trial court’s ad-
    mission of the plea allocution, “is absurd in the context of
    the Confrontation Clause, the purpose of which is to afford
    the accused the right to meaningfully test the prosecution’s
    proof.” App. 388. “Once a federal claim is properly pre-
    sented, a party can make any argument in support of that
    claim.” Yee v. Escondido, 
    503 U. S. 519
    , 534 (1992). The
    Court may therefore consider any argument Hemphill
    raises in support of his claim that he did not “forfei[t] his
    right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the Confron-
    tation Clause” by “open[ing] the door to responsive evi-
    dence.” Pet. for Cert. i.2
    ——————
    2 According to the dissent, Hemphill did not present his constitutional
    claim below because he “challenged only the misapplication of state law”
    (i.e., the opening-the-door rule enunciated in People v. Reid, 19 N. Y. 3d
    382, 
    971 N. E. 2d 353
     (2012)) without developing his constitutional ob-
    jection. Post, at 4 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Not so. Hemphill argued
    before the Court of Appeals that the Appellate Division’s interpretation
    of Reid in his case “equates presenting a valid, evidence-based third
    8                      HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    Opinion of the Court
    Accordingly, the Court turns to the merits of that claim.
    III
    A
    One of the bedrock constitutional protections afforded to
    criminal defendants is the Confrontation Clause of the
    Sixth Amendment, which states: “In all criminal prosecu-
    tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
    with the witnesses against him.”3
    In Ohio v. Roberts, 
    448 U. S. 56
    , 66 (1980), this Court had
    held that this confrontation right did not bar the admission
    of statements of an unavailable witness so long as those
    statements had “adequate ‘indicia of reliability,’ ” meaning
    that they fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or
    otherwise bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
    ness.” However, 24 years later, this Court rejected that re-
    liability-based approach to the Confrontation Clause. See
    Crawford, 
    541 U. S., at 61
    .
    In charting a different path, the Crawford Court exam-
    ined the history of the confrontation right at common law
    and concluded that “the principal evil at which the Confron-
    tation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of crimi-
    nal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examina-
    tions as evidence against the accused.” 
    Id., at 50
    . The
    ——————
    party defense with misleading the jury, opening the door to testimonial
    hearsay”—a rule that “unjustifiably undermines the right to Confronta-
    tion” for reasons he proceeded to explain. App. 388. Thus, Hemphill
    expressly raised a Confrontation Clause argument and, contrary to the
    dissent’s contention, offered the Court of Appeals “ ‘the first opportunity’ ”
    to construe Reid “ ‘in a way which saves [its] constitutionality.’ ” Post, at
    9 (quoting Cardinale v. Louisiana, 
    394 U. S. 437
    , 439 (1969)). The dis-
    sent also accuses this Court of “redefin[ing] Reid to be what Hemphill
    said it was not.” Post, at 10. Far from it: This Court accepts the Court
    of Appeals’ conclusive determination that Reid authorized the admission
    of testimonial hearsay in this case.
    3 The Clause binds the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
    Pointer v. Texas, 
    380 U. S. 400
    , 403 (1965).
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)                   9
    Opinion of the Court
    Court continued, “the Framers would not have allowed ad-
    mission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not
    appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the
    defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examina-
    tion.” 
    Id.,
     at 53–54.4 Because “[t]he text of the Sixth
    Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions
    from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the
    courts,” the requirement was “most naturally read” to ad-
    mit “only those exceptions established at the time of the
    founding.” Id., at 54; see also Giles v. California, 
    554 U. S. 353
    , 377 (2008) (“declin[ing] to approve an exception to the
    Confrontation Clause unheard of at the time of the found-
    ing or for 200 years thereafter”).
    B
    The State accepts all of the foregoing principles. It does
    not dispute that Morris’ plea allocution was testimonial,
    meaning that it implicated Hemphill’s rights under the
    Confrontation Clause. Nor does the State argue that the
    “opening the door” rule announced in People v. Reid and ap-
    plied in Hemphill’s case was an exception to the right to
    confrontation at common law.
    The State’s primary contention is that the Reid rule “is
    not an exception to the Confrontation Clause at all.” Brief
    for Respondent 36. Instead, the State attempts to charac-
    terize the Reid rule as a mere “procedural rule” that “treats
    the misleading door-opening actions of counsel as the equiv-
    alent of failing to object to the confrontation violation.”
    Brief for Respondent 31. So construed, the argument goes,
    ——————
    4 The Crawford Court defined “testimony” as a “solemn declaration or
    affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”
    
    541 U. S., at 51
     (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]t a minimum,”
    the Court explained, this includes “prior testimony at a preliminary
    hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and . . . police
    interrogations.” 
    Id., at 68
    . Subsequent decisions have expounded on this
    definition. See, e.g., Ohio v. Clark, 
    576 U. S. 237
    , 244–245 (2015).
    10                 HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    Opinion of the Court
    the Reid rule limits only the manner of asserting the con-
    frontation right, not its substantive scope.
    It is true that the Sixth Amendment leaves States with
    flexibility to adopt reasonable procedural rules governing
    the exercise of a defendant’s right to confrontation. For ex-
    ample, “States are free to adopt procedural rules governing
    objections,” including contemporaneous objection require-
    ments and, in the context of forensic evidence, “notice-and-
    demand statutes.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
    557 U. S. 305
    , 327 (2009). In addition, the Confrontation Clause
    will not bar a defendant’s removal from a courtroom if, de-
    spite repeated warnings, he “insists on conducting himself
    in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of
    the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the
    courtroom.” Illinois v. Allen, 
    397 U. S. 337
    , 343 (1970).
    The door-opening principle incorporated in Reid,
    however, is not a member of this class of procedural rules.
    Rather, it is a substantive principle of evidence that dic-
    tates what material is relevant and admissible in a case.
    See Massie, 2 N. Y. 3d, at 182–184, 
    809 N. E. 2d, at
    1104–
    1105 (citing People v. Melendez, 55 N. Y. 2d 445, 
    434 N. E. 2d 1324
     (1982), a case about the admissibility of hearsay
    testimony, as “[t]he leading case in this Court on ‘opening
    the door’ ”); New York State Unified Court System, Guide to
    New York Evidence Rule 4.08 (2021) (explaining the “open
    the door” principle as a rule of evidence). As this case illus-
    trates, the principle requires a trial court to determine
    whether one party’s evidence and arguments, in the context
    of the full record, have created a “misleading impression”
    that requires correction with additional material from the
    other side.
    Moreover, the State’s argument would negate Crawford’s
    emphatic rejection of the reliability-based approach of Ohio
    v. Roberts. If Crawford stands for anything, it is that the
    history, text, and purpose of the Confrontation Clause bar
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)            11
    Opinion of the Court
    judges from substituting their own determinations of relia-
    bility for the method the Constitution guarantees. The
    Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that
    reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in
    the crucible of cross-examination.” Crawford, 
    541 U. S., at 61
    . It “thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desira-
    bility of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be
    little dissent), but about how reliability can best be deter-
    mined.” 
    Ibid.
     “[A] mere judicial determination” regarding
    the reliability of evidence is no substitute for the “constitu-
    tionally prescribed method of assessing reliability.” 
    Id., at 62
    . The upshot is that the role of the trial judge is not, for
    Confrontation Clause purposes, to weigh the reliability or
    credibility of testimonial hearsay evidence; it is to ensure
    that the Constitution’s procedures for testing the reliability
    of that evidence are followed.
    The trial court here violated this principle by admitting
    unconfronted, testimonial hearsay against Hemphill
    simply because the judge deemed his presentation to have
    created a misleading impression that the testimonial hear-
    say was reasonably necessary to correct. For Confrontation
    Clause purposes, it was not for the judge to determine
    whether Hemphill’s theory that Morris was the shooter was
    unreliable, incredible, or otherwise misleading in light of
    the State’s proffered, unconfronted plea evidence. Nor, un-
    der the Clause, was it the judge’s role to decide that this
    evidence was reasonably necessary to correct that mislead-
    ing impression. Such inquiries are antithetical to the Con-
    frontation Clause.
    C
    The State next insists that the Reid rule is necessary to
    safeguard the truth-finding function of courts because it
    prevents the selective and misleading introduction of evi-
    dence. See Reid, 19 N. Y. 3d, at 388, 971 N. E. 2d, at 357.
    The State relies on this Court’s precedents recognizing the
    12                HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    Opinion of the Court
    need for sensitivity to “ ‘the legitimate demands of the ad-
    versarial system.’ ” Taylor v. Illinois, 
    484 U. S. 400
    , 413
    (1988) (quoting United States v. Nobles, 
    422 U. S. 225
    , 241
    (1975); emphasis deleted). This argument falls short as
    well. Even as it has recognized and reaffirmed the vital
    truth-seeking function of a trial, the Court has not allowed
    such considerations to override the rights the Constitution
    confers upon criminal defendants.
    The State cites a series of cases in which this Court per-
    mitted a State to impeach a defendant using evidence that
    would normally be barred from use at trial. Brief for Re-
    spondent 32 (citing Kansas v. Ventris, 
    556 U. S. 586
     (2009);
    Harris v. New York, 
    401 U. S. 222
     (1971); Walder v. United
    States, 
    347 U. S. 62
     (1954)). None of those cases, however,
    involved exceptions to constitutional requirements. Ra-
    ther, in each case, the Court considered the appropriate
    scope of a prophylactic rule designed to remedy “a violation
    that ha[d] already occurred.” Ventris, 
    556 U. S., at 593
    . For
    example, the Court distinguished violations of the Fourth
    Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches or
    seizures from the prophylactic rule designed to deter viola-
    tions of that guarantee by excluding the fruits of such
    searches or seizures from trial. 
    Id.,
     at 590–591. Because
    the prophylactic exclusionary rule is a “deterrent sanction”
    rather than a “substantive guarantee,” the Court applied a
    balancing test to allow States to impeach defendants with
    the fruits of prior Fourth Amendment violations, even
    though the rule barred the admission of such fruits in the
    State’s case-in-chief. 
    Id.,
     at 591 (citing Walder, 
    347 U. S., at 65
    ).
    In contrast, the Court has not held that defendants can
    “open the door” to violations of constitutional requirements
    merely by making evidence relevant to contradict their de-
    fense. Thus, in New Jersey v. Portash, 
    440 U. S. 450
    , 458–
    459 (1979), the Court rejected a State’s effort to impeach a
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)           13
    Opinion of the Court
    defendant through the introduction of his own coerced tes-
    timony. It did so despite the strong and obvious interest in
    preventing perjury because the very introduction of the
    coerced testimony would violate the Fifth Amendment’s
    provision that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any
    criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In view of
    that guarantee, balancing of interests was “not simply un-
    necessary,” but “impermissible.” Portash, 
    440 U. S., at 459
    .
    The Sixth Amendment speaks with equal clarity: “In all
    criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
    to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” It admits
    no exception for cases in which the trial judge believes un-
    confronted testimonial hearsay might be reasonably neces-
    sary to correct a misleading impression. Courts may not
    overlook its command, no matter how noble the motive. See
    United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 
    548 U. S. 140
    , 145 (2006)
    (“It is true enough that the purpose of the rights set forth
    in [the Sixth] Amendment is to ensure a fair trial; but it
    does not follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as
    the trial is, on the whole, fair”).
    D
    The State warns that a reversal will leave prosecutors
    without recourse to protect against abuses of the confronta-
    tion right. These concerns are overstated. State and fed-
    eral hearsay rules generally preclude all parties from intro-
    ducing unreliable, out-of-court statements for the truth of
    the matter asserted. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 802. Even
    for otherwise admissible evidence, “well-established rules,”
    such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403, “permit trial judges
    to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by
    certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of
    the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Holmes v.
    South Carolina, 
    547 U. S. 319
    , 326 (2006). If a court admits
    evidence before its misleading or unfairly prejudicial na-
    ture becomes apparent, it generally retains the authority to
    14                     HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    Opinion of the Court
    withdraw it, strike it, or issue a limiting instruction as ap-
    propriate. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 105; New York State
    Unified Court System, Guide to New York Evidence Rule
    1.13(1) (“Absent undue prejudice to a party, a judge may
    revisit his or her own evidentiary rulings during trial”).
    Finally, the Court does not decide today the validity of
    the common-law rule of completeness as applied to testimo-
    nial hearsay. Under that rule, a party “ ‘against whom a
    part of an utterance has been put in, may in his turn com-
    plement it by putting in the remainder.’ ” Beech Aircraft
    Corp. v. Rainey, 
    488 U. S. 153
    , 171 (1988) (quoting 7 J. Wig-
    more, Evidence §2113, p. 653 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1978)); see
    also Fed. Rule Evid. 106. The parties agree that the rule of
    completeness does not apply to the facts of this case, as Mor-
    ris’ plea allocution was not part of any statement that
    Hemphill introduced. Whether and under what circum-
    stances that rule might allow the admission of testimonial
    hearsay against a criminal defendant presents different is-
    sues that are not before this Court.5
    *   *     *
    The Confrontation Clause requires that the reliability
    and veracity of the evidence against a criminal defendant
    be tested by cross-examination, not determined by a trial
    court. The trial court’s admission of unconfronted testimo-
    nial hearsay over Hemphill’s objection, on the view that it
    was reasonably necessary to correct Hemphill’s misleading
    argument, violated that fundamental guarantee. The judg-
    ment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
    ——————
    5 The State also asks this Court to hold the constitutional error in this
    case harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, see Chapman v. California,
    
    386 U. S. 18
    , 24 (1967), citing what it calls “substantial independent ev-
    idence of [Hemphill’s] guilt,” Brief for Respondent 49. It offers no reason,
    however, for the Court to depart from its “general custom of allowing
    state courts initially to assess the effect of erroneously admitted evidence
    in light of substantive state criminal law.” Lilly v. Virginia, 
    527 U. S. 116
    , 139 (1999).
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)          15
    Opinion of the Court
    case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
    with this opinion.
    It is so ordered.
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)            1
    ALITO, J., concurring
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 20–637
    _________________
    DARRELL HEMPHILL, PETITIONER v. NEW YORK
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF NEW YORK
    [January 20, 2022]
    JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE KAVANAUGH joins,
    concurring.
    I agree with the Court’s conclusion that—assuming Mor-
    ris’s statement was testimonial—its admission violated the
    Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. I write sep-
    arately to address the conditions under which a defendant
    can be deemed to have validly waived the right to confront
    adverse witnesses.
    “The question of a waiver of a federally guaranteed con-
    stitutional right is, of course, a federal question controlled
    by federal law.” Brookhart v. Janis, 
    384 U. S. 1
    , 4 (1966).
    Waiver consists in the “intentional relinquishment or aban-
    donment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst,
    
    304 U. S. 458
    , 464 (1938). But a valid waiver need not be
    express. Implied waiver can be established through “ ‘a
    course of conduct’ ” even “absent formal or express state-
    ments of waiver.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
    560 U. S. 370
    ,
    383–384 (2010) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 
    441 U. S. 369
    , 373 (1979)). In the prototypical case of implied waiver,
    the relevant course of conduct signals an intention to relin-
    quish the right at issue. But “[a]s a general proposition, the
    law can presume that an individual who, with a full under-
    standing of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent
    with their exercise has made a deliberate choice to relin-
    quish the protection those rights afford.” Berghuis, 
    560 U. S., at 385
    .
    2                     HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    ALITO, J., concurring
    Our precedents establish that a defendant can impliedly
    waive the Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse wit-
    nesses through conduct.* The cause of implied waiver can
    be a “failure to object to the offending evidence” in accord-
    ance with the procedural standards fixed by state law.
    Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
    557 U. S. 305
    , 314, n. 3
    (2009). But implied waiver can also occur when a defendant
    engages in a course of conduct that is incompatible with a
    demand to confront adverse witnesses. In Illinois v. Allen,
    
    397 U. S. 337
     (1970), for instance, we held that a defendant
    may relinquish his right to confront adverse witnesses by
    “conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive,
    and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be car-
    ried on with him in the courtroom.” 
    Id., at 343
    .
    The problem with the New York rule at issue in this case
    is that its application is predicated on neither conduct
    evincing intent to relinquish the right of confrontation nor
    action inconsistent with the assertion of that right. The in-
    troduction of evidence that is misleading as to the real facts
    does not, in itself, indicate a decision regarding whether
    any given declarant should be subjected to cross-examina-
    tion. Nor is that kind of maneuver inconsistent with the
    assertion of the right to confront a declarant whose out-of-
    court statements could potentially set the record straight.
    There are other circumstances, however, under which a
    defendant’s introduction of evidence may be regarded as an
    implicit waiver of the right to object to the prosecution’s use
    ——————
    * The conduct relevant to waiver may be the defendant’s or that of trial
    counsel. As a rule, for decisions “pertaining to the conduct of the trial,
    the defendant is ‘deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent’ ” and
    charged with the knowledge of trial counsel. New York v. Hill, 
    528 U. S. 110
    , 115 (2000) (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 
    370 U. S. 626
    , 634
    (1962)). The exceptions to this rule are few, and they do not encompass
    decisions regarding what arguments to pursue at trial. See Hill, 
    528 U. S., at 115
    .
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)            3
    ALITO, J., concurring
    of evidence that might otherwise be barred by the Confron-
    tation Clause. Under the traditional rule of completeness,
    if a party introduces all or part of a declarant’s statement,
    the opposing party is entitled to introduce the remainder of
    that statement or another related statement by the same
    declarant, regardless of whether the statement is testimo-
    nial or there was a prior opportunity to confront the declar-
    ant. See, e.g., 1 B. Bergman, N. Hollander, & T. Duncan,
    Wharton’s Criminal Evidence §4:10 (15th ed. 1997) (ex-
    plaining rule of completeness and collecting cases); Fed.
    Rule Evid. 106 (partially codifying rule of completeness
    with respect to writings and recorded statements).
    The rule of completeness fits comfortably within the con-
    cept of implied waiver. By introducing part or all of a state-
    ment made by an unavailable declarant, a defendant has
    made a knowing and voluntary decision to permit that de-
    clarant to appear as an unconfronted witness. As a result,
    the defendant cannot consistently maintain that the re-
    mainder of the declarant’s statement or the declarant’s
    other statements on the same subject should not be admit-
    ted due to the impossibility of cross-examining that declar-
    ant. The defendant’s decision to present the statement of
    an unavailable declarant is inconsistent with the simulta-
    neous assertion of the Sixth Amendment right to subject
    that declarant to cross-examination.
    Analogous logic governs the Fifth Amendment privilege
    against self-incrimination. As our precedent makes clear,
    when an accused takes the stand, he implicitly “ ‘determines
    the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry’ ” and thus
    “cannot reasonably claim that the Fifth Amendment gives
    him . . . an immunity from cross-examination on the mat-
    ters he has himself put into dispute.” Brown v. United
    States, 
    356 U. S. 148
    , 155–156 (1958).
    The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation should be
    analyzed no differently. When a defendant introduces the
    statement of an unavailable declarant on a given subject,
    4                 HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    ALITO, J., concurring
    he commits himself to the trier of fact’s examination of what
    the declarant has to say on that subject. The remainder of
    the declarant’s statement or statements—and any other
    statements by the same declarant on the same subject—are
    fair game. The defendant cannot reasonably claim other-
    wise, given his tactical choice to put the declarant’s state-
    ments on the relevant subject in contention despite his un-
    availability for cross-examination.        And that is true
    regardless of whether the defendant attempts to “invoke”
    his right to confront an unavailable declarant after intro-
    ducing his out-of-court statements. Having made the choice
    to introduce the statements of an unavailable declarant, a
    defendant cannot be heard to complain that he cannot
    cross-examine that declarant with respect to the remainder
    of that statement or the declarant’s related statements on
    the same subject.
    *     *    *
    The Court emphasizes that its decision does not call into
    question the rule of completeness or other principles that
    may support implied waiver of the confrontation right. On
    this understanding, I join the opinion of the Court in full.
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)            1
    THOMAS, J., dissenting
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 20–637
    _________________
    DARRELL HEMPHILL, PETITIONER v. NEW YORK
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF NEW YORK
    [January 20, 2022]
    JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
    This Court may review “[f]inal judgments or decrees ren-
    dered by the highest court of a State” only where, as rele-
    vant here, a federal right “is specially set up or claimed” in
    the state court. 
    28 U. S. C. §1257
    (a). Because Darrell
    Hemphill did not raise his Sixth Amendment claim in the
    New York Court of Appeals, we lack jurisdiction to review
    that court’s decision. I respectfully dissent.
    I
    Under New York case law, a trial court may generally ad-
    mit otherwise inadmissible evidence if a party has “opened
    the door” to its introduction at trial. People v. Massie, 2
    N. Y. 3d 179, 180, 
    809 N. E. 2d 1102
     (2004) (internal quota-
    tion marks omitted). A party “opens the door” when he pre-
    sents “evidence or argument” that is “incomplete and mis-
    leading,” and responsive evidence is necessary to “correct
    the misleading impression.” Id., at 184, 
    809 N. E. 2d, at 1105
    . In People v. Reid, 19 N. Y. 3d 382, 388, 
    971 N. E. 2d 353
    , 357 (2012), the New York Court of Appeals held that
    this door-opening doctrine permits a trial court to admit
    testimonial hearsay otherwise barred by the Sixth Amend-
    ment’s Confrontation Clause. In this case, invoking Reid,
    the trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce Nich-
    olas Morris’ plea allocution to rebut Hemphill’s defense that
    Morris possessed the murder weapon. See ante, at 3–5.
    2                  HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    THOMAS, J., dissenting
    Hemphill argues in this Court that the Reid rule violates
    the Sixth Amendment. That claim is not properly before
    us. Under 
    28 U. S. C. §1257
    , “we will not consider a peti-
    tioner’s federal claim unless it was either addressed by or
    properly presented to the state court that rendered the de-
    cision we have been asked to review.” Adams v. Robertson,
    
    520 U. S. 83
    , 86 (1997) (per curiam). When the state court
    does not “expressly address the question on which we
    granted certiorari,” but is instead “silent on [the] federal
    question before us, we assume that the issue was not
    properly presented.” 
    Ibid.
     The petitioner then “bears the
    burden of . . . demonstrating that the state court had a fair
    opportunity to address the federal question that is sought
    to be presented.” 
    Id., at 87
     (internal quotation marks omit-
    ted).
    The New York Court of Appeals did not address—“ex-
    pressly” or otherwise, 
    id.,
     at 86—Hemphill’s Sixth Amend-
    ment claim. It affirmed the trial court’s application of Reid
    in a single sentence: “[T]he trial court did not abuse its dis-
    cretion by admitting evidence that the allegedly culpable
    third party pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm other
    than the murder weapon.” 35 N. Y. 3d 1035, 1036, 
    150 N. E. 3d 356
    , 358 (2020). This lone sentence does not evince
    any awareness of, let alone respond to, a Confrontation
    Clause claim. Because the Court of Appeals was “silent on
    [the] federal question before us,” Hemphill must prove that
    he afforded the state court a “fair opportunity” to address
    his current Sixth Amendment claim. Adams, 
    520 U. S., at
    86–87 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Hemphill does not meet that burden. To provide the
    Court of Appeals with a “fair opportunity” to evaluate his
    Sixth Amendment claim, Hemphill was required to raise
    that claim “with fair precision,” New York ex rel. Bryant v.
    Zimmerman, 
    278 U. S. 63
    , 67 (1928), and in an “unmistak-
    able manner,” Dewey v. Des Moines, 
    173 U. S. 193
    , 198
    (1899), such that “the mind of the state court was directed
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)              3
    THOMAS, J., dissenting
    to [the federal] question,” Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio,
    
    183 U. S. 238
    , 248 (1902); see also Marvin v. Trout, 
    199 U. S. 212
    , 223 (1905). Put simply, there must have been a
    “real contest . . . upon” the federal claim in state court. Mor-
    rison v. Watson, 
    154 U. S. 111
    , 115 (1894); accord, Illinois
    v. Gates, 
    462 U. S. 213
    , 222–223 (1983).
    Here, there was no contest upon any federal claim in the
    New York Court of Appeals. In his briefing before that
    court, Hemphill asserted that the “only issue before [that]
    Court [was] whether the defense opened the door to Mor-
    ris’s testimonial hearsay.” App. 385 (emphasis added). To
    that end, Hemphill argued that his defense’s presentation
    of evidence was not “misleading” under Massie, Reid, and
    other cases. See App. 386–387. Of course, whether
    Hemphill triggered New York’s “substantive principle of ev-
    idence,” ante, at 10, is a question of state law “not subject to
    review here,” Moore v. Illinois, 
    408 U. S. 786
    , 799 (1972);
    see also Hiawassee River Power Co. v. Carolina-Tennessee
    Power Co., 
    252 U. S. 341
    , 343 (1920). Federal law does not
    govern whether a defendant’s presentation of his case is
    “misleading.” Thus, Hemphill pressed only a state-law
    claim in the New York Court of Appeals.
    True, Hemphill cited one Sixth Amendment precedent,
    Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U. S. 36
     (2004), and stated
    that “the introduction of Morris’s guilty plea minutes vio-
    lated [his] Sixth Amendment right.” App. 385. But
    Hemphill reached that conclusion not because there was a
    “real contest . . . upon” the constitutionality of the Reid rule,
    Morrison, 
    154 U. S., at 115
    , but rather because the trial
    court misapplied Reid and thus improperly admitted un-
    confronted testimonial hearsay.            Put another way,
    Hemphill never argued that evidence that complied with
    Reid violated the Confrontation Clause. To the contrary,
    Hemphill understood Reid to be constitutional.                As
    Hemphill explained, “both the trial judge and the Appellate
    4                   HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    THOMAS, J., dissenting
    Division recognized that [Morris’] statements would other-
    wise be barred by the Confrontation Clause” if he had not
    opened the door. App. 385. (emphasis added). In short, eve-
    ryone agreed on what the Sixth Amendment required; the
    only dispute was whether the trial court misapplied New
    York’s door-opening doctrine.
    The Court declines to address the substance of
    Hemphill’s argument in the Court of Appeals. It focuses
    instead on Hemphill’s remark, toward the end of his analy-
    sis, that the Appellate Division’s ruling “unjustifiably un-
    dermine[d]” the right to confrontation and was “absurd in
    the context of the Confrontation Clause.” Id., at 388. But
    this was not a challenge to the constitutionality of the Reid
    rule; rather, it was an explanation why the Appellate Divi-
    sion’s approach to Reid represented “a radical shift never
    adopted by” the New York Court of Appeals in Reid or its
    progeny. App. 388. Hemphill repeated that charge at
    length in his reply brief. See id., at 404–406. Notably, he
    faulted the trial court for its “basic misunderstanding of the
    Reid doctrine.” Id., at 406. Thus, as before, Hemphill chal-
    lenged only the misapplication of state law.
    Nonetheless, even if the Court were correct that
    Hemphill’s fleeting reference to the Confrontation Clause
    addressed the constitutionality of the Reid rule, Hemphill
    still would not have raised a “properly presented” federal
    claim under 
    28 U. S. C. §1257
    . Adams, 
    520 U. S., at 86
    . For
    more than a century, this Court has held that “[a] general
    statement that the decision of a court is against the consti-
    tutional rights of the objecting party . . . will not raise a fed-
    eral question.” Clarke v. McDade, 
    165 U. S. 168
    , 172 (1897);
    see also Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. McGuire, 
    196 U. S. 128
    ,
    131 (1905) (“mere suggestion of a violation of a Federal
    right”—rather than “the distinct presentation of a Federal
    question”—is inadequate). A litigant must adequately de-
    velop any federal claim in his state briefing in order to give
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)             5
    THOMAS, J., dissenting
    the state court a “fair opportunity” to assess the claim. Ad-
    ams, 
    520 U. S., at 87
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Here, the Court highlights two statements from Hemphill’s
    state-court briefing that, at best, offered a general and un-
    reasoned assertion that the New York courts violated the
    Sixth Amendment. Such an unspecific statement mani-
    festly failed to give the Court of Appeals a “fair opportunity”
    to assess any constitutional claim.
    The Court tacitly recognizes that its chosen excerpts from
    Hemphill’s brief are inadequate. It asserts that Hemphill,
    after making those statements, “proceeded to explain” the
    basis for a Confrontation Clause claim. Ante, at 8, n. 2. The
    record demonstrates otherwise. Hemphill did not cite a sin-
    gle case. He made no legal argument. In fact, he did not
    even address the right to confront adverse witnesses. Ra-
    ther, Hemphill lamented that, “[a]s a practical matter,” the
    Appellate Division’s approach “create[d] a minefield for
    counsel in which the only way for the accused to rely on the
    rules of evidence or constitutional protections is to remain
    mute.” App. 388. This general grievance about the inabil-
    ity to present evidence or argument in defense says nothing
    about the Confrontation Clause. To the contrary, under our
    precedents, the right to present a defense in a state crimi-
    nal trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment’s Compul-
    sory Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
    Process Clause. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 
    388 U. S. 14
    , 19 (1967). A claim under those provisions would not
    preserve a Confrontation Clause claim. See Gates, 
    462 U. S., at
    219–220. It follows that Hemphill’s assertion
    about the practicalities of criminal defense, with no citation
    to any authority, is even more obviously inadequate.
    Ultimately, the Court all but concedes Hemphill’s failure
    to develop his claim below, but relies on Yee v. Escondido,
    
    503 U. S. 519
     (1992), for the proposition that we may “con-
    sider any argument Hemphill raises in support of his
    claim.” Ante, at 7. But Yee still requires a federal claim to
    6                      HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    THOMAS, J., dissenting
    be “properly presented” to the state court, even if a new ar-
    gument in support of that claim is raised for the first time
    here. 
    503 U. S., at 534
    . So, in Yee, the Fifth Amendment
    taking claim was properly presented because the petition-
    ers “unquestionably raised [that] claim in the state courts”
    based on a “physical taking argument,” and it was “unclear”
    only whether they also raised a related “regulatory taking”
    argument. 
    Ibid.
     Here, by contrast, Hemphill developed no
    basis for any federal claim before the Court of Appeals. Yee
    is therefore inapplicable and §1257 bars this Court’s re-
    view.
    II
    Hemphill’s failure to properly present his Sixth Amend-
    ment claim to the New York Court of Appeals divests this
    Court of jurisdiction. To be sure, on rare occasions, this
    Court has excused the failure to present a federal claim in
    state court. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort
    Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P. C., 
    476 U. S. 877
    , 883 (1986). Our insistence on proper presentation has
    been “ ‘almost,’ ” though not completely, “ ‘unfailin[g].’ ”
    Ante, at 6 (quoting Howell v. Mississippi, 
    543 U. S. 440
    , 443
    (2005) (per curiam)). But, in my view, the Court’s recent
    treatment of §1257’s proper-presentation requirement as
    merely prudential is erroneous. We have no authority to
    forgive a petitioner’s failure to raise a federal claim in state
    court, because the proper-presentation requirement is a ju-
    risdictional prerequisite to our review. Absent jurisdiction,
    the only appropriate remedy is dismissal.1
    Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, §25, 
    1 Stat. 85
    , Congress
    ——————
    1 Even if the proper-presentation requirement were merely prudential,
    I still would dismiss this case, albeit as improvidently granted. I see no
    reason to deviate from our “almost unfailin[g]” refusal to hear improperly
    presented federal claims. Howell, 
    543 U. S., at 443
    . In this case, like
    many others, “ ‘the circumstances . . . justify no exception.’ ” 
    Id., at 446
    (collecting cases). Particularly here, strong interests in comity counsel
    against hearing Hemphill’s Sixth Amendment claim. See Part III, infra.
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)                       7
    THOMAS, J., dissenting
    has permitted this Court to review the judgments of state
    courts only when petitioners properly present their federal
    claims to those courts below. See Gates, 
    462 U. S., at 218
    .
    This Court’s earliest cases held that the absence of a federal
    claim in the state court defeats this Court’s jurisdiction.
    See, e.g., Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 
    5 Cranch 344
    , 347
    (1809). Justice Story explained: “[T]o give this court appel-
    late jurisdiction two things should have occurred and be ap-
    parent in the record: first, that some one of the [federal]
    questions . . . did arise in the court below; and secondly,
    that a decision was actually made thereon by the same
    court.” Crowell v. Randell, 
    10 Pet. 368
    , 392 (1836).2 That
    conclusion was unremarkable given that the proper-
    presentation requirement has always appeared in this
    Court’s only statutory grant of jurisdiction to review state-
    court decisions.
    For nearly 200 years, this Court adhered to the proper-
    presentation requirement as a jurisdictional rule. The
    Court routinely dismissed cases for lack of jurisdiction
    when the petitioner failed to properly present his federal
    claim to the state court. See, e.g., Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler
    County, 
    166 U. S. 648
    , 660 (1897); Cincinnati, N. O. &
    T. P. R. Co. v. Slade, 
    216 U. S. 78
    , 83–84 (1910); Cardinale
    v. Louisiana, 
    394 U. S. 437
    , 439 (1969); see also Howell, 
    543 U. S., at 445
     (noting “the long line of cases clearly stating
    that the presentation requirement is jurisdictional”). Even
    a century ago, it was “well settled” that this Court was
    “without jurisdiction to review the judgment of a State
    court . . . by reason of a federal question which was not
    raised below or called to the attention of or decided by the
    ——————
    2 Our later cases have stated this test in the disjunctive. See Illinois v.
    Gates, 
    462 U. S. 213
    , 218, n. 1 (1983). Because neither precondition is
    satisfied—Hemphill did not raise his Sixth Amendment claim below, nor
    did the New York Court of Appeals address any such claim—I express no
    view on whether a federal claim must be both pressed and passed upon
    in the state court.
    8                  HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    THOMAS, J., dissenting
    State court.” New York ex rel. Rosevale Realty Co. v.
    Kleinert, 
    268 U. S. 646
    , 650 (1925).
    Despite this long tradition, our more recent cases say it
    is “unsettled” whether the proper-presentation require-
    ment is a jurisdictional bar or merely a prudential consid-
    eration. E.g., Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 
    486 U. S. 71
    , 79 (1988). But the Court has never explained why
    it abandoned a centuries-old limit on our jurisdiction. Two
    cases in the mid-20th century unsettled the doctrine with
    little justification. First, in Terminiello v. Chicago, 
    337 U. S. 1
     (1949), the petitioner raised a First Amendment
    challenge to a city ordinance in state court, but failed to
    challenge the jury instruction interpreting that ordinance
    either below or in this Court. The Court sidestepped the
    proper-presentation requirement by reading the jury in-
    struction as a “construction of the ordinance . . . as binding
    on us as though the precise words had been written into the
    ordinance.” 
    Id., at 4
    . Later, in Vachon v. New Hampshire,
    
    414 U. S. 478
     (1974) (per curiam), the Court deviated yet
    further from the jurisdictional understanding of the proper-
    presentation rule. For the first time, and in an unreasoned
    footnote, the Court explicitly forgave a petitioner’s failure
    to present a federal claim to the state court. See 
    id., at 479, n. 3
    . Other than Terminiello, the Court cited three cases
    that reviewed claims from federal court, see 
    414 U. S., at 483
     (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), where the requirement to
    present a federal claim has never been jurisdictional, see,
    e.g., Springfield v. Kibbe, 
    480 U. S. 257
    , 259 (1987) (per cu-
    riam).
    Since Vachon, the Court has not explained why the re-
    quirement to present a federal claim in state court is pru-
    dential rather than jurisdictional. Instead, we have repeat-
    edly ducked the issue. See Howell, 
    543 U. S., at
    445–446
    (collecting cases). I see no reason to prolong this Court’s
    ambivalence. The proper-presentation requirement ap-
    pears in the only statute that grants this Court jurisdiction
    Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022)              9
    THOMAS, J., dissenting
    to review state-court decisions. For most of our history,
    that requirement was unfailingly understood to be jurisdic-
    tional. And our cases have since departed from this princi-
    ple without squaring that departure with §1257’s unquali-
    fied text. Accordingly, I would hold that this Court lacks
    jurisdiction to hear a federal claim on review from a state
    court where a petitioner, like Hemphill, fails to properly
    present his claim to the court below.
    III
    That the Court decides this case despite Hemphill’s fail-
    ure to present his claim to the New York Court of Appeals
    is not a mere academic defect. “Federal nullification of a
    state statute,” or any state rule, “is a grave matter.” Maine
    v. Taylor, 
    477 U. S. 131
    , 135 (1986); see also Abbott v. Perez,
    585 U. S. ___, ___, n. 17 (2018) (slip op., at 21, n. 17) (“the
    inability to enforce its duly enacted plans clearly inflicts ir-
    reparable harm on the State”). And it is “unseemly in our
    dual system of government to disturb the finality of state
    judgments on a federal ground that the state court did not
    have occasion to consider.” Adams, 
    520 U. S., at 90
     (inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is “important that
    state courts be given the first opportunity to consider the
    applicability of state [rules],” particularly “in light of con-
    stitutional challenge, since the [rules] may be construed in
    a way which saves their constitutionality.” Cardinale, 394
    U. S., at 439. A state court’s interest in deciding “whether
    to . . . amend [its] rules to avoid potential constitutional
    challenges” is “undeniable.” Adams, 
    520 U. S., at 90
    .
    Today, the Court disregards these important “[p]rinciples
    of comity.” Webb v. Webb, 
    451 U. S. 493
    , 499 (1981). In the
    Court of Appeals, Hemphill argued that state law required
    “an affirmative attempt to mislead the jury . . . before the
    door can be opened to otherwise inadmissible evidence.”
    App. 386. Hemphill maintained that “[t]he doctrine is not
    so capacious as to allow the admission of any evidence made
    10                 HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK
    THOMAS, J., dissenting
    relevant by the opposing party’s strategy.” 
    Ibid.
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted). But here, the Court describes
    Reid as permitting the prosecution to introduce all evidence
    that is “arguably relevant” to rebut the defendant’s “theory
    of defense.” Ante, at 2. The Court thus redefines Reid to be
    what Hemphill said it was not, and then holds that carica-
    ture of Reid unconstitutional without giving the Court of
    Appeals an opportunity to clarify its evidentiary rule in
    light of a concrete constitutional challenge. Even if Massie,
    Reid, and their progeny do not clearly define what it means
    to “mislead” a jury, any uncertainty is all the more reason
    for this Court to refrain from deciding this case prema-
    turely. That the New York courts may clarify their doctrine
    in a later case does not forgive the Court’s impetuosity here.
    The Court’s neglect of our settled jurisdictional principles
    is particularly unfortunate in this case. As Hemphill con-
    cedes, New York’s Appellate Division does not appear to ap-
    ply the door-opening doctrine consistently. See Reply Brief
    10, n. 4. Some cases hold that Massie and Reid do not per-
    mit the prosecution to introduce evidence merely to
    “counte[r] the defendant’s theory of the case.” People v.
    Richardson, 95 App. Div. 3d 1039, 1040, 943 N. Y. S. 2d
    599, 600 (2012). Others seem to apply the rule more ag-
    gressively. See People v. Cole, 59 App. Div. 3d 302, 302–
    303, 873 N. Y. S. 2d 603, 604 (2009). Either way, the Court
    today purports to resolve what is effectively an intramural
    disagreement within the New York judiciary in order to
    reach a novel constitutional claim. That task should—and
    under §1257’s jurisdictional bar, must—be left to the New
    York Court of Appeals in the first instance.
    *     *    *
    I would dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction under 
    28 U. S. C. §1257
     because Hemphill did not raise his federal
    claim to the New York Court of Appeals. I respectfully dis-
    sent.