South Boston Elderly Residences, Inc. v. Moynahan , 88 Mass. App. Ct. 742 ( 2015 )

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15-P-319 Appeals Court
SOUTH BOSTON ELDERLY RESIDENCES, INC. vs. GERALD MOYNAHAN.
No. 15-P-319.
Suffolk. November 2, 2015. - December 15, 2015.
Present: Agnes, Sullivan, & Blake, JJ.
Practice, Civil, Summary Process, Appeal, Dismissal of appeal,
Assembly of record. Summary Process. Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
Summary process. Complaint filed in the Boston Division of
the Housing Court Department on February 4, 2013.
A motion to dismiss the appeal was heard by Jeffrey M.
Winik, J.
A. Joseph Ross for the tenant.
W. Paul Needham for the landlord.
BLAKE, J. Following the entry of judgment in a summary
process action in the Boston Division of the Housing Court, the
defendant tenant, Gerald Moynahan, filed a notice of appeal from
the judgment. More than one year later, the plaintiff landlord,
South Boston Elderly Residences, Inc. (SBER), moved to dismiss
2
the appeal, citing Moynahan's delay in filing the trial
transcript with the court. The motion was allowed, and this
appeal followed. We reverse.
1. Procedural background. On October 28, 2013, Moynahan's
notice of appeal relating to the underlying judgment was filed
with the court. On November 25, 2013, Moynahan through counsel
(counsel) ordered a copy of the recording of the trial, which
the court received on December 2, 2013, and so notified counsel
that day. On January 21, 2014, counsel retrieved the copy and
sent it to be transcribed. A dispute arose between the
transcriber and counsel as to who would file the transcript with
the court. The transcriber ultimately refused to file the
transcript, contrary to Mass.R.A.P. 8(b)(3)(iv), as appearing in
388 Mass. 1106 (1983). On February 18, 2014, the transcription
was completed and delivered to counsel. Rather than filing the
transcript when he received it from the transcriber, counsel
decided to wait until after he recovered from a scheduled
surgery to file it.1 Counsel eventually filed the transcript
with the court on December 12, 2014. On December 17, 2014, SBER
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for undue delay pursuant to
Mass.R.A.P. 9(c), as amended, 417 Mass. 1601 (1994), and
1
Counsel received the transcript before he was to undergo
spinal surgery. Anticipating a significant absence from his
office following surgery, he decided to postpone filing the
transcript until his return to work.
3
Mass.R.A.P. 10(c), as amended, 417 Mass. 1602 (1994). After a
hearing, a judge allowed the motion, on the ground that counsel
had committed inexcusable neglect by purposely delaying the
filing of the transcript to control the timing of the appeal.
Moynahan filed a timely notice of appeal from the order
dismissing his appeal.
2. Discussion. It is without question that the Rules of
Appellate Procedure "put the responsibility for expediting the
appeal squarely on the appellant." Mailer v. Mailer, 387 Mass.
401, 407 (1982). See Scheuer v. Mahoney, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 704,
709 (2011). Rule 9(c) outlines a civil appellant's duties in
relation to assembly of the record on appeal, including the
immediate delivery of the transcript to the clerk. Rule 10(c)
provides:
"If any appellant in a civil case shall fail to comply
with Rule 9(c) or Rule 10(a)(1) or (3), the lower
court may, on motion with notice by any appellee,
dismiss the appeal, but only upon a finding of
inexcusable neglect; otherwise, the court shall
enlarge the appellant's time for taking the required
action. If, prior to the lower court's hearing such
motion for noncompliance with Rule 9(c), the appellant
shall have cured the noncompliance, the appellant's
compliance shall be deemed timely" (emphasis
supplied).
See Neuwirth v. Neuwirth, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 248, 256 (2014).
Thus, the rules contemplate a situation in which an appellant
commits inexcusable neglect, but nevertheless escapes dismissal
by virtue of the compulsory language of the cure provision. See
4
ibid. Given the liberality of the cure provision, in Neuwirth
we cautioned that, to avoid unnecessary delay, appellees must
remain vigilant in "policing the progress of an appeal" and
should be willing to "nudge an appellant along" if need be. Id.
at 257.
Here, counsel, during the hearing on the motion to dismiss,
was candid in his explanation to the judge as to the reasons for
the delay in filing the transcript, and admitted that, in so
acting, he was relying on the strict language of the cure
provision. See note 2, infra. While we do not condone
counsel's manipulation of the appellate timeline for his own
personal reasons,2 he is correct that, regardless of his
motivations, the judge was bound, by the language of rule 10(c),
to deem the filing of the transcript timely. See Kaufman v.
Buckley, 285 Mass. 83, 86 (1933) ("Individual judges have no
power to dispense with rules of court lawfully adopted");
Commonwealth v. Brown, 395 Mass. 604, 606 (1985).
Furthermore, we observe that SBER was not without a remedy.
While it complains about the approximate ten months that passed
from when counsel received the transcript to when he filed it
with the court, SBER took no steps to address the noncompliance.
2
Counsel acknowledged the better course would have been to
promptly file the transcript and seek a stay of the proceedings
based on his medical status.
5
Also, SBER has made no showing that the delay compromised its
position as to the appeal or caused it to suffer prejudice. In
fact, the record reflects that Moynahan continued to pay rent
through the time of the hearing on SBER's motion to dismiss.
SBER's claims that the actions of counsel are per se prejudicial
and violate public policy are without record support or support
in the rules.
3. Conclusion. In the absence of an amendment to the
Rules of Appellate Procedure, dismissal of the appeal was an
abuse of discretion. We accordingly reverse the order
dismissing the appeal, reinstate the notice of appeal, and
direct the clerk of the Boston Division of the Housing Court
Department to forthwith complete assembly of the record.
So ordered.