STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ANTHONY B. HUGGINS (16-06-1175, 16-06-1271 AND 17-06-0982, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4414-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANTHONY B. HUGGINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted December 13, 2021 – Decided February 11, 2022
Before Judges Fasciale and Sumners.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Ocean County, Indictment Nos. 16-06-1175,
16-06-1271 and 17-06-0982.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Samuel Marzarella, Chief
Appellate Attorney, of counsel; Shiraz Deen, Assistant
Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Anthony B. Huggins appeals from an order denying his
post-conviction relief (PCR) petition without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
The main thrust of defendant's appeal centers around jail credits he
received following his guilty pleas to three separate indictments. On April 17,
2017, defendant pled guilty to third-degree possession of controlled dangerous
substances (CDS) with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and
2C:35-5(b)(3), under Indictment No. 16-06-1175, and to an amended count of
disorderly persons offense of loitering for purposes of obtaining CDS, N.J.S.A.
2C:33-2.1(b), under Indictment No. 16-06-1271. The State agreed to
recommend a sentence of 364 days in jail on the first indictment, concurrent to
a six-month sentence on the second indictment.
On November 3, defendant pled guilty to fourth-degree operating a motor
vehicle while suspended for driving while intoxicated (DWI) offense, N.J.S.A.
2C:40-26(b), under Indictment No. 17-06-0982. In exchange for the plea, the
State agreed to resolve all three of his indictments with an aggregate sentence
of five years of special probation in drug court, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, conditioned
on a mandatory 180-day jail term, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c), with alternative
sentence of a four-year prison term.
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On December 4, defendant was sentenced in accordance with the
November 3 plea agreement. He was awarded eight days jail credit on the motor
vehicle offense and eighty-two days jail credit on the two CDS offenses.
After filing and withdrawing a notice of appeal concerning his sentence,
defendant filed a pro se PCR petition Counsel was subsequently appointed to
represent defendant and filed a brief. Defendant contended his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to meet with him to prepare his
defense; (2) leading him to believe he would be getting eighty-four days jail
credit1 toward his 180-day mandatory jail term for his motor vehicle offense;
and (3) failing to file a motion to vacate his guilty plea because of the jail credit
miscalculation. Defendant also sought an evidentiary hearing. PCR Judge Guy
P. Ryan denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, issuing an order together
with an eighteen-page written decision on April 13, 2020.
In his written decision, the judge applied the well-recognized two-prong
test to establish ineffectiveness of counsel, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), to find there was no
1
Defendant argued he had eighty-four days jail credit. The trial record clearly
states eighty-two days jail credit would be provided. Nevertheless, as Judge
Ryan reasoned, "the two-day discrepancy [is] immaterial for the purposes of
analyzing [defendant's] arguments."
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prima facie claim that: (1) trial counsel's performance was deficient and (2) the
performance prejudiced the defense. As to the first prong, the judge recognized
defendant's primary argument that "his defense counsel promised he would
receive [eighty-four] days of jail credit on his driving while suspended charge,
the same amount he was entitled to receive on his CDS charges under the other
two indictments," was a "legally impossible" claim because "[a]ll but eight days
of [his] jail credits were accrued prior to the date he was charged" with his motor
vehicle offense. The judge emphasized that "[o]n the CDS charges, [defendant]
had jail credits from April 12 to June 16, 2016[;] March 29 to 30, 2017[;] and
April 3 to 5, 2017 for [seventy-four] days. [He] was incarcerated for only eight
days after he was charged with [the motor vehicle offense], from June 30 to July
7, 2017." Since defendant was not arrested and charged with the motor vehicle
until April 20, 2017, "[he] was not entitled to credit[] for time spent in custody
on other charges prior to the date he was so charged."
In rejecting defendant's contention that his counsel failed to meet with
him, Judge Ryan noted defendant, in response to the plea court's inquiry,
acknowledged he had enough time to talk to his counsel and understood
"everything about [his] plea and the recommended sentence," reviewed the plea
form, initialed, and signed it "freely and voluntarily." The judge stressed that
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"[a]t no time" during the plea hearing "did [defendant] ever tell the [plea court]
he was promised [eighty-two] or [eighty-four] days of jail credit on the driving
while suspended charge[,] or that he was relying upon a promise of any
particular jail credit in order to enter his plea." The judge further emphasized
defendant failed to question the plea court regarding his jail credits, and instead
brought up the length of his drug court probation, whereupon the court dispelled
his notion that it was for three years but was five years. The judge concluded
the record did not support defendant's claim that "he was promised [eighty-]plus
days jail credit on the . . . [motor vehicle] charge."
Turning to Strickland's second prong, the judge stated that even if trial
counsel was deficient in advising defendant about the amount of jail credits, he
was unable to "demonstrate any prejudice resulted from that deficiency nor
[was] he able to demonstrate that, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would have
pled not guilty and gone to trial." There was no dispute that defendant was
convicted of two previous DWI's and consequently had his license suspended.
Quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) and State v. Maldon,
422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011), the judge maintained defendant
could not "show 'a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational
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under the circumstances.'" At no point during his plea hearing did defendant
assert his innocence to the motor vehicle charge.
Significantly, the record does not indicate when defendant asked his
counsel to file a motion withdrawing his guilty plea. Yet, assuming defendant
did, the judge applied the four factors set forth in State v. Slater that trial courts
must "consider and balance . . . in evaluating motions to withdraw a guilty plea,"
namely: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence;
(2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the
existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in un fair
prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused." 198 N.J. 145, 157-58
(2009). In balancing the Slater factors, the judge determined defendant's guilty
plea would not have been vacated.
Judge Ryan held that the first three factors weighed against allowing
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Regarding the first factor, the judge found
"defendant d[id] not even make a bare assertion of innocence nor offer any
potential defense; he ma[de] no claim of innocence at all." With respect to the
second factor, the judge determined there was no valid reason for withdrawing
defendant's guilty plea, because it was based on the groundless assertion that
"he should have been entitled to jail credits for time spent in custody before he
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was actually charged with the particular offense." As for the third factor, the
judge determined counsel negotiated "a very favorable concurrent probationary
resolution of three cases for [defendant], with the only jail term being the
mandatory 180 days[,]" which allowed defendant to avoid "the very real
possibility, if not likelihood, of consecutive sentences if he went to trial."
Defendant reached a plea agreement, which, therefore, weighs against a
withdrawal of his guilty plea. And concerning the fourth factor, the judge found
it was neutral because there was no prejudice to the State or advantage to
defendant in allowing withdrawal of the guilty plea. Hence, because "any
motion to withdraw [defendant's guilty] plea would have been meritless," the
judge, citing State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 618-19 (2007) and State v. Warlock,
117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990), concluded counsel did not provide ineffective
assistance by failing to file a motion.
As for defendant's claim that his counsel forced him to plead guilty to
loitering for purposes of obtaining CDS, the judge found it to be "equally
groundless." Considering the plea hearing record and the absence of any
certification supporting defendant's contention, the judge determined there was
no evidence he was "pressured" to enter his plea. Relying upon State v.
Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999), the judge maintained
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defendant's "bald assertion" that his plea was involuntary was insufficient to
prove ineffective assistance.
Because the judge found defendant did not establish a prima facie claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, he determined that based upon State v.
Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992), defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing.
Before us, defendant argues:
POINT I
THE PCR COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE RECEIVED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF HIS PLEA
COUNSEL WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
A. THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
REGARDING CLAIMS FOR INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY
HEARINGS[,] AND PETITIONS FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.
B. DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA
FACIE CLAIM FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF, ENTITLING HIM TO AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
In his merits brief, defendant essentially reiterates the arguments raised
before and rejected by Judge Ryan. Considering these arguments in light of the
record and applicable legal standards, these arguments lack sufficient merit to
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warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), and we affirm
substantially for the reasons set forth by the judge in his cogent written decision.
Affirmed.
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