People v. Sanchez CA2/7 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 2/15/22 P. v. Sanchez CA2/7
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b ). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    THE PEOPLE,                                             B312061
    Plaintiff and                                  (Los Angeles County
    Respondent,                                    Super. Ct. No. VA070524-01)
    v.
    JACINTO PEREZ SANCHEZ,
    Defendant and
    Appellant.
    APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
    of Los Angeles County, Debra Cole-Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
    Richard D. Miggins, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Thomas C. Hsieh,
    Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    _______________
    Jacinto Perez Sanchez, convicted in 2004 with Aviu Garcia
    of first degree murder with a felony-murder special-circumstance
    finding, appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing
    pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.951 after the superior court
    found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Sanchez could still be
    convicted of felony murder under amended section 189,
    subdivision (e)(3), as a major participant in the underlying
    attempted robbery who had acted with reckless indifference to
    human life. We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    1. The Drug Deal, Attempted Robbery and Shooting
    Sanchez, Garcia and Janet Cota were charged in an
    information with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), attempted robbery
    (§§ 211, 664) and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) with
    a special-circumstance allegation the murder had occurred during
    the commission of the attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).
    The information additionally alleged all three defendants had
    personally used a handgun when committing felony murder and
    attempted robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and Sanchez had
    personally and intentionally discharged a handgun proximately
    causing Adrian Briones’s death (§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (d)). It
    was further alleged that Garcia had used a handgun (§ 12022.5,
    subd. (a)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury on a second
    victim, Roberto Farias. Cota pleaded guilty to attempted robbery
    1     Statutory references are to this code.
    2
    and admitted a firearm enhancement in a negotiated agreement
    and testified at Sanchez and Garcia’s trial.
    The prosecutor’s theory of the case, as outlined in the
    information and described in his opening statement, was that
    Sanchez fired the shot that killed Briones. By closing argument,
    however, the prosecutor argued the evidence showed Garcia was
    the shooter. Our opinion affirming the judgments of conviction,
    reviewed by the superior court when considering Sanchez’s
    petition, described the evidence presented at the men’s joint trial.
    (People v. Sanchez (July 18, 2005, B173340) [nonpub. opn.].)
    Cota needed to make money while her husband was in jail.
    Cota’s husband put her in touch with Farias, whom her husband
    had met while incarcerated. Farias said Briones, Farias’s
    nephew, would pay a finder’s fee for bringing him drug buyers.
    Farias and Cota set up a drug deal with Sanchez and Garcia, who
    agreed to purchase between 100 to 150 pounds of marijuana for
    $300 to $330 per pound.
    The day of the deal Sanchez and Garcia met Cota at a gas
    station, and the three drove to Farias’s home. Farias, who
    thought Cota was coming alone, spoke to Briones on the phone
    and told him to come quickly because the buyers were there. At
    Briones’s urging, Farias asked to see the money. Sanchez and
    Garcia showed him a bag in the back of the car that appeared to
    contain money wrapped in plastic. Sanchez said there was close
    to $50,000 in the bag.
    Before Briones arrived, Cota noticed a gun in the
    waistband of Sanchez’s pants. She asked Sanchez to give it to
    her so the deal could go forward. Sanchez gave Cota the gun,
    which she put in her pocket. Although Briones was reluctant to
    go through with the deal because Cota had not come alone, he
    3
    changed his mind when Sanchez showed him the bag of money
    and asked to see “the merchandise.” Briones invited Sanchez to
    go with him to the trailer behind Farias’s duplex where the
    marijuana was stored.
    Sanchez accompanied Briones to the trailer, bringing the
    bag of money with him. They started weighing packages of
    marijuana. Garcia backed the car into the driveway and down
    near the trailer. Briones handed Garcia several packages, and
    Garcia loaded them into the trunk of the car. By this time,
    Farias and Cota had walked down the driveway and were
    standing near Garcia. Briones told Garcia to stop loading any
    more packages into the car until he counted the money. Sanchez
    placed the money bag on the table. Briones picked up some bills
    and started counting.
    According to Farias, who was standing outside the trailer
    door, Sanchez pulled out a gun, pointed it at Briones and said,
    “You’re fucked. I’m taking everything.” Briones dropped the
    money and reached for the gun. He grabbed Sanchez’s arm, and
    the two men struggled. Briones had his back to the trailer door
    during the struggle. Farias saw Garcia run by him, raise his gun
    and point it at Briones. Farias tried to grab Garcia’s hands.
    Farias felt an impact on his hand and went down to the ground.
    He later realized he had been shot. Once on the ground Farias
    shielded his face with his hands. He was shot two more times,
    once in the arm and once in the stomach. He did not know who
    shot Briones.
    Cota’s narrative differed from Farias’s. She testified she
    had been back near the trailer when the men were loading
    packages into the trunk. She, Garcia and Farias then walked to
    the front yard of Farias’s home. When they heard a shot, they
    4
    ran back to the trailer.2 Farias, who arrived first, got up on the
    step and looked inside the trailer. He then turned around and
    jumped on top of Garcia. Garcia, who was holding a gun, fired a
    shot. (Cota said she only heard a total of two shots.) Sanchez ran
    out of the trailer; and he, Garcia and Cota ran to the car.
    Cota did not see a gun in Sanchez’s hand as he left the
    trailer, but she saw him holding a gun when they were in the car.
    (Cota still had the gun Sanchez had given her earlier. Garcia and
    Sanchez told her to take that gun home with her.) Sanchez said
    everything had gone badly and he had left the money behind.
    Briones died as a result of a gunshot wound. According to a
    deputy medical examiner, Briones was shot in the back from a
    distance of more than two or three feet. The bullet traveled
    through his body at an upward angle. A supervisor from the
    firearms identification section of the sheriff’s department
    testified three .38 caliber shell casings found at the scene were
    fired from the same gun.3
    The jury convicted Sanchez and Garcia of first degree
    murder, attempted robbery and assault with a firearm, found
    true the felony-murder special-circumstance allegation and, as to
    Garcia, also found true the firearm-use and great bodily injury
    enhancements with respect to the aggravated assault charge.
    The jury found not true the allegations Sanchez had personally
    and intentionally discharged a firearm during the attempted
    robbery and felony murder. The court sentenced both men to life
    2     Faustino Farias, Roberto Farias’s brother, testified he saw
    Cota back by the trailer before any shots were fired.
    3     Two of the shell casings were found outside the trailer and
    one inside it.
    5
    without parole for murder plus determinate terms for the
    additional charges and enhancements.
    We affirmed the judgments on appeal, rejecting Garcia’s
    arguments there was insufficient evidence to support his
    convictions and Sanchez’s claims of instructional error relating to
    Cota’s testimony as an accomplice and his argument the trial
    court had abused its discretion in denying his motion for
    acquittal as to the section 12022.53, subdivisions (c) and (d),
    enhancement allegations that he had personally and
    intentionally discharged a firearm proximately causing the death
    of Briones. (People v. Sanchez, supra, B173340.)
    2. Sanchez’s Petition for Resentencing
    On March 12, 2019 Sanchez, representing himself, filed a
    petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 and requested the
    court appoint counsel to represent him in the resentencing
    proceedings. Sanchez checked boxes on the printed form petition
    to establish his eligibility for resentencing relief, including the
    boxes stating he had been convicted under a felony-murder
    theory and could not now be convicted of first or second degree
    murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189 by
    Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018,
    ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437). The superior court appointed
    counsel to represent Sanchez.4
    Following briefing by the People and Sanchez’s appointed
    counsel, the superior court found Sanchez had made a prima facie
    showing of his entitlement to relief and issued an order to show
    cause, setting the matter for an evidentiary hearing. On
    4     Judge Robert J. Higa presided at Garcia and Sanchez’s
    2004 trial. Judge Higa retired prior to the filing of Sanchez’s
    petition. The matter was assigned to Judge Debra Cole-Hall.
    6
    April 19, 2021, after considering the trial record and this court’s
    opinion affirming Sanchez’s felony-murder conviction on appeal
    and hearing argument from counsel, the court denied the
    petition, finding beyond a reasonable doubt Sanchez had been a
    major participant in the commission of the attempted murder
    and had acted with reckless indifference to human life and,
    therefore, could still be found guilty of murder on a valid theory
    of felony murder.
    Sanchez filed a timely notice of appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    1. Senate Bill 1437 and the Section 1170.95 Petition
    Procedure
    Senate Bill 1437 substantially modified the law relating to
    accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the natural and
    probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant
    guilty of murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 
    10 Cal.5th 830
    , 842-843
    (Gentile)) and significantly narrowing the felony-murder
    exception to the malice requirement for murder. (§§ 188,
    subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e)(3); see People v. Lewis (2021)
    
    11 Cal.5th 952
    , 957 (Lewis).)5 It also authorized, through new
    section 1170.95, an individual convicted of felony murder or
    murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine
    to petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be
    resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could not have
    been convicted of murder because of Senate Bill 1437’s changes to
    5     As amended by Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
    (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2), effective January 1, 2022, the
    ameliorative provisions of Senate Bill 1437 now also apply to
    attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
    7
    the definition of the crime. (See Lewis, at p. 957; Gentile, at
    p. 843.)
    If the section 1170.95 petition contains all the required
    information, including a declaration by the petitioner that he or
    she is eligible for relief (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1)(A)), the court must
    appoint counsel to represent the petitioner, if requested
    (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(3)),6 and direct the prosecutor to file a
    response to the petition, permit the petitioner to file a reply and
    determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that
    he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1170.95, subd. (c); see Lewis,
    supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963.)
    In determining whether the petitioner has carried the
    burden of making the requisite prima facie showing he or she
    falls within the provisions of section 1170.95 and is entitled to
    relief, the superior court properly examines the record of
    conviction, “allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
    potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis,
    supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) However, “the prima facie inquiry
    under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie
    inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, the court takes petitioner’s
    factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
    regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
    or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue
    an order to show cause. . . . However, if the record, including the
    court’s own documents, contain[s] facts refuting the allegations
    made in the petition, then the court is justified in making a
    6     Prior to enactment of Senate Bill No. 775 the requirement
    to appoint counsel was set forth in subdivision (c) of
    section 1170.95.
    8
    credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” (Id. at
    pp. 970-971, internal quotation marks omitted.)
    If the section 1170.95, subdivision (c), prima facie showing
    has been made, the court must issue an order to show cause and
    hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the
    murder conviction and resentence the petitioner on any
    remaining counts. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(1).) At the hearing the
    prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
    that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. (§ 1170.95,
    subd. (d)(3).)7 The prosecutor and petitioner may rely on the
    record of conviction or offer new or additional evidence to meet
    their respective burdens. (See Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
    pp. 853-854.)
    We review the superior court’s factual findings following the
    evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. (People v. Ramirez
    (2021) 
    71 Cal.App.5th 970
    , 985; People v. Hernandez (2021)
    
    60 Cal.App.5th 94
    , 113.)
    2. Section 189, Subdivision (e)(3), and the Narrowed
    Felony-murder Rule
    At the time of Sanchez and Garcia’s trial section 189
    permitted a conviction for felony murder by imputing malice to a
    participant in an inherently dangerous felony, including robbery,
    that resulted in a homicide. (See People v. Chun (2009)
    
    45 Cal.4th 1172
    , 1184.) As amended by Senate Bill 1437,
    7     As amended by Senate Bill No. 775, section 1170.95,
    subdivision (d)(3), now clarifies, “A finding that there is
    substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder,
    attempted murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to prove,
    beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
    resentencing.”
    9
    section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice
    based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime and
    requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder except
    under the revised felony-murder rule as set forth in section 189,
    subdivision (e), which requires proof of specific facts relating to
    the defendant’s individual culpability: The defendant was the
    actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual killer,
    the defendant, with the intent to kill, assisted in the commission
    of the murder (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major
    participant in an underlying felony listed in section 189,
    subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference to human
    life, “as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2,” the felony-
    murder special-circumstance provision (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)).
    The overlapping factors for assessing whether a defendant
    was a major participant in an underlying serious felony and acted
    with reckless indifference to human life for purposes of
    section 190.2, subdivision (d), and thus for new section 189,
    subdivision (e)(3), were identified by the Supreme Court in People
    v. Banks (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 788
     (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016)
    
    63 Cal.4th 522
     (Clark), and reiterated most recently in In re
    Scoggins (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 667
     (Scoggins). As to whether the
    defendant was a major participant in one of the specified felonies,
    the Banks Court listed the following factors: “What role did the
    defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to
    one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in
    supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the
    defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the
    crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
    participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the
    killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder,
    10
    and did his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in
    the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was
    used?” (Banks, at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
    As to whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference
    to human life, the Supreme Court has enumerated the following
    factors: “Did the defendant use or know that a gun would be used
    during the felony? How many weapons were ultimately used?
    Was the defendant physically present at the crime? Did he or she
    have the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim?
    What was the duration of the interaction between the
    perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What was the
    defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s propensity for
    violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts did the
    defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the
    felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; accord, Clark,
    supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-622.) “‘“[N]o one of these
    considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
    sufficient.”’” (Scoggins, at p. 677; accord, Banks, supra,
    61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
    As the Scoggins Court explained, “Reckless indifference to
    human life is ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal
    activities known to carry a grave risk of death.’” (Scoggins, supra,
    9 Cal.5th at p. 676; accord, Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 808
    [“[a]wareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death
    inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient”; reckless
    indifference to human life requires “knowingly creating a ‘grave
    risk of death’”].) “Reckless indifference ‘encompasses a
    willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a
    distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that
    11
    death as the outcome of his actions.’” (Scoggins, at pp. 676- 677,
    quoting Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.)
    3. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Finding
    That Sanchez Is Ineligible for Resentencing Relief Under
    Section 1170.95
    There can be no question substantial evidence supports the
    superior court’s finding that Sanchez was a major participant in
    the attempted robbery. Although Cota arranged the drug
    transaction, it is a reasonable inference that the men, both
    carrying loaded firearms, came to Farias’s home with the
    intention of robbing the drug dealers. Sanchez then initiated the
    robbery as Briones was counting the money Sanchez had given
    him, pointing his gun at Briones (after giving one gun to Cota
    immediately before their encounter with Farias) and
    provocatively declaring, “You’re fucked. I’m taking everything.”
    Although the proof Sanchez acted with reckless indifference
    to human life during the attempted robbery was not as
    overwhelming, that finding, too, is supported by substantial
    evidence. (See People v. Dalton (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 166
    , 244 [When
    considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support a conviction, the reviewing court determines “‘“whether,
    after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    [Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court “presumes in support of
    the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
    reasonably deduce from the evidence”’”]; see also Clark, supra,
    63 Cal.4th at p. 626 [“‘[w]here the circumstances reasonably
    justify the trier of fact’s findings, a reviewing court’s conclusion
    12
    the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
    contrary finding does not warrant the judgment’s reversal’”].)
    Even though the evidence indicated it was Garcia, not
    Sanchez, who fired the fatal shot (as reflected by the jury’s
    finding not true as to Sanchez the section 12022.53,
    subdivisions (c) and (d), firearm use enhancements), Sanchez was
    armed and physically present at the scene of what he necessarily
    knew was a crime with a high risk of escalating violence—the
    robbery of drug dealers during a drug deal involving a large
    quantity of marijuana, a large amount of money and at least
    three loaded guns. As discussed, after Sanchez announced the
    robbery and Briones attempted to disarm Sanchez, Garcia came
    to Sanchez’s aid, first shooting Farias and then Briones. There
    was no evidence Sanchez did anything to restrain Garcia or
    lessen his lethal reaction to the robbery gone bad. Moreover,
    after Garcia shot Briones, rather than attempt to assist Briones
    or call for help, Sanchez fled with Garcia and Cota—all factors
    suggesting Sanchez acted with reckless indifference to human
    life. (See Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; Clark, supra,
    63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-622; see generally People v. Law (2020)
    
    48 Cal.App.5th 811
    , 825, review granted July 8, 2020, S262490
    [“[W]e are not aware of a single case that concludes a defendant
    who personally committed a robbery, used a gun, and was
    present for the shooting did not meet the standard in
    section 190.2, subdivision (d). The defendants who have been
    able to get their special circumstance findings vacated under
    Banks and Clark are those who were not wielding guns
    themselves and also not present for the shooting (either because
    they were acting as getaway drivers or because they were
    involved in the planning of the crime only”].)
    13
    It is the superior court, not the reviewing court, that must
    be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt the petitioner can still
    be convicted of murder after Senate Bill 1437’s amendments to
    sections 188 and 189. The evidence in the record here
    reasonably justified the superior court’s conclusion. That it also
    might have supported a finding that Sanchez, although actively
    involved in the attempted robbery, did not act with reckless
    indifference to human life does not warrant reversal of the order
    denying his petition for resentencing. (See People v. Ramirez,
    supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 985; see also People v. Zamudio (2008)
    
    43 Cal.4th 327
    , 357-358.)
    DISPOSITION
    The postjudgment order denying Sanchez’s petition for
    resentencing under section 1170.95 is affirmed.
    PERLUSS, P. J.
    We concur:
    SEGAL, J.
    FEUER, J.
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B312061

Filed Date: 2/15/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/15/2022