Louis Sedillo, Jr. v. Carolyn Colvin , 645 F. App'x 536 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               MAR 23 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LOUIS JACK SEDILLO, Jr.,                           No. 14-15560
    Plaintiff - Appellant,               D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01486-SRB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
    of Social Security,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 14, 2016**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: KLEINFELD, RAWLINSON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    Louis Sedillo appeals the district court’s order affirming the denial of his
    applications for disability benefits and supplemental security income. “We review
    the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial of social security benefits de
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    novo, and reverse only if the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial
    evidence or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 
    763 F.3d 1154
    , 1159 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
    The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial
    evidence, for rejecting Dr. Khan’s January 2012 opinion regarding Sedillo’s
    physical capacity to work, see 
    id.
     at 1160–61, finding that the record showed
    Sedillo could function at a higher level. The ALJ noted evidence showing that
    Sedillo played several sports in 2009 and worked out at the gym in 2009 and 2011,
    that Sedillo’s medications and treatments provided consistent relief from his pain,
    and that Sedillo’s physical examinations during his alleged disability consistently
    revealed negative straight leg raise testing, a normal gait, a normal range of motion,
    and full bilateral extremity strength. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
    
    359 F.3d 1190
    , 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n ALJ may discredit treating physicians’
    opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole, or by
    objective medical findings.” (citation omitted)). The ALJ also found that no
    medical documentation showed a worsening of Sedillo’s functional capacity
    between January 2011, when Dr. Khan’s assessment suggested Sedillo could do
    light, unskilled work, and Dr. Khan’s contrary January 2012 assessment. See
    2
    Bayliss v. Barnhart, 
    427 F.3d 1211
    , 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ properly discounted
    opinion of a treating physician where there was a discrepancy between his opinion
    and his clinic notes and other observations).
    Although the ALJ gave Dr. Khan’s 2011 assessment the “most probative
    weight,” he properly rejected Dr. Khan’s opinion that Sedillo was unable to stand
    and walk less than six hours a day, stoop, or work around moving machinery
    because. Sedillo’s daily activities were inconsistent with such limitations, the
    objective medical evidence did not support those limitations, and Sedillo regularly
    engaged in physical activities. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195.
    The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons, supported by
    substantial evidence, for discounting Sedillo’s symptom testimony. See Molina v.
    Astrue, 
    674 F.3d 1104
    , 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). The evidence that Sedillo was
    physically active conflicted with his testimony that his back and neck pain
    prevented him from doing anything other than making breakfast, watching
    television, reading, talking on the phone, and occasionally cleaning. See Valentine
    v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    574 F.3d 685
    , 693–94 (9th Cir. 2009) (ALJ
    properly discounted symptom testimony where evidence of exercise and other
    3
    activities conflicted with the severity of the claimant’s alleged limitations). And the
    objective medical evidence suggested Sedillo was managing his pain effectively,
    and was physically capable of doing more than he claimed. See Warre v. Comm’r
    of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    439 F.3d 1001
    , 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be
    controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of
    determining eligibility for SSI benefits.”).
    The ALJ’s credibility determination was also supported by the
    inconsistencies between Sedillo’s claim that his disability began in April 2009, and
    his search for work after his April 2009 termination. Similarly, the ALJ was
    entitled to rely on the inconsistency between Sedillo’s claim that a July 2009 car
    accident caused his disability, and test results from July and September 2009
    indicating his spinal condition was degenerative and congenital. See Burch v.
    Barnhart, 
    400 F.3d 676
    , 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In determining credibility, an ALJ
    may engage in ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as considering
    claimant’s reputation for truthfulness and inconsistencies in claimant’s
    testimony.”); see also Bruton v. Massanari, 
    268 F.3d 824
    , 828 (9th Cir. 2001)
    (testimony that the claimant left his job because he was laid off, rather than injured,
    was a “specific, cogent reason[]” for the ALJ to disregard the claimant’s testimony).
    4
    The ALJ’s determination of Sedillo’s residual functional capacity was also
    supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ found Sedillo could perform light,
    unskilled work with some restrictions based on the objective medical evidence,
    Sedillo’s regular exercise, Sedillo’s improvement in functioning and decreased pain
    complaints as the result of treatment, his own less than credible testimony, and Dr.
    Khan’s 2011 assessment. See 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545
    (a)(3), 416.945(a)(3); SSR 96-
    8p, 
    1996 WL 374184
    , at *5 (July 2, 1996).
    AFFIRMED.
    5