Darrell Moore, Sr. v. Rudolf Montiel , 599 F. App'x 787 ( 2015 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT APR 16 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
DARRELL J. MOORE, Sr., No. 13-55396
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-03391-GW-CW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RUDOLF MONTIEL, as Chief of the
Housing Authority of the City of Los
Angeles; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 7, 2015**
Before: FISHER, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Darrell J. Moore, Sr., appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his
employment action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We may affirm on any
basis fairly supported by the record, Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 979
(9th Cir. 2007), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Moore’s conspiracy and
retaliation claims because the harms alleged in the complaint occurred more than
two years before Moore filed his action. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-
year statute of limitations for personal injury action); Lukovsky v. City & County of
San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying California’s statute
of limitations for personal injury torts to § 1983 and § 1985 claims).
The district court properly dismissed Moore’s damages claim against Judge
Jones on the basis of judicial immunity. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072,
1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“Judges and those performing judge-like functions
are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official
capacities.”). To the extent Moore alleged claims for declaratory relief concerning
Judge Jones’s state court ruling on demurrer, dismissal of the claim was proper
because it is barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. See Henrichs v. Valley View
Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The clearest case for dismissal based on
the Rooker–Feldman doctrine occurs when a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal
wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a
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state court judgment based on that decision[.]” (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Moore leave to
amend his complaint because amendment would have been futile. See Lopez v.
Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that “a district court should grant leave to amend
even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the
pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” (citation and
internal marks omitted)).
We reject Moore’s contentions concerning bias of the district court judge,
denial of access to courts, and California’s anti-SLAPP statute.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Appellees AFSCME and Sylvena Parker’s motion to take judicial notice,
filed on October 21, 2013, is denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
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