Com. v. Jones, J. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES JONES :
:
Appellant : No. 2570 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 7, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0907751-1993
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2018
James Jones appeals, pro se, from the order dismissing his petition for
writ of habeas corpus as an untimely Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)
petition. Jones argues his sentence of life imprisonment without parole was
illegal. We conclude the court properly treated Jones’s petition as a PCRA
petition. Additionally, the court properly found no exception to the PCRA’s
time-bar applied. We therefore affirm.
A jury found Jones guilty of killing Francis Hamilton and shooting Charles
Hamilton while trying to rob the brothers. The court subsequently sentenced
Jones to life in prison, plus four to eight years. This Court affirmed the
judgment of sentence, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied
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 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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allowance of appeal on February 23, 1998. Jones did not file for writ of
certiorari with Supreme Court of the United States.
Jones filed his first PCRA petition in 1999, and the PCRA court dismissed
it. In 2009, he filed his second PCRA petition. The PCRA court dismissed
Jones’s second PCRA petition as untimely. This Court affirmed, observing that
the petition was facially untimely, and that Jones had failed to establish an
exception to the PCRA’s time-bar. See Commonwealth v. Jones, No. 1438
EDA 2012, at 6-7 (Pa. Super., filed February 19, 2013) (unpublished
memorandum).
This appeal arises from Jones’s most recent collateral petition, which he
filed on September 29, 2014. Jones presented eight issues in his pro se
petition, each one requesting that his sentence be vacated and/or reduced.
He asserted his claims were not cognizable under the PCRA, and thus not
subject to the PCRA’s time bar provisions. In the alternative, he argued that
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding mandatory life without
parole sentences imposed on juveniles are unconstitutional), Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2015) (determining Miller applies retroactively
during collateral proceedings), and Alleyne v. United States 133 S. Ct. 2151
(2013) (holding disputed facts that support the imposition of a mandatory
minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury for determination), constitute
newly recognized rights sufficient to qualify for an exception to the PCRA’s
time bar.
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The argument section of Jones’s brief on appeal verges on incoherent.
To the best of our ability to decipher his claims, we recognize Jones seeks to
raise the same eight arguments before this Court. To the extent Jones sought
to raise any issue not addressed here, we conclude such issue is waived for
failure to coherently raise it on appeal.
First, Jones contends the court improperly treated his petition as a PCRA
petition. If “a defendant’s post-conviction claims are cognizable under the
PCRA, the common law and statutory remedies now subsumed by the PCRA
are not separately available to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Hall, 771
A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001) (citations omitted). It is well settled that the PCRA
subsumes the remedy of habeas corpus when the PCRA offers a remedy. See
Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007). And the PCRA
offers a remedy to prisoners who claim they are serving an illegal sentence.
See Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2010). As
all of Jones’s substantive claims seek the elimination or reduction of his
sentence, the court properly treated his petition as a PCRA petition.
Next, Jones arguably claims that he has established an exception to the
PCRA’s time bar.1 Jones contends he is entitled to relief under the newly
recognized constitutional right exception, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).
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1 To the best we can parse Jones’s brief, we can find no passage that even
arguably claims his petition was facially timely under the PCRA.
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With respect to his claims pursuant to Miller and Montgomery, we
note those decisions are explicitly limited to juvenile defendants. See Miller,
567 U.S. at 465; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. A petitioner who was not a
juvenile at the time of his crime may not invoke these cases to establish an
exception to the PCRA’s time-bar. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 179 A.3d
37, 44 (Pa. Super. 2017); Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa.
Super. 2016).
The criminal information filed against Jones in 1993 indicated his birth
date was May 9, 1967. The information further identified the date of the
murder of Francis Hamilton as July 22, 1993. Thus, Jones was 25 years old
when he committed these crimes. He cannot gain relief from Miller and
Montgomery.
With respect to his claim under Alleyne, our Supreme Court has held
that “Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral
review….” Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 820 (Pa. 2016).
Jones’s sentence became final in 1998, see Jones, supra, at 5, while Alleyne
was published in 2013.
Furthermore, the record belies Jones’s contention that he received a
mandatory minimum sentence based upon facts not presented to the jury. He
received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based
upon the jury’s verdict that he committed first-degree murder. This sentence
was a mandatory minimum sentence, but it did not require any judicial fact-
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finding. As such, even if we addressed Jones’s claim on the merits, he would
be due no relief.
Finally, Jones contends he is entitled to relief under Martinez v. Ryan,
566 U.S. 1 (2012). In Martinez, the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized that “for purposes of federal habeas corpus relief, inadequate
assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish
cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 60 A.3d 162, 165 (Pa. Super.
2013) (emphasis supplied; citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Martinez is therefore “of no moment with respect to the way Pennsylvania
courts apply the plain language” of the PCRA’s time bar. Id. Jones is due no
relief under Martinez.
In summary, the PCRA court properly treated Jones’s petition as a PCRA
petition. And it correctly determined Jones’s petition was untimely under the
PCRA. We therefore affirm the order dismissing Jones’s petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/21/18
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