U.S. Bank Nat'L Ass'N v. Sfr Invs. Pool 1, Llc ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION                           No. 79235
    AS TRUSTEE FOR MERRILL LYNCH
    MORTGAGE INVESTORS TRUST,
    MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET-BACKED
    CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-A8,                              FILED
    Appellant,
    vs.                                                        FEB 1 8 2022
    SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, A                             ELIZABETH A. BROWN
    CLERK OFAUPREVE COURT
    NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY                                BY S
    DERRY CŒRK
    COMPANY,
    Res • ondent.
    ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
    This is an appeal from a district court judgment following a
    bench trial in an action to quiet title. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
    County; Joanna Kishner, Judge. We review the district court's factual
    findings for substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo, Weddell
    v. H20, Inc., 
    128 Nev. 94
    , 101, 
    271 P.3d 743
    , 748 (2012), and affirm.'
    The district court found that appellant failed to establish that
    its predecessor (via the predecessor's agent, Miles Bauer) made a
    superpriority tender because Miles Bauer did not deliver the check to the
    HONs agent (A&K). Consequently, the district court determined that the
    HONs foreclosure sale extinguished the first deed of trust.2 As support for
    'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
    is not warranted in this appeal.
    2The district court also dismissed appellant's claims for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction, finding that appellant lacked standing. We question
    how the district court could contemporaneously dismiss appellant's claims
    and rule on their merits (or rule on the merits of respondent's counterclaims
    if they were asserted against the wrong entity), but neither appellant nor
    SUPREME COURT
    Of
    NEVADA
    (0) I947A    4404)
    its finding that Miles Bauer did not deliver the check, the district court
    relied upon the following evidence and testimony: (1) former Miles Bauer
    employee Rock Jung and former A&K employee David Alessi both testified
    that it was Miles Bauer's practice to deliver its checks and accompanying
    letter via runner, and in this case, appellant did not produce a run slip; (2)
    Mr. Alessi testified that it was A&K's practice to keep a copy of the letters
    accompanying Miles Bauer's checks in A&K's file or to note receipt of such
    letters in a status report, and in this case, A&Ks file did not contain a copy
    of the letter or a note of receipt in its status report3; (3) A&K's status report
    included two payoff requests from Miles Bauer after Miles Bauer had
    purportedly delivered the at-issue check, which would not have made sense
    if Miles Bauer had delivered the at-issue check and effectuated a
    superpriority tender; and (4) the loan servicer for appellant's predecessor
    inquired about excess proceeds following the HOA's foreclosure sale, to
    which appellant's predecessor would not have been entitled if a
    superpriority tender had been made.
    We conclude that this evidence constituted a reasonable basis
    to support the district court's finding that Miles Bauer did not deliver the
    respondent appear to take issue with this potential discrepancy. Relatedly,
    in light of our resolution of this appeal, we need not address the parties'
    arguments regarding the statute of limitations or the district court's
    exclusion of evidence relating to the amount of the HOA's superpriority lien.
    3  The district court supported these first two findings with NRS
    51.145, which provides that "[e]vidence that a matter is not included in
    the . . . records . . . of a regularly conducted activity" can be used "to prove
    the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind
    which . . . was regularly made and preserved."
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    2
    (0) I 947A    4WD
    check and that no superpriority tender was made.4 See Weddell, 128 Nev.
    at 101, 
    271 P.3d at 748
     ("Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable
    mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."). We recognize
    appellant's reliance on (1) Mr. Jung's testimony regarding his pattern and
    practice regarding the delivery of checks and accompanying letters, (2) Mr.
    Alessi's testimony that A&K did not always follow its practice of keeping
    copies of the Miles Bauer letters or noting their receipt in a status report;
    and (3) the possibility that Miles Bauer may have tried to make a second
    superpriority tender.5 However, we are not persuaded that this testimony
    and proffered inference renders the district court's finding of non-delivery
    clearly erroneous. 
    Id.
     ("The district court's factual findings . . . are given
    deference and will be upheld if not clearly erroneous and if supported by
    substantial evidence." (quoting Ogawa v. Ogawa, 
    125 Nev. 660
    , 668, 221
    P.33 699, 704 (2009))).
    As substantial evidence supports the district court's finding
    that Miles Bauer did not deliver the check to A&K, the district court
    4Appellant   contends that delivering the check was unnecessary to
    effectuate a tender. This contention defies common sense and is
    unsupported by on-point authority. Cf. Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest.,
    
    122 Nev. 317
    , 330 n.38, 
    130 P.3d 1280
    , 1288 n.38 (2006) (observing that it
    is an appellant's responsibility to present cogent arguments supported by
    salient authority).
    5Appellant  also contends that Miles Bauer's computer records contain
    an entry showing that A&K had returned the check, with the implication
    being it was delivered. However, we are not persuaded that the district
    court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence due to appellant's
    failure to comply with its NRCP 16.1 obligations. MC. Multi-Fam. Dev.,
    L.L.C. v. Crestdale Assocs., Ltd., 
    124 Nev. 901
    , 913, 
    193 P.3d 536
    , 544 (2008)
    (We review a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse
    of discretion, and we will not interfere with the district court's exercise of
    its discretion absent a showing of palpable abuse.").
    3
    correctly concluded that no superpriority tender had been made and that
    the HOA's foreclosure sale extinguished the first deed of trust.6
    Accordingly, we
    ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 7
    Parraguirre
    J.
    Hardesty
    cc:   Hon. Joanna Kishner, District Judge
    Stephen E. Haberfeld, Settlement Judge
    Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP/Las Vegas
    Hanks Law Group
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    °We decline to consider appellant's argument that tender should have
    been excitsed for futility under 7510 Perlct Del Mar Avenue Trust v. Bank of
    America, N.A., 
    136 Nev. 62
    , 
    458 P.3d 348
     (2020), as appellant did not raise
    an excused-for-futility argument below. Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 
    97 Nev. 49
    , 52, 
    623 P.2d 981
    , 983 (1981).
    'The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
    decision Of this matter under a general order of assignment.
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    4
    (0) I5147A csW.,