Mezher v. Schrand , 2018 Ohio 3787 ( 2018 )


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  • [Cite as Mezher v. Schrand, 
    2018-Ohio-3787
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
    MIKE MEZHER,                                   :   APPEAL NO. C-180071
    TRIAL NO. A-1705484
    and                                         :
    JOSEPEH MEZHER,                                :
    O P I N I O N.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,                :
    vs.                                         :
    JEFF SCHRAND,                                  :
    and                                         :
    KARRI SCHRAND,                                 :
    Defendants-Appellees.                 :
    Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
    Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
    Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 21, 2018
    Kathleen Mezher & Associates and Kathleen D. Mezher, for Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    Graydon Head & Ritchey, LLP, and Michael A. Roberts, for Defendants-Appellees.
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    DETERS, Judge.
    {¶1}   This is a dispute over the sale of a high-end residential property in Mt.
    Adams owned by defendants-appellees Karri and Jeff Schrand. Plaintiffs-appellants
    Joseph and Mike Mezher contend that the Schrands agreed by email to sell their
    home to Mike Mezher and that the Schrands breached that agreement.                  The
    Schrands argue that no agreement existed because of the requirements of the statute
    of frauds. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that a question of fact exists as to
    whether the parties intended to be bound by the email exchange. Therefore, we
    reverse the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Schrands, and we remand the cause
    for further proceedings.
    Background
    {¶2}   Joseph Mezher owns property at 1140 Fort View Place.            In 2016,
    Joseph Mezher sought and received a building permit from the city of Cincinnati to
    build a new home on his property. The Schrands bought the property next door to
    Joseph Mezher in July 2017. Joseph Mezher’s father, Mike Mezher, spoke with the
    Schrands regarding the new-home construction plans, and he proposed renting a
    sidewalk on the Schrands’ property to aid in the construction.           The Schrands
    responded by offering to sell their property to Mike Mezher.             Mike Mezher
    negotiated with the Schrands through email about purchasing the property.
    {¶3}   On September 29, 2017, Karri Schrand sent an email to Mike Mezher,
    stating, “Mike: We would like to wrap this up if there is still a conversation going
    regarding your potential purchase of our home. As you are aware your offer of
    $960,000 was way too low.        We are countering with $1,000,000.         We would
    appreciate a quick response. Karri and Jeff Schrand.” Mike responded, “Hi Karrie
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    [sic], The max that I can do is $980,000 as Cash closing with inspection contingency.
    (split the difference between us and call it a day). Let me know. Thanks, Mike.” Ms.
    Schrand responded, “Mike we have an agreement if we are at $985,000.” Mike
    responded: “I starched [sic] the amount it to go [sic] to 980K. However, will split it
    again with you because I want to be flexible. I am good at $982,500 for a purchase
    price Based on inception [sic] and customary closing. we can get a simple contract
    drafted Monday and have it signed by us Tuesday with the earnest money cashier
    check to you upon acceptance of contract by Tuesday. Please let me know, Mike[.]”
    The next morning, Ms. Schrand responded to Mike, “We accept.” Mike responded,
    in part, “Great, I agree too. Do you have some one [sic] to draw a simple contract
    (neutral contract). I am willing to do one if you like.”
    {¶4}    The parties further discussed drafting a formal document, as well as
    inspection and closing timing, and earnest money. On October 5, Mike Mezher, his
    wife, and the home builder for his son’s property next door went to the Schrands’
    home. At this meeting, Mike Mezher gave Ms. Schrand a document titled “Contract
    to Purchase Real Estate.” Christine Mezher signed the document as the buyer. The
    document stated that “[t]his offer expires Monday October 9, 2017 at 4:00 p.m. if not
    signed by the Buyer and Sellers.” The parties have differing accounts as to exactly
    what happened at this October 5 meeting, but both parties agree that an argument
    ensued and Ms. Schrand asked the group to leave the home. The Schrands never
    signed the document.
    {¶5}    Mike and Joseph Mezher filed a complaint against Jeff and Karri
    Schrand, requesting specific performance of the real estate contract, a preliminary
    injunction, and pecuniary and punitive damages. The Schrands filed an answer,
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    asserting that no agreement had been reached, because the parties had merely been
    negotiating a potential purchase via email. The Schrands also filed a counterclaim
    for a declaratory judgment.
    {¶6}   The Schrands filed a summary-judgment motion, arguing that no
    contract existed because the Schrands never signed the October 5 document, that any
    email “agreement” was barred by the statute of frauds, and that no meeting of the
    minds occurred. The Mezhers also filed a motion for partial summary judgment with
    respect to their claim for specific performance.      The Mezhers argued that the
    September 29-30 email exchange constituted a contract and satisfied the statute of
    frauds. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Schrands, finding
    that the September 29-30 email exchange between the parties did not satisfy the
    statute of frauds, because the emails did not describe the subject property with
    particularity. The Mezhers have appealed.
    Standard of Review
    {¶7}   In two assignments of error, the Mezhers argue that the trial court
    erred in granting the Schrands’ motion for summary judgment, and the trial court
    should have ruled in favor of the Mezhers on their motion for summary judgment.
    We apply a de novo review of a trial court’s decision under Civ.R. 56(C). First Fin.
    Bank, N.A. v. Cooper, 
    2016-Ohio-3523
    , 
    67 N.E.3d 140
    , ¶ 9 (1st Dist.). Summary
    judgment is proper only where no genuine issues of material fact remain, the moving
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and it appears from the evidence that
    reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and with the evidence construed
    most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to that
    party. Civ.R. 56(C).
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Statute of Frauds
    {¶8}    Ohio’s statute of frauds with respect to the sale of land, R.C. 1335.05,
    provides in relevant part: “No action shall be brought whereby to charge the
    defendant * * * upon a contract or sale of lands * * * unless the agreement upon
    which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing
    and signed by the party to be charged therewith * * *.” A writing satisfies the statute
    of frauds if it (1) identifies the subject matter, (2) establishes that a contract has been
    made, and (3) states the essential terms with reasonable certainty. LHPT Columbus,
    L.L.C. v. Capitol City Cardiology, Inc., 
    2014-Ohio-5247
    , 
    24 N.E.3d 712
    , ¶ 22 (10th
    Dist.). As to essential terms, the essential terms of a contract are “the identity of the
    parties to be bound, the subject matter of the contract, consideration, a quantity
    term, and a price term.” Alligood v. Procter & Gamble Co., 
    72 Ohio App.3d 309
    , 311,
    
    594 N.E.2d 668
     (1st Dist.1991). “Because the statute of frauds only requires the
    memorandum contain the essential terms of the agreement, it need not contain all
    the terms of the agreement.” Fairfax Homes, Inc. v. Blue Belle, Inc., 5th Dist.
    Licking No. 05-CA-110, 
    2006-Ohio-2261
    , ¶ 28. Therefore, a contract to transfer land
    does not violate the statute of frauds because it fails to provide, for example, a closing
    date. Id.; McGee v. Tobin, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 04 MA 98, 
    2005-Ohio-2119
    , ¶ 25.
    {¶9}    The trial court granted summary judgment to the Schrands on the
    basis that the September 29-30 email exchange regarding the sale of the property did
    not satisfy the statute of frauds, because the property subject to the purported
    agreement was not described with enough particularity.            We disagree, and the
    Schrands concede that this specific argument was not advanced to the trial court.
    Nevertheless, the Schrands contend that the trial court’s decision should be affirmed
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    on a different basis. See State ex rel. Carter v. Schotten, 
    70 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 92, 
    637 N.E.2d 306
     (1994) (a reviewing court cannot reverse a correct judgment on the sole
    basis that the trial court provided erroneous reasons to support its judgment).
    {¶10} In their motion for summary judgment, the Schrands rely on the terms
    of the October 5 document to argue that the September 29-30 email exchange failed
    to contain the essential terms of the agreement, such as the identity of the buyer, sale
    of items within the home, such as appliances and chandeliers, and the scope of the
    home inspection. However, as the Mezhers argue, the email exchange identified the
    sellers as Karri and Jeff Schrand and the buyer as Mike Mezher. The exchange
    identified the property as the Schrands’ home on Fort View, as stated in the subject
    line of the email chain. The exchange contained a sale price of $982,500. Finally,
    the emails contained an electronic signature of the parties to be charged. See R.C.
    1306.06(C) (where the law requires a signature of the party to be charged, an
    electronic signature suffices). But, the parties’ email exchange contemplated that the
    parties would sign a formal document. Thus, in determining whether the statute of
    frauds is satisfied, the question becomes whether the parties intended to enter into a
    contract at the time of the email exchanges.
    {¶11} An agreement can be specifically enforced even where the parties
    contemplated execution of a formal written document, so long as the parties have
    manifested an intent to be bound and their intentions are sufficiently definite.
    Normandy Place Assoc. v. Beyer, 
    2 Ohio St.3d 102
    , 105-106, 
    443 N.E.2d 161
     (1982).
    In determining whether the parties intended to be bound, courts can look at the
    circumstances surrounding the parties’ discussion. 26901 Cannon Rd. LLC v. PSC
    Metals, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80986, 
    2002-Ohio-6050
    , ¶ 17. Moreover, the
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    question of whether the parties intended a contract is a factual question for the
    finder of fact. Normandy Place at 105, citing Arnold Palmer Golf Co. v. Fuqua
    Indus., Inc., 
    541 F.2d 584
    , 588 (6th Cir.1976) (applying Ohio law).
    {¶12} In this case, once the parties had agreed upon a purchase price, Mike
    Mezher stated, “we can get a simple contract drafted Monday and have it signed by
    us Tuesday with the earnest money cashier check to you upon acceptance of contract
    by Tuesday.” The Schrands responded, “We accept.” Even though this language
    indicated that both parties anticipated executing a formal document, neither party
    expressly indicated that a formally-executed document was necessary before the
    parties could be bound by the sale.
    {¶13} When the Mezhers presented the Schrands with a formal document on
    October 5, the identity of the buyer had changed from Mike Mezher to Christine
    Mezher. According to Ms. Schrand’s affidavit, she had not been made aware of
    Christine’s involvement until October 5. Mike Mezher’s affidavit does not address
    why the buyer had changed in the October 5 document. The October 5 document
    also contained other terms of the sale that had not been expressly agreed upon by the
    parties prior to that time, according to Ms. Schrand, including sale of items within
    the home, such as appliances and chandeliers, and the scope of the inspection
    contingency.
    {¶14} According to Ms. Schrand, at the October 5 meeting, Mike Mezher’s
    wife had stated to her that the Mezhers were “considering” buying the property. Ms.
    Schrand also averred that she had not received any earnest money at this meeting.
    According to Mike Mezher, he had the earnest money in the form of a $10,000 check
    at the October 5 meeting. Ms. Schrand further averred that the email exchange had
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    lacked many items that she had deemed customary or standard for a real-estate
    purchase agreement.
    {¶15} Given the circumstances surrounding the parties’ email exchange and
    later discussions, including that other terms of the sale had yet to be agreed upon, an
    issue of fact exists as to whether the parties had a present intention to be bound at
    the time of the email exchange, or whether the parties did not intend to be bound
    until execution of the more formal contract. Thus, the trial court erred in granting
    summary judgment to the Schrands, because a genuine issue of material fact exists
    as to whether a contract had been made. As a corollary, the trial court did not err in
    denying the Mezhers’ motion for summary judgment.
    Standing
    {¶16} The Schrands argue that Mike and Joseph Mezher lack standing to
    pursue a breach-of-contract claim, because the October 5 document identified
    Christine Mezher as the buyer. This assertion lacks merit. As a general rule, “a
    particular party’s standing, or lack thereof, does not affect the subject-matter
    jurisdiction of the court in which the party is attempting to obtain relief.” Bank of
    Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 
    141 Ohio St.3d 75
    , 
    2014-Ohio-4275
    , 
    21 N.E.3d 1040
    , ¶ 23.
    Except for subject-matter jurisdiction, issues not raised to the trial court cannot be
    raised for the first time on appeal. See Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 
    105 Ohio App.3d 295
    , 302, 
    663 N.E.2d 1030
     (1st Dist.1995). Moreover, the complaint
    alleged that the email exchange created a binding contract between the Schrands and
    Mike Mezher, not Christine. The complaint alleged that Joseph Mezher owned the
    Fort View building next door, subject to the demolition permit, which allegedly
    started the feud between the Schrands and the Mezhers. Joseph Mezher had a
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    particularized need for the sidewalk on the Schrands’ property to aid in construction,
    and therefore the Mezhers sought specific performance as a remedy.
    Conclusion
    {¶17} We sustain the Mezhers’ first assignment of error, and overrule the
    Mezhers’ second assignment of error. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and
    remand the cause for further proceedings.
    Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
    ZAYAS, P.J., and MYERS, J., concur.
    Please note:
    The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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