United States v. Simmons , 59 M.J. 485 ( 2004 )

IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Patrick L. SIMMONS, First Lieutenant
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 03-0369
Crim. App. No. 20000153
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued January 14, 2004
Decided June 1, 2004
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GIERKE
and EFFRON, JJ., joined. BAKER, J., filed a separate opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. CRAWFORD, C.J.,
filed a separate dissenting opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Robert E. Desmond (argued); Colonel
Robert D. Teetsel, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Tellitocci, Major
Allyson G. Lambert, and Captain Gregory M. Kelch (on brief);
Lieutenant Colonel E. Allen Chandler, Jr., Major Imogene M.
Jamison and Captain Mary E. Card.
For Appellee: Captain Ryan R. McKinstry (argued); Colonel
Lauren B. Leeker, Lieutenant Colonel Margaret B. Baines, and
Major Theresa A. Gallagher (on brief).
Military Judge: John P. Galligan and Stephen R. Henley
This opinion is subject to editorial correction before final publication.
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.
First Lieutenant Patrick L. Simmons was tried by a general
court-martial composed of officer members and was convicted of
assault consummated by a battery and conduct unbecoming an
officer and gentleman in violation of Articles 128 and 133,
Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §§ 928 and
933 (2000), respectively. The adjudged and approved sentence
included dismissal, confinement for nine months, and total
forfeiture of all pay and allowances.
Prior to trial, Simmons filed a motion to suppress a
handwritten letter discussing a homosexual relationship and a
portion of a videotaped interrogation conducted by civilian law
enforcement officials concerning the letter. Simmons argued
that the letter had been discovered and seized in violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights and that the challenged portions of
the videotaped statement were derivative of the illegally seized
letter. The military judge denied the motion to suppress and
both the letter and the videotaped statement were admitted into
evidence.
The Army Court of Criminal Appeals held that the search
leading to the discovery of the letter violated the Fourth
Amendment and that the military judge had erred in allowing the
admission of the letter and the derivative videotaped statement
into evidence. It determined, however, that the military
2
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
judge's error was “harmless beyond any reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Simmons, ARMY 20000153, slip op. at 9 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. March 31, 2003). We granted review of the following
issue:
WHETHER THE ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT APPELLANT’S 4TH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BUT THEN
CONCLUDED THAT THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT.
We hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly
assessed the effect of the improperly admitted evidence with
respect to a portion of Simmons' finding of guilt under Article
133, but erred in concluding that the effect of the improperly
admitted evidence on the Article 128 assault conviction was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
BACKGROUND
Both convictions flow from Simmons' relationship with an
enlisted subordinate in his unit, Private First Class (PFC) W.
At some point in early August 1999, Simmons and PFC W entered
into an arrangement under which PFC W occupied, at times, one of
the two bedrooms in the off-post apartment leased by Simmons in
Killeen, Texas. Although PFC W was not a party to the apartment
lease, he kept several sets of clothing there and spent
approximately 15 nights at the apartment during August 1999.
On August 29 Simmons and PFC W had an argument. PFC W
subsequently left the apartment but returned later in the
3
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
afternoon with another soldier to pick up some personal items.
Upon his return, PFC W and Simmons engaged in an escalating
confrontation that eventually turned physical.
At that point, the soldier who had accompanied PFC W to the
apartment contacted the police. Officer Fox of the Killeen
Police Department arrived on the scene and asked Simmons what
had happened. Simmons advised Officer Fox that there had been a
fight but that PFC W had already left the apartment. After the
other soldier advised Officer Fox that PFC W had not in fact
left the apartment, Simmons consented to Officer Fox's entry
into the apartment where he discovered PFC W lying unresponsive
on the floor in a pool of blood.
Simmons told Officer Fox that PFC W had barged in and that
he [Simmons] "had to kick his ass." Due to the amount of blood
and the nature of PFC W's injuries, Officer Fox believed that a
weapon had been used and he ordered Simmons to the floor and
frisked him for weapons, but found none. After interviewing
several witnesses, Officer Fox arrested Simmons for assaulting
PFC W and Simmons was transported to the Killeen Police
Department for questioning.
Officer Fox conducted two brief searches of the apartment
looking for a weapon, but no weapon was found and no evidence
was seized as a result of those searches. After Officer Fox had
concluded his second search and 20 minutes after Simmons had
4
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
been removed from the scene, Investigator Boone of the Killeen
Police Department arrived and Officer Fox advised him that he
had already searched for a weapon. Investigator Boone spent the
next hour to hour and a half taking photographs, examining
clothing and conducting his own search of the apartment. After
observing a bloodstain on the sink and counter in the guest
bathroom, Investigator Boone entered the bathroom and opened a
closed medicine cabinet.
Upon opening the cabinet door, Investigator Boone observed
a manila file folder with handwritten text on the outside of the
folder. Without removing the folder, Investigator Boone read
the text. According to Investigator Boone, the text discussed a
homosexual relationship and, based on his assessment that the
handwriting appeared similar to other visible items in the
apartment bearing Simmons' name, Boone seized the letter as
evidence of possible motive for the assault. Officer Fox
testified that Investigator Boone's comment to him upon finding
the letter was something to the effect of "This is going to be
good."
The next morning Investigator Boone interrogated Simmons
for over an hour concerning the circumstances surrounding the
fight with PFC W and videotaped that interrogation. Simmons
initially denied anything more than a platonic relationship with
PFC W, but when Investigator Boone informed him that he had
5
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
seized the handwritten letter, Simmons admitted to a sexual
relationship with PFC W. This admission occurred during the
last three minutes of the interrogation.
Simmons sought to suppress both the handwritten letter and
his videotaped statement on the grounds that the search by which
the letter had been discovered and its subsequent seizure had
occurred in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The
military judge denied that motion and Simmons ultimately
testified in his own defense at trial concerning his
relationship with PFC W, including the circumstances surrounding
the seized letter and the homosexual nature of their
relationship. Simmons indicated that PFC W had at first
blackmailed him regarding his homosexuality, but that they
subsequently became friends and that the relationship became
sexual. He further testified to having taken PFC W to his
family reunion and to having lent him money that PFC W had
failed to repay.
With respect to the assault charge, Simmons raised the
defense of self-defense. He testified that PFC W continuously
came at him and that he struck back simply to keep him away.
Simmons also testified that PFC W had injured him on prior
occasions by punching him, pushing him into a bathtub and
cracking a rib, kicking him in the stomach, biting his finger,
hitting him in the face, grabbing his testicles and stabbing him
6
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
in the back with a knife. Simmons stated that due to these
prior beatings, at the time of the fight with PFC W, he was in
fear for his life.
The soldier who had accompanied PFC W to the apartment was
the only other witness to the fight. He testified that he never
saw Simmons strike PFC W and that the only physical act he
observed was PFC W having Simmons pinned against a glass window
with his forearm against Simmons' throat. The soldier separated
the two because of his concern that Simmons could have gone
through the window and been severely cut by the glass. According
to the soldier, he complied with Simmons’ request to leave the
apartment at that point and then asked a neighbor to call 911.
PFC W testified under a grant of immunity and, although he
denied any homosexual relationship with Simmons, he acknowledged
that Simmons had confided his homosexuality to him. He
testified that Simmons had taken him to a homosexual club on two
separate occasions, had attempted to kiss him twice and had
grabbed his buttocks on a few occasions.
In regard to the assault charge, PFC W testified that he
had returned to the apartment to retrieve his clothing and
effects. He testified, however, that he had no specific
recollection of the assault apart from being grabbed from
behind, exchanging words with Simmons concerning telephone calls
made to PFC W's girlfriend and hitting the ground with blood
7
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
coming out of his nose and mouth. The injuries PFC W sustained
as a result of the assault included a fracture of the bones
right below the right eye, a fracture through the thin part of
the skull just above and in front of the right ear, and a small
amount of bleeding just over the surface of the brain.
The members found Simmons not guilty of the charged assault
in which grievous bodily injury is inflicted, but guilty of the
lesser-included offense of assault consummated by battery. The
members also found him guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman, with the language of the guilty finding
modified through exceptions and substitutions as follows:
[O]n or between 01 September 1998 and 29 August 1999, at or
near Camp Dobol, Bosnia and Fort Hood, Texas, wrongfully
enter into an unprofessional relationship with [PFC W], a
subordinate, to wit: a close personal friendship, a rent-
paying roommate regular over-night [sic] guest
relationship, an intimate relationship involving sexual
contact, and the pursuit of a continued romantic
relationship by means of writing and delivering to [PFC W]
a letter in which the said 1LT Simmons solicited a
continued romantic relationship, in violation of the
customs of the United States Army that officers shall not
fraternize with enlisted persons on terms of military
equality.
DISCUSSION
A. Introduction
The Government has not certified any challenge to the Court
of Criminal Appeals' determination that the evidence at issue
here was the product of a search and seizure that violated
Simmons' rights under the Fourth Amendment. See Article
8
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
67(a)(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(2) (2000). Although we are
not precluded from examining the legal ruling of a service court
in a case where the Judge Advocate General has not certified the
issue for review, we are reluctant to exercise that power and,
as a rule, reserve it only for those cases where the lower
court's decision is "clearly erroneous and would work a manifest
injustice" if the parties were bound by it. United States v.
Doss, 57 M.J. 182, 185 (C.A.A.F. 2002)(citing Christian v. Colt
Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1998)). That is
not the case here.
We therefore turn to the question presented by the granted
issue, which is whether the Army Court of Criminal Appeals
properly assessed the impact of the military judge's erroneous
denial of Simmons' motion to suppress certain evidence.
B. Standard of Review
The Court of Criminal Appeals properly identified the
applicable legal standard. After finding that the military
judge erroneously admitted into evidence material that the
Government had obtained in violation of Simmons' rights under
the Fourth Amendment, that error was subject to a "harmless
error" review under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967). Under Chapman, a reviewing court must declare the
impact of the error to be "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"
9
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
in order to affirm the resultant conviction. See e.g., United
States v. Hall, 58 M.J. 90, 94 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
The Government bears the burden of establishing that any
constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.(citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). Whether the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt is a question of law that we review de
novo. Id. (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295-96
(1991)).
The question before this Court, therefore, is whether the
effect of the improperly admitted evidence on Simmons'
convictions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The inquiry
under the Chapman analysis is whether "it appears 'beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
to the verdict[s] obtained.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, ___ U.S.
___, ___, 124 S.Ct. 7, 11 (2003)(per curiam)(quoting Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999)). See also Hall, 58 M.J.
at 94.
C. The Article 133 Conviction
The finding of guilt in regard to the Article 133
conviction reflects a determination by the members that Simmons
engaged in the following with PFC W:
• a close personal friendship;
• a regular overnight guest relationship;
10
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
• an intimate relationship involving sexual
contact; and
• the pursuit of a continued romantic relationship
by means of writing and delivering to PFC W a
letter in which Appellant solicited a continued
romantic relationship.
In regard to the “pursuit of a continued romantic
relationship” portion of the finding, in order for us to deem
the erroneous admission of the illegally seized letter "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt," we would have to conclude that it
"did not contribute to" a guilty finding that makes specific
reference to the letter itself. Neder, 527 U.S. at 15. That we
cannot do. The very act of "writing and delivering" that letter
was an explicit part of the criminal conduct that Simmons was
charged with and found guilty of. Absent the erroneous admission
of the letter into evidence, the members could not have found him
guilty of "writing and delivering" it.
We also cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the admission of the letter and the derivative videotaped
statement by Simmons concerning the sexual nature of his
relationship with PFC W "did not contribute to" that portion of
the guilty finding regarding "an intimate relationship involving
sexual contact." The letter indicates that "sex w/ [PFC W] was
incredible" and that Simmons knows he will never have sex with
11
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
PFC W "until [PFC W] is ready again or never." The videotaped
statement contains Simmons' acknowledgement that he and PFC W had
sexual relations.
As the Court of Criminal Appeals noted, however, PFC W
denied having any sexual relationship with Simmons. Thus, the
only evidence in that regard apart from the improperly admitted
letter and derivative videotaped statement was Simmons' trial
testimony. Although there was testimony from other witnesses
concerning the friendship between Simmons and PFC W in Bosnia and
at Fort Hood, none of that testimony was directed toward
establishing a sexual relationship.
Under the circumstances of this case, we are not convinced
that the defense strategy of having Simmons testify at trial
concerning the sexual nature of the relationship would have been
the same in the absence of the improperly admitted evidence. See
e.g., United States v. Grooters, 39 M.J. 269, 273 (C.A.A.F. 1994)
(accused may not have been compelled to testify to explain
improperly admitted statements); United States v. Bearchild, 17
C.M.A. 598, 602, 38 C.M.R. 396, 400 (1968)(in-court testimony
tainted if given to overcome inadmissible confession). Although
we need not determine whether their improper admission was the
exclusive motivation, Simmons' trial testimony on this aspect of
the charged offense was clearly responsive to the letter and
derivative videotaped statement. In the absence of those items
12
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
of evidence (which should not have been admitted) or supporting
testimony from PFC W (which did not exist), the record does not
reflect any other evidence available to demonstrate the existence
of "an intimate relationship involving sexual contact." Under
those circumstances, we cannot view Simmons' trial testimony as
an "independent" basis for concluding that the improperly
admitted evidence "did not contribute to" that portion of the
finding regarding sexual contact.
We can conclude, however, that the admission of the
improper evidence did not contribute to the remaining portions
of the finding, that Simmons engaged in "a close personal
friendship" and "regular over-night [sic] guest" relationship
with PFC W. As noted by the Court of Criminal Appeals, there
was testimony and evidence unrelated to the improperly admitted
letter and derivative statement that demonstrated the
unprofessional character of Simmons' relationship with PFC W:
In addition to PFC W's testimony, a staff sergeant in
appellant's platoon testified that the noncommissioned
officers expressed concerns about appellant's relationship
with PFC W; that he saw PFC W driving appellant's car; and
that personnel commented that if someone wanted to find
appellant when in the field, he or she would likely find
him at PFC W's medic track. Appellant's platoon sergeant
also testified that appellant spent a lot of time at the
medic track; that PFC W and appellant called each other by
their first names; that appellant pulled PFC W off of guard
duty when they were deployed to Bosnia. A neighbor in the
apartment complex testified that PFC W lived in appellant's
apartment. Private First Class W's fiancée testified that
PFC W lived with "Patrick," the appellant. A written
statement given by appellant to [Investigator] Boone, in
which appellant accounts for the events on the day the
13
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
assault occurred, was admitted into evidence without
objection. Appellant referred to PFC W by his first name
throughout the statement; stated that PFC W had stayed
overnight in his apartment the prior evening; mentioned
that he cancelled a visit that he and PFC W had planned to
appellant's sister-in-law; and drank beer together while
watching football games.
Simmons, slip op. at 7-8. The quantum and character of the
evidence specifically referred to by the Court of Criminal
Appeals above is not related to or otherwise a product of the
illegally seized letter or the derivative videotaped statement.
Moreover, Simmons did not seriously contest the friendship and
roommate aspects of the charge. In light of those
circumstances, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
constitutional error did not contribute to that portion of the
guilty finding that refers to "engaging in a close personal
friendship" and a "regular over-night [sic] guest" relationship
with PFC W. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 15.
Accordingly, while we conclude that the military judge’s
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to
the members' guilty finding of conduct unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman in regard to the sexual contact and the improperly
admitted letter, we conclude that the military judge's error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to that portion
of the members' guilty finding that Simmons violated Article 133
by engaging in "a close personal friendship" and "regular over-
night [sic] guest" relationship with PFC W.
14
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
D. The Article 128 Conviction
The Court of Criminal Appeals focused exclusively on
Simmons' conviction under Article 133 and did not assess the
impact of the erroneously admitted evidence on Simmons'
conviction for assault consummated by a battery. While they are
distinct criminal offenses our inquiry remains the same -- can
the Government demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the
admission of the illegally seized letter and the derivative
videotaped statement did not contribute to the finding of guilt
under the assault charge? See Neder, 527 U.S. at 15.
The Government has not met its burden here. Under the
Government's theory of the case, the assault was the direct
product of Simmons' alleged unrequited homosexual "obsession"
with PFC W. In fact, trial counsel referred to the illegally
seized letter in the beginning, middle and end of his closing
argument. The illegally seized letter and derivative videotaped
statement were the obvious centerpieces of the Government's
theory and, as discussed above, were the only evidence apart
from Simmons’ derivative trial testimony that concerned a
homosexual relationship. Simmons, on the other hand, vigorously
contested that theory of the assault and raised evidence under a
self-defense theory. PFC W testified to only a limited
recollection of the events surrounding the fight. The only
15
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
other witness testified that he saw PFC W pinning Simmons to a
window with his arm to his throat.
Under those circumstances, the Government has not met its
burden of demonstrating that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt under the Chapman analysis. We cannot say that
the improper admission of the evidence at issue here and the "gay
obsession" theory that it was offered in support of did not
contribute to the finding of guilty under the assault charge.
See Neder, 527 U.S. at 15.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is reversed. The finding of guilty of Charge II, its
specification and the sentence are set aside. That portion of
the specification under Charge I referring to "an intimate
relationship involving sexual contact" and "the pursuit of a
continued romantic relationship by means of writing and
delivering to [PFC W] a letter in which the said 1LT Simmons
solicited a continued romantic relationship" is set aside, but
Charge I and the balance of its specification is affirmed. The
case is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army. A
rehearing on Charge II and the sentence may be ordered. If a
rehearing as to Charge II is deemed impracticable, the dismissal
of Charge II and a rehearing as to sentence alone may be
ordered.
16
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
BAKER, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur in the majority’s treatment of Appellant’s
conviction under Article 133, Uniform Code of Military Justice
[hereinafter UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2000). However, for the
reasons stated below, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s
analysis regarding Appellant’s conviction under Article 128,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 928 (2000).
As the majority recounts, the Court of Criminal Appeals
determined that the search of Appellant’s apartment, resulting
in the discovery of his letter to Private First Class (PFC) W,
violated Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights. As a result, the
letter should have been suppressed at trial. Since this was a
constitutional error, the question before this Court is whether
the admission of the letter was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); United
States v. Hall, 58 M.J. 90, 94 (C.A.A.F. 2003). The Government
bears the burden of demonstrating that a constitutional error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24;
Hall, 58 M.J. at 94. On these two points the case law is
consistent and clear. Thus, in Chapman the Supreme Court
stated, “The beneficiary of a constitutional error [must] prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
1
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
contribute to the verdict obtained.”1 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
In ruling for the appellant in that case, the Supreme Court also
considered the strength of the Government’s case absent the
constitutional error. The Court concluded that “though the case
in which this occurred presented a reasonably strong
‘circumstantial web of evidence’ against petitioners, it was
also a case in which, absent the constitutionally forbidden
comments, honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have
brought in not-guilty verdicts.” Id. at 25-26 (citation
omitted). See also Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254
(1969)(“Our judgment must be based on our own reading of the
record and on what seems to us to have been the probable impact
of the two confessions on the minds of an average jury.”).
Subsequent to Chapman, the Supreme Court and our Court have
emphasized different facets of the Chapman analysis. In Arizona
v. Fulminante, the Supreme Court said, “The Court has the power
to review the record de novo in order to determine an error’s
1
The Supreme Court stated, “We prefer the approach of this Court
in deciding what was harmless error in our recent case of Fahy
v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 [(1963)]. There we said: ‘The
question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction.’” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23
(1967)(citation omitted). The Court went on to state that
“[t]here is little, if any, difference” between the Fahy test
and the Chapman test “that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. at 24. Of course, the
Chapman formulation omits the qualifications “reasonable
possibility” and “might have” that are found within the Fahy
test. See id. at 23-24; Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86-87.
2
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
harmlessness. In so doing, it must be determined whether the
State has met its burden of demonstrating that the admission of
the [coerced] confession . . . did not contribute to
Fulminante’s conviction.” 499 U.S. 279, 295-96 (1991)(citations
omitted)(emphasis added). We adopted the same point of emphasis
in United States v. Grooters, 39 M.J. 269 (C.M.A. 1994). In
weighing the strength of the Government’s case against the taint
of constitutional error, we stated, “The Government . . . must
exclude the ‘reasonable possibility that the evidence complained
of might have contributed to the conviction.’” Id. at 273(quoting Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86-87)(emphasis added).
However, in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) the
Supreme Court focused not only on the contribution of the
tainted evidence, but also on the strength of the Government’s
case and therefore the impact of the tainted evidence: “We
think, therefore, that the harmless-error inquiry must be . . .
: Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” Id. at
18. In Hall, we did the same, noting that the focus of the
Chapman inquiry is “on whether the error had or reasonably may
have had an effect upon the members’ findings.”2 Hall, 58 M.J.
2
In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), the Supreme
Court applied a per se rule of prejudice where the jury was
provided an unconstitutional reasonable doubt instruction.
There the Court determined that application of the Chapman
3
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
at 94 (emphasis added)(quoting United States v. Bins, 43 M.J.
79, 86 (C.A.A.F. 1995)). See also United States v. Grijalva, 55
M.J. 223, 228 (C.A.A.F. 2001)(admission of tainted evidence
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it “was not a
significant factor in the determination whether appellant was
guilty of the greater or lesser offense” and powerful and
uncontested evidence of guilt was otherwise presented.)
The difference in focus between these cases is important,
if not determinative, as to how harmless error analysis applies
in Appellant’s case. Appellant’s letter was integral to the
Government’s theory of the case. Appellant argued self-defense
and the Government countered by using the letter to suggest that
Appellant had a motive to beat PFC W, notwithstanding his claim
of self-defense. Thus, if one focuses on whether the letter
“contributed” to Appellant’s conviction, it would be impossible
to conclude otherwise.
Such contribution is incalculable. In theory, all evidence
presented at trial “contributes” in some manner to a panel’s
consideration of the case, including where it is discounted, but
nonetheless informs a panel’s decision to give greater weight to
other evidence. Thus, I have no doubt that the presentation of
harmless error review was illogical where the jury’s verdict was
itself a nullity. 508 U.S. at 280. “The Sixth Amendment
requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical
jury’s action, . . . ; it requires an actual jury finding of
guilty.” Id.4
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
Appellant’s letter by the Government contributed to the verdict
in this case. Portions of the letter were read aloud to the
panel during Appellant’s testimony. The panel read the letter.
There is, therefore, no way of knowing beyond a reasonable doubt
that it did not “contribute” in some manner to their verdict.
In my view, however, Chapman and Neder require appellate
courts to focus on the impact of the tainted evidence on the
verdict as the measure of the tainted evidence’s potential
“contribution.”3 See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Neder, 527 U.S. at
18. Otherwise, there would be no need for harmless error
analysis since we would never be able to disaggregate the
relative contribution of one piece of evidence over another
without polling the members and opening jury deliberations to
appellate inspection. This was the view of Justice Harlan’s
dissent in Chapman. See 386 U.S. at 55. The Supreme Court,
however, could not have intended this result or it would not
have upheld the Chapman line of harmless error cases.
The Neder-Hall impact test leads to a review of other
evidence in this case and, in my view, a different conclusion
than that reached by the majority. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 18;
Hall, 58 M.J. at 94. Appellant’s self-defense argument rested
3
The constitutional error in this case was not of the nature
suggested in Sullivan where the error went to the underlying
validity of the court-martial itself. In that situation, a
harmless error analysis is illogical and should be precluded.
See 508 U.S. at 280.
5
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
upon the nature of his prior altercations with PFC W, the fact
that Specialist (SPC) Dewit, the friend who accompanied PFC W to
the apartment, had seen Appellant pinned against the window by
PFC W’s forearm, and the potential that PFC W could have
fractured his skull by hitting his head on a wooden bar in the
back of the bedroom, as opposed to as a direct result of
Appellant’s blows. Nevertheless, the evidence against Appellant
of assault consummated by a battery was significant and
substantial. This is not a case like Grooters where the only
evidence was derivative of the tainted evidence. 39 M.J. at
273.
• First, SPC Dewit, intervened to break up the fight
between Appellant and PFC W at the point where PFC W
had Appellant pinned against the window with his
forearm. Thus, at this point, Appellant had the
opportunity to walk away from any threat he may have
felt from PFC W. SPC Dewit also indicated that
tempers did not seem to be exceedingly flared so it
was easy for him to break up the fight.
• Second, PFC W’s medical injuries were extensive.
Doctors and police testified they had never seen
anyone beaten this badly without the use of a weapon.
Moreover, the injuries were a product of repeated
6
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
blows, not a singular traumatic strike. In contrast,
Appellant’s injuries consisted of one broken knuckle.
• Third, Appellant told the police that the individual
he had the fight with had already left the apartment.
Officer Fox testified that Appellant told his mother
over the phone, PFC W “came in and started some shit,
and I beat his ass down bad.” Appellant also
testified that he “may” have hit PFC W while PFC W was
on the ground.
After weighing the strength of the Government’s case
against the potential contribution of the tainted evidence, I am
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational panel would
have found Appellant guilty of assault consummated by battery
absent the error. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 18. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent in part.
7
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
CRAWFORD, Chief Judge (dissenting):
The majority ignores∗ the “touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment” -- the reasonableness of police action at the scene
of the crime. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251
(1991). The majority also gives short shrift to several salient
facts, including: Appellant lied to the police regarding what
transpired in his apartment, and then became very agitated as
the police were trying to control the crime scene, aid the
victim, ensure their own safety, and gather evidence. The
actions of the responding police officer and his back-up under
these circumstances were more than reasonable.
The Fourth Amendment has two clauses: reasonableness and
probable cause. Most importantly, the Fourth Amendment requires
all government searches and seizures to be reasonable. The
search in this case satisfied that requirement and is not
precluded by Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), or Flippo
v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (1999). In addition to the search
being reasonable, it also may be justified as incident to the
lawful arrest of Appellant. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent
from the lead opinion.
∗
We are not bound by the lack of a Government challenge to the
Court of Criminal Appeals opinion. See United States v.
Williams, 41 M.J. 134, 135 (C.M.A. 1994).
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
FACTS
It is important to highlight additional facts of this case
to understand the reasonableness of the police officer’s action.
On August 29, 1999, at 6:25 p.m., a Kileen, Texas, Police
Officer, Eric Fox, arrived at Appellant’s apartment in response
to a report of a fight. When Officer Fox arrived, he approached
Specialist (SPC) Dewit, who said that he had accompanied PFC W,
the assault victim, to the apartment to remove PFC W’s personal
belongings. Officer Fox then approached the apartment and
talked to Appellant. Appellant said there had been a fight, but
that the friend with whom he fought had departed. SPC Dewit, by
contrast, told the officer no one had left the scene.
Officer Fox then asked to enter the apartment. Appellant
was initially reluctant, but eventually allowed him to enter the
apartment to see if anyone was injured after the fight. Officer
Fox made a visual sweep of the apartment and found PFC W
unconscious lying in a pool of blood on the floor in the guest
bedroom next to the bathroom door. At first, Appellant complied
with Officer Fox’s order to stay on his knees, but then became
agitated and stood up. Officer Fox asked what had happened.
Officer Fox stated that Appellant “proclaimed that [PFC W] had
barged in and he had to kick his ass.” Appellant then “got up
off the ground . . . then again ordered him to the ground, and
there was a small scuffle. [Officer Fox] did have to place him
2
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
in [hand]cuffs.” Appellant continued to insist that PFC W had
barged in, but Officer Fox challenged this assertion by noting
that there was no damage to the front door. A very agitated
Appellant still insisted that PFC W had barged in. Officer Fox
again ordered him to the floor. “Due to his size and me still
trying to watch the victim, [Officer Fox] pull[ed] out [his]
pepper spray and advised that [he] would have to spray him. He
did calm down again, but then escalated his behavior again.”
Appellant was ordered to his knees a number of times, causing
Officer Fox to pull out the pepper spray. Because of
Appellant’s reactions, Officer Fox quickly ordered back-up and
an ambulance, and handcuffed Appellant.
Within five minutes of the backup request, additional
officers arrived, took control of Appellant, and secured the
apartment. Within 15 or 20 minutes after the officers had
secured the crime scene and left, Investigator Patrick Boone
arrived. Even though the other officers had left and
Investigator Boone had arrived, the police did not know who else
might be involved and Appellant was not cooperative.
Accordingly, Investigator Boone conducted a search of the
bedroom and bathroom for a weapon. While looking for weapons,
he opened the medicine cabinet, which is about three feet from
where the victim had been before he was moved, and noticed a
manila folder with writing on the outside, admitted at trial as
3
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
Prosecution Exhibit 6. Investigator Boone described the folder
as being “immediately visible” and “in plain view.” “Without
removing the [folder] from the cabinet, Investigator Boone began
reading the front side; the handwriting appeared similar to
other visible items in the apartment bearing the accused’s
name.” Investigator Boone, who had prior military service,
thought it “strange that a private would be sharing an apartment
with an officer.” After reading the note, “[Investigator] Boone
concluded the letter provided a motive for the accused to
assault [PFC W] and seized it as evidence.” Investigator Boone
stayed at the crime scene for approximately an hour and a half,
to take crime scene photographs, including photographs of the
blood splatters and blood swipes.
The next morning, Investigator Boone interrogated
Appellant, who described the circumstances surrounding the
fight. Appellant, a platoon leader, denied anything more than a
platonic friendship with PFC W. Investigator Boone then asked
him about the handwritten note, and Appellant admitted to a
sexual relationship with PFC W. After the judge denied the
motion to suppress the note, Appellant entered a guilty plea to
fraternization by exceptions and substitution in the lesser
included offense of assault by inflicting grievous bodily harm.
In denying the motion to suppress, the judge said: “Under
the circumstances of this case, I find the accused forfeited any
4
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
reasonable expectation of privacy he may have had in the letter
when he surrendered it to [PFC W]. . . .” The judge held that
the seizure of the letter “from the medicine cabinet was
incident to the accused’s lawful arrest.” The search was
“substantially contemporaneous with the accused’s arrest and
especially limited to the area within the accused’s immediate
control.”
DISCUSSION
The Bill of Rights grants American citizens extensive
rights. Courts and commentators have long debated the
application of these rights to servicemembers. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lopez, 35 M.J. 35, 41 n.2 (C.M.A. 1992);
Fredric I. Lederer & Frederic L. Borch, Does the Fourth
Amendment Apply to the Armed Forces?, 3 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts J.
219 (1994), reprinted and expanded in 144 Mil. L. Rev. 110(1994). This Court in United States v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428,
430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960), stated that “the
protections of the Bill of Rights, except for those which are
expressly, or by necessary implication inapplicable, are
available to members of the armed forces.” One of the most
important of these rights is the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no
5
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
Investigator Boone’s actions in this case were reasonable
and could be justified under the search incident-to-arrest
doctrine. Neither Mincey nor Flippo precludes holding that
Investigator Boone’s actions were reasonable. Mincey resulted
from an undercover drug bust gone awry, which entailed a four-
day search to obtain evidence. An undercover police officer,
Barry Headricks, had arranged to purchase drugs from the
appellant Mincey at Mincey’s house. Mincey ostensibly left the
house to obtain money. On his return, he was accompanied by
nine other plain clothes policemen and a deputy county attorney.
John Hodgman, one of three of Mincey’s housemates, opened the
door. Upon seeing the entourage, Hodgman immediately attempted
to slam the door, but Headricks slipped inside and moved quickly
to the bedroom. The officers were able to push Hodgman back,
but a volley of shots rang out, one of them striking Headricks,
who was wounded and semiconscious on the floor. Officer
Headricks died a few hours later. After the victims were
removed from the scene, a four-day search that included opening
dresser drawers ensued. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 387-89.
The Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that
Mincey forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy or “that
6
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
the police entry to arrest Mincey was so great an invasion of
his privacy that the additional intrusion caused by the search
was constitutionally irrelevant.” Id. at 391. The Court stated
that “this claim is hardly tenable in light of the extensive
nature of this search.” Id. It is one thing to argue that a
person arrested has a lesser expectation of privacy, but “[i]t
is quite another to argue that he also has a lesser right of
privacy in his entire house. . . . Indeed, this very argument
was rejected when it was advanced to support the warrantless
search of a[n] [entire] dwelling where a search occurred as
‘incident’ to the arrest of its occupant.” Id.The Court also rejected the argument that there was a
lawful search “in light of the extensive nature of this search.”
Id. “[A] four-day search that included opening dresser drawers
and ripping up carpets can hardly be rationalized in terms of
legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search.” Id. at
393. The actions of the police in Mincey were an over-reaction
to the killing of a police officer. The Supreme Court in Mincey
did not state at what point during the four days the officers
crossed the line. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the
state court for a determination as to what evidence was lawfully
gathered. Id. at 395 n.9
Importantly, the Court in Mincey recognized that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit warrantless entries if a person is
7
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
reasonably believed to be in need of aid. Nevertheless, such
searches must be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
justify its initiation . . . and simply cannot be contended that
this search was justified by any emergency threatening life or
limb.” Id. at 393 (citation omitted). As in the instant case,
and most similar cases, the police often call for back-up to
assist any victims, secure the crime scene, and ensure there is
no escape by the suspect. Courts have upheld the follow-up
entry of additional police officers in this manner under the
“continuation doctrine”. See State v. Magnano, 528 A.2d 760,
764 (Conn. 1987).
Flippo v. West Virginia is also distinguishable. Flippo
and his wife were vacationing in an isolated cabin in a state
park. The local authorities received a 911 call from Flippo
stating that he and his wife had been attacked by an intruder
wielding a log and a knife. When the police arrived on the
scene, they found Mrs. Flippo dead and her head covered with
blood. After taking Flippo to the hospital, the police returned
to the cabin to investigate, where they unlocked a brief case
and found photographs that incriminated Flippo. These
photographs were admitted at trial to convict Flippo.
Addressing the argument that the photographs were
unlawfully seized in violation of Flippo’s Fourth Amendment
right to privacy, the Supreme Court remanded the case because
8
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
the West Virginia Court “simply found that after the homicide
crime scene was secured for investigation, a search of ‘anything
and everything found within the crime scene area’ was ‘within
the law,’” and “made no attempt to distinguish Mincey.” Flippo,
528 U.S. at 14-15. On remand, the West Virginia Supreme Court
found that because Flippo had consented for the police to return
to the premises, the photographs were lawfully seized as
evidence. State v. Flippo, 575 S.E.2d 170 (W. Va. 2002).
The facts of the instant case establish the reasonableness
of Investigator Boone’s actions. Certainly, because the search
in this case was a continuation of the initial entry, rather
than an entirely new entry, Investigator Boone’s search of the
immediate area was appropriate. See, e.g., Magnano, 528 A.2d at
764; People v. Reynolds, 672 P.2d 529, 531 (Colo. 1983). The
continuation doctrine permits officers who are called to the
scene as back-up support to take photographs and gather
evidence, while the initial responding officer is still on the
premises.
Additionally, the search incident-to-arrest doctrine
justifies “the opening of containers found within the physical
area covered by the search.” United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d
1409, 1419 (9th Cir. 1996). In determining whether the object
seized was within the “immediate control” of the defendant, the
crucial time “for analysis . . . is the time of the arrest and
9
United States v. Simmons, No. 03-0369/AR
not the time of the search.” In re Sealed Case 96-3167, 153
F.3d 759, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In applying this test, the D.C.
Circuit court noted it was in accord with “our sister circuits.”
Id. at 768 n.4. To hold otherwise “might create a perverse
incentive for an arresting officer to prolong the period during
which the arrestee is kept in an area where he could pose a
danger to the officer.” Id. at 768 (quoting United States v.
Abdul-Sabor, 85 F.3d 664, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
In sum, unlike Mincey, the search in this case was not a
four-day search, but rather a brief search following an arrest
which required Investigator Boone’s back-up to control an unruly
suspect, aid the ailing victim, protect the crime scene from
further disruption, and guarantee the originating officer’s
protection. Investigator Boone’s search of the bedroom and
bathroom was certainly reasonable under these circumstances, and
the manila folder he seized was found within the radius where an
officer would reasonably check for evidence or a weapon under
the search incident-to-arrest doctrine. For these reasons, I
would validate the search and affirm Appellant’s conviction.
10