Gilroy Daniels, Sr. v. Arcade, L.P. , 477 F. App'x 125 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1191
GILROY J. DANIELS, SR.,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
and
JEFFREY JOEL JUDY
Plaintiff,
v.
ARCADE, L.P.,
Defendant – Appellee,
-------------------
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE BLIND
Amicus Supporting Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:10-cv-00607-RDB)
Argued: March 20, 2012 Decided: April 24, 2012
Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Norman K. MOON,
Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Keenan wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Floyd and Judge Moon joined.
ARGUED: Jessica Paulie Weber, BROWN, GOLDSTEIN & LEVY, LLP,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Suzanne Sangree, BALTIMORE
CITY DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Brien Penn, THE LAW OFFICE OF BRIEN PENN, LLC, Glenwood,
Maryland, for Appellant. Eve L. Hill, Gregory P. Care, BROWN,
GOLDSTEIN & LEVY, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Amicus
Supporting Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:
Gilroy J. Daniels, Sr. appeals from the district court’s
order dismissing his lawsuit against Arcade, L.P. In the first
amended complaint, Daniels and Jeffrey Joel Judy, a co-plaintiff
who is not a party to this appeal, alleged that Arcade violated
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
12181, et seq. (the ADA), by failing to provide adequate access
for persons who require the use of wheelchairs to certain
property purportedly owned or operated by Arcade. The district
court held that Daniels and Judy each lacked standing because
they failed to state plausible allegations that they suffered a
“concrete, particularized injury,” or that such injury, if it
had occurred, was “traceable” to Arcade’s actions. Upon our
review of the parties’ arguments, we hold that Daniels’
allegations concerning injury and traceability were sufficient
to withstand Arcade’s motion to dismiss, and we vacate the
district court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.
I.
This case began in March 2010 when Judy, a resident of
Florida who requires a wheelchair as his primary means of
mobility, filed a complaint (the original complaint) against
Arcade seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for Arcade’s
alleged violations of the ADA with respect to the Lexington
3
Market (the Market), in Baltimore, Maryland. The Market, which
has been in operation for many years and includes the separate
businesses of individual vendors, allegedly is owned or operated
by Arcade. Daniels was not a party to the original complaint.
After Arcade filed a motion to dismiss the original
complaint, Judy filed an amended complaint in which Daniels was
added as a co-plaintiff. Daniels is a resident of Pasadena,
Maryland, which is located about 20 miles from the Market. Like
Judy, Daniels also requires a wheelchair as his primary means of
mobility.
The amended complaint alleged that the Market, a place of
public accommodation subject to the ADA, was in violation of the
ADA because the property had inaccessible entry routes,
inaccessible ramps throughout the facility, inaccessible
restrooms, inaccessible counters, and other amenities that are
inaccessible for persons who require the use of a wheelchair.
The amended complaint also alleged that Arcade is the “owner,
lessee, and/or operator” of the Market, “whose main entrance is
located at 400 West Lexington Street, . . . but whose property
is located between N. Eutaw St., Marion St., W. Lexington St.,
N. Greene St., and W. Saratoga St.”
With respect to Daniels, the amended complaint alleged that
he “resides in close proximity to” the Market, and that he
“regularly visits” the Market. The amended complaint further
4
alleged that Daniels “intends to continue to visit the [Market]
in the future for his shopping needs,” but that he will
“continue to experience serious difficulty due to the barriers”
described in the complaint. Arcade filed a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to
dismiss the amended complaint on the basis that Daniels and Judy
lacked standing.1
The district court granted Arcade’s motion to dismiss,
holding that Daniels and Judy failed to allege a “concrete and
particularized injury,” and that they failed to allege facts
that plausibly would suggest that any such injury was
“traceable” to Arcade’s actions. With respect to the “concrete
and particularized” injury requirement, the district court
adopted a four-factor test from an unpublished decision rendered
by an Ohio federal district court.2 See Judy v. Pingue, No. 08-
1
Arcade’s motion to dismiss was premised on both Rule
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
although the district court analyzed the parties’ arguments
solely under Rule 12(b)(6). Neither party assigns error to the
district court’s omission of a Rule 12(b)(1) analysis.
Accordingly, we address only whether the district court erred in
dismissing the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
2
In Pingue, the Southern District of Ohio also relied on
unpublished district court decisions in setting forth this four-
factor test. See 2009 WL 4261389, at *2 (citing D’lil v.
Stardust Vacation Club, No. 2:00-CV-01496, 2001 WL 1825832, at
*3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2001); Vaughn v. Rent-a-Center, No. 2:06-
CV-1207, 2009 WL 723166 (S.D. Ohio March 16, 2009)). We are not
(Continued)
5
859, 2009 WL 4261389 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 25, 2009). Accordingly,
the district court analyzed “(1) the proximity of defendant’s
business to plaintiff’s residence, (2) the plaintiff's past
patronage of defendant’s business, (3) the definitiveness of
plaintiff’s plans to return, and (4) the plaintiff’s frequency
of travel near defendant.” Id. at *2. In addition to these
four factors, the district court added a fifth factor, the
number of lawsuits previously filed by the plaintiffs.
With regard to Daniels, the district court held that the
“proximity” factor weighed in his favor because he lived about
20 miles from the Market. However, the district court held that
the remaining factors weighed against a finding that Daniels
suffered a concrete and particularized injury. The district
court noted Daniels’ allegation that he “regularly visits” the
Market, but held that Daniels’ failure to provide specific dates
on which he previously visited the Market rendered his
allegations vague, “cast[ed] doubt” on whether he would continue
to patronize the Market in the future, and did not suffice to
establish his “frequency of travel near defendant.”
The district court also noted Daniels’ statement that he
“intends to continue to visit [the Market] in the future for his
aware of any published federal appellate decisions that have
adopted Pingue’s four-factor test.
6
shopping needs,” but held that this assertion failed to
demonstrate the “requisite concrete and specific intent to
return” necessary to establish standing. Finally, the district
court held that Daniels’ “litigation history” of joining two
other ADA complaints filed by Judy “undermine[d]” his “vague
statements” regarding his intention to return to the Market.
Accordingly, the district court held that Daniels lacked
standing because he failed to allege facts suggesting that he
was likely to return to the Market, and therefore did not
adequately allege a “real threat of future harm.”
As an independent basis for dismissal, the district court
also held that the amended complaint failed to allege facts
suggesting that any injury was traceable to Arcade. In reaching
this conclusion, the district held that although the amended
complaint alleged that Arcade was the “owner, lessee, and/or
operator” of the Market, this allegation was insufficient in
light of an affidavit submitted by John M. Prugh, Arcade’s
general partner. In this affidavit, Prugh stated that Arcade
owns the buildings located at 403, 421, and 423 West Lexington
Street, but that Arcade does not own or lease 400 West Lexington
Street nor does Arcade “operate” the Market. Relying on this
affidavit, the district court concluded that Arcade could not be
held responsible for the architectural barriers identified in
the amended complaint. After the district court entered its
7
order granting Arcade’s motion to dismiss, Daniels, but not
Judy, timely filed a notice of appeal.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s decision granting
Arcade’s motion to dismiss and, in conducting our review, we
assume as true all well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of Daniels, the plaintiff. Nemet Chevrolet,
Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir.
2009). However, we will not accept as true any unwarranted
inferences or unreasonable conclusions. Id. Instead, the
allegations must establish a plausible claim to relief. See
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (to survive
a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face”).
In reviewing the district court’s dismissal of the amended
complaint on the basis that Daniels lacked standing, we observe
that the requirement of standing is a threshold requirement
implicating the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and is
“perhaps the most important” condition for a justiciable claim.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). The standing inquiry
ensures that a plaintiff has a sufficient personal stake in a
8
dispute to render its judicial resolution appropriate. See id.
at 750-51.
To meet the minimum constitutional requirements for
standing, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) that
the plaintiff has sustained an injury in fact; (2) that the
injury is traceable to the defendants’ actions; and (3) that the
injury likely can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 629
F.3d 387, 396 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). At the pleading stage,
general factual allegations concerning the plaintiff’s injury
are sufficient because, in evaluating a motion to dismiss,
courts “presum[e] that general allegations embrace those
specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Lujan,
504 U.S. at 561 (citation omitted).
To demonstrate an injury in fact, a plaintiff must suffer
an invasion of a legally-protected interest that is concrete and
particularized, as well as actual or imminent. Friends of the
Earth, 629 F.3d at 396 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). To
satisfy the “traceability” requirement, “there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,”
rather than the injury occurring as a result of “the independent
action of some third party not before the court.” Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560 (citation omitted).
9
A.
We first address Daniels’ argument that the district court
erred in holding that he failed to allege facts demonstrating
that he suffered an “injury in fact.” We decline at this time
to endorse the four-factor test that the district court adopted
from the Southern District of Ohio in Pingue. Although this
Court often has formulated or adopted factor-based tests to
guide our analyses, the use of this type of analysis in some
cases, such as in the present one, overly and unnecessarily
complicates the issue at hand.
In this case, we simply are required to determine whether
the amended complaint sufficiently alleges that Daniels suffered
an injury that is concrete and particularized, as well as actual
or imminent. With regard to the “concrete and particularized”
prong of the “injury in fact” requirement, we conclude that
Daniels’ allegations were sufficient to withstand Arcade’s
motion to dismiss. Assuming that his allegations are true and
construing all inferences in Daniels’ favor, as we are required
to do in this context, we observe that Daniels lives near the
Market, had visited the Market before the filing of the amended
complaint, and in fact “regularly visits” the Market. During
these visits, Daniels alleges, he was subject to discrimination
within the meaning of the ADA by the following purported
structural deficiencies of the Market: inaccessible entry
10
routes, inaccessible ramps, inaccessible restrooms, and other
inaccessible amenities. These alleged structural deficiencies
excluded Daniels from, or denied him the benefits of, the goods
and services offered by the Market’s vendors.
Because he visited the Market and encountered these
difficulties himself, Daniels’ injury is “actual” and
“concrete,” rather than theoretical. Moreover, the injury is
“particularized” because the injury affected Daniels “in a
personal and individual way.” Lujan, 504 U.S. 561 n.1.
Rather than monetary damages, the amended complaint seeks
only declarative and injunctive relief, in addition to
attorneys’ fees and court costs. In seeking such “prospective
equitable relief instead of damages for a concrete past harm,”
Daniels also must allege and prove that there is a “real and
immediate threat” that he will be wronged again. Bryant v.
Cheney, 924 F.2d 525, 529 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-03 (1983)); see also Lyons,
461 U.S. at 111 (equitable remedy unavailable absent showing of
irreparable injury, which requires sufficient likelihood that
plaintiff will again be wronged in a similar way). It is this
requirement that the district court held was lacking from
Daniels’ allegations in the amended complaint.
Although we agree with the district court that Daniels was
required to state a plausible allegation that there is a
11
likelihood that he will suffer future harm, we disagree with the
district court’s conclusion that Daniels’ allegations are
insufficient. Daniels alleged that he “intends to continue to
visit the [Market] in the future for his shopping needs.” We
must accept this allegation as true for purposes of the motion
to dismiss, and we deem the allegation plausible because Daniels
resides in relatively close proximity to the Market.
The district court found Daniels’ statement that he intends
to return to the market implausible for two reasons. First, the
district court held that Daniels’ failure to provide exact dates
that he visited the Market in the past, and a more specific time
at which he intends to visit the Market in the future,
demonstrated the absence of a reasonable likelihood that he
would return. However, we are aware of no precedent in this
Circuit that requires this degree of specificity to survive a
motion to dismiss, and we decline to impose such a requirement
here.
Second, the district court held that Daniels’ litigation
history “undermine[d]” his statements concerning his intention
to return to the Market. However, we are not faced with the
issue here whether a party’s extensive litigation history may be
used to determine the plausibility of his alleged future
intentions, because Daniels’ litigation history is scant and,
thus, cannot have served to undermine his allegations. As the
12
district court observed, Daniels was a party to two lawsuits
raising claims of ADA violations in Maryland. There is no
indication in the record that either of these two lawsuits was
held to have been frivolous.
“The right to sue and defend in the courts . . . is one of
the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship . . .
[and] is granted and protected by the Federal Constitution.”
Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
Absent a determination that Daniels has abused those privileges,
we will not hold his past participation in the judicial process
against him. Accordingly, we conclude that Daniels’ litigation
history is not relevant to this case.
For these reasons, we hold that the district court erred in
determining that Daniels failed to satisfy the “injury in fact”
component of the standing requirement. Our conclusion is not
altered by Arcade’s additional argument, not addressed by the
district court, that Daniels failed to allege that he visited
the Market before Judy filed the original complaint, to which
Daniels was not a party. Although it is unclear whether
Daniels’ “regular[]” visits to the Market began before the date
of the original complaint, March 3, 2010, or instead began
merely before the date of the amended complaint, August 9, 2010,
we conclude that the resolution of this question is not
necessary to the result we reach. It is undisputed that Daniels
13
visited the Market before he became a party to this lawsuit when
the amended complaint was filed. Under this Court’s precedent,
“an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and
renders it of no legal effect.” Young v. City of Mount Ranier,
238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001).
We acknowledge the cases from other courts cited by Arcade
for the principle that a court’s jurisdiction is determined by
the pleadings at the time the lawsuit was initiated.3 However,
none of these cases cited by Arcade addresses the situation
presented here, in which the sole plaintiff remaining in the
case was not a party to the original complaint.4 Moreover, all
3
See Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2000);
Coalition for ICANN Transparency Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 771 F.
Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Doran v. Del Taco, Inc., No. 04-
046, 2006 WL 2037942 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2006); Brother v. CPL
Investments, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2004);
Brother v. Rossmore Tampa L.P., No. 03-1253, 2004 WL 3609350(M.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2004); Clark v. McDonald's Corp., 213 F.R.D.
198 (D.N.J. 2003); Ass’n for Disabled Americans, Inc., v.
Claypool Holdings LLC, No. 00-0344, 2001 WL 1112109 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 6, 2001); Moyer v. Walt Disney World Co., 146 F. Supp. 2d
1249 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
4
Arcade appropriately acknowledges in its brief a case from
the District of Maryland, which involved a procedural history
analogous to the present case and supports Daniels’ argument.
See Equal Rights Ctr. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 767 F. Supp.
2d 510 (D. Md. 2010). The district court held in Abercrombie
that a plaintiff who was not a party to the original complaint,
but who joined the case upon the filing of an amended complaint
in which she asserted injuries that occurred between the filing
of the original and amended complaints, had standing to pursue
her claims. See id. at 515. The court relied on our decision
in Young, as discussed above. See id.14
but one of these cases was decided before the Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Rockwell International Corp. v. United
States, in which the Court stated that “when a plaintiff files a
complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the
complaint, courts look to the amended complaint to determine
jurisdiction.” 549 U.S. 457, 473-74 (2007). Accordingly, even
if Daniels had not visited the Market until the period between
the filing of the original complaint and when he became a party
to this case by way of the amended complaint, Daniels had
standing to pursue, and the district court had jurisdiction to
adjudicate, the claims alleged in the amended complaint.
B.
We next address Daniels’ argument that the district court
erred in holding that Daniels’ alleged injuries were not fairly
traceable to Arcade. In reaching this conclusion, the district
court stated that Prugh’s affidavit attested that “Arcade does
not, in fact, own, lease or operate” the Market. Upon our
examination of the affidavit, however, we conclude that the
district court’s construction of the affidavit’s content is
unwarranted.
In the affidavit, Prugh stated that “Arcade owns the
building located at 403, 421 and 423 West Lexington Street” in
Baltimore. Prugh further attested that “Arcade does not own or
15
lease 400 West Lexington Street[,] [n]or does it operate the
property commonly known as Lexington Market.” We agree with
Daniels’ contention that these statements are “artfully worded,”
and do not serve to disclaim Arcade’s potential ownership
interest in the Market, or Arcade’s potential operating interest
in the buildings that comprise the Market but which do not have
a street address of 400 West Lexington Street.
Additionally, Prugh’s affidavit establishes that Arcade
does in fact own the “building” located at 403, 421, and 423
West Lexington Street. Although the mailing address and main
entrance of Lexington Market is listed as “400 West Lexington
Street,” there remains a dispute concerning whether the 403,
421, and 423 West Lexington Street addresses comprise a portion
of the Market.5 Daniels’ injury could be traceable to Arcade,
potentially rendering it liable under the ADA, if Arcade has any
ownership or business interest in at least a part of the Market.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of disability by anyone who “owns, leases (or leases to),
or operates a place of public accommodation”).
For these reasons, Prugh’s affidavit does not resolve the
dispute concerning Arcade’s legal relationship to the Market.
5
The amended complaint alleged that the Market was located
“between N. Eutaw St., Marion St., W. Lexington St., N. Greene
St., and W. Saratoga St.”
16
Accordingly, the district court erred in holding that Daniels
lacked standing on the basis of his purported failure to allege
adequately in the amended complaint that his injury was fairly
traceable to Arcade’s actions.
III.
In conclusion, we hold that the district court erred in
determining that Daniels lacked standing to pursue his claims
against Arcade. Upon evaluating the amended complaint for
purposes of Arcade’s motion to dismiss, we conclude that Daniels
sufficiently alleged an “injury in fact” that was “fairly
traceable” to Arcade’s actions. Accordingly, we vacate the
district court’s decision granting Arcade’s motion to dismiss,
and we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
17