State of Minnesota v. Jeffray Leallen Walker ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1240
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Jeffray Leallen Walker,
Appellant.
Filed July 5, 2016
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-14-7764
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; Melissa
Sheridan, Assistant Public Defender, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Jeffray Leallen Walker and three other men conducted a violent, nighttime home
invasion during which they robbed and assaulted a family of four at gunpoint. A Ramsey
County jury found Walker guilty of 15 counts of burglary, criminal sexual conduct,
robbery, kidnapping, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced
him to 360 months of imprisonment. We conclude that the district court did not err by
admitting Spreigl evidence and, therefore, affirm.
FACTS
In 2014, A.S. and J.S. lived with their two children, a 13-year-old boy and a 2-year-
old girl, in a two-story home in St. Paul. During that year, they twice experienced a
nighttime home invasion.
The first home invasion occurred in the early morning hours of May 6, 2014. At
approximately 2:00 a.m., as J.S. returned home from grocery shopping, three men attacked
him, pistol-whipped him, and dragged him inside his home. The intruders demanded
money; J.S. gave them the money in his pockets and gave them his cell phone. While J.S.
was held at gunpoint, one of the intruders went into a first-floor bedroom, where A.S. was
sleeping. The intruder, who was armed, ordered A.S. to get out of bed and to expose her
breasts. The intruder brought A.S. to the living room, where another intruder held A.S.
and J.S. at gunpoint while other intruders searched the house. At the time, neither J.S. nor
A.S. recognized any of the intruders. An investigation followed, but no charges were filed.
The second home invasion occurred in the early morning hours of October 8, 2014.
A.S. was sleeping in a first-floor bedroom, and J.S. was sleeping on a couch in the living
room. Four men, later identified as Walker, Sebastian Jackson, Jonathan Lira-Solis, and
Jose Dominguez, entered the home through a basement window and confronted J.S. in the
living room, demanding money and drugs. At least two of the intruders were armed. After
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taking the money in J.S.’s pockets and his cell phone, the intruders punched J.S., kicked
him, pistol-whipped him, threw hot wax on him, stabbed his legs with kitchen knives, and
Tased him.
Two of the intruders, later identified as Walker and Jackson, went into the first-floor
bedroom where A.S. had been sleeping. Walker, who was armed, wore a red mask and a
black hooded sweatshirt. Jackson left the room at Walker’s request. Walker turned on the
light and locked the door. Walker pointed his pistol at A.S. and ordered her to expose her
breasts. He also said, “Suck my dick.” A.S. complied with Walker’s demand until Jackson
knocked on the door. Walker opened the door and ordered A.S. to crawl to the living room.
In the living room, she saw other intruders assault J.S. The intruders threatened to kill
someone if J.S. or A.S. called the police. One of the intruders brought the two-year-old
girl downstairs to the living room. One of the intruders threatened to kill the girl if A.S.
did not stop her crying. The intruders also brought the 13-year-old boy into the living
room, made him lie on the floor, kicked him, and pointed a gun at him. The intruders told
A.S. to take the girl to the first-floor bedroom. A.S. locked the door to the bedroom,
barricaded the door with her dresser, opened her bedroom window, and screamed for help.
Jackson kicked in the door, closed the window, and fired his pistol at the dresser. Walker
entered the room and fired two gunshots into the ceiling. At some point, A.S. saw Walker
without a mask on.
The intruders left the house, taking with them many items, including consumer
electronics, a firearm, and cell phones. After the intruders left, A.S. called 911. A.S. told
the 911 dispatcher that the same men had done the same thing to them in May. J.S. told
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two police officers that one of the intruders was Walker, whom J.S. recognized, despite the
mask, because they had grown up in the same neighborhood. Later that morning, A.S. had
a sexual-assault examination during which her mouth and hands were swabbed. DNA
testing was inconclusive.
In October 2014, the state charged Walker with seven offenses: (1) first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(c) (2014); (2) first-
degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d); (3) aiding
and abetting first-degree burglary with a dangerous weapon, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.582, subd. 1(b) (2014); (4) aiding and abetting first-degree burglary
(based on the assault of J.S.), in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.582,
subd. 1(c); (5) aiding and abetting first-degree burglary (based on the assault of the 13-
year-old boy), in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.582, subd. 1(c); (6) aiding
and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery of A.S., in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05,
subd. 1, 609.245, subd. 1 (2014); and (7) aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated
robbery of J.S., in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.245, subd. 1.
The state later amended the complaint to allege eight additional offenses: (8) a
second count of aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery of J.S., in violation of
Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.245, subd. 1, (9) aiding and abetting first-degree
aggravated robbery of the 13-year-old boy, in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1,
609.245, subd. 1; (10) a second count of aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated
robbery of the 13-year-old boy, in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.245,
subd. 1; (11) possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, in violation of Minn. Stat.
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§ 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2014); (12) aiding and abetting kidnapping of A.S., in violation of
Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.25, subd. 1(2) (2014); (13) aiding and abetting
kidnapping of J.S., in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.25, subd. 1(2);
(14) aiding and abetting kidnapping of the 13-year-old boy, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.25, subd. 1(2); and (15) aiding and abetting kidnapping of the two-
year-old girl, in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.25, subd. 1(2).
In January 2015, the state gave notice of its intent to offer Spreigl evidence
concerning four incidents of prior bad acts, including the first home invasion. The state
later revised its notice by limiting its Spreigl evidence to the first home invasion. In
February 2015, Walker moved to suppress the evidence of the first home invasion. At a
pretrial hearing, the state submitted a packet of exhibits that includes, among other things,
numerous police reports relating to both the first and second home invasions, which in turn
include statements given by A.S., J.S., and Jackson. The packet also includes a transcript
of Jackson’s plea hearing, in which he admitted that he was in A.S.’s and J.S.’s home with
Walker during the first home invasion. The district court denied Walker’s motion to
suppress evidence of the first home invasion. The district court found that the evidence
was offered to prove Walker’s identity and a common scheme, that the state established by
clear and convincing evidence that the evidence is true, and that the potential for unfair
prejudice “was significantly less than the probative value of the evidence.” The district
court proposed a cautionary instruction concerning the Spreigl evidence, to which neither
party objected.
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At trial in February 2015, the state called 16 witnesses, including A.S., J.S., and
their 13-year-old son. A.S. testified that she had seen at least one intruder’s face during
the first home invasion. She testified that, during the second home invasion, she recognized
the voice of the man wearing the red mask who ordered her to expose her breasts and forced
her to engage in fellatio as the same man who ordered her to expose her breasts during the
first home invasion. J.S. testified that he recognized Walker during the second home
invasion because they previously lived in the same neighborhood and because Walker got
very close to his face during the incident. J.S. also testified that one of the intruders said,
“We got you again. We were the ones that hit you before.”
Jackson testified for the state pursuant to a plea agreement. He provided details
about the second home invasion, including the logistics of entering the home, the threats
and violent acts, and the items stolen. In particular, he testified that Walker told him to
leave him alone with A.S. in her bedroom. Jackson testified that, after he knocked on the
door, A.S. crawled out of the bedroom, followed by Walker.
Sergeant Sheila Lambie testified about her investigation of the second home
invasion, including her interview of A.S. Sergeant Lambie testified that A.S. identified
Walker’s photograph in a photo array as the man who told her to expose her breasts during
the first home invasion and the man who sexually assaulted her during the second home
invasion. Sergeant Lambie also testified about her pre-trial interview of Walker. She
testified that Walker admitted to participating in the second home invasion with Jackson,
Lira-Solis, and Dominguez, and admitted to possessing several firearms, including a pistol,
and shooting twice into the bedroom ceiling. Walker also admitted to Sergeant Lambie
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that he wore a red mask and was the only intruder wearing a mask. Walker denied to
Sergeant Lambie that he sexually assaulted A.S. and stated that Lira-Solis was the intruder
who entered her bedroom and sexually assaulted her. Sergeant Lambie’s interview was
audio-recorded, and several excerpts were played during trial, and the jury also was given
a written transcript of those excerpts.
Walker did not offer any evidence. The jury found Walker guilty on all counts. In
May 2015, the district court imposed a sentence of 360 months of imprisonment on count
1 and imposed lesser, concurrent sentences on counts 4, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. Walker
appeals.
DECISION
Walker argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence of the first home
invasion as Spreigl evidence. Walker’s argument has two main parts. First, he argues that
the state did not prove the truthfulness of its Spreigl evidence by clear and convincing
evidence. Second, he argues that the probative value of the state’s Spreigl evidence is
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.
Walker’s argument is governed by a rule of evidence that states, in relevant part:
Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident. In a criminal prosecution, such evidence shall not
be admitted unless . . . the other crime, wrong, or act and the
participation in it by a relevant person are proven by clear and
convincing evidence . . . .
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Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence of other crimes or bad acts also may be admissible to
prove a common scheme. State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998). Evidence
of other crimes or bad acts is known in Minnesota as “Spreigl evidence.” Id. (citing State
v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965)). A district court must apply a five-
part test to determine whether Spreigl evidence is admissible:
(1) the prosecutor gives notice of its intent to admit the
evidence consistent with the Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(2) the prosecutor clearly indicates what the evidence will be
offered to prove; (3) the other crime, wrong, or act and the
participation in it by a relevant person are proven by clear and
convincing evidence; (4) the evidence is relevant to the
prosecutor’s case; and (5) the probative value of the evidence
is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice to the
defendant.
Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); see also State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Minn. 2006). This
court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s admission of
Spreigl evidence. State v. Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 345 (Minn. 2007).
In this case, there is no dispute that the state gave notice of its intent to offer Spreigl
evidence and that the evidence is relevant to Walker’s identity and to the existence of a
common scheme. Walker challenges the admission of the state’s Spreigl evidence under
the third and fifth parts of the five-part test.
A.
Walker first argues that the district court erred by finding that the state proved the
truthfulness of its evidence of the first home invasion by clear and convincing evidence. A
defendant’s prior bad acts are proved by clear and convincing evidence if it is “highly
probable that the facts sought to be admitted are truthful.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 686. The
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uncorroborated testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to satisfy the clear-and-
convincing standard. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d at 389.
The district court found that the evidence concerning the first home invasion was
proved by clear and convincing evidence. In making that finding, the district court relied
on police reports of both the first home invasion and the second home invasion, a statement
A.S. made to police immediately following the second home invasion, statements Jackson
made during his plea hearing, and statements Jackson made when interviewed by a police
officer.
Walker contends that the district court’s finding is flawed because it is based in part
on A.S.’s identification of him during the second home invasion, which is the conduct for
which he was charged. Specifically, Walker contends, “A defendant’s presumption of
innocence is compromised if courts permit the state to prove a prior bad act incident with
evidence of the very offense the prior incident is offered to prove.” Walker does not cite
any authority in support of this contention. In the circumstances of this case, A.S.’s
statement to a police officer that Walker participated in the first home invasion is explained
by the fact that it was not until the second home invasion that she recognized Walker, by
both his voice and his face. A.S.’s statement to a police officer is not an improper basis
for the district court’s clear-and-convincing finding merely because her statement is based
in part on her observations during the second home invasion. Furthermore, the district
court’s clear-and-convincing finding also is based on Jackson’s pre-trial statement to a
police officer and his admission at his plea hearing that he and Walker were at A.S.’s and
J.S.’s home during the first home invasion. Walker does not contend that Jackson’s
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statements cannot be relied on for purposes of the district court’s Spreigl analysis.
Jackson’s statements, which corroborate A.S.’s statements, would be sufficient by
themselves to prove Walker’s involvement in the first home invasion by clear and
convincing evidence.
Thus, the district court did not err by finding that the state proved the truthfulness
of its Spreigl evidence by clear and convincing evidence.
B.
Walker also argues that the district court erred by determining that the probative
value of the state’s Spreigl evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.
Spreigl evidence is admissible only if “the probative value of the evidence is not
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).
Evidence may give rise to “unfair prejudice” if the evidence “lure[s] the factfinder into
declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.” State v.
Smith, 749 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted). “Spreigl evidence may
be relevant and material to show the identity of the perpetrator if identity is at issue and if
there is a sufficient ‘time, place, or modus operandi nexus’ between the charged offense
and the Spreigl offense.” State v. Wright, 719 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn. 2006) (quoting
State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 612 (Minn. 2004)). If identity is at issue, Spreigl evidence
is “admissible only if the trial court finds the direct or circumstantial evidence of
defendant’s identity is otherwise weak or inadequate, and that it is necessary to support the
state’s burden of proof.” State v. Lynch, 590 N.W.2d 75, 81 (Minn. 1999) (quotation
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omitted). Spreigl evidence has probative value if it has a sufficiently close relationship to
the charged offense. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d at 390.
In this case, the state’s Spreigl evidence has a very close relationship to the charged
offense. The district court noted that, in both the first and the second home invasions, the
invaders entered at nighttime, wore masks to conceal their identity, used firearms, pistol-
whipped the residents and forced them to lie on the floor, and entered a bedroom and
demanded that A.S. expose her breasts. The unusually close similarity between the first
home invasion and the second home invasion establishes a high degree of probative value.
See Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 688; Blom, 682 N.W.2d at 612.
Walker nonetheless contends that the potential for undue prejudice outweighs the
probative value on the ground that the state did not need the Spreigl evidence to prove its
case. In weighing probative value and the potential for undue prejudice, a district court
may consider the state’s need for the evidence. Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 690. In this case, the
admission of the state’s Spreigl evidence is justified by the fact that Walker’s identity was
the central issue at trial. A.S. was not acquainted with Walker, who was masked during
most of the second home invasion. Jackson’s incriminating testimony was of uncertain
value because of attacks on his credibility. The state’s forensic evidence of the sexual
assault was inconclusive. In closing argument, Walker’s trial counsel suggested that
Walker simply was not present during either the first or the second home invasion. Because
Walker’s identity was important and contested, the state’s Spreigl evidence was necessary
to support the state’s case. See State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008) (affirming
admission of Spreigl evidence in part because identity was central issue and other evidence
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was not dispositive); Blom, 682 N.W.2d at 613 (affirming admission of Spreigl evidence
in part because identity was at issue and physical evidence was lacking).
Walker further contends that the district court erred by not limiting the scope of the
state’s Spreigl evidence. This contention is inconsistent with the record. As the state
contends, the Spreigl evidence constitutes only 8 of the 87 pages of A.S.’s testimony, only
5 of the 44 pages of J.S.’s testimony, only 2 of the 28 pages of Sergeant Lambie’s
testimony, and none of Jackson’s testimony. Furthermore, the potential for undue
prejudice was reduced by the district court’s cautionary instruction. See Kennedy, 585
N.W.2d at 392 (concluding that cautionary instructions lessened probability of undue
prejudice of Spreigl evidence).
In sum, the district court did not err by admitting the state’s Spreigl evidence
concerning the first home invasion.
Affirmed.
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