Albert Burgess, Jr. v. Angela Dunbar , 628 F. App'x 175 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6622
ALBERT CHARLES BURGESS, JR.,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
ANGELA DUNBAR, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:13-hc-02177-BO)
Submitted: September 28, 2015 Decided: October 8, 2015
Before KING, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Albert Charles Burgess, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Michael
Bredenberg, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Thomas
Gray Walker, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Albert Charles Burgess, Jr., a federal prisoner, appeals
from the district court’s orders granting summary judgment to
Respondent and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012)
petition challenging a prison disciplinary conviction and
denying his motion to reconsider, confining his appeal to the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to Respondent on the
basis that any claim for a due process violation in this case
was without merit. We affirm.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s award of
summary judgment. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 873
(4th Cir. 2013). An award of summary judgment is appropriate
“only if the record shows ‘that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
The relevant inquiry on summary judgment is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Additionally, this
court may affirm on any ground presented in the record, even if
it was not the basis on which the district court relied in
awarding summary judgment. Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc.,
288 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2002).
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Because Burgess’s disciplinary conviction resulted in the
loss of good-conduct credit, he was entitled to the following
for the minimum requirements of procedural due process to be
satisfied: (1) written notice of the claimed violation at least
24 hours prior to the disciplinary hearing; (2) a written
statement by the adjudicator as to the evidence relied upon and
the reasons for the disciplinary action; and (3) the right to
call witnesses and present evidence, when doing so would not be
“unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional
goals.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974).
We conclude after review of the record that the district
court did not reversibly err in granting summary judgment to
Respondent. Burgess did not claim a denial of written notice of
the claimed disciplinary violation or a failure to provide him
with a written statement by the adjudicator as to the evidence
relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken
against him. Additionally, given Burgess’s lack of evidence
regarding: the witnesses he would have called at the
disciplinary hearing, the content of their testimony, and the
nature of any non-testimonial evidence he would have presented,
his claim challenging Respondent’s alleged denial of his right
to call witnesses and present evidence provides no basis for
vacating the district court’s judgment. See Hallmark v.
Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073, 1080 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that the
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“prerequisite” to issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a
showing of prejudice as a result of an alleged constitutional
violation).
Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, we affirm the district court’s orders. Burgess v.
Dunbar, No. 5:13-hc-02177-BO (E.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 2014 & Apr. 1,
2015). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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