Nielsen Contracting, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc. ( 2018 )


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  • Filed 5/23/18 (unmodified opn. attached)
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    NIELSEN CONTRACTING, INC. et al.,                    D072393
    Plaintiffs and Respondents,
    (Super. Ct. No.
    v.                                          37-2017-00001814-CU-CO-CTL)
    APPLIED UNDERWRITERS, INC. et al.,                   ORDER DENYING REHEARING
    AND MODIFYING OPINION
    Defendants and Appellants.
    NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
    THE COURT:
    It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on May 3, 2018, be modified as follows:
    1. On page 5, following the third sentence of the first full paragraph and before
    footnote 3, the following two sentences are added:
    This agreement was subject to certain exceptions, including that (1)
    CIC was permitted to renew a policy "issued in connection with an
    RPA in force as of July 1, 2016"; and (2) AUCRA could issue or
    renew an RPA if Shasta Linen's rulings were successfully challenged
    in a court proceeding. Additionally, the parties agreed that
    arbitrations under "an in-force RPA or a past RPA entered into or
    issued in California will take place in California."
    3. On page 25, following the second sentence of the first full paragraph, add as
    footnote 4 the following footnote, which will require renumbering of all subsequent
    footnotes:
    Defendants maintain we should not consider Shasta Linen because
    its decision was "undermined" by the Stipulated Cease and Desist
    order. This argument is unsupported. The stipulation reaffirms
    Shasta Linen's ruling that AUCRA may not issue or renew RPAs
    absent compliance with the administrative filing requirements set
    forth in sections 11658 and 11735. The parties' agreement as to
    certain limited exceptions to this rule and to conduct any arbitrations
    in California does not undercut Shasta Linen's reasoning. The
    administrative decision is relevant to our analysis because we have
    found its reasoning persuasive, not because we are legally bound by
    its conclusions.
    There is no change in the judgment.
    The petition for rehearing is denied.
    McCONNELL, P. J.
    Copies to: All parties
    2
    Filed 5/3/18 (unmodified version)
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    NIELSEN CONTRACTING, INC. et al.,                   D072393
    Plaintiffs and Respondents,
    v.                                         (Super. Ct. No.
    37-2017-00001814-CU-CO-CTL)
    APPLIED UNDERWRITERS, INC. et al.,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Gregory
    W. Pollack, Judge. Affirmed.
    Hinshaw & Culbertson, Spencer Y. Kook and Travis Wall for Defendants and
    Appellants.
    Larry J. Lichtenegger for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
    Nielsen Contracting, Inc. and T&M Framing, Inc. (collectively Nielsen) sued
    several entities (defendants) alleging these entities fraudulently provided workers'
    compensation policies to Nielsen that were illegal and contained unconscionable terms.
    Defendants moved to compel arbitration and stay the litigation under an arbitration
    provision in one defendant's contract, titled Reinsurance Participation Agreement
    (RPA). Nielsen opposed the motion, asserting the arbitration provision and the
    provision's delegation clause were unlawful and void. After briefing and a hearing, the
    trial court agreed and denied defendants' motion.
    Defendants appeal. They contend: (1) the arbitrator, and not the court, should
    decide the validity of the RPA's arbitration agreement under the agreement's delegation
    clause; and (2) if the court properly determined it was the appropriate entity to decide
    the validity of the delegation and arbitration provisions, the court erred in concluding
    these provisions are not enforceable. We reject these contentions and affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
    We summarize the facts based on the complaint's allegations, and the materials
    submitted in support of and opposition to the motion to compel arbitration. We describe
    only those facts necessary to resolve the issues pertaining to the arbitration issue, and
    make no attempt to discuss all of the facts relevant to Nielsen's substantive allegations
    against defendants.
    Background
    In 2012, Applied Underwriters, Inc. (Applied) provided quotes to Nielsen for
    Applied's patented workers' compensation program known as "EquityComp." Based on
    Applied's representations about the program's low cost and profit-sharing benefits,
    Nielsen signed a "Request to Bind" with Applied. Under this agreement, Nielsen was
    2
    initially issued a guaranteed-cost workers' compensation policy by California Insurance
    Company (CIC), one of Applied's subsidiaries.
    The Request to Bind also required Nielsen to sign a separate agreement (the
    RPA) with another one of Applied's subsidiaries, Applied Underwriters Captive Risk
    Assurance Company, Inc. (AUCRA). Nielsen and AUCRA signed the RPA in
    December 2012. The RPA had a three-year term.
    The RPA modified and supplanted many of the CIC policy terms, including
    adding an arbitration provision. As discussed in more detail below, this provision
    required arbitration of "[a]ny dispute or controversy" in the British Virgin Islands before
    "disinterested officials of insurance or reinsurance companies." The arbitration
    provision delegated to the arbitrator the authority to rule on disputes concerning the
    enforceability of the arbitration provision. This is known as a "delegation clause."
    Complaint
    In January 2017, Nielsen filed a complaint against Applied and its two
    subsidiaries (AUCRA and CIC) (collectively defendants). Nielsen sought a declaration
    that the RPA is void and its provisions are unconscionable, and sought damages for
    defendants' misrepresentations and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing. Nielsen alleged the RPA is an adhesion contract with unfair and
    unconscionable terms; the RPA was written and structured to purposely mislead Nielsen
    and to intentionally avoid and circumvent California insurance laws; and the RPA is an
    illegal contract because it was not filed with or approved by the California Department
    3
    of Insurance (Insurance Department), as required by Insurance Code section 11658 and
    title 10 of the California Code of Regulations section 2268.1 Nielsen alleged
    "EquityComp is the brainchild of Applied," which caused CIC to issue an approved
    guaranteed-cost workers' compensation insurance policy "to give the appearance of
    compliance with the California insurance regulations, although CIC is never responsible
    for making payment on claims using its own money."
    Several months before this complaint was filed, in June 2016, the California
    Insurance Commissioner (Insurance Commissioner) issued an administrative decision in
    a case involving a different insured (Shasta Linen Supply, Inc.) that had challenged the
    same EquityComp insurance program offered by these same defendants. (Matter of
    Shasta Linen Supply, Inc., Decision & Order, dated June 20, 2016, File No. AHB-
    WCA-14-31 (Shasta Linen).) In the 70-page decision, the Insurance Commissioner
    found the RPA to be unlawful and void as a matter of law for various reasons, including
    that it had not been filed and approved by the Insurance Department before it was
    issued. (Ibid.) In reaching this conclusion, the Insurance Commissioner also found the
    governing administrative regulations require workers' compensation insurers to obtain
    approvals for "side agreements," including arbitration provisions that differ from the
    1      Further unspecified statutory references are to the Insurance Code. Further
    references to Regulations sections are to title 10 of the California Code of Regulations.
    Unless otherwise stated, all references to Regulations section 2268 are to the version
    existing in 2012 when the parties signed the RPA.
    4
    dispute resolution provisions in a previously approved insurance policy. (Id. at p. 43;
    See Regs., § 2268.)
    Two months after the Shasta Linen administrative decision was issued, the
    Insurance Department entered into a stipulated cease-and-desist order with Applied,
    CIC, and AUCRA. In this stipulation, defendants stated they disagreed with the Shasta
    Linen administrative decision, but acknowledged the decision "was made precedential"
    under Government Code section 11425.60, subdivision (b).2 Defendants also agreed it
    would not issue any new RPA or renew any existing RPA unless the policy is filed with
    and approved by the Insurance Department.3
    Motion to Compel Arbitration
    In response to Nielsen's complaint, AUCRA moved to compel arbitration under
    the RPA's lengthy arbitration provision. Of relevance here, the provision states:
    "(A) It is the express intention of the parties to resolve any disputes
    arising under this Agreement without resort to litigation in order to
    protect the confidentiality of their relationship and their respective
    business and affairs. Any dispute or controversy . . . arising out of
    2       This code section permits an administrative agency to designate a decision as
    "precedent" if the decision "contains a significant legal or policy determination of
    general application that is likely to recur." (Gov. Code, § 11425.60, subd. (b).) An
    administrative decision so designated can be relied upon by the agency in later cases.
    (Id., subd. (a).)
    3      We deny Nielsen's request that we take judicial notice of a later settlement
    agreement between defendants and the Insurance Department in which defendants
    agreed to dismiss their superior court writ petition challenging the Shasta Linen
    decision. This settlement agreement was not before the trial court, and therefore it is
    not properly before this court. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996)
    
    14 Cal. 4th 434
    , 444, fn. 3.)
    5
    or related to this Agreement shall be fully determined in the British
    Virgin Islands under the provisions of the American Arbitration
    Association [AAA].
    "(B) All disputes between the parties relating in any way to (1) the
    execution and delivery, construction or enforceability of this
    Agreement, (2) the management or operations of the Company, or
    (3) any other breach or claimed breach of this Agreement or the
    transactions contemplated herein shall be . . . finally determined
    exclusively by binding arbitration in accordance with the
    procedures provided herein. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
    "(D) . . . All arbitrators shall be active or retired, disinterested
    officials of insurance or reinsurance companies not under the
    control or management of either party to this Agreement and will
    not have personal or financial interests in the result of the
    arbitration. [¶] . . . [¶]
    "(G) . . . Judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrator or
    arbitrators may be entered by any court of competent jurisdiction in
    Nebraska or application may be made in such court for judicial
    acceptance of the award and an order of enforcement as the law of
    Nebraska may require or allow.
    "(H) The award of the arbitrator or arbitrators shall be binding and
    conclusive on the parties . . . .
    "(I) All arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in the English
    language in accordance with the rules of the [AAA] and shall take
    place in Tortola, British Virgin Islands or at some other location
    agreed to by the parties." (Italics added.)
    In seeking arbitration under these provisions, AUCRA argued the italicized
    language in paragraph (B) requiring arbitration of disputes concerning the
    "enforceability of this Agreement" was a delegation clause that gave the arbitrator the
    sole and exclusive authority to rule on challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration
    agreement. AUCRA presented evidence that the AAA rules likewise delegate to the
    6
    arbitrator the exclusive authority to rule on the arbitration clause's enforceability.
    AUCRA thus argued the court had no authority to rule on challenges to the
    enforceability of the arbitration agreement or its delegation clause.
    As explained in more detail below, AUCRA alternatively argued that if the court
    reached the arbitrability issues, the arbitration clause is valid and enforceable.
    Defendants Applied and CIC (not named parties in the RPA) joined in the
    motion to the extent AUCRA sought to stay the litigation pending the arbitration.
    Opposition to Motion to Compel
    In opposing the motion to compel arbitration, Nielsen argued that under settled
    authority a delegation clause is severable from the main contract and from the
    arbitration clause, and the court must first resolve challenges to the enforceability of the
    delegation clause if the party brings a specific challenge to the delegation clause. (See
    Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S 63 (Rent-A-Center).)
    Nielsen argued that its specific challenge to the delegation clause satisfied this
    test and therefore the court (and not the arbitrator) was required to rule on the
    enforceability of the delegation clause and the arbitration provision. In explaining this
    challenge, Nielsen argued that the RPA's arbitration provision and delegation clause
    materially changed the dispute resolution provisions in the approved CIC insurance
    policies, and therefore they were "collateral" agreements required to be filed with the
    Insurance Department under section 11658 and Regulations section 2268. Nielsen
    7
    maintained that by not filing these provisions with the Insurance Department, the
    provisions were void and unenforceable.
    Nielsen also presented evidence showing the RPA was "virtually identical" to the
    agreement found to be unlawful and void in the Shasta Linen administrative decision.
    Reply to Motion to Compel
    In reply, defendants argued that because Nielsen's illegality challenge was "not
    specific" to the arbitration provision or its delegation clause, and instead "implicates"
    the RPA "as a whole," the court must allow the arbitrator to decide if the delegation
    clause and arbitration agreement are enforceable. Defendants alternatively argued that
    even if the court were to consider Nielsen's challenge to the enforceability of the
    arbitration provisions (including the delegation provision), these provisions are
    enforceable under California law despite the failure to file them with the appropriate
    agency.
    Court's Ruling
    After a hearing, the court denied defendants' motion to compel. On the question
    whether the court has the authority to decide the enforceability of the delegation and
    arbitration clauses, the court stated that Nielsen was not merely derivatively challenging
    the legality of the main contract, but instead was asserting that "both the delegation
    provision and the arbitration provision are illegal and unenforceable separate and apart
    from the evident unenforceability of the entire RPA, albeit for the same reason, i.e.,
    failure to file with, and obtain approval from, the Insurance Commissioner."
    8
    On the merits, the court agreed with Nielsen that neither the delegation clause
    nor the arbitration requirement was enforceable. The court reasoned: "The delegation
    and arbitration provisions qualify as collateral agreements which modify the obligation
    of the underlying CIC policy that should have been attached to the original CIC policy
    as endorsements and filed with the Insurance Commissioner for approval. Because they
    were not filed and approved, they are unenforceable as a matter of law pursuant to
    [section] 11658 and [Regulations section] 2268."
    Defendants appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the trial court shall order parties to
    arbitrate "if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists . . . ."
    (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) "[T]he party seeking arbitration bears the burden of
    proving the existence of an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence,
    and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of
    the evidence any defense . . . ." (Peng v. First Republic Bank (2013) 
    219 Cal. App. 4th 1462
    , 1468.) In evaluating an order denying a motion to compel arbitration, " ' "we
    review the arbitration agreement de novo to determine whether it is legally enforceable,
    applying general principles of California contract law." ' " (Carmona v. Lincoln
    Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 
    226 Cal. App. 4th 74
    , 82.) If the trial court resolved
    contested facts, we "review the court's factual determinations for substantial evidence."
    (Ibid.)
    9
    The parties agree the RPA is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
    which provides that a contractual arbitration provision "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
    enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
    any contract." (9 U.S.C. § 2.) The FAA " 'declare[s] a national policy favoring
    arbitration' of claims that parties contract to settle in that manner." (Preston v. Ferrer
    (2008) 
    552 U.S. 346
    , 353 (Preston).) Arbitration is a matter of contract, and "parties
    are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit." (Volt Info.
    Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. University (1989) 
    489 U.S. 468
    , 479.) However, under
    the FAA's savings clause, an arbitration agreement is not enforceable if a party
    establishes a state law contract defense, such as fraud, duress, unconscionability, or
    illegality. (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 
    563 U.S. 333
    , 339; Poublon v.
    C.H. Robinson Co. (9th Cir. 2017) 
    846 F.3d 1251
    , 1259; see McGill v. Citibank, N.A.
    (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 962.) Although arbitration agreements cannot be "invalidated 'by
    defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an
    agreement to arbitrate is at issue,' " the enforceability of the agreement remains subject
    to defenses applicable to all other contracts. (McGill, at p. 962.)
    Under these general principles, we consider defendants' contentions that the trial
    court erred in concluding (1) the court, and not the arbitrator, decides the enforceability
    of the delegation clause and arbitration agreement; and (2) the unfiled delegation and
    arbitration agreements were unlawful and therefore unenforceable.
    10
    I. "Who Decides": Enforceability of Delegation Clause
    The parties agree the delegation clause expresses the parties' clear intent to
    delegate the issue of the enforceability of the arbitration clause to the arbitrator, but that
    applicable law requires courts to rule on specific challenges to the enforceability of
    delegation clauses before compelling the matter to arbitration. They disagree as to
    whether Nielsen raised an adequate challenge to the enforceability of the delegation
    clause to require judicial resolution of the challenge.
    We conclude the court properly found Nielsen's challenge to the delegation
    clause was sufficient to require the court to rule on the question of the enforceability of
    the delegation clause. To explain this conclusion, it is helpful to understand the general
    rules pertaining to the "who decides" issue, and the United States Supreme Court's view
    that a delegation clause, an arbitration agreement, and the underlying agreement are
    each evaluated—for purposes of applying the FAA—as severable contracts. (Rent-A-
    
    Center, supra
    , 561 U.S. at pp. 70-72.)
    A. Legal Principles
    It has long been settled that when parties have agreed to arbitration, challenges to
    the validity of the underlying contract, including contract defenses such as fraud in the
    inducement or illegality, are for the arbitrator to decide. 
    (Preston, supra
    , 552 U.S. at p.
    353; Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc, v. Cardegna (2006) 
    546 U.S. 440
    , 443-445
    (Buckeye); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. (1967) 
    388 U.S. 395
    , 402-
    403 (Prima Paint).) This is because the arbitration clause is viewed as separate from
    11
    the underlying contract. (Buckeye, at pp. 445-446.) Thus, allegations that the main
    contract is unlawful or unconscionable does not affect the enforceability of the
    arbitration clause. (Ibid.)
    However, challenges to the validity of the arbitration clause itself are generally
    resolved by the court in the first instance. (Rent-A-
    Center, supra
    , 561 U.S. at p. 71;
    
    Buckeye, supra
    , 546 U.S. at pp. 444-445; Prima 
    Paint, supra
    , 388 U.S. at pp. 403-404.)
    An exception to this rule applies when the parties have clearly and unmistakably agreed
    to delegate questions regarding the validity of the arbitration clause to the arbitrator.
    (Rent-A-Center, at pp. 68-69; Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880,
    891-892.) Such delegation clauses are generally enforceable according to their terms.
    (First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 
    514 U.S. 938
    , 944; Aanderud, at pp.
    891-892; Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2015) 
    238 Cal. App. 4th 227
    , 239.)
    In Rent-A-Center, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of
    who rules on a challenge to the enforceability of a delegation clause: does the court
    decide or does the arbitrator decide? (Rent-A-
    Center, supra
    , 561 US. at pp. 67-76.) The
    high court began this analysis by confirming that a delegation clause—nested within the
    larger arbitration agreement—must be viewed as an independent ("severable") contract.
    (Id. at pp. 70-71.) Thus, the court held that as with any independent contract, the court
    must resolve specific challenges to the delegation clause that are proper under section 2
    of the FAA, i.e., any "generally applicable contract defenses." (Rent-A-Center, at pp.
    68, 71.) "If a party challenges the validity under [FAA] § 2 of the precise agreement to
    12
    arbitrate at issue, the federal court must consider the challenge before ordering
    compliance with" the delegation clause. (Id. at p. 64.) Otherwise, courts would be
    treating the delegation clause on a ground that would " 'elevate it over other forms of
    contract,' " which is not permitted under the FAA. (Id. at p. 71.)
    But—consistent with its severability reasoning—the Rent-A-Center court made
    clear this rule requiring judicial consideration of contractual defenses to the
    enforceability of the delegation clause is triggered only if the challenge is "directed
    specifically to the agreement to arbitrate." (Rent-A-
    Center, supra
    , 561 U.S. at p. 71.)
    Thus, an argument that the arbitration agreement or the underlying contract is
    unenforceable is not sufficient to trigger the court's obligation to resolve contentions
    regarding the enforceability of a severable delegation clause. (Id. at pp. 71-76.)
    The facts of Rent-A-Center illustrate this principle. There, the plaintiff filed an
    employment discrimination suit against his former employer. (Rent-A-
    Center, supra
    ,
    561 U.S. at p. 65.) The employer responded by seeking arbitration based on an
    arbitration agreement that was separate from the underlying employment contract and
    contained a delegation clause. (Id. at pp. 65-66.) The employee opposed the motion,
    arguing the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. (Id. at p. 66.) But the employee
    challenged only the validity of the arbitration contract and never "even mention[ed] the
    delegation provision." (Id. at p. 72.) On this record, the United States Supreme Court
    found the arbitrator, and not the court, was to consider the enforceability of the
    delegation clause because the employee had not challenged the delegation provision.
    13
    (Id. at pp. 72-76.) The court reasoned that the delegation clause must be viewed as a
    separate agreement nested within the arbitration agreement, and unless the clause is
    directly challenged, the arbitrator must resolve all of the disputed issues. (Ibid.)
    Following Rent-A-Center, California courts have recognized that a court is the
    appropriate entity to resolve challenges to a delegation clause nested in an arbitration
    clause when a specific contract challenge is made to the delegation clause. (See, e.g.,
    Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 
    226 Cal. App. 4th 1551
    , 1559-1560 (Malone).) In
    Malone, the plaintiff challenged an employment contract and the delegation clause on
    grounds of unconscionability. (Id. at pp. 1556-1557.) The reviewing court held the
    unconscionability challenge to the delegation clause was for the court to resolve. (Id. at
    pp. 1559-1560.) However, after evaluating that challenge, the court held the
    unconscionability challenge to the delegation clause was without merit. (Id. at pp.
    1560-1571.) The court thus held the delegation clause was enforceable and the
    defendants' motion to compel arbitration should have been granted. (Id. at pp. 1570-
    1571.)
    B. Analysis
    Defendants contend the court erred in finding that Nielsen raised an adequate
    challenge to the enforceability of the delegation clause to require judicial resolution of
    the challenge. The contention is unsupported. Unlike the Rent-A-Center plaintiff and
    similar to the Malone plaintiff, Nielsen expressly raised contract challenges to the
    delegation clause. In opposing the motion to compel, Nielsen argued the delegation
    14
    clause was unenforceable because it constituted a material change to CIC's filed
    insurance policy (which contained no arbitration clause or delegation clause), and the
    RPA's delegation clause constituted an endorsement or collateral agreement that was
    required to be filed with the Insurance Department to be lawful and enforceable.
    Defendants countered by arguing California law does not require a delegation clause to
    be approved by the Insurance Department, and an unfiled arbitration provision and
    delegation clause remain lawful and enforceable. These issues relate specifically to the
    enforceability of the delegation clause, and thus under Rent-A-Center these issues are
    for the court to resolve.
    Relying on Rent-A-Center, defendants contend a court may rule on the
    enforceability of the delegation clause only if the plaintiff's challenge to the delegation
    clause is different from the plaintiff's challenge to the entire contract or to the entire
    arbitration agreement. This argument is not supported by Rent-A-Center's holding or
    logic. The high court's determination that a court should generally resolve specific state
    law contractual defenses to delegation clauses was based on its view that delegation
    clauses are separate and severable from the remainder of the arbitration agreement and
    the FAA requires that arbitration provisions be enforced in the same manner as other
    types of contractual provisions. (Rent-A-
    Center, supra
    , 561 U.S. at pp. 67, 70-71 [under
    the FAA courts must "place[] arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other
    contracts"].) If we were to accept defendants' argument that courts are precluded from
    ruling on specific contract defenses to a delegation clause merely because the same
    15
    defense is also brought to invalidate other related contractual provisions, we would be
    treating delegation clauses differently than other contractual clauses, a determination
    that would be inconsistent with the FAA, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
    Court.
    Rent-A-Center's discussion of the type of challenge that might have triggered
    court review supports our conclusion. In explaining that the plaintiff's
    unconscionability challenge specifically concerned only the validity of the contract as a
    whole, rather than the delegation provision, the high court noted that the plaintiff's
    "substantive unconscionability arguments assailed arbitration procedures called for by
    the [arbitration] contract—the fee-splitting arrangement and the limitations on
    discovery—procedures that were to be used during arbitration under both the agreement
    to arbitrate employment-related disputes and the delegation provision. It may be that
    had [the employee] challenged the delegation provision by arguing that these common
    procedures as applied to the delegation provision rendered that provision
    unconscionable, the challenge should have been considered by the court. To make such
    a claim based on the discovery procedures, [the employee] would have had to argue that
    the limitation upon the number of depositions causes the arbitration of his claim that the
    Agreement is unenforceable to be unconscionable. That would be, of course, a much
    more difficult argument to sustain than the argument that the same limitation renders
    arbitration of his factbound employment-discrimination claim unconscionable.
    Likewise, the unfairness of the fee-splitting arrangement may be more difficult to
    16
    establish for the arbitration of enforceability than for arbitration of more complex and
    fact-related aspects of the alleged employment discrimination. [The employee],
    however, did not make any arguments specific to the delegation provision; he argued
    that the fee-sharing and discovery procedures rendered the entire Agreement invalid."
    (Rent-A-
    Center, supra
    , 561 U.S. at p. 74.)
    This hypothetical—that if the plaintiff had directed the unconscionability
    challenges (the unfairness of the discovery limitations and the fee-splitting
    requirements) against the delegation clause in addition to asserting the same
    unconscionability challenge against the arbitration agreement itself, the "challenge [to
    the delegation clause] should have been considered by the court"—illustrates that the
    focus of the court's attention must be on whether the particular challenge is directed at
    the delegation clause, not whether the same challenges are also directed at the
    agreement or agreements into which the delegation clause is embedded or nested.
    (Rent-A-
    Center, supra
    , 561 U.S. at p. 74.) Under Rent-A-Center's reasoning, whether
    the challenge is the same as or different from the challenge to other provisions of the
    arbitration clause or underlying agreement is not dispositive of whether the challenge is
    specifically directed at the delegation clause. (See 
    Malone, supra
    , 226 Cal.App.4th at
    pp. 1559-1560.)
    We find unhelpful defendants' reliance on Justice Paul Steven's dissenting
    opinion to support their interpretation. (Rent-A-
    Center, supra
    , 561 U.S. at pp. 76-88
    (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's view that a
    17
    court can "pluck" a delegation clause from a potentially invalid or illegal arbitration
    clause, and enforce the delegation clause despite the alleged invalidity of the arbitration
    provision in which it is nested. (Id. at pp. 85, 86-87.) In explaining this objection,
    Justice Stevens suggested that under the majority opinion, "A claim that an entire
    arbitration agreement is invalid will not go to the court unless the party challenges the
    particular sentences that delegate such claims to the arbitrator, on some contract ground
    that is particular and unique to those sentences." (Id. at p. 86, third italics added.)
    Viewed in context, this "particular and unique" observation does not support that
    a challenge to the delegation clause cannot be the same as the challenge to the
    arbitration agreement. Justice Stevens was emphasizing the majority's view (with
    which he disagreed) that the objection must be directed to the delegation clause and not
    to the larger arbitration provisions into which it is nested, and did not consider
    circumstances when a party makes the same or similar challenge to the delegation and
    arbitration clause. Moreover, a dissenting opinion's interpretation of a majority opinion
    is not binding, and its validity is particularly questionable when, as here, it is based on
    an expansive reading of the majority opinion beyond the particular holding of the case.
    Recently, a federal court held the court was the proper entity to resolve
    challenges to a delegation clause in a similar RPA. (See Minnieland Private Day
    School, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co. (4th Cir. 2017) 
    867 F.3d 449
    (Minnieland).) In Minnieland, a daycare center sued AUCRA, asserting that
    the " 'Equity Comp' " program and the RPA "constituted an unlawful 'attempt to
    18
    circumvent' various Virginia laws related to insurance and workers' compensation." (Id.
    at pp. 451, 452.) In response to AUCRA's motion to compel arbitration under an
    arbitration provision and delegation clause essentially identical to the provision here,
    Minnieland argued that Virginia law "rendered void 'any' arbitration provision in the
    RPA" (including the delegation clause) and therefore the court must determine the
    enforceability of the delegation clause and the arbitration provision. (Id. at p. 453.) The
    district court agreed, and refused to enforce the delegation clause. (Ibid.)
    The Fourth Circuit affirmed, reasoning:
    "Rent-A-Center makes clear . . . that '[i]f a party challenges the
    validity under § 2 of the precise agreement to arbitrate at issue, the
    federal court must consider the challenge before ordering
    compliance with that agreement . . . .' [¶] . . . [¶]
    "[AUCRA] argues that Minnieland, like the plaintiff in Rent-A-
    Center, failed to specifically challenge the delegation provision in
    the RPA. But before the district court, Minnieland argued that
    [Virginia law] rendered void 'any' arbitration provision in the RPA
    [citation], necessarily including the delegation provision, which is
    simply 'an additional, antecedent agreement' to arbitrate [citations].'
    And to avoid any doubt that its challenge to the enforceability of
    the arbitration agreements in the RPA extended to the delegation
    provision, Minnieland expressly asserted that under [a Virginia
    statute], 'the court must resolve the validity of the arbitration
    provision,' an argument relevant only to the enforceability of the
    delegation provision. [Citation.] Accordingly, Minnieland
    'challenged the validity of that delegation with sufficient force and
    specificity' to satisfy Rent-A-Center." 
    (Minnieland, supra
    , 867
    F.3d at pp. 455-456.)
    In Minnieland, the specific challenge to the delegation clause was the same as the
    challenge to the arbitration clause as a whole, but this fact did not preclude the
    19
    reviewing court from upholding the district court's conclusion that it was the proper
    entity to rule on the enforceability of the delegation clause. (Ibid.)
    This case and Minnieland are factually distinguishable from the decisions relied
    upon by defendants. (See Matter of Monarch Consulting, Inc. v. National Union Fire
    Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (2016) 
    26 N.Y.3d 659
    (Monarch Consulting);
    Mike Rose's Auto Body, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company,
    Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 
    2016 WL 5407898
    ; South Jersey Sanitation Company, Inc. v.
    Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Inc. (3d Cir. 2016) 
    840 F.3d 138
    ; Milan Express Co., Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance
    Company, Inc. (6th Cir. 2014) 590 Fed. Appx. 482, 485-486.) Although these courts
    addressed the enforceability of the same (or similar) arbitration clause contained in the
    same (or similar) insurance contracts, the courts found the plaintiff-insured had not
    asserted a specific challenge to the delegation clause. (See, e.g., Monarch Consulting,
    at p. 676 ["a review of the record reveals that [the insured] did not specifically direct
    any challenge to the delegation clauses empowering the arbitrators to determine
    gateway questions of arbitrability," italics added]; Mike Rose's, at p. *9 [rejecting
    plaintiff-insured's argument that "the delegation provision cannot be enforced because
    the Agreements themselves are unlawful"; see also Milan Express, at pp. 485-486.)
    Defendants argue that a party cannot trigger a judicial determination on the
    enforceability of a delegation provision merely by labeling a challenge to the broader
    arbitration clause or the substantive contract as a challenge to the delegation provision.
    20
    They maintain "it is not enough simply to state that one is challenging" the delegation
    provision " 'if [the argument] is a subterfuge for a challenge that the entire agreement
    . . .' is unenforceable." We agree with these assertions. But the need for a careful
    inquiry regarding the nature of the party's challenge does not support a blanket rule that
    any time there is a similar challenge to the delegation clause and to other contractual
    provisions, a court must ignore its statutory obligation to rule on state law contract
    defenses specifically asserted against the enforceability of the delegation clause. (See
    
    Malone, supra
    , 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1559-1560.)
    In this case, the court found Nielsen asserted a specific, substantive challenge to
    the delegation clause separate from the challenge to the arbitration clause and the
    underlying contracts, and this challenge was not merely a device to challenge other
    provisions in the contract. The record supports this conclusion. The court thus properly
    found it was the proper entity to rule on Nielsen's challenges to the enforceability of the
    delegation clause.
    II. Enforceability of Delegation Clause and Arbitration Provision
    Defendants contend that assuming the court had the authority to decide the issue,
    the court erred in concluding Nielsen met its burden to show the delegation clause and
    arbitration provision were unenforceable. This contention is without merit. The court
    properly found these provisions were void and unenforceable because defendants had
    not filed these provisions with the Insurance Commissioner as required by section
    11658 and Regulations section 2268.
    21
    A. Applicable Law
    Section 11658 states in relevant part:
    "(a) A workers' compensation insurance policy or endorsement
    shall not be issued by an insurer to any person in this state unless
    the insurer files a copy of the form or endorsement with [the
    Workers Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau] . . . and 30 days
    have expired from the date the form or endorsement is received by
    the commissioner from the rating organization . . . , unless the
    commissioner gives written approval of the form or endorsement
    prior to that time.
    "(b) If the commissioner notifies the insurer that the filed form or
    endorsement does not comply with the requirements of law,
    specifying the reasons for his or her opinion, it is unlawful for the
    insurer to issue any policy or endorsement in that form." (Italics
    added.)
    At the time the RPA was executed, Regulations section 2268 provided: "No
    collateral agreements modifying the obligation of either the insured or the insurer shall
    be made unless attached to and made a part of the policy . . . ." (Italics added.) In 2016,
    this Regulations section was amended to delete the reference to "collateral agreements"
    and instead state: "An insurer shall not use a policy form, endorsement form, or
    ancillary agreement except those filed and approved by the Commissioner in
    accordance with these regulations." (Regs., § 2268, subd. (b), italics added.) The
    Regulations were also amended to define an "Ancillary agreement" to include a "dispute
    resolution agreement[]." (Regs., § 2250, subd. (f).)
    In this case, Applied (and/or its subsidiary) filed the CIC guaranteed-cost policies
    with the Insurance Commissioner and the Workers Compensation Insurance Rating
    Bureau (Rating Bureau). These policies did not require arbitration or contain a
    22
    delegation clause, and instead provided that the insured had the right to appeal CIC's
    classification and rating decisions to administrative agencies under applicable statutory
    procedures (§§ 11737, 11753.1).
    Shortly after, AUCRA (another one of Applied's wholly-owned subsidiaries)
    entered into the contractually-required RPA with Nielsen that changed many of the CIC
    policy terms, and for the first time included the broad arbitration provision requiring all
    disputes to be submitted to arbitration (including the enforceability of the arbitration
    clause), and arbitration proceedings to be conducted in the British Virgin Islands before
    "disinterested" insurance executives. The Insurance Commissioner had no opportunity
    to consider or evaluate these arbitration provisions.
    In Shasta Linen, the Insurance Commissioner found the RPA between Shasta
    Linen and AUCRA was a "collateral agreement" within the meaning of Regulations
    section 2268 because it modified and supplanted the terms of the CIC policies and
    therefore it should have been filed with, and approved by, the Insurance Department
    before it became effective. (Shasta Linen, at pp. 1, 46, 53, 58.) The Insurance
    Commissioner also found the failure to do so rendered the RPA void as a matter of law.
    (Id. at p. 65.) The Insurance Commissioner emphasized section 11658's mandatory
    language that an unfiled policy or endorsement " 'shall not be issued by an insurer' " and
    that "issuing an unapproved policy or endorsement 'is unlawful.' " (Shasta Linen, at p.
    65, italics added.)
    The Insurance Commissioner also observed:
    23
    "By its own admission [Applied] designed EquityComp and the
    RPA to circumvent workers' compensation policy. It would defeat
    the statutory purpose to allow CIC to bypass the governmental
    review process by simply waiting until after the insurance policy
    has gone into effect to introduce additional or modified terms to its
    insurance program. Workers' compensation insurance is
    mandatory and California employers expect the statute's protection.
    CIC knew of the review and pre-approval process and deliberately
    ignored that process with regard to the RPA. . . .
    "[T]he legal requirement for modifying any workers' compensation
    insurance obligation is to endorse the agreement to the insurance
    policy. This is done by filing the agreement with the [Rating
    Bureau], which in turn will file it with the Insurance
    Commissioner, and endorse it to the insurance policy after the
    requisite time or approval. Unfiled side agreements are prohibited
    and shall not be used without complying with these requirements;
    otherwise, they are not permitted in this state and are void as a
    matter of law." (Shasta Linen, at pp. 66-67, fns. omitted.)
    Although Shasta Linen pertained primarily to the validity of the entire RPA
    agreement, the Insurance Commissioner also considered the RPA's arbitration
    provisions. The Insurance Commissioner found the RPA's arbitration clause was
    "intended to supersede [the dispute resolution provisions] of the [CIC] guaranteed cost
    policy" and the arbitration clause substantially modified these CIC provisions. (Shasta
    Linen, at p. 56.) The Insurance Commissioner found that Regulations section 2268 was
    "clear on its face" that "unendorsed side agreements are prohibited" and an "arbitration
    obligation" comes within the definition of a "side agreement" that must be filed before it
    is effective. (Shasta Linen, at p. 43.)
    24
    B. Filing Required for RPA's Delegation Clause and Arbitration Agreement
    The RPA considered in Shasta Linen was essentially identical to the RPA issued
    to Nielsen. Although we are not bound by the Shasta Linen decision (Yamaha Corp. of
    America v. State Board of Equalization (1998) 
    19 Cal. 4th 1
    , 7-8), we find its analysis
    persuasive on the prohibition of unfiled "collateral" or "side-agreements." Under the
    plain language of section 11658 and Regulations section 2268, defendants were required
    to file the delegation clause and arbitration provision with the Insurance Commissioner
    because these provisions were collateral side agreements that materially modified the
    earlier approved CIC policies.4
    Defendants contend the delegation clause and arbitration requirement contained
    in the RPA were not subject to the filing requirement because AUCRA is not an
    "insurer"; the RPA is not a workers' compensation policy; and the RPA did not
    "modify" the CIC issued policies. The Insurance Commissioner rejected identical
    arguments. After carefully reviewing the terms of Shasta Linen's RPA, the Insurance
    Commissioner found that "it is clear the RPA's dispute resolution . . . provisions are
    meant to replace those of [the CIC policies]" and that the "affiliated entities" (Applied,
    4      The 2016 amendments to Regulations sections 2268 and 2250, subdivision (f)
    specifically require ancillary agreements, including dispute resolution provisions, to be
    filed with the Insurance Commissioner. Although these amendments are not expressly
    applicable here (as the RPA was executed earlier) and there is no information showing
    the reason for the amendment, we agree with Nielsen's contention that these
    amendments appeared to be clarifications, rather than substantive changes, to the
    applicable regulations.
    25
    AUCRA, and CIC) were "so enmeshed" and "intertwined" that they should be
    considered together in determining whether the RPA constitutes a modification of the
    CIC policies. (Shasta Linen, at pp. 57, 49.)
    The record here supports those findings. The RPA expressly pertains to
    Nielsen's workers' compensation coverage and states that it "represents the entire
    understanding . . . between the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and
    supersedes all prior negotiations, proposals, letters of intent, correspondence and
    understandings relating to the subject matter hereof." The RPA additionally states that
    its terms apply "to all payroll, premium, and losses occurring under the Policies . . . ."
    In materials provided to Nielsen, Applied stated that its EquityComp program (that
    includes the CIC policies and the RPA agreement) "is a seamlessly integrated package
    providing nationwide workers' compensation coverage . . . ." Based on this evidence,
    we are unpersuaded by defendants' attempt to recharacterize their integrated
    EquityComp program to suggest that the statutory filing requirements should not apply.
    We likewise find unhelpful defendants' argument that the added arbitration
    provision was not an "endorsement" or a "collateral" agreement under applicable law.
    (§ 11658; Regs., § 2268.) An endorsement "is an amendment to or modification of an
    existing policy of insurance" that " 'may alter or vary any term or condition of the
    policy.' " (Adams v. Explorer Ins. Co. (2003) 
    107 Cal. App. 4th 438
    , 451, 450.) A
    collateral agreement is a "secondary," "accompanying," or "auxiliary" agreement.
    (Random House Dict. of the English Language (2d. Unabridged ed. 1987) p. 403, col.
    26
    2.) As found by the Insurance Commissioner, the RPA's arbitration provision and
    delegation clause are endorsements and/or collateral agreements to the CIC policies
    because they relate to and materially alter the dispute resolution provisions in the earlier
    approved policy. (See American Zurich Ins. Co. v. Country Villa Service Corp. (C.D.
    Cal. 2015) 
    2015 WL 4163008
    , *5-6 (American Zurich).)
    Defendants contend the RPA was not an "endorsement" because it was issued by
    AUCRA rather than CIC. Defendants rely on authority which they say describe an
    endorsement as a modification to the existing insurance contract. (See e.g. Aerojet-
    General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co. (1997) 
    17 Cal. 4th 38
    , 50, fn. 4; Frontier Oil
    Corp. v. RLI Ins. Co. (2007) 
    153 Cal. App. 4th 1436
    , 1463; Mission Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
    Coachella Valley Water Dist. (1989) 
    210 Cal. App. 3d 484
    , 496-497.) Those decisions
    are unhelpful because the courts were not presented with an insurance arrangement
    similar to here that required the use of two policies, the second of which amends and/or
    supplants the first.
    C. Arbitration Clause and Delegation Provision are Unenforceable
    Having found that the arbitration and delegation provisions were prohibited
    because they were not properly filed with the Insurance Commissioner, we determine
    these provisions are unenforceable. Generally, " ' "a contract made in violation of a
    regulatory statute is void." ' " (Malek v. Blue Cross of California (2004) 
    121 Cal. App. 4th 44
    , 70; see Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons (1957) 
    48 Cal. 2d 141
    , 150;
    American 
    Zurich, supra
    , 
    2015 WL 4163008
    , at p. *6.) Although there are exceptions to
    27
    this rule if the unenforceability would result in unjust enrichment, forfeiture, or other
    form of unfair outcome (see Malek, at pp. 70-71), none of these factual circumstances
    are present here.
    Section 11658, subdivision (b) expressly states it is "unlawful" for an insurer to
    issue any policy or endorsement or form that is not approved by the Insurance
    Commissioner, and the regulations implementing this law made clear that collateral
    agreements must be filed to be effective. (See Regs., § 2268.) These prohibitions
    would have no meaning if the insurer could enforce contracts despite having violated
    the disclosure and approval requirements. Allowing the insurer to make material
    modifications to the filed and approved dispute resolution mechanism without the
    knowledge of the Rating Bureau or the Insurance Commissioner would effectively
    remove any regulatory oversight of this process.
    In California, workers' compensation insurance (or an adequate substitute) is
    mandatory, and the Insurance Commissioner is charged with closely scrutinizing
    insurance plans to protect both workers and their employers. (See American 
    Zurich, supra
    , 
    2015 WL 4173009
    , at p. *17.) To accomplish this objective, the Legislature
    mandated that the Commissioner have full access to insurance information through
    mandatory filing requirements. (Regs., § 2268.) It follows that a violation of these
    requirements prevents crucial regulatory oversight and thus renders the unfiled
    agreement unlawful and void as a matter of law.
    28
    Defendants contend the arbitration provisions were not void and unenforceable
    because section 11658 and Regulations section 2268 do not specifically provide for this
    remedy, citing Gonzales v. Concord Gardens Mobile Home Park, Ltd. (1979) 
    90 Cal. App. 3d 871
    .) In Gonzales, a building contractor violated a statute requiring the
    contractor to give a notice describing lien laws to a client (a homeowners' association)
    before starting work. (Id. at pp. 873-874.) When the contractor sued the homeowners'
    association for payment, the association argued the contractor had forfeited his rights to
    compensation by failing to provide this notice. (Ibid.) The court disagreed,
    emphasizing that the association's argument would impose "a forfeiture upon the
    contractor," which is disfavored. (Id. at p. 873.) The court also noted that because the
    statute did not include a penalty for noncompliance, and another provision in the
    contractor's license law expressly required a forfeiture (for working without a license),
    the maxim of " 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius' " applied to support a conclusion
    that no forfeiture was required for the violation of the lien law notice. (Id. at p. 874.)
    This case is distinguishable. First, by not enforcing the unfiled delegation and
    arbitration provisions, there is no forfeiture. The parties will still have their day in
    court, and all parties will have the opportunity to present evidence, arguments, and
    defenses. Second, unlike the statutory notice requirement at issue in Gonzales, the
    statutes here specifically provide that an agreement that has not been appropriately filed
    is "unlawful." (§ 11658, subd. (b).)
    29
    Relying on section 11658.5, defendants contend the Legislature specifically
    rejected the rule that an unfiled arbitration or delegation clause is void as a matter of
    law. Section 11658.5 states in relevant part:
    "(a)(1) An insurer that intends to use a dispute resolution or
    arbitration agreement to resolve disputes arising in California out
    of a workers' compensation insurance policy or endorsement issued
    to a California employer shall disclose to the employer,
    contemporaneously with any written quote that offers to provide
    insurance coverage, that choice of law and choice of venue or
    forum may be a jurisdiction other than California and that these
    terms are negotiable between the insurer and the employer. The
    disclosure shall be signed by the employer as evidence of receipt
    where the employer accepts the offer of coverage from that insurer.
    "(2) After compliance with paragraph (1), a dispute resolution or
    arbitration agreement may be negotiated by the insurer and the
    employer before any dispute arises.
    "(b) Nothing in this section is intended to interfere with any
    authority granted to the Insurance Commissioner under current law.
    "(c) Failure by the insurer to observe the requirements of
    subdivision (a) shall result in a default to California as the choice
    of law and forum for resolution of disputes arising in California."
    Defendants contend this statute shows "the Legislature knows how to impose
    penalties for non-compliance with statutory requirements, and could have included a
    provision rendering all unfiled arbitration agreements void if that were the Legislature's
    intention. Because it did not do so, this penalty may not be inferred."
    The argument is unpersuasive. Based on the statute's plain language, it is
    apparent the Legislature enacted section 11658.5 in 2011 to address a specific issue—
    the circumstances when an insurance contract designates the controlling law or the
    30
    forum/venue to be a jurisdiction other than California. The Legislature did not prohibit
    these terms, but wanted to ensure employers were fully informed of the existence and
    consequences of such provisions. The statute thus requires that the insured be made
    aware of these extra-territorial provisions, be informed that they are negotiable, and sign
    a disclosure form "as evidence of" the receipt of this information. (§ 11658.5, subd.
    (a)(1).)
    In the proceedings below, Nielsen did not challenge the choice-of-law or
    forum/venue provisions; it asserted that the delegation and arbitration clause are
    unenforceable because they were not filed and approved by the Insurance Department as
    required under section 11658 and Regulations section 2268. Because section 11658.5
    does not concern or address the filing requirement issue, it does not govern the remedies
    for an insurer's intentional failure to file and obtain approval of a modified dispute
    resolution provision.
    Defendants rely on legislative history materials underlying section 11658.5.
    However, on the issue before us (whether the unfiled arbitration provision is
    enforceable), section 11658 and Regulations section 2268 are clear and unambiguous,
    and therefore resort to legislative history regarding a separate code section is
    inappropriate. (See Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2006) 
    39 Cal. 4th 750
    , 758.)
    Moreover, on our review of the proffered committee reports and the evolution of
    the statutory language, we do not discern any clear intent to eliminate or modify the
    filing requirement for endorsements or collateral agreements as it pertains to arbitration-
    31
    related provisions or to limit the remedies for an unfiled arbitration agreement. The
    proposed bill that was eventually enacted as section 11658.5 changed many times and
    its final language appears to have been the result of a compromise. Because (as here) a
    bill's committee and floor analysis reports are often fragmented and unclear, "the wisest
    course is to rely on legislative history only when that history itself is unambiguous."
    (J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 
    27 Cal. App. 4th 1568
    , 1578, fn.
    omitted.)
    Under this principle, the legislative materials relating to section 11658.5 do not
    support that the Legislature was intending to create rules applicable to section 11658's
    filing requirements with respect to an arbitration agreement or a delegation clause. This
    is particularly true given the recent regulatory clarification that arbitration agreements
    must be filed and approved under section 11658 and Regulations section 2268. (See
    Regs., § 2268 (as amended 2016), § 2250, subd. (f).) Defendants do not challenge the
    validity of this amendment or suggest it is inconsistent with section 11658.5.
    We also find unhelpful defendants' reliance on decisions reached by courts
    interpreting other states' insurance statutes. (See e.g. McCullough Transfer Co. v.
    Virginia Sur. Co. (6th Cir. 1954) 
    213 F.2d 440
    , 442; Ritter v. Shotwell (1964) 63 Wash.
    2d 601, 606-607 [
    388 P.2d 527
    ].) These statutes are different from here, and none of
    these decisions involved the question whether an unfiled arbitration provision is
    enforceable under California law.
    32
    Based on our conclusion, we do not reach Nielsen's alternate argument (not
    raised below) that the FAA is reverse-preempted under the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15
    U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015.) (See Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Applied Underwriters, Inc.
    (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 806, 812-821; Monarch 
    Consulting, supra
    , 26 N.Y.3d at pp.
    670-674.)5
    DISPOSITION
    Order affirmed. Appellants to bear respondents' costs on appeal.
    HALLER, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    McCONNELL, P. J.
    HUFFMAN, J.
    5      We emphasize that in resolving the parties' contentions on the "who decides" and
    the arbitration/delegation clause enforceability issues, we base our determinations solely
    on the limited factual record presented in the motion to compel proceedings. These
    determinations do not preclude the parties from litigating the merits of Nielsen's causes
    of action and requested relief at trial based on a more complete evidentiary record.
    33