Matthews v. Methodist Healthcare ( 2002 )


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  •                   IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 01-60812
    Summary Calendar
    TENA MATTHEWS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    METHODIST HEALTHCARE, D/B/A CONSOLIDATED RECOVERY SYSTEMS,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 3:00-CV-638BN
    --------------------
    July, 12, 2002
    Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-Appellant, Tena Matthews (“Matthews”), appeals from
    the   district     court’s    grant   of       summary   judgment   in   favor   of
    defendant-appellee,       Methodist            HealthCare   d/b/a   Consolidated
    Recovery Systems (“Methodist”), concerning Matthews’ claims for
    breach    of     contract,     tortious          interference   with     contract,
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    1
    intentional    infliction   of    emotional    distress,   and   wrongful
    discharge under Title VII.       For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    In   March   1996,   Consolidated    Recovery   System   (“CRS”),   a
    subsidiary of Methodist, hired Matthews, a white female,         as a debt
    collector.     Matthews’ job involved manually calling debtors of
    Methodist to make payment arrangements, or answer calls placed by
    a computer-operated automatic dialer.         By all accounts, Matthews
    was one of the top collectors during her tenure at CRS.          However,
    in July 1999, Matthews began reporting to a new supervisor, Lance
    Hafler.   From that point forward, she began to experience work-
    related problems.
    Hafler was a stickler who strictly enforced the collection and
    payment guidelines (the “Guidelines”) used by the collectors on a
    daily basis.      Apparently, Hafler’s practice departed from the
    methods of previous supervisors.         Matthews did not like Hafler’s
    management style and claims that Hafler treated her in an “ugly”
    fashion. She also contends that she complained to her supervisors,
    Hafler included, that some of the practices required by Methodist
    violated the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).
    On September 9, 1999, Hafler issued a corrective action
    against Matthews for insubordination. After Matthews complained to
    Hafler’s immediate supervisor, Wayne Jackson, the insubordination
    action was reduced to a verbal warning.           On February 4, 2000,
    2
    Hafler   issued   another   correction   action   against   Matthews   for
    inappropriate customer service that had a negative effect on the
    department.   In other words, Matthews had bad-mouthed the company,
    Hafler, and Night Supervisor Richard Beasley to other collectors.
    Those collectors had then complained to Hafler.
    On February 11, 2000, CRS suspended Matthews without pay for
    allegedly falsifying payroll records on the “Vowell” account.          CRS
    claims that Matthews made an improper notation on the “Vowell”
    account.   Hafler conducted a further review of Matthews’ work and
    claims to have found at least nine instances in which Matthews made
    inappropriate notations in the computer system in violation of the
    Guidelines during the time period from January 4, 2000 until
    February 10, 2000.    Subsequently, Matthews was terminated.1
    In August 2000, Matthews filed suit in federal district court.
    After discovery closed, Methodist filed a motion for summary
    judgment as to all Matthews’ claims.       The district court granted
    summary judgment to Methodist on all of Matthews’ claims except her
    state law McArn claim.2      The district court declined to exercise
    1
    Methodist contended Matthews was terminated for falsification
    of payroll documents.      Matthews contended she was actually
    terminated for opposing the collection practices made illegal by
    the FDCPA and/or for discriminatory reasons in violation of Title
    VII.
    2
    In McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., Inc., 
    626 So. 2d 603
    ,
    607 (Miss. 1993), the Mississippi Supreme Court created a narrow
    public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in two
    circumstances.   Under McArn, it is unlawful for an employer to
    terminate an employee either (1) because the employee refused to
    3
    supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining McArn claim pursuant
    to 42 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and entered final judgment dismissing all
    of Matthews’ claims with prejudice except the McArn claim which was
    dismissed without prejudice.      Matthews timely appeals the summary
    judgment ruling.
    II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment. Walton v. Bisco Industries, Inc., 
    119 F.3d 369
    , 370 (5th
    Cir. 1997).
    III. DISCUSSION
    Matthews contends that genuine issues of material fact exist
    which preclude the grant of summary judgment on her claims for
    breach   of   contract,    tortious     interference   with    contract,
    intentional   infliction   of    emotional   distress,   and   wrongful
    discharge under Title VII.      We address each argument in turn.
    A.    Breach of Contract and Tortious Interference with Contract
    Matthews argues that Methodist issued her a policies and
    procedure manual (i.e., employee handbook) which created an implied
    contract of employment.    She contends that this manual set forth
    participate in an illegal act, or (2) because the employee reported
    illegal acts of his employer to his employer. After considering
    all the summary judgment evidence, the district court determined
    that Matthews produced sufficient evidence to show that genuine
    issues of material fact existed concerning whether she was
    terminated for refusing to participate in acts made illegal under
    the FDCPA, or for reporting to CRS that some of the company’s
    collection methods violated the FDCPA. Neither party appeals this
    ruling.
    4
    procedures regarding progressive discipline which Methodist was
    contractually obligated to follow, but that Methodist did not
    follow these procedures in making the decision to terminate her.
    In Bobbitt v. The Orchard, Ltd., 
    603 So. 2d 356
    , 361 (Miss.
    1992), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that when an employer
    furnishes it employees with a detailed manual stating its rules of
    employment, and setting forth procedures that will be followed in
    event of infraction of its rules of employment, the employer is
    obligated to follow its provisions in reprimanding, suspending or
    disciplining an employee for infractions specifically covered by
    the manual.     However, both the Fifth Circuit and the Mississippi
    Supreme Court have also ruled that an employment manual will not
    modify   at-will   employment   status     when    the    employee    signs   an
    employment application which contains an express employment at-will
    disclaimer.     Solomon v. Walgreen Co., 
    975 F.2d 1086
    (5th Cir.
    1992); Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
    508 So. 2d 1086
    , 1088-89
    (Miss. 1987).
    Here,    Matthews    signed    an    employment      application     which
    specifically stated that Methodist had the option to terminate her
    employment “with or without cause and with or without notice, at
    any time.”    Moreover, the employee handbook at issue specifically
    states that (1) the handbook is not intended to constitute a legal
    contract   with    any   employee   and   (2)     the    handbook    provisions
    regarding discipline and discharge “do not waive or affect MHS’
    5
    rights as an employer to terminate employment for any reason or no
    reason without notice.”   Thus, the legal precedent in Mississippi
    and this Circuit establish that the employee manual did not modify
    Matthews’ status as an at-will employee.       Matthews’ breach of
    contract argument therefore fails.3
    B.   Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
    Matthews contends that the district court erred in granting
    summary judgment to Methodist on the intentional infliction of
    emotional distress (“IIED”) claim.      To prevail on an IIED claim
    under Mississippi law, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s
    conduct was “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
    as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
    atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
    Brown v. Inter City Federal Bank for Savings, 
    738 So. 2d 262
    , 264
    (Miss. 1999).
    In this Circuit, we have often stated that plaintiffs face a
    heavy burden when trying to show that a defendant’s conduct falls
    into this category, especially when the IIED allegation arises in
    the context of an employment dispute.    Conduct of an employer that
    is illegal does not necessarily qualify as “outrageous.”        See
    Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie Ashphalt Co., 
    990 F.2d 239
    , 243 (5th Cir.
    1993)(“[e]ven conduct which may be illegal in an employment context
    3
    Because no employment contract existed between Matthews and
    Methodist, it is axiomatic that Matthews cannot recover on any
    claim for tortious interference with contract.
    6
    may not be the sort of conduct constituting extreme and outrageous
    conduct.”); Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 
    939 F.2d 1138
    , 1143 (5th
    Cir. 1991)(“although [the employer’s] conduct often rises to the
    level of illegality, except in the most unusual cases it is not the
    sort of conduct, as deplorable as it may sometimes be, that
    constitutes ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct”). Proving the point,
    we recently concluded that even where sufficient evidence existed
    from which a reasonable juror could conclude that an employer
    racially harassed its employee in violation of Title VII the
    alleged harassment could not rise to the level of extreme and
    outrageous conduct as a matter of law.       Walker v. Thompson, 
    214 F.3d 615
    , 628 (5th Cir. 2000).
    In the case sub judice, the district court determined that
    Matthews’ claims that she was once “hollered” at by Manager Wayne
    Jackson during a meeting between the two of them and that Assistant
    Manager Hafler intimidated her did not rise to the level of extreme
    and outrageous conduct.   We agree.       Although Matthews may have
    been “hollered” at, there is no evidence to suggest that either
    Jackson or Hafler called Matthews names or used obscene language in
    her   presence.   Moreover,   Matthews’   allegation   that   she   was
    “intimidated” only reflected her perception that Hafler was a very
    controlling manager.   In short, the behavior alleged to have been
    engaged in by the supervisors does not rise to the level of
    “outrageous conduct” necessary to support an intentional infliction
    7
    of emotional distress claim.          See 
    Walker, 214 F.3d at 628
    (citing
    RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)) (“Insults,
    indignities, threats, annoyances, or petty oppressions, without
    more, do not rise to the level of intentional infliction of
    emotional distress”).4
    C.   Wrongful Discharge Under Title VII
    Matthews had the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
    case of discrimination in violation of Title VII. To establish her
    prima facie case, she must show that: (1) she is a member of a
    protected    class:   (2)    she    was   qualified    for   her   position   as
    collector;    (3)   she     was    discharged   from   employment;    and     (4)
    Methodist sought to replace her with a similarly qualified male or
    African-American.     Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 
    102 F.3d 199
    , 202 (5th
    Cir. 1997).
    4
    Although Matthews has not specifically raised the issue, we
    also reject the notion that Methodist’s alleged violation of McArn
    could in and of itself rise to the level of extreme and outrageous
    conduct. See Rescar, Inc. v. Ward, 
    60 S.W.3d 169
    , 179 (Tex. App. -
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. filed)(terminating employee for
    failing to perform illegal acts does not constitute extreme and
    outrageous conduct as a matter of law); Beiser v. Tomball Hosp.
    Auth., 
    902 S.W.2d 721
    , 725 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1995,
    no writ) (employer hospital who allegedly fired employee lab
    technician for notifying the FDA that the hospital was storing
    patient blood samples and donor blood units in violation of FDA
    regulations did not engage in conduct which constituted extreme and
    outrageous conduct as a matter of law); Hockaday v. Texas Dept. of
    Criminal Justice, 
    914 F. Supp. 1439
    , 1448 (S.D. Tex. 1996)
    (allegation that TDCJ employee was fired by TDCJ in violation of
    the Texas Whistleblower Act for voicing concerns over TDCJ’s method
    of alleviating crowded jail cells was not “outrageous”).
    8
    The district court found that Matthews had not presented any
    evidence to show that the position from which she was terminated
    was filled by a black or male collector. Accordingly, the district
    court ruled that Matthews had not satisfied her prima facie case
    and   granted    summary   judgment   to   Methodist     on   the   Title   VII
    discrimination claim. We agree with the district court’s decision.
    On appeal, Matthews has not presented any evidence to show that she
    was   replaced    by   a   person   outside   of   her    protected    class.
    Therefore, her Title VII claim also fails.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s
    summary judgment ruling.
    9