United States v. Broyles , 71 F. App'x 328 ( 2003 )


Menu:
  •                                                             United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                    August 4, 2003
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 02-30968
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    NINA SUE BROYLES,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 01-CR-35-ALL
    Before GARWOOD, DEMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Nina   Sue    Broyles   appeals   her   guilty-plea   conviction     and
    sentence for conspiracy to make false statements in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 371
     and 1001.      Broyles was charged by and plead guilty to
    one count of a bill of information and was sentenced to thirty-
    three months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.
    Broyles now asserts that the district court erred in denying
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
    the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    her presentencing motion to withdraw her guilty plea, that the
    appeal-waiver    provision   contained     in    the    plea   agreement    was
    invalid, and that she received ineffective assistance of counsel.
    Broyles’s main contention on this appeal is that her guilty
    plea was not knowing and voluntary because of misrepresentations
    made by the Government. Broyles’s plea agreement put her on notice
    that she could receive up to five years’ imprisonment and stated
    that there was no agreement between Broyles and the United States
    as to the actual sentence that would be imposed by the court.
    Broyles signed the agreement, which included a statement that she
    fully understood the agreement. Broyles also informed the district
    court at arraignment that no one had made her any promises to
    entice her to plead guilty.       Unfulfilled expectations of a lighter
    sentence do not constitute a fair and just reason for allowing
    withdrawal of a guilty plea.         United States v. Badger, 
    925 F.2d 101
    , 104 (5th Cir. 1991).        The remaining factors we consider under
    Federal   Rule   of   Criminal    Procedure     32(e)   also   do   not   favor
    withdrawal of Broyles’s guilty plea.          Considering the totality of
    the circumstances, Broyles did not clearly establish a fair and
    just reason for withdrawing her guilty plea.             See FED. R. CRIM. P.
    32(e); United States v. Brewster, 
    137 F.3d 853
    , 857-58 (5th Cir.
    1998). We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse
    its discretion in denying Broyles’s motion to withdraw her guilty
    plea.   See Brewster, 
    137 F.3d at 857
    .
    2
    Broyles also raises several sentencing issues. As part of her
    plea agreement, however, Broyles agreed to waive her right to
    appeal her sentence except in two limited circumstances, namely, in
    the case of a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum, or in
    the case of an upward departure from the applicable guidelines as
    determined by the district court.        Neither of those circumstances
    are present here.     The record indicates that Broyles’s waiver of
    her right to appeal her sentence in her plea agreement was knowing
    and voluntary and, therefore, enforceable.        See United States v.
    Portillo, 
    18 F.3d 290
    , 292 (5th Cir. 1994).
    Broyles also argues that she received ineffective assistance
    of counsel during the (post-plea) presentencing and the sentencing
    phases of her case.      A knowing and voluntary waiver of appeal,
    however, also bars claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at
    sentencing.     See United States v. White, 
    307 F.3d 336
    , 343 (5th
    Cir. 2002).    Because Broyles does not directly allege (and did not
    below) that any ineffective assistance of counsel affected the plea
    or the plea agreement, she is barred by the provisions of her plea
    agreement     from   raising,   on   direct   appeal,   any   claim   of
    ineffectiveness of counsel in connection with her sentence.           See
    
    id.
       Moreover, even if she were not so barred, Broyles’s claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be resolved on direct
    appeal since it was not first raised in the district court.      United
    States v. Bounds, 
    943 F.2d 541
    , 544 (5th Cir. 1991).       The district
    3
    court did not make any factual findings regarding allegations of
    ineffective assistance at sentencing, and analysis of these claims
    would require speculation by this court as to the reasons for
    counsel’s alleged acts and omissions. See United States v. Kizzee,
    
    150 F.3d 497
    , 503 (5th Cir. 1998).   Broyles’s waiver of her right
    to appeal, however, did not expressly extend to waiving her right
    to petition for a writ of habeas corpus or for relief under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .   Cf. White, 
    307 F.3d at 337
    .   We therefore decline
    to reach the merits of Broyles’s ineffective assistance of counsel
    claim, but do so without prejudice to whatever right, if any, she
    may have (an issue we do not resolve) to present this matter to the
    district court via a motion under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .     See United
    States v. Route, 
    104 F.3d 59
    , 64-65 (5th Cir. 1997).
    AFFIRMED.
    4