DIETRICH, CRAIG R. v. PLANNING BOARD OF TOWN OF WEST SENE ( 2014 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    508
    CA 13-01765
    PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, FAHEY, SCONIERS, AND VALENTINO, JJ.
    IN THE MATTER OF CRAIG R. DIETRICH,
    PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,
    V                             MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    PLANNING BOARD OF TOWN OF WEST SENECA AND
    TOWN OF WEST SENECA, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.
    GOLDBERG SEGALLA LLP, BUFFALO (CHRISTOPHER BOPST OF COUNSEL), FOR
    RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.
    LIPPES MATHIAS WEXLER FRIEDMAN, LLP, BUFFALO (DENNIS C. VACCO OF
    COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court,
    Erie County (Joseph R. Glownia, J.), entered December 4, 2012 in a
    proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78. The judgment, among other
    things, vacated and annulled the determination of respondent Planning
    Board of the Town of West Seneca, which denied petitioner’s site plan
    request.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the petition is
    dismissed.
    Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78,
    respondents appeal from a judgment that, inter alia, vacated and
    annulled the determination denying petitioner’s site plan request to
    construct an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) track on his property.
    Respondents contend that Supreme Court erred in concluding that
    respondents proceeded in excess of their jurisdiction by requiring
    petitioner to submit a site plan, and further erred in vacating and
    annulling the determination of respondent Planning Board of the Town
    of West Seneca (Planning Board). We agree, and we therefore reverse
    the judgment and dismiss the petition.
    As a threshold matter, we agree with the Planning Board that its
    requirement of a site plan was “neither irrational, unreasonable nor
    inconsistent with the governing [code]” (Matter of Emmerling v Town of
    Richmond Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 67 AD3d 1467, 1467 [internal quotation
    marks omitted]; see Matter of New York Botanical Garden v Bd. of Stds.
    & Appeals of City of N.Y., 91 NY2d 413, 419). As relevant here, the
    West Seneca Town Code (Code) excepts from the site plan requirement
    any “[p]ermitted accessory residential structures and uses” (§ 102-2
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    CA 13-01765
    [B]; see generally Town Law § 274-a [2] [a]). Inasmuch as the
    proposed site of the ATV track is zoned R-65A, permissible uses of the
    property include, inter alia, private garages or off-street parking
    areas, family swimming pools, greenhouses, and horse stables (see Code
    § 120-13 [B] [1-4]; see also § 120-14 [B] [1]), as well as “[o]ther
    customary accessory uses” (§ 120-14 [B] [7]).
    We further agree with the Planning Board that it did not act
    irrationally or unreasonably when it determined that the ATV track,
    which features six- to eight-foot jumps and “rumble strips,” does not
    fall within the definition of “[o]ther customary accessory uses” (see
    generally Matter of Granger Group v Town of Taghkanic, 77 AD3d 1137,
    1138, lv denied 16 NY3d 781). Although a separate provision of the
    Code permits limited use of recreational vehicles on private property
    (see § 117-3), no reference is made therein to the construction of ATV
    tracks with features similar to those of professional racetracks.
    Furthermore, we cannot agree with petitioner that this case is similar
    to cases involving worn paths that developed from the use of
    recreational vehicles over time (see Matter of Spinella v Town of
    Paris Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 
    191 Misc 2d 807
    , 809). We therefore
    conclude that the Planning Board did not err in requiring petitioner
    to submit a site plan for approval.
    With respect to respondents’ contention that the court erred in
    vacating and annulling the Planning Board’s determination, we note
    that “[t]he authority to approve or deny applications for site
    development plans is generally vested in local planning boards”
    (Matter of Valentine v McLaughlin, 87 AD3d 1155, 1157, lv denied 18
    NY3d 804, citing Town Law § 274-a [2] [a]). Thus, “[i]n conducting .
    . . site plan review, the Planning Board is required to set
    appropriate conditions and safeguards which are in harmony with the
    general purpose and intent of the Town’s zoning code . . . To this
    end, a planning board may properly consider criteria such as whether
    the proposed project is consistent with the use of surrounding
    properties, whether it would bring about a noticeable change in the
    visual character of the area, and whether the change would be
    irreversible” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).
    Judicial review is thus limited to the issue “whether the action
    taken by the [Planning B]oard was illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of
    discretion” (Matter of Kempisty v Town of Geddes, 93 AD3d 1167, 1169,
    lv denied 19 NY3d 815, rearg denied, 21 NY3d 930 [internal quotation
    marks omitted]). The Planning Board’s determination should therefore
    be sustained so long as it “has a rational basis and is supported by
    substantial evidence” (Matter of Pelican Point LLC v Hoover, 50 AD3d
    1497, 1498 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Indeed, “[a]
    ‘reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the . . .
    [Planning B]oard, even if there is substantial evidence supporting a
    contrary determination’ ” (Matter of Violet Realty, Inc. v City of
    Buffalo Planning Bd., 20 AD3d 901, 902, lv denied 5 NY3d 713).
    With those legal principles in mind, we conclude that there is
    substantial evidence to support the Planning Board’s determination
    that the ATV track is inconsistent with the residential use of
    -3-                           508
    CA 13-01765
    surrounding properties (see Valentine, 87 AD3d at 1157). Put simply,
    the evidence in the record establishes that the track would increase
    already existing problems, including the noise level in the
    neighborhood, the number of incidents of physical damage and trespass
    to neighboring properties, and the potential for neighboring
    landowners to be held liable for injuries occurring on their
    properties.
    Having concluded that there was a rational basis for the Planning
    Board’s denial of petitioner’s request for site plan approval, we turn
    to petitioner’s contention that the matter must be remitted to the
    Planning Board for the requisite factual findings. We reject that
    contention. “Generally, findings of fact which show the actual
    grounds of a decision are necessary for an intelligent judicial review
    of a quasi-judicial or administrative determination” (Matter of
    Livingston Parkway Assn., Inc. v Town of Amherst Zoning Bd. of
    Appeals, 114 AD3d 1219, 1219-1220 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
    Here, despite petitioner’s contention to the contrary, the Planning
    Board adequately set forth specific findings of fact by indicating
    that its determination was based on concerns about trespassers and
    liability, property damage, and noise pollution. In any event, even
    assuming, arguendo, that such findings were inadequate, we conclude
    that remittal is unnecessary where, as here, the record as a whole
    addresses the applicable considerations or otherwise provides a basis
    for concluding that there was a rational basis for the Planning
    Board’s determination (see generally Matter of Paloma Homes, Inc. v
    Petrone, 10 AD3d 612, 614; Matter of Fischer v Markowitz, 166 AD2d
    444, 445).
    Entered:   June 20, 2014                        Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA 13-01765

Filed Date: 6/20/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/7/2016