United States v. Spezzia , 307 F. App'x 853 ( 2009 )


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  •           IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 22, 2009
    No. 07-20848
    Summary Calendar                  Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    CHARLES JAIRO SPEZZIA
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4: 07-CR-31-1
    Before SMITH, STEWART and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Charles Jairo Spezzia was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit
    hostage taking, two counts of aiding and abetting hostage taking; conspiracy to
    harbor undocumented aliens; harboring and concealing from detection an
    undocumented alien; brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
    violence (i.e., hostage taking); and possession of an unregistered short-barrel
    shotgun. He was sentenced to a total of 324 months of imprisonment and a five-
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 07-20848
    year term of supervised release. He now seeks to appeal his conviction of one
    count of hostage taking.
    Spezzia specifically contends on appeal that there was insufficient
    evidence to support the jury’s verdict that he “detained” Miguel Nunez-
    Rodriguez (Miguel) in within the meaning of the Hostage Taking Act (HTA). See
    18 U.S.C. § 1203(a). Spezzia notes that the HTA requires that an individual be
    confined for an appreciable period of time against his will such that the
    relationship with the defendant becomes non-consensual. According to Spezzia,
    there was no evidence presented at trial that Miguel was held against his will;
    Spezzia asserts that he and his cohorts adhered to the terms of a negotiated
    smuggling agreement (i.e., the smugglers agreed to cross Miguel into the United
    States in exchange for a specific fee), and that the interactions between the
    smugglers and Miguel was devoid of any coercive or involuntary elements.
    Because Spezia failed to renew his motion for a judgment of acquittal
    under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 at the close of evidence, we review his sufficiency
    challenge for a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Green, 
    293 F.3d 886
    , 895 (5th Cir. 2002). We therefore review the record only to determine
    whether it “is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt, or . . . [whether] the evidence
    on a key element of the offense was so tenuous that a conviction would be
    shocking.” United States v. Pierre, 
    958 F.2d 1304
    , 1310 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
    (internal quotations and citations omitted).
    To establish the offense of hostage taking under the HTA, the Government
    must establish that the defendant (1) seized or detained another person, and
    (2) threatened to kill, injure, or continue to detain that person, (3) with the
    explicit purpose of compelling a third person or entity to act in some way as an
    ‘explicit or implicit condition for the release of the person detained.’” United
    States v. Ibarra-Zelaya, 
    465 F.3d 596
    , 602 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see
    18 U.S.C. § 1203(a). Spezzia solely contests whether the evidence was sufficient
    2
    No. 07-20848
    to establish the first element of the offense – i.e., whether Miguel actually was
    seized or detained.
    This court has held that “a hostage is ‘seized’ or ‘detained’ within the
    meaning of the [HTA] when [he] is held or confined against [his] will for an
    appreciable period of time.” United States v. Carrion-Caliz, 
    944 F.2d 220
    , 225
    (5th Cir. 1991). To seize or detain a hostage, the hostage taker need not use, or
    even threaten to use, physical force or violence; non-physical restraint (e.g., fear
    or deception) can be sufficient to restrain a person against his will. 
    Id. (citing United
    States v. Wesson, 
    779 F.2d 1443
    (9th Cir. 1986)). Moreover, the HTA
    “does not require that the seizure or detention of the hostage be against the
    hostage’s will from its inception”; while the initial acquiescence of the victim may
    be relevant to determining whether he was ever held against his will, it is not
    dispositive of the question, and it does not preclude a conviction under the HTA.
    
    Id. at 226.
          Spezzia has not shown that the record is devoid of evidence that he
    detained Miguel, and thus has not shown that the jury’s verdict was a manifest
    miscarriage of justice. See 
    Pierre, 958 F.2d at 1310
    . Although Spezzia suggests
    that Miguel consented to be smuggled into the United States in exchange for a
    fee, such a contract was void ab initio and conferred no right on Spezzia to
    engage in conduct that would otherwise violate the HTA. See 
    Carrion-Caliz, 944 F.2d at 226
    . The evidence at trial demonstrated that after he surreptitiously
    crossed into this country, Miguel was held in a hotel room under the constant
    supervision of the smugglers, and was incapacitated by the same disabilities
    that we previously have held to be indicative of detention: Miguel had not
    previously been to the United States and was unfamiliar with the country, he
    possessed no functional English language skills, and he lacked the resources or
    abilities that might enable him to leave.         See 
    id. The evidence
    further
    established that Miguel was instructed by the smugglers that if he was unable
    to secure the agreed-upon smuggling fee, he likely would be killed; such threats
    3
    No. 07-20848
    convinced Miguel that he could not leave the hotel room voluntarily and that he
    was entirely under the smugglers’ control until the smuggling fee had been paid.
    In light of the foregoing, the jury could have reasonably concluded that
    Miguel was sufficiently frightened that he remained in the presence of the
    smugglers against his will; it is enough that the smugglers’ threats intimidated
    Miguel and caused him to stay with them when he would have preferred to be
    elsewhere. See 
    id. at 226-27.
    Accordingly, the conviction is AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-20848

Citation Numbers: 307 F. App'x 853

Judges: Per Curiam, Smith, Southwick, Stewart

Filed Date: 1/22/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023