Angel L. v. Dcs, A.L. ( 2022 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    ANGEL L., Appellant,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.L., Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 22-0097
    FILED 9-15-2022
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. JD32132
    The Honorable David O. Cunanan, Judge, Retired
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Jamie R. Heller
    Counsel for Appellant
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
    By Michelle R. Nimmo
    Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
    ANGEL L. v. DCS, A.L.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.
    F U R U Y A, Judge:
    ¶1           Angel L. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
    terminating his parental rights to his minor child (born in 2020).1 Father
    challenges the court’s order finding statutory grounds for termination as to
    his child (“Child”), that the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) made
    reasonable efforts to provide Father reunification services, and that
    termination of his parental rights was in Child’s best interests. For the
    following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Father and Mother are the biological parents of Child. In July
    2020, DCS became involved upon learning Child was born substance
    exposed to fentanyl. Mother admitted to using fentanyl consistently for a
    year, though Father claimed he knew nothing about such use and denied
    using any substances himself except for marijuana. Mother and Father
    agreed to submit to uranalysis (“UA”) and hair follicle testing on July 31
    but did not do so until August 4. Father tested positive for marijuana in his
    UA, and his hair follicle tested positive for marijuana and cocaine. Mother
    tested positive for fentanyl. Child was temporarily placed in a licensed
    foster care home.
    ¶3            In November 2020, Child was adjudicated dependent as to
    Father and Mother, and the juvenile court approved a case plan of family
    reunification, which was later changed to termination and adoption. DCS
    offered Father various reunification services, including a psychological
    evaluation, parent aide services, visitation, random UA testing, substance
    abuse treatment, and transportation. Father inconsistently engaged with
    these services. Although he was asked to begin random UA testing on July
    31, Father did not do so until August 14. From October 2021 to March
    1     The parental rights of Child’s mother, Extacy T., were also
    terminated, and she is not a party to this appeal.
    2
    ANGEL L. v. DCS, A.L.
    Decision of the Court
    2022—the month of the termination hearing—Father completed 10 out of
    24 UA tests.
    ¶4           In addition to Father failing to drug-test for “three and a half
    months” before the termination hearing, he did not complete the
    recommended maintenance recovery program from the substance abuse
    treatment program at Terros. He was aware that his participation in such
    “recommended services” was a condition of Child’s return to Father. As a
    result, DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to the
    chronic substance abuse and fifteen-months’ time in out-of-home
    placement grounds. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(c).
    ¶5            At the March 2022 termination trial, the juvenile court found
    Father “voluntarily absented [himself] from the proceedings by not
    appearing” and thus waived his right to contest such proceedings. The DCS
    case manager testified that Child was currently residing with an adoptive
    placement and was otherwise adoptable. The case manager further opined
    that terminating Father’s parental rights would benefit Child by allowing
    him to have permanency in a stable home.
    ¶6            The court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding clear
    and convincing evidence supported termination and finding by a
    preponderance of the evidence that termination would be in Child’s best
    interests. Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to
    A.R.S. § 8-235(A) and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court
    103(A).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7             To terminate a parent’s rights, the juvenile court must find
    clear and convincing evidence that supports at least one statutory ground
    for termination. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 353(C).2 The court must
    also separately find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is
    in the child’s best interests. Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 353(C). We “will affirm the
    juvenile court’s termination order absent an abuse of discretion or unless
    the court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous.” E.R. v. DCS, 
    237 Ariz. 56
    , 58, ¶ 9 (App. 2015). A finding is clearly erroneous if no reasonable
    evidence supports it. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    207 Ariz. 43
    , 47
    ¶ 8 (App. 2004). We will not reweigh the evidence on appeal because the
    juvenile court, as a direct observer of the parties’ credibility, is “in the best
    2      Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules
    cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
    3
    ANGEL L. v. DCS, A.L.
    Decision of the Court
    position to weigh the evidence.” 
    Id.
     Indeed, “[w]e view the facts in the light
    most favorable to upholding the juvenile court’s order.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
    Sec. v. Matthew L., 
    223 Ariz. 547
    , 549 ¶ 7 (App. 2010).
    ¶8           Parental rights may be terminated if “the parent is unable to
    discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of chronic abuse
    of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or alcohol and there are
    reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a
    prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).
    ¶9              Father argues the court abused its discretion by terminating
    his parental rights based on the substance abuse ground because he
    successfully completed substance abuse treatment and his UA tests were
    positive for marijuana only (and he had a medical marijuana card). Father’s
    argument ignores other evidence of his drug use, including positive hair
    follicle test results. It also fails to acknowledge the court’s key finding, that
    “Father [was] inconsistent with his testing,” and thus rendered DCS
    “unable to fully assess Father’s sobriety,” which Father was required to
    demonstrate to show his ability to “maintain a safe, stable, sober, and
    sanitary home for himself and his child.” We believe the court’s finding is
    supported by reasonable evidence in the record and reflective of the
    directive that “a child’s interest in permanency must prevail over a parent’s
    uncertain battle with drugs.” Jennifer S. v. DCS, 
    240 Ariz. 282
    , 287 ¶ 17 (App.
    2016). Thus, the court’s conclusion to terminate on substance abuse grounds
    was not in error.3
    ¶10           Citing Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    193 Ariz. 185
    ,
    192 ¶ 37 (App. 1999), Father contends the court abused its discretion in
    finding DCS made reasonable efforts to provide him with reunification
    services because DCS neglected to offer him services recommended by the
    psychologist who conducted his psychological evaluation. But the treating
    psychologist did not testify at trial. Nor did Father offer any evidence—
    such as the psychological evaluation—that would have proved these
    recommendations or DCS’ failure to honor those recommended services.
    Therefore, in the absence of evidence on the matter, we cannot confirm the
    existence or nature of the purported recommendation for services or assess
    DCS’ alleged failure to provide them. Where the record is so deficient,
    3       Because we affirm the court’s finding that clear and convincing
    evidence supports the termination order based upon the substance abuse
    ground, we do not address Father’s challenges to the court’s findings on the
    fifteen-months’ time in out-of-home placement ground. Jesus M. v. Ariz.
    Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    203 Ariz. 278
    , 280 ¶ 3 (App. 2002).
    4
    ANGEL L. v. DCS, A.L.
    Decision of the Court
    Father’s argument cannot prevail. See Michaelson v. Garr, 
    234 Ariz. 542
    , 546
    ¶ 13 (App. 2014) (explaining it is an appellant’s responsibility to ensure the
    record contains material to which he takes exception).
    ¶11            And contrary to his argument that DCS failed to make
    reasonable efforts to provide him with reunification services, the record
    reflects Father was offered various reunification services, in which he
    inconsistently participated. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 
    180 Ariz. 348
    , 353 (App. 1994) (stating DCS fulfills its statutory mandate to
    make reasonable efforts to provide reunification services where it affords
    the parent “the time and opportunity” to participate in programs designed
    to help become an effective parent, and DCS “is not required to provide
    every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each
    service it offers”). Further, DCS’ case manager discussed the psychological
    evaluation at trial and confirmed that DCS asked Father to self-refer for
    individual and couples counseling based on the same. The case manager
    provided Father with “a list of places” that would accept his insurance. The
    case manager told Father he was required to participate in such counseling
    “on his own,” but further testified that when Father disclosed he had
    encountered problems with his insurance, the case manager sent him to
    Terros. Father also informed the case manager that he “got it all worked
    out” and “was able to get a setup with Terros.” But Father ceased
    communications with DCS in December 2021 and never provided
    documentation that he completed counseling. On this record, the juvenile
    court did not abuse its discretion in finding DCS made reasonable efforts to
    provide Father with reunification services.
    ¶12            Finally, Father challenges the court’s best-interests finding.
    When a child benefits from termination or is harmed by continuing the
    parent-child relationship, termination is in that child’s best interests. Alma
    S. v. DCS, 
    245 Ariz. 146
    , 150 ¶ 13 (2018). A child may benefit if a current
    adoptive plan exists, see Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 
    167 Ariz. 1
    , 6 (1990), or if DCS can show the child is adoptable, Alma S., 245 Ariz. at
    150–51 ¶¶ 13–14. The court may also consider whether the existing
    placement meets the child’s needs and adoption is otherwise legally
    possible and likely. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 
    239 Ariz. 1
    , 3–4 ¶ 12 (2016).
    Ultimately, the court’s primary concern during the best-interests inquiry is
    “protect[ing] a child’s interest in stability and security.” 
    Id.
     at 4 ¶ 15
    (quoting Kent K. v. Bobby M., 
    210 Ariz. 279
    , 286 ¶ 34 (2005)).
    ¶13          Here, the court found termination would benefit Child,
    echoing the case manager’s testimony that “it would further the plan of
    adoption, which would provide [Child] with permanency and stability.”
    5
    ANGEL L. v. DCS, A.L.
    Decision of the Court
    The court also found that Child was residing in an adoptive placement that
    met all of his needs and was considered adoptable. Another placement
    could be located should his current placement be unable to adopt him.
    Father cites no evidence to dispute the case manager’s testimony. Instead,
    he criticizes the weight given this testimony. But the court’s findings are
    supported by reasonable evidence in the record, and we will not reweigh
    that evidence. Mary Lou C., 
    207 Ariz. at
    47 ¶ 8. The court did not err in
    finding that termination was in Child’s best interests.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶14          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    6