State of Minnesota v. Melvin Matthew Willems ( 2015 )


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  •                          This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A14-1476
    State of Minnesota,
    Respondent,
    vs.
    Melvin Matthew Willems,
    Appellant.
    Filed May 18, 2015
    Affirmed
    Reyes, Judge
    Kandiyohi County District Court
    File No. 34CR13796
    Lori Swanson, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
    Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Aaron P. Welch, Assistant County
    Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)
    Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate State Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant
    State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
    Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
    Reyes, Judge.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    REYES, Judge
    Appellant Melvin Willems argues that his test-refusal conviction must be reversed
    because Minnesota’s test-refusal statute is unconstitutional. We affirm.
    FACTS
    On October 2, 2013, Deputy Josiah Puckett was driving northbound on Highway
    71 when he noticed a vehicle driving 45 miles per hour in a 60 mile per hour zone. The
    vehicle eventually slowed to 21 miles per hour and drove through an intersection while
    partially positioned in a turn-only lane. The vehicle continued northbound at 30 miles
    per hour and began weaving within the vehicle’s lane of traffic. These observations led
    Deputy Puckett to initiate a traffic stop.
    Deputy Puckett identified the driver as Willems. When speaking with Willems,
    Deputy Puckett detected the odor of alcohol from the interior of the vehicle and noted
    that Willems had bloodshot, watery eyes and slurred speech. Willems told Deputy
    Puckett that he was driving slowly because he was lost, but admitted that he had drank a
    couple of beers, with the last one being consumed approximately one hour earlier.
    Suspecting that Willems was under the influence of alcohol, Deputy Puckett
    requested that Willems participate in a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. Willems
    failed the HGN test. Deputy Puckett explained and demonstrated the Walk and Turn test,
    but Willems stated that he could not complete it. Deputy Puckett next asked Willems to
    participate in a Preliminary Breath Test (PBT) and Willems agreed to provide a breath
    sample. However, before the PBT could be administered, Willems attempted to complete
    the Walk and Turn test despite the fact that Deputy Puckett was not in the process of
    administering it. Deputy Puckett requested that Willems return to the patrol vehicle so
    that the PBT could be completed. At that time, Willems refused to provide a sample.
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    Deputy Puckett arrested Willems on probable cause for driving while impaired
    (DWI) and transported him to the Kandiyohi County Jail, where he read Willems
    Minnesota’s Implied Consent Advisory. Willems stated that he understood the advisory
    but would not participate in the breath test. After the refusal, Willems was charged with
    one count of third-degree refusal to submit to chemical testing (count one) and one count
    of fourth-degree DWI (count two).
    Willems moved to dismiss count one on the basis that Minnesota’s test-refusal
    statute is unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion. Following a trial on
    stipulated facts under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4 and State v. Lothenbach, 
    296 N.W.2d 854
     (Minn. 1980), the district court found Willems guilty on count one. Count
    two was dismissed as part of the Lothenbach agreement. This appeal follows.
    DECISION
    The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that this court reviews de
    novo. State v. Ness, 
    834 N.W.2d 177
    , 181 (Minn. 2013). The reviewing court presumes
    that statutes are constitutional and will strike down a statute only if absolutely necessary.
    State v. Wiseman, 
    816 N.W.2d 689
    , 692 (Minn. App. 2012). “[A] party challenging the
    constitutionality of a statute must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute
    violates a constitutional provision.” State v. Cox, 
    798 N.W.2d 517
    , 519 (Minn. 2011).
    “[T]o challenge successfully the constitutional validity of a statute, the challenger bears
    the very heavy burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is
    unconstitutional.” State v. Merrill, 
    450 N.W.2d 318
    , 321 (Minn. 1990).
    3
    Willems was convicted of gross-misdemeanor test refusal, which is defined as the
    “refus[al] to submit to a chemical test of the person’s blood, breath, or urine.” Minn.
    Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2012). The test-refusal statute criminalizes refusal to submit to
    testing authorized under the implied-consent statute, which states that anyone who drives
    a motor vehicle consents “to a chemical test of that person’s blood, breath, or urine for
    the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(a)
    (2012). The implied-consent and test-refusal statutes only take effect when police
    officers have probable cause to believe a person was driving while impaired and the
    person has been lawfully arrested for DWI. See id., subd. 1(b) (2012).
    The federal and state constitutions protect citizens against unreasonable searches
    and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The ultimate measure of
    a permissible government search under the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness.”
    Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
    515 U.S. 646
    , 652, 
    115 S. Ct. 2386
    , 2390 (1995).
    Blood, breath, and urine tests are searches under the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner v.
    Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 
    489 U.S. 602
    , 616-17, 
    109 S. Ct. 1402
    , 1412-13 (1989); State v.
    Brooks, 
    838 N.W.2d 563
    , 568 (Minn. 2013). “[W]arrantless searches are presumptively
    unreasonable unless one of ‘a few specifically established and well-delineated
    exceptions’ applies.” State v. Diede, 
    795 N.W.2d 836
    , 846 (Minn. 2011) (quoting State
    v. Licari, 
    659 N.W.2d 243
    , 250 (Minn. 2003)).
    Willems argues that Minnesota’s test-refusal statute—section 169A.20,
    subdivision 2—violates his right to due process because it criminalizes his Fourth
    Amendment right to refuse an unconstitutional, warrantless search. Because Willems
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    bases his due-process argument on a Fourth Amendment violation, we first decide
    whether a warrantless search of Willems’s breath would have been constitutional under
    the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Bernard, 
    859 N.W.2d 762
    , 766 (Minn. 2015)
    (“Because Bernard bases his due process argument on a Fourth Amendment violation, we
    turn first to the question of whether a warrantless search of Bernard’s breath would have
    been constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.”).
    I.     Constitutionality of a warrantless search of Willems’s breath
    The Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion in Bernard is dispositive. In Bernard,
    the defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree test refusal for his refusal to
    submit to a breath test subsequent to his arrest for suspicion of DWI. Id. at 764-65. The
    supreme court upheld the constitutionality of Minnesota’s test-refusal statute as it applied
    to Bernard’s case, concluding that a warrantless breath test would not have violated the
    Fourth Amendment because it would have qualified as a search incident to Bernard’s
    valid arrest. Id. at 767. The same reasoning applies here.
    Under the search-incident-to-arrest exception, an officer may search a suspect
    when the officer has probable cause to arrest the suspect. Arizona v. Gant, 
    556 U.S. 332
    ,
    338, 
    129 S. Ct. 1710
    , 1716 (2009). Probable cause to arrest exists when “the objective
    facts are such that under the circumstances a person of ordinary care and prudence
    [would] entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime has been committed.” State
    v. Johnson, 
    314 N.W.2d 229
    , 230 (Minn. 1982) (quotation omitted). Here, Deputy
    Puckett observed Willems drive exceedingly slow, use a turn-only lane when driving
    through an intersection, and weave within his lane of traffic. Deputy Puckett then
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    detected the odor of alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, and slurred speech. Willems
    subsequently admitted to drinking a couple of beers and failed the HGN test.
    Accordingly, Deputy Puckett possessed the requisite probable cause to arrest Willems for
    suspicion of DWI, and Willems does not contend otherwise.
    Because Deputy Puckett had probable cause to arrest Willems, a warrantless
    breath test would have been constitutional as a search incident to a valid arrest. Bernard,
    859 N.W.2d at 767. Moreover, Willems’s reliance on Missouri v. McNeely, 
    133 S. Ct. 1552
    , 1556 (2013), is misplaced because McNeely only addressed the single-factor
    exigency exception to the warrant requirement and the Minnesota Supreme Court
    declined to extend McNeely to the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Id. at 772
    (“McNeely does not foreclose our decision regarding the search-incident-to-arrest
    exception to the warrant requirement.”).
    Willems also argues that the test-refusal statute violates the unconstitutional-
    conditions doctrine. The unconstitutional-conditions doctrine prevents the state from
    conditioning privileges on the relinquishment of constitutional rights. Frost v. Railroad
    Comm’n, 
    271 U.S. 583
    , 592-94, 
    46 S. Ct. 605
    , 606-07 (1926). The test-refusal statute
    does not violate the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine because “a driver’s decision to
    agree to take a test is not coerced simply because Minnesota has attached the penalty of
    making it a crime to refuse the test.” Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 570. “Although refusing the
    test comes with criminal penalties . . . the [s]upreme [c]ourt has made [it] clear that while
    the choice to submit or refuse to take [a] chemical test ‘will not be an easy or pleasant
    one for a suspect to make,’ the criminal process ‘often requires suspects and defendants
    6
    to make difficult choices.’” Id. at 571 (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 
    459 U.S. 553
    , 564,
    
    103 S. Ct. 916
    , 923 (1983)). The fact that refusal is a crime does not render the
    Minnesota implied-consent law unconstitutional. 
    Id. at 572-73
    ; see also Stevens v.
    Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 
    850 N.W.2d 717
    , 731 (Minn. App. 2014) (concluding, in a civil
    context, that Minnesota’s implied-consent law does not violate the unconstitutional-
    conditions doctrine). Thus, the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine does not apply.
    II.    Willems’s substantive due-process challenges
    The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions
    “prohibit ‘certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions, regardless of the fairness of the
    procedures used to implement them.’” Boutin v. LaFleur, 
    591 N.W.2d 711
    , 716 (Minn.
    1999) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 
    494 U.S. 113
    , 125, 
    110 S. Ct. 975
    , 983 (1990)).
    Because a search of Willems’s breath would have been constitutional under the search-
    incident-to-arrest exception, no fundamental right is implicated here. See Bernard, 859
    N.W.2d at 773 (concluding that Bernard did not have a fundamental right to refuse a
    constitutional search).
    Because no fundamental right is implicated, we apply a rational-basis review to
    assess the constitutionality of the test-refusal statute. Id. at 773 (“If a statute does not
    implicate a fundamental right, we assess its constitutionality using rational basis
    review.”). To survive rational-basis review, a statute must not be “arbitrary or
    capricious” and will be upheld so long as it is “a reasonable means to a permissive
    object.” Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “the state has a compelling
    interest in highway safety justifying efforts to keep impaired drivers off the road.”
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    Bendorf v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 
    727 N.W.2d 410
    , 417 (Minn. 2007). The supreme
    court has also held that “it is rational to conclude that criminalizing the refusal to submit
    to a breath test relates to the [s]tate’s ability to prosecute drunk drivers and keep
    Minnesota roads safe.” Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 774. Because the test-refusal statute is a
    reasonable means to a permissive object, it passes rational-basis review. State v. Behl,
    
    564 N.W.2d 560
    , 567 (Minn. 1997). Thus, Willems’s due-process rights were not
    violated.
    Affirmed.
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