United States v. Josie Arvizu ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    OCT 28 2019
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No.   18-10285
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                D.C. No.
    4:17-cr-01056-JGZ-BPV-1
    v.
    JOSIE ARVIZU,                                    MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellant.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No.   18-10296
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                D.C. No.
    4:17-cr-01056-JGZ-BPV-2
    v.
    ERIKA HERNANDEZ-NUNEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Submitted October 23, 2019**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: KLEINFELD and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,*** Judge.
    Defendants-Appellants, Josie Arvizu and Erika Hernandez-Nunez
    (collectively, “Defendants”), appeal from the district court's denial of their motion
    to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a stop of their vehicle, during which
    illegal aliens were discovered in the trunk. Defendants entered conditional plea
    agreements to the transport of illegal aliens for profit under 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(v)(i), 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), and 1324(a)(1)(B)(i). They reserved their
    rights to appeal the denial of their motion to suppress. We have jurisdiction under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm the district court decision.
    We review “de novo the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress and
    for clear error the district court’s underlying findings of fact.” United States v.
    Evans, 
    786 F.3d 779
    , 784 (9th Cir. 2015). Reasonable suspicion determinations
    are reviewed de novo, findings of historical fact are reviewed for clear error and
    due weight is given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and
    local law enforcement officers.” United States v. Valdes-Vega, 
    738 F.3d 1074
    ,
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of
    International Trade, sitting by designation.
    2
    1077 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted). “We thus apply ‘a peculiar sort of
    de novo review,’ United States v. Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. 266
    , 278 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
    concurring), slightly more circumscribed than usual, because we defer to the
    inferences drawn by the district court and the officers on the scene, not just the
    district court's factual findings.” 
    Id.
    A law enforcement officer may “stop and briefly detain a person for
    investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by
    articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks
    probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 
    490 U.S. 1
    , 7 (1989). In determining
    whether there was reasonable suspicion, a court looks at the totality of the
    circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 
    449 U.S. 411
    , 417 (1981). “The
    reasonable-suspicion standard is not a particularly high threshold to reach.”
    Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1078. “Reasonable suspicion is a commonsense,
    nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of
    everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Id.
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    Here, a number of facts support the district court’s finding of reasonable
    suspicion for stopping Defendants’ car. The San Miguel West Church is
    surrounded by the dense Vamori Wash, which is known to provide coverage for
    3
    illegal aliens crossing the border. There were recent incidents of alien smuggling
    in the area of the church. Defendants’ car was unknown to the agents, was
    registered in Tucson, more than 90 minutes away, and had crossed the border from
    Mexico less than 72 hours earlier. The car only stayed at the church for a short
    period of time. Leaving the church the car drove faster than local traffic, kicking
    up dust, and, contrary to the practice of local drivers, slowed down when the agent
    began to follow it. The agent “observed a disturbance in the dirt on the vehicle’s
    trunk, consistent with handprints previously found on the trunks of vehicles
    transporting illegal aliens in the trunk.” These factors created a reasonable
    suspicion even if, as Defendants contend, there could be innocent reasons for each
    of them. The totality of the circumstances supports the finding of reasonable
    suspicion. See United States v. Diaz-Juarez, 
    299 F.3d 1138
     (9th Cir. 2002); United
    States v. Guzman-Padilla, 
    573 F.3d 865
     (9th Cir. 2009).
    Defendants’ convictions are AFFIRMED.
    4