Legal Sense, Done With The Intent To Commit a Crime.'\" State v. Smith, 119 Tenn. 521 ( 1998 )


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  •               IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE                     FILED
    JANUARY 1998 SESSION
    March 25, 1998
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appe llate Court C lerk
    NELSON B. GRAVES,       )
    )
    Appellant,   )                No. 01C01-9705-CR-00171
    )
    )                 Johnson County
    v.                      )
    )                 Honorable Lynn W. Brown, Judge
    )
    HOWARD CARLTON, WARDEN,)                  (Habeas Corpus)
    and STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
    )
    Appellees.   )
    CONCURRING OPINION
    I concur in the results and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I
    would hold, though, that the indictments sufficiently contain any necessary mens rea by
    allegations that the offenses were “feloniously” committed. Historically, the word
    “feloniously” has meant “[p]roceeding from an evil heart or purpose; done with a
    deliberate intention of committing a crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary 617 (6th ed. 1990).
    As our supreme court has previously noted, “one meaning attached to the word is: ‘In a
    legal sense, done with the intent to commit a crime.’” State v. Smith, 
    119 Tenn. 521
    ,
    526, 
    105 S.W. 68
    , 70 (1907). Thus, I believe that the indictments include any required
    mens rea.
    ____________________________
    Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01C01-9705-CR-00171

Filed Date: 3/25/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/31/2014