United States v. Andre Franklin , 701 F. App'x 575 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         JUN 29 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    16-50095
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 2:15-cr-00067-DSF-1
    v.
    ANDRE FRANKLIN,                                 MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 11, 2017
    Pasadena, California
    Before: PREGERSON and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and DONATO,**
    District Judge.
    Defendant Andre Franklin appeals his 60-month sentence following a guilty
    plea to distributing cocaine base in the form of crack cocaine, in violation of 21
    U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Franklin argues that the district court
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable James Donato, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    erred by not recognizing that it could adjust the five-year mandatory minimum
    sentence prescribed by § 841(b)(1)(B) to account for the 18 months he served in
    state custody for related conduct. His guilty plea in this case, however, was
    entered pursuant to a plea agreement with the Government which contained a
    waiver of Franklin’s right to appeal his sentence. We conclude that Franklin’s
    appellate waiver bars this appeal, and we dismiss it on that basis.
    Cognizant of the appellate waiver in his plea agreement, Franklin argues that
    he has been freed to appeal because the Government breached the plea agreement
    at the sentencing phase of this case. Because Franklin did not make this argument
    to the district court, we review it under a plain error standard. See United States v.
    Hernandez-Castro, 
    814 F.3d 1044
    , 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2016) (reviewing argument
    that appellate waiver was unenforceable due to the government’s plea agreement
    breach for plain error where defendant had not objected to the breach in the district
    court (citing Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009)).1 “Relief for plain
    1
    Franklin argues that his unpreserved plea agreement claim should be reviewed de
    novo under United States v. Gonzalez, 
    16 F.3d 985
    (9th Cir. 1993), but this
    argument is foreclosed by Puckett and Hernandez-Castro. Although Hernandez-
    Castro did not expressly state that Gonzalez is clearly irreconcilable with Puckett,
    there is no other way to understand Hernandez-Castro, which cited Gonzalez in the
    very paragraph that applied Puckett’s plain error 
    standard. 577 F.3d at 1045-46
    ;
    see also United States v. Lovelace, 
    565 F.3d 1080
    , 1086 (8th Cir. 2009)
    (“Following Puckett, this court holds that when a defendant seeks to avoid an
    appellate waiver contained in a plea agreement by arguing, for the first time on
    appeal, that the government breached the plea agreement, this court will review the
    2
    error is available if there has been (1) error; (2) that was plain; (3) that affected
    substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
    reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Whitney, 
    673 F.3d 965
    ,
    970 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Cannel, 
    517 F.3d 1172
    , 1176 (9th
    Cir. 2008)).
    We conclude as an initial matter that the Government breached the plea
    agreement in this case. The Government agreed to recommend a base offense
    level of 24 in the plea agreement, but took the position in its sentencing
    memorandum that a base offense level of 26, as calculated by the United States
    Probation Office (“USPO”), was “technically accurate.”2 The Government
    emphasizes that it simultaneously entreated the court to “vary downward from the
    forfeited claim (and related claims) under the plain error test of Fed. R. Crim. P.
    52(b).”).
    2
    The Government claims it was merely providing complete and accurate
    sentencing information to the district court, relying on United States v. Maldonado,
    
    215 F.3d 1046
    (9th Cir. 2000). But Maldonado and similar cases, which stand for
    the proposition that the Government must correct factual inaccuracies relevant to
    sentencing and respond truthfully to the district court’s questions, have no
    application here. The Government was neither correcting a factual error in the plea
    agreement nor responding to an inquiry from the district court; rather, the
    Government offered an unsolicited opinion about the USPO’s position on relevant
    conduct. Nothing precluded the Government from staying silent about the USPO’s
    analysis “and then performing as promised under the plea agreement,” namely, by
    recommending that the district court anchor its sentencing calculations on a base
    offense level of 24. Cf. United States v. Manzo, 
    675 F.3d 1204
    , 1211-12 (9th Cir.
    2012) (holding that the Government’s obligation to honestly answer the district
    court’s questions “did not preclude” doing so and then recommending the sentence
    agreed upon in the plea agreement).
    3
    USPO’s total offense level of 26 and impose a sentence consistent with the parties’
    plea agreement by applying a base offense level of 24.” But the Government did
    not promise in the plea agreement to seek a variance on Franklin’s behalf; it agreed
    to a base offense level of 24 and obligated itself to “abide by all agreements
    regarding sentencing contained in [the plea] agreement.” The Government clearly
    contravened those guarantees by representing that the higher base offense level
    was correct and recommending that the court vary downward from it. See United
    States v. Mondragon, 
    228 F.3d 978
    , 980 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he government is
    held to the literal terms of the [plea] agreement.”).
    Nonetheless, we conclude that the Government’s breach did not affect
    Franklin’s substantial rights because he himself argued for a base offense level of
    26 at the sentencing hearing and, for reasons explained infra, that level actually
    lowered his sentencing range. It thus does not appear that the Government affected
    his sentence, at least not in a way detrimental to Franklin, by agreeing (in breach of
    the plea agreement) that a base offense level of 26 was the correct starting point.
    Because Franklin cannot show that the Government’s breach affected his
    substantial rights, we hold that Franklin has not shown plain error and is bound by
    his appellate waiver. See 
    Whitney, 673 F.3d at 970
    .
    But that conclusion is purely the result of the unusual, and frankly
    concerning, facts of this case. The higher base offense level calculated by the
    4
    USPO reflected its determination that the controlled substances and gun seized on
    January 15, 2013 -- seven days after the sale underlying Franklin’s offense of
    conviction -- should be considered “relevant conduct” for sentencing purposes.
    That conclusion inured to Franklin’s benefit in that it enabled him to seek a
    departure for time served in state prison for the same conduct.
    Franklin’s counsel thus found himself between Scylla and Charybdis: He
    could object to the USPO’s relevant conduct determination and the Government’s
    breach, continuing to advocate for the lower, agreed-upon base offense level, or he
    could assent to the USPO’s calculations in the hope of obtaining a better overall
    sentencing outcome for his client. Franklin’s attorney opted for the latter course
    but, in doing so, left unchallenged the Government’s compliance with the plea
    agreement and by extension, the validity of the appellate waiver in that agreement.
    The procedural hurdle barring our review of Franklin’s appeal thus resulted from
    the same concern that animates his merits argument -- his desire to avoid serving
    more time in prison based on crimes for which he has already been convicted and
    incarcerated.
    Both problems could have been avoided by the exercise of prosecutorial
    discretion. At the time of the federal indictment -- seven months after he was
    released from state prison early for good behavior and service in a fire camp --
    Franklin had obtained gainful employment and had, by all accounts, successfully
    5
    reintegrated into society. Today, he is behind bars again for essentially the same
    activity for which he already served a state prison sentence. Franklin served 18
    months in state custody for conduct that the district court took into account in
    fashioning his federal sentence. He used that time to prepare himself for a
    constructive life after prison. We fail to see how the goals of the criminal justice
    system are furthered by the prosecution and reincarceration of an individual who
    has already been punished and rehabilitated.
    But the fact remains that in his plea agreement, Franklin gave up the right to
    appeal the procedures and calculations used to determine and impose any portion
    of his sentence, and the term of imprisonment imposed by the district court, so
    long as the district court did not impose a term of imprisonment higher than 60
    months. The district court did not impose more than 60 months of imprisonment.
    And although the Government did breach the plea agreement, because the breach
    did not amount to a plain error, Franklin remains bound by the appellate waiver in
    his agreement, and we must therefore dismiss this appeal. See 
    Hernandez-Castro, 814 F.3d at 1046
    .
    DISMISSED.
    6
    FILED
    JUN 29 2017
    United States v. Franklin, No. 16-50095
    Pregerson, J., dissenting:                                                  MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    I agree that the Government breached the plea agreement. But I do not agree
    that the Government’s breach is protected by plain error review because breach of
    the plea agreement affected Defendant Andre Franklin’s substantial rights.
    Using the Government’s higher base offense level of 26 (which accounted
    for the related conduct underlying Franklin’s state conviction), Franklin
    successfully argued for a sentence reduction of 18 months based on time served in
    state prison. The majority supposes that Franklin would not have ended up with a
    more favorable sentence had the court used the lower base offense level of 24. But
    I am not so sure. Franklin likely would have made a comparable sentence
    reduction argument had the court used the lower base offense level of 24. See
    United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 
    161 F.3d 556
    , 563-64 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
    banc) (holding that a sentencing court is not categorically barred from departing
    downward based on time served in state custody, or on the lost opportunity to serve
    more of one’s state term concurrently with one’s federal term). The Government’s
    breach of the plea agreement led the district court to use a higher offense level,
    which unfairly established a higher starting point for the court’s sentencing
    calculations. Because I believe that the higher starting point ultimately impacted
    Franklin’s sentence, I would hold that the breach affected Franklin’s substantial
    rights.
    1
    Like the majority, I seriously doubt whether the goals of the criminal justice
    system were furthered by the prosecution and reincarceration of Franklin, who had
    already served significant time in prison, had obtained steady and successful
    employment, and had turned his life around.
    I also write separately to point out another concerning aspect of this case—
    the appellate waiver. Prosecutors are powerful officials in our criminal justice
    system. They wield substantial control over the levers of justice through their
    charging and plea bargaining powers. They decide whether, when, and what
    criminal charges should be brought. Mix in the threat of unnecessarily harsh
    mandatory minimums, and it is no wonder that criminal defendants bargain away
    everything they have, including, as in this case, the right to appeal. With the deck
    stacked against a criminal defendant, an appellate waiver only serves to make an
    unjust result even more likely because the waiver undermines a reviewing court’s
    role in examining a sentence for fairness and consistency. See Robert K. Calhoun,
    Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 Hastings Const. L. Q. 127 (1995); Alexandra W.
    Reimelt, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains and Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 
    51 Barb. C
    . L. Rev. 871 (2010); Kevin Bennardo, Post-Sentencing Appellate Waivers, 48
    U. Mich. J.L. Reform 347 (2015).
    For these reasons, I dissent.
    2