Kaur v. Lynch , 662 F. App'x 45 ( 2016 )


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  •      14-25
    Kaur v. Lynch
    BIA
    A075 306 900
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
    (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
    OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
    2   the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
    3   Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
    4   12th day of October, two thousand sixteen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            JON O. NEWMAN,
    8            ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
    9            RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   AMARJIT KAUR,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                   v.                                              14-25
    17                                                                   NAC
    18   LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    19   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                    Amarjit Kaur, Pro Se, Richmond Hill,
    24                                      New York.
    25
    26   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant
    27                                       Attorney General; Jennifer L.
    28                                       Lightbody, Senior Litigation
    29                                       Counsel; Laura M.L. Maroldy, Trial
    30                                       Attorney, Office of Immigration
    31                                       Litigation, United States
    32                                       Department of Justice, Washington,
    33                                       D.C.
    1        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
    4    DENIED.
    5        Petitioner Amarjit Kaur, a native and citizen of India,
    6    seeks review of a December 12, 2013, decision of the BIA denying
    7    her fifth motion to reopen.     In re Amarjit Kaur, No. A075 306
    8    900 (B.I.A. Dec. 12, 2013).    We assume the parties’ familiarity
    9    with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
    10       Our review is limited to the BIA’s December 2013 decision
    11   denying Kaur’s fifth motion to reopen her removal proceedings.
    12   See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    265 F.3d 83
    , 89-90
    13   (2d Cir. 2001).   We review the BIA’s denial of Kaur’s motion
    14   for abuse of discretion.      Ali v. Gonzales, 
    448 F.3d 515
    , 517
    15   (2d Cir. 2006).
    16       An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion
    17   to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative
    18   decision.   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R.
    19   § 1003.2(c)(2).   There is no dispute that Kaur’s September 2013
    20   motion to reopen is untimely and number barred because the final
    21   administrative decision was issued in 1998—when Kaur failed to
    22   appear in immigration court—and this was Kaur’s fifth motion.
    23   Although the time and number limitations may be excused based
    24   on a material change in conditions “in the country of
    2
    1    nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered,”
    2    8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R.
    3    § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), as discussed below, Kaur’s evidence showed
    4    only a continuation of prior conditions.
    5        Kaur’s motion alleged that police continue to look for her
    6    based on her political activities 17 years ago; she alleged the
    7    same in prior motions to reopen.    The BIA did not err in finding
    8   these conditions to be merely a continuation of those previously
    9   alleged and thus not new evidence as required for reopening.
    10   See Norani v. Gonzales, 
    451 F.3d 292
    , 294 (2d Cir. 2006); In
    11   re S-Y-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007).
    12       Moreover, the country conditions evidence in the record
    13   supports the BIA’s determination that Kaur failed to establish
    14   a material change in conditions.    Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546
    
    15 F.3d 138
    , 169 (2d Cir. 2008).      The BIA did not err in giving
    16   little weight to letters from Kaur’s father-in-law and village
    17   leader.   Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    ,
    18   342 (2d Cir. 2006); In re H-L-H & Z-Y-Z, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209,
    19   215 (BIA 2010), rev'd on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v.
    20   Holder, 
    677 F.3d 130
    (2d Cir. 2012).    First, although the 1997
    21   State Department India Country Profile, in evidence during
    22   Kaur’s original proceedings, showed improvement in conditions
    23   for Punjabi Sikhs following a widespread crackdown on violent
    24   Sikh separatists, that report also reflected that individual
    3
    1   Sikhs were still detained and questioned about prior militancy
    2   and that “[c]ustodial abuse[s of individual Sikhs] . . .
    3   remain[ed] a significant problem.”            Kaur appended similar
    4   evidence to her motion, including several newspaper articles
    5   showing isolated incidents of torture and unexplained deaths
    6   of Sikhs in police custody.        The evidence also showed that,
    7    while     torture   remained   a   problem,    the   government   was
    8    investigating and arresting offending officers.          None of her
    9    evidence establishes that Sikh separatists are at a greater
    10   threat of police violence than they were in 1998, the year of
    11   Kaur’s merits hearing.      In re S-Y-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 253.
    12   Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding no material
    13   change as needed to excuse the time and number limitations on
    14   Kaur’s motion.      8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); Ali, 
    448 F.3d 15
      at 517.
    16       Kaur also argues that the BIA should have reopened because
    17   her counsel in her initial proceeding was ineffective and
    18   allowed her to be ordered removed in absentia.        We, as did the
    19   BIA, decline to reach this issue as we have already addressed
    20   it and found it without merit.       A motion to reopen is not a
    21   vehicle to present previously rejected arguments based on
    22   evidence that existed years prior to the filing of the motion.
    23   See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (requiring new evidence for reopening);
    24   Johnson v. Holder, 
    564 F.3d 95
    , 99 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that
    4
    1    “law of the case” doctrine requires court to adhere to prior
    2    decision on issue in subsequent stages of same case).
    3        For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    4    DENIED.    As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
    5    that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
    6    and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
    7    is DISMISSED as moot.    Any pending request for oral argument
    8    in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    9    Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    10   34.1(b).
    11                                 FOR THE COURT:
    12                                 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    5