Ronnie Sanders, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2016 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 15-0711
    Filed October 12, 2016
    RONNIE SANDERS,
    Applicant-Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Thomas J. Bice,
    Judge.
    The defendant appeals from the district court’s dismissal of application for
    postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
    Edward W. Bjornstad of Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
    2
    POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
    Ronnie Sanders appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his
    application for postconviction relief (PCR). Sanders maintains the district court
    was wrong to dismiss his application because he established that he received
    ineffective assistance from trial counsel.    Sanders asserts he would have
    accepted the offer to plead to a “C” felony rather than going to trial on the “B”
    felony count with which he was charged if his attorney had explained the
    agreement to him.
    Although PCR proceedings are generally reviewed for correction of errors
    at law, we review alleged constitutional violations de novo. See Reilly v. Iowa
    Dist. Ct., 
    783 N.W.2d 490
    , 493 (Iowa 2010).
    To succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance, Sanders has the burden
    to establish both that his counsel breached an essential duty and prejudice
    resulted. See Lamasters v. State, 
    821 N.W.2d 856
    , 866 (Iowa 2012). We may
    affirm if either element is lacking. 
    Id. The essential-duty
    prong requires the
    applicant to prove counsel performed below the standard of a reasonably
    competent attorney; we start from the presumption that counsel performed
    competently. 
    Id. As here,
    where the applicant claims they would have accepted
    a plea agreement but for counsel’s failure, to establish prejudice the applicant
    “must show the outcome of the plea process would have been different with
    competent advice.” Dempsey v. State, 
    860 N.W.2d 860
    , 868 (Iowa 2015) (citing
    Lafler v. Cooper, 
    132 S. Ct. 1376
    , 1384 (2012)). In order to do so, Sanders must
    demonstrate:
    3
    (1) “a reasonable probability [he] would have accepted the earlier
    plea offer had [he] been afforded effective assistance of counsel”;
    (2) “a reasonable probability the plea would have been entered
    without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to
    accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under
    state law”; and (3) “a reasonable probability that the end result of
    the criminal process would have been more favorable by reason of
    a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.”
    See 
    id. at 869
    (alteration in original) (quoting Missouri v. Frye, 
    132 S. Ct. 1399
    ,
    1409 (2012)). “In establishing a reasonable probability a claimant would have
    accepted the earlier plea offer had he or she received effective assistance of
    counsel, a claimant must proffer more than his or her own subjective, self-serving
    testimony.” 
    Id. At the
    PCR hearing, Sanders testified that he would have accepted the
    State’s second plea offer if his attorney had explained the agreement to him, if he
    understood the possible maximum sentence he could receive if he went to trial,
    and if he knew about the special sentence that attached to a conviction for sexual
    abuse in the second degree. When asked what he had to offer to show that he
    would have accepted the agreement, Sanders testified:
    Well, because if I would have known—It’s just really pretty
    simple math. I mean, if I would have known I was going to have to
    end up doing almost eighteen years to be eligible for parole versus
    anywhere between four and seven years, depending on what kind
    of “C” Felony that it was going to be, then I mean that’s kind of a
    pretty simple choice.
    Here, the PCR court found the testimony of Sanders’ trial counsel more credible
    than the testimony of Sanders. At the hearing, trial counsel testified that he did
    communicate with Sanders regarding the plea agreement, and he remembered
    feeling frustrated that Sanders was so unwilling to consider it. Additionally, trial
    counsel had made a record before trial accurately listing the possible plea
    4
    agreement and asking Sanders, “I just want to confirm on the record that you are
    not interested in that offer and you have rejected it and you want to go to trial on
    Tuesday. Is that correct?” Sanders confirmed that it was.
    Upon our de novo review, Sanders has not established that counsel
    breached an essential duty. Trial counsel testified credibly that he had discussed
    the plea agreement with Sanders before making the record of his refusal. As the
    PCR court found:
    [Trial counsel] fulfilled his obligation to communicate with this client
    about the pending plea bargain and to explain to him the pros and
    cons of accepting or rejecting such an offer. It is not for defense
    trial counsel to “handicap” the odds of success but rather to explain
    the options at hand and allow the client to make an informed
    decision. That is exactly what happened here.
    We affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-0711

Filed Date: 10/12/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/12/2016