becon-construction-company-inc-and-bechtel-equipment-operations-inc-v ( 2014 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-13-00295-CV
____________________
BECON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. AND BECHTEL
EQUIPMENT OPERATIONS, INC., Appellants
V.
JOSE ALONSO, MIGUEL BETANCOURT, JOSE RODRIGUEZ, LUIS
GUAJARDO, ALEJANDRO SALINAS, AND RICARDO SALINAS JR.,
Appellees
_______________________________________________________ ______________
On Appeal from the 58th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. A-190,853
________________________________________________________ _____________
OPINION
In this permissive appeal, we address whether the exclusive remedy defense
provided by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act applies on a worksite that was
subject to a contractor-controlled insurance program. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§
406.123, 408.001 (West 2006). Because the summary-judgment proof of the
appellants, who were subcontractors on the site, established that they were entitled
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to rely on the exclusive remedy defense, the appellants’ joint motion for summary
judgment should not have been denied. The trial court also erred by granting the
appellees’ no-evidence cross-motion for summary judgment, which asserted that
the appellants could not rely on the exclusive remedy defense because they
provided the trial court with no evidence to show that the general workplace
insurance plan in which the appellants were enrolled complied with several Texas
Department of Insurance regulations that apply to such plans. We grant the
appellants’ joint motion for summary judgment, we deny the appellees’ no-
evidence cross-motion for summary judgment, and we order that the appellees take
nothing on their claims against the appellants.
Background
In January 2011, Jose Alonso, Miguel Betancourt, Jose Rodriguez, Luis
Guajardo, Alejandro Salinas, and Ricardo Salinas Jr. (the employees and appellees)
were on a scaffold working at a refinery on a project that involved work that other
contractors and subcontractors were performing when a crane collapsed. All of the
appellees who are parties to this suit, except Luis Guajardo, were employees of
A&L Industrial Services, Inc. when the incident occurred; Luis was employed by
Empire Scaffold, LLC. Initially, the employees sued Motiva Enterprises LLC and
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Becon Construction Company, Inc.; later, they sued Bechtel Equipment
Operations, Inc. in the same suit.
When the crane collapsed, A&L Industrial and Empire Scaffold were
subcontractors on Motiva’s project. Both were subcontractors to Performance
Contractors, Inc., and Performance was working on the project under a contract
with Motiva. The Motiva/Performance contract obligated Performance to provide
labor and equipment on the project and required Performance to take directions on
the project from the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture. The various contracts in
evidence reflect that the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture was the contractor placed in
charge of managing the overall project.
The various contracts on the project also included clauses requiring the
various contractors and subcontractors to have various types of insurance for the
project, including a workers’ compensation policy that covered their respective
employees while they worked on the project. The parties to the prime contract on
the project were Motiva, Jacobs Engineering Group Inc., and Bechtel Corporation.
The contract, with respect to the provisions that concern insurance for the project,
required the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture, the project’s general contractor, to
“bring into effect a Contractor Controlled Insurance Program[.]” With respect to
the workers’ compensation coverage for the project, the program for the project
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obligated the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture to obtain a policy covering all of the
contractors and subcontractors who were to work on the project.1
The parties do not dispute that when the collapse occurred, Becon
Construction and Bechtel Equipment (the subcontractors) were providing either
construction equipment or services for the project under their respective
subcontracts. Under their respective subcontracts with Performance, A&L
Industrial and Empire Scaffold were not obligated to take direction on their work
from the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture; they were under contract to Performance.
But, they were indirectly required to take direction from the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint
Venture, as Performance’s contract with Motiva required that Performance take
direction on its work from the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture.
There is also no dispute that Becon Construction and Bechtel Equipment
were named as insureds on the workers’ compensation policy obtained for the
project by the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture. The summary-judgment evidence
included various insurance policy endorsements and schedules, and these indicate
1
The contract contains an exception to the single-policy-for-the-project
requirement, and allowed the contractors and subcontractors, by express
agreement, to be excluded from the contract requirement that they enroll in the
general workplace insurance plan. With respect to A&L Industrial and Empire
Scaffold, the employers of the appellees, there was no summary-judgment
evidence indicating that they had express agreements that excluded them from the
requirement to enroll in the general workplace insurance plan created for the
project.
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that the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture, Becon Construction, Bechtel Equipment,
Performance, A&L Industrial, and Empire Scaffold, as well as numerous other
entities not subject to the appeal, were named as additional insureds on the
workers’ compensation policy that the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture procured for
the project. In the Motiva/Performance contract, Performance and its
subcontractors were required to enroll as insureds in the general workplace
insurance plan created for the project.
The employees who sued were injured when a crane owned by Bechtel
Equipment and operated by Becon Construction collapsed. The employees who
sued were present and were working on the project because their respective
employers, A&L Industrial and Empire Scaffold, had contracts with Performance.
The employees of Empire Scaffold and A&L Industrial who sued collected
compensation benefits under the workers’ compensation policy obtained under the
requirements obligating the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture to procure the insurance
coverage for the contractors and subcontractors who were to work on the project.
The Parties’ Arguments
Arguing that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision limited the employees to
their compensation benefits and precluded them from bringing their common law
damage claims, Becon Construction and Bechtel Equipment moved for summary
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judgment on all of the claims of the employees that sued them. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
166a(c). In their appeal, Becon Construction and Bechtel Equipment contend the
trial court erred by not granting their joint motion for summary judgment, and they
argue the trial court should have rendered a take-nothing judgment in their favor on
the employees’ claims.
In response to Becon Construction’s and Bechtel Equipment’s joint motion
for summary judgment, the employees filed a combined response and no-evidence
motion for summary judgment. See generally Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) (allowing a
party to move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence to
support specified essential elements of the other party’s claims). In their response
and cross-motion, the employees argue that A&L Industrial and Empire Scaffold
were performing their work under their master contracts with Performance; that the
master contracts predate the Motiva/Performance contract and their subcontracts;
and that the terms of their master contracts, which also included workers’
compensation requirements, control the legal relationship with respect to who was
required to provide a compensation policy for their employers. The employees
conclude that the insurance provisions found in their master contracts with
Performance take precedence over the insurance requirements found in the
Motiva/Performance contract. Additionally, the employees’ response and cross-
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motion argues that the general workplace insurance plan created for Motiva’s
project failed to comply with several regulations of the Texas Department of
Insurance that apply to such plans. Specifically, the employees note in their
response that the contracts governing the general workplace insurance plan on
Motiva’s project did not provide that the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture was to
continue to provide compensation coverage if the general workplace insurance
plan were to be terminated, and they argue that the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture
failed to provide the Texas Department of Insurance with the estimated number of
employees affected by the general workplace insurance plan.
The trial court denied Becon Construction’s and Bechtel Equipment’s joint
motion, and it granted the no-evidence motion filed by the employees. The trial
court’s order on the parties’ respective motions included a provision that gave
Becon Construction and Bechtel Equipment the opportunity to have its rulings
reviewed in an interlocutory appeal. After the trial court granted the appellants the
right to pursue an interlocutory appeal from its order on these motions, we agreed
to hear the appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(d) (West Supp.
2014); see also Tex. R. App. P. 28.3.
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Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment using a
de novo standard of review. See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128
S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). With respect to their joint motion, Becon
Construction and Bechtel Equipment were required to show that no genuine issue
of material fact existed, and to show that they were entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); see also Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 216. On appeal, we
review the summary-judgment record “in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against
the motion.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005).
Becon Construction and Bechtel Equipment also appeal from the trial
court’s ruling on the employees’ no-evidence motion for summary judgment. “A
no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict, and we
apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary
judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict.” King Ranch, Inc. v.
Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex. 2003).
The standards under Rule 166a(i) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
govern trial courts in resolving no-evidence motions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
To prevail on a no-evidence summary-judgment motion, a movant must establish
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that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of the adverse party’s
cause of action or affirmative defense. Id.; Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v.
Reese, 148 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 2004). To defeat the motion, the nonmovant must
present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to each of the elements
challenged by the moving party’s no-evidence motion. Id. In responding to a no-
evidence motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must produce more than a
scintilla of evidence to avoid summary judgment. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135
S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). A no-evidence motion may be granted only when
“(a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred
by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to
prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a
mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital
fact.” Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)
(citing Robert W. Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of
Error, 38 Texas L. Rev. 361, 362-63 (1960)). More than a scintilla of evidence
exists when the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-
minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879
S.W.2d 10, 25 (Tex. 1994) (citing William Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another
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Look at “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence,” 69 Texas L. Rev. 515, 522,
523 (1991)).
In this case, the parties’ dispute concerns whether the Act’s exclusive
remedy defense provides Becon Construction and Bechtel Equipment a defense to
the employees’ common law injury claims. The resolution of the parties’
arguments on that question requires that we construe the Act. On appeal, a trial
court’s interpretation of a statute is reviewed as a question of law, using a de novo
standard. State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). After construing the
statute, we determine whether the trial court properly resolved the respective
motions. See Rose v. Ben C. Hebert Heirs, 305 S.W.3d 874, 878 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2010, no pet.).
The trial court’s resolution of the motions also required the trial court to
construe the various contracts in evidence and to decide whether the parties
intended to require A&L Industrial and Empire Scaffold to be governed by the
insurance procured to establish the general workplace insurance plan or by the
insurance required by the master service agreements that their employers had with
Performance. Unambiguous written instruments are construed by courts, as matters
of law. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983). “Whether a contract is
ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide by looking at the contract as
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a whole in light of the circumstances present when the contract was entered.” Id. at
394. To determine the parties’ intent under a contract, courts “must examine and
consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the
provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless.” J.M.
Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003). If a court properly
concludes that a relevant contract term is ambiguous, the court should deny a
request for summary judgment “because the interpretation of the instrument
becomes a fact issue.” Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 394.
Analysis
The exclusive remedies provision of the Act states: “Recovery of workers’
compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by
workers’ compensation insurance coverage or a legal beneficiary against the
employer or an agent or employee of the employer for the death of or a work-
related injury sustained by the employee.” Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.001(a).
Section 406.123 of the Act allows general contractors and subcontractors to enter
into written agreements “under which the general contractor provides workers’
compensation insurance coverage to the subcontractor and the employees of the
subcontractor.” See id. § 406.123(a). When such an agreement is made, it “makes
the general contractor the employer of the subcontractor and the subcontractor’s
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employees only for purposes of the workers’ compensation laws of this state.” Id. §
406.123(e).
According to the employees, the exclusive remedy defense does not apply
because Performance and the respective subcontractors for whom they were
working did not have written agreements that required Performance to provide
them with the workers’ compensation insurance coverage on the project at issue.
The employees note that Performance, their general contractor for the project, was
not required to obtain the compensation policy for the project on which they were
injured; they conclude that because Performance did not obtain the policy, the
provisions in the Act that relate to general workplace insurance plans did not apply
to the project. They further note that their respective employers were required
under their master service agreements with Performance to provide a compensation
policy for the work done by Empire Scaffold and A&L Industrial, which
agreements predate the Motiva project.
The employees’ argument that the Act does not extend to the subcontractors
they sued relies on language in Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers. See 282
S.W.3d 433, 436 (Tex. 2009). Summers, however, involved a worksite where the
issue was whether the premises owner, Entergy, could utilize the exclusive remedy
defense because it was not the general contractor on the project. Id. at 435-36. The
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Texas Supreme Court decided that even though Entergy was the premises owner, it
could nevertheless rely on the exclusive remedy defense provided by the Act under
the general worksite insurance plan that was created for that project. Id. at 444-45.
With respect to the Motiva project, however, the question is not whether Motiva
can benefit from the general workplace insurance plan. The question before us is
whether various tiers of subcontractors are entitled to rely on the exclusive remedy
defense given the structure of the contractual relationships that were created for the
Motiva project. Here, the defendants seeking to rely on the exclusive remedy
defense were subcontractors who were working on the Motiva project along with
the employers of the employees who sued; thus, the case now before us involves
tiers of relationships that were not present on Entergy’s project.
Nevertheless, the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Summers is instructive.
Id. In concluding that Entergy could raise the exclusive remedy defense as a bar to
the common law claims of the employees that sued it, the Texas Supreme Court
interpreted the Act “in the context of a policy that encourages the provision of
workers’ compensation coverage to all workers on a given work site[.]” Id. at 444.
As recognized by another case decided by the Texas Supreme Court after it
decided Summers, “[a] general workplace insurance plan that binds a general
contractor to provide workers’ compensation insurance for its subcontractors and
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its subcontractors’ employees achieves the Legislature’s objective” with respect to
worksites where multitiered relationships exist. HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d
349, 350, 359 (Tex. 2009). Interpreting the Act “in a way that favors blanket
coverage to all workers on a site aligns more closely with the Legislature’s
‘decided bias’ for coverage.” Id. at 359 (citing Wingfoot Enters. v. Alvarado, 111
S.W.3d 134, 140 (Tex. 2003)). Given the Texas Supreme Court’s subsequent
observations in Rice about worksites involving multiple tiers of contractors, we
conclude that the employees’ reliance on Entergy as support for their argument is
misplaced.
With respect to the various contractual insurance provisions that are at issue,
the contracts are not ambiguous. Collectively, the contracts contain an
unambiguous expression that makes it clear that Motiva, the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint
Venture, Becon Construction, Bechtel Equipment, Performance, Empire Scaffold,
and A&L Industrial intended to create a general workplace insurance plan
providing a single workers’ compensation insurance policy covering all of their
respective employees.
The prime contract between the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture and Motiva
required Bechtel-Jacobs to establish a contractor-controlled insurance program,
creating a general workplace insurance plan for the project. Motiva’s contract with
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Performance required that Performance and its subcontractors enroll in the general
workplace insurance plan created by the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture. The
contract between Motiva and Performance also required that Performance “take
direction from . . . the MANAGING CONTRACTOR[,]” which was defined
elsewhere in that same agreement as “the BECHTEL-JACOBS, JOINT
VENTURE[.]”
In the trial court and on appeal, the employees also argue that the insurance
provisions governing their work were not those found in Performance’s contract
with Motiva. Instead, the employees contend that their work on the project was
governed by the master service agreements found in the respective contracts
between Empire Scaffold, A&L Industrial, and Performance. The insurance
provision at issue that is in both of the master service agreements provides:
Subcontractor shall at its own expense purchase and maintain in a company
or companies lawfully authorized to do business in the State of Louisiana
and in companies satisfactory to Contractor, insurance coverage, as
specified in this section. Such insurance shall be maintained until final
payment by Owner and will protect Contractor and the Subcontractor from
claims set forth below which may arise out of or result from the
Subcontractor’s operations under the Contract and for which the Contractor
may be liable, whether such operations be by the Subcontractor or by
anyone directly or indirectly employed by any of them, or by anyone for
whose acts any of them may be liable.
The employees note that when their respective employers completed work
on the Motiva project, each signed work release orders referencing the respective
15
master service agreements as the controlling contract. The employees conclude that
the insurance provisions in the master service agreements controlled the insurance
requirements for their employers’ work on Motiva’s project. They contend that the
master service agreements required their respective employers to purchase the
compensation coverage that covered them at the time of the incident, and they
conclude that as a result, they were not—at the time they were injured—subject to
the insurance requirements of the general workplace insurance plan that the
Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture established for the project.
Even if we were to accept that Empire Scaffold and A&L Industrial were
performing their work on the project under the terms of their master service
agreements, we are not persuaded that the insurance provisions in the master
service agreements prevented Empire Scaffold and A&L Industrial from
complying with their respective contracts with Performance by enrolling their
employees in the general workplace insurance plan that the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint
Venture established on the project. In this case, it was undisputed that Empire
Scaffold’s and A&L Industrial’s employees were enrolled in the general workplace
plan created for the project.
While the respective master service agreements required that Empire
Scaffold and A&L Industrial purchase workers’ compensation coverage covering
16
their work, the summary-judgment evidence conclusively established that Empire
Scaffold and A&L Industrial adjusted their contract prices for the Motiva project to
account for the fact that the insurance on Motiva’s project was to be provided
through a general workplace insurance plan. The purchase provision in the
respective master agreements requiring Empire Scaffold and A&L Industrial to
purchase the coverage, under the circumstances, amounts merely to an accounting
matter. By adjusting the prices they charged for their work they were being hired to
perform, Empire Scaffold and A&L Industrial effectively purchased the coverage
for their work on Motiva’s project under the terms of the master service
agreements they had with Performance. That various insurance provisions are
found in the various contracts in this case did not create a material dispute of fact
regarding whether Empire Scaffold and A&L Industrial intended their employees
to be covered while working on the Motiva project under the general workplace
insurance plan.
With respect to the work the employees were doing at the time the crane
collapsed, we conclude that the summary-judgment evidence conclusively
establishes that A&L Industrial and Empire Scaffold were enrolled in the general
workplace insurance plan established on the Motiva project. We further conclude
that the summary-judgment evidence conclusively establishes that the employees
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collected workers’ compensation benefits through the general workplace insurance
plan.
The question not yet answered, however, is whether the exclusive remedy
defense was intended to benefit all tiers of subcontractors on a project governed by
a general workplace insurance plan. With respect to that question, the Act provides
that the exclusive remedy defense applies not only to the employer but the
employer’s agents. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.001. Additionally, the Act provides
a broad definition of who may qualify as a “general contractor” by defining the
term to include “a person who undertakes to procure the performance of work or a
service, either separately or through the use of subcontractors.” Id. § 406.121(1)
(West 2006). The Act has been interpreted to allow a premise owner to enter into
an agreement that allowed it to benefit from the exclusive remedy defense of the
Act, reasoning that a premise owner may qualify to be a general contractor as
defined by the Act. Summers, 282 S.W.3d at 444; Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §
406.123(a).
Addressing whether the exclusive remedy defense applies throughout all
tiers of contractors at a worksite governed by a general workplace insurance plan,
two of our sister courts have concluded that the defense is available. In a case that
involved a worksite arrangement similar but not identical to the one at issue here,
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the First Court of Appeals explained that where general workplace insurance plans
exist, “the purposes of the Act are best served by deeming immune from suit all
subcontractors and lower tier subcontractors who are collectively covered by
workers’ compensation insurance.” Etie v. Walsh & Albert Co., Ltd., 135 S.W.3d
764, 768 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). In Etie, the First
Court concluded that the deemed employment relationship extends throughout all
tiers of subcontractors. Id. Similarly, the San Antonio Court of Appeals has stated
that for sites governed by general workplace insurance plans, all of the employees
covered by the compensation plan for the site are treated as “‘fellow employees’”
for the purposes of the Act. See Garza v. Zachry Constr. Corp., 373 S.W.3d 715,
721 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied).
We agree with Bechtel Equipment and Becon Construction that the various
contracts governing the Motiva project qualified Bechtel Equipment and Becon
Construction for the defense the Legislature gave employers against common law
damage claims under the Act. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 406.121(1), 406.123,
408.001. The various contracts effectively made Becon Construction and Bechtel
Equipment agents of the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture for purposes of
compensation coverage; consequently, both Becon Construction and Bechtel
Equipment were entitled to rely on the exclusive remedy defense against the claims
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of the employees who sued them. Because they were participating subcontractors
on a site utilizing a general workplace insurance plan authorized by the Act, we
hold that Becon Construction and Bechtel Equipment are entitled to assert the
exclusive remedy defense to the same extent that the defense could have been
asserted by the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture. See id. § 408.001(a).
In the trial court and on appeal, the employees also argue that the exclusive
remedy defense does not apply because the summary-judgment evidence showed
that the general workplace plan did not comply with certain administrative rules
for such plans promulgated by the Texas Department of Insurance. According to
the employees, the general workplace plan on Motiva’s project failed to comply
with administrative rules governing such plans because it fails to state that the
subcontractor and the subcontractor’s employees are employees of the general
contractor for the sole purpose of workers’ compensation coverage, and fails to
state the estimated number of workers that are affected by the agreement. See 28
Tex. Admin. Code § 112.101 (2014) (Tex. Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp.,
Scope of Liab. for Comp.). Because the general workplace insurance plan on
Motiva’s project violated these administrative rules, the employees contend that
Becon Construction and Bechtel Equipment cannot rely on the Act’s exclusive
remedy defense. In their brief, Becon Construction and Bechtel Equipment argue
20
that the Department’s administrative regulations are directory, not mandatory, and
that the Department did not create an administrative penalty stripping entities of
the exclusive remedy defense provided by the Legislature in the Act for violations
of these specific regulations.
Neither the Act nor the regulations governing contractor-controlled
insurance programs in the Administrative Code describe the penalty for violating
the administrative rules at issue. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 406.123, 408.001; 28
Tex. Admin. Code § 112.101(a)(2), (a)(6). Given the Legislature’s “decided bias in
favor of employers electing to provide coverage” through a policy “that
encourages the provision of workers’ compensation coverage to all workers on a
given work site,” the Act should not be interpreted in the manner the employees
argue. The employees’ interpretation would discourage contractors from becoming
involved in worksites governed by general workplace insurance plans and might
prevent some employees who would otherwise be covered by insurance from being
covered under these types of policies due to the violation of regulations, as it does
not appear that the Legislature intended for these types of violations to strip
employers of defenses or to cause employees to lose the benefits of their coverage.
See Summers, 282 S.W.3d at 444; Wingfoot Enters. v. Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d 134,
140 (Tex. 2003). We conclude that the proper penalty for the violations raised by
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the employees is a matter that should be left to the Texas Department of Insurance.
See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.001(a).
The employees also contend that Becon Construction and Bechtel
Equipment failed to conclusively establish that the contracts governing the general
workplace insurance plan required the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture to continue to
provide compensation coverage if the plan were to be terminated. The employees
argue that a possibility exists under the contracts at issue that the insurance
coverage on the project could be discontinued. However, nothing in the summary-
judgment evidence shows that the compensation carrier that is obligated to pay the
employees their compensation benefits has a right to terminate its obligation to pay
these employees benefits if the general workplace insurance plan were to be
discontinued. There is also no evidence showing that the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint
Venture retained the right to terminate its obligation to pay premiums on the
coverages put in place on Motiva’s project.
Regardless of what might or might not happen in the future, evaluating
whether a general workplace insurance plan provides a defendant with an exclusive
remedy defense requires that courts “look at what did happen, not what might
happen.” HCBeck, 284 S.W.3d at 359 n.4. In this case, conclusive summary-
judgment evidence shows that the employees collected compensation benefits
22
under coverage put in place based on the general workplace insurance plan
established by the Bechtel-Jacobs Joint Venture for Motiva’s project.
Conclusion
We hold that the summary-judgment evidence conclusively establishes that
the exclusive remedy defense of the Act applied to all of the claims made by the
employees who sued. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 406.123, 408.001. We hold the
trial court erred by granting the employees’ no-evidence motion for summary
judgment and by denying Becon Construction’s and Bechtel Equipment’s joint
motion for summary judgment. We reverse the trial court’s order.
Under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, we must then render the judgment
the trial court should have rendered on the motions that are the subject of the
appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(c). Therefore, we grant Becon Construction’s and
Bechtel Equipment’s joint motion for summary judgment, and we deny the
employees’ no-evidence motion for summary judgment. We further order that Jose
Alonso, Miguel Betancourt, Jose Rodriguez, Luis Guajardo, Alejandro Salinas, and
Ricardo Salinas Jr. recover nothing on all of their claims against Becon
23
Construction and Bechtel Equipment, as these are the rulings the trial court should
have rendered. 2
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
________________________________
HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Submitted on April 24, 2014
Opinion Delivered September 25, 2014
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
2
This permissive appeal concerns the employees’ negligence claims against
Becon Construction and Bechtel Equipment, and is not intended to dispose of any
claims they may have against any other defendant they have sued. See Tex. R.
App. P. 28.3.
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