Robers v. United States ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • (Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2013                                       1
    Syllabus
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
    being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
    The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
    See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 
    200 U.S. 321
    , 337.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    ROBERS v. UNITED STATES
    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
    THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12–9012. Argued February 25, 2014—Decided May 5, 2014
    Petitioner Robers was convicted of a federal crime for submitting
    fraudulent mortgage loan applications to two banks. On appeal, he
    argued that the District Court had miscalculated his restitution obli-
    gation under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 
    18 U.S. C
    . §§3663A–3664, a provision of which requires property crime
    offenders to pay “an amount equal to . . . the value of the property”
    less “the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of
    the property that is returned,” §3663A(b)(1)(B). The District Court
    had ordered Robers to pay the difference between the amount lent to
    him and the amount the banks received in selling the houses that
    had served as collateral for the loans. Robers claimed that the Dis-
    trict Court should have instead reduced the restitution amount by
    the value of the houses on the date the banks took title to them since
    that was when “part of the property” was “returned.” The Seventh
    Circuit rejected Robers’ argument.
    Held: The phrase “any part of the property . . . returned” refers to the
    property the banks lost, namely, the money they lent to Robers, and
    not to the collateral the banks received, namely, the houses. Read
    naturally, the words “the property,” which appear seven times in
    §3663A(b)(1), refer to the property that was lost as a result of the
    crime, here, the money. Because “[g]enerally, ‘identical words used
    in different parts of the same statute are . . . presumed to have the
    same meaning,’ ” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit,
    
    547 U.S. 71
    , 86 (quoting IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 
    546 U.S. 21
    , 34), “the
    property . . . returned” must also be the property lost as a result of
    the crime. Any awkwardness or redundancy that comes from substi-
    tuting an amount of money for the words “the property” is the lin-
    guistic price paid for having a single statutory provision that covers
    2                      ROBERS v. UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    different kinds of property. Since valuing money is easier than valu-
    ing other types of property, the natural reading also facilitates the
    statute’s administration.
    Robers’ contrary arguments are unconvincing. First, other provi-
    sions of the statute, see, e.g., §§3664(f)(2), (3)(A), (4), seem to give
    courts adequate authority to avoid Robers’ false dichotomy of having
    to choose between refusing to award restitution and requiring the of-
    fender to pay the full amount lent where a victim has not sold the col-
    lateral by the time of sentencing. Second, for purposes of the stat-
    ute’s proximate-cause requirement, see §§3663A(a)(2), 3664(e),
    normal market fluctuations do not break the causal chain between
    the offender’s fraud and the losses incurred by the victim. Third,
    even assuming that the return of collateral compensates lenders for
    their losses under state mortgage law, the issue here is whether the
    statutory provision, which does not purport to track state mortgage
    law, requires that collateral received be valued at the time the victim
    received it. Finally, the rule of lenity does not apply here. See Mus-
    carello v. United States, 
    524 U.S. 125
    , 139. Pp. 3–7.
    
    698 F.3d 937
    , affirmed.
    BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SO-
    TOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.
    Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)                              1
    Opinion of the Court
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
    notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
    ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
    that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 12–9012
    _________________
    BENJAMIN ROBERS, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
    [May 5, 2014]
    JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
    The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 requires
    certain offenders to restore property lost by their victims
    as a result of the crime. 
    18 U.S. C
    . §3663A. A provision
    in the statue says that, when return of the property lost by
    the victim is “impossible, impracticable, or inadequate,”
    the offender must pay the victim “an amount equal to . . .
    the value of the property” less “the value (as of the date
    the property is returned) of any part of the property that is
    returned.” §3663A(b)(1)(B). The question before us is
    whether “any part of the property” is “returned” when a
    victim takes title to collateral securing a loan that an
    offender fraudulently obtained from the victim.
    We hold that it is not. In our view, the statutory phrase
    “any part of the property” refers only to the specific prop-
    erty lost by a victim, which, in the case of a fraudulently
    obtained loan, is the money lent. Therefore, no “part of
    the property” is “returned” to the victim until the collat-
    eral is sold and the victim receives money from the sale.
    The import of our holding is that a sentencing court must
    reduce the restitution amount by the amount of money the
    victim received in selling the collateral, not the value of
    2                ROBERS v. UNITED STATES
    Opinion of the Court
    the collateral when the victim received it.
    I
    The relevant facts, as simplified, are the following: In
    2005 petitioner Benjamin Robers, acting as a straw buyer,
    submitted fraudulent loan applications to two banks. The
    banks lent Robers about $470,000 for the purchase of two
    houses, upon which the banks took mortgages. When
    Robers failed to make loan payments, the banks foreclosed
    on the mortgages. In 2006 they took title to the two houses.
    In 2007 they sold one house for about $120,000. And
    in 2008 they sold the other house for about $160,000. The
    sales took place in a falling real estate market.
    In 2010 Robers was convicted in federal court of con-
    spiracy to commit wire fraud. See §§371, 1343. He was
    sentenced to three years of probation. And the court
    ordered him to pay restitution of about $220,000, roughly
    the $470,000 the banks lent to Robers less the $280,000
    the banks received from the sale of the two houses (minus
    certain expenses incurred in selling them).
    On appeal Robers argued that the sentencing court had
    miscalculated his restitution obligation. In his view, “part
    of the property” was “returned” to the banks when they
    took title to the houses. And, since the statute says that
    “returned” property shall be valued “as of the date the
    property is returned,” the sentencing court should have
    reduced the restitution amount by more than $280,000:
    $280,000 was what the banks received from the sale of the
    houses, but since the banks sold the houses in a falling
    real estate market, the houses had been worth more when
    the banks took title to them.
    The Court of Appeals rejected Robers’ argument. 
    698 F.3d 937
    (CA7 2012). And, because different Circuits
    have come to different conclusions about this kind of
    matter, we granted Robers’ petition for certiorari. Com-
    pare 
    id., at 942
    (case below) (restitution obligation reduced
    Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)              3
    Opinion of the Court
    by money received from sale of collateral), with United
    States v. Yeung, 
    672 F.3d 594
    , 604 (CA9 2012) (restitution
    obligation reduced by value of collateral at time lender
    took title).
    II
    In our view, the phrase “any part of the property . . .
    returned” refers to the property the banks lost, namely,
    the money they lent to Robers, and not to the collateral
    the banks received, namely, the two houses. For one
    thing, that is what the statute says. The phrase is part of
    a long sentence that reads as follows:
    “(b) The order of restitution shall require that [the]
    defendant—
    “(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to
    or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the
    offense—
    “(A) return the property to the owner of the property
    . . . ; or
    “(B) if return of the property under subparagraph
    (A) is impossible, impracticable, or inadequate, pay an
    amount equal to—
    “(i) the greater of—
    “(I) the value of the property on the date of the dam-
    age, loss, or destruction; or
    “(II) the value of the property on the date of sentenc-
    ing, less
    “(ii) the value (as of the date the property is re-
    turned) of any part of the property that is returned
    . . . .” §3663A (emphasis added).
    The words “the property” appear seven times in this sen-
    tence. If read naturally, they refer to the “property” that
    was “damage[d],” “los[t],” or “destr[oyed]” as a result of the
    crime. §3663A(b)(1). “Generally, ‘identical words used in
    different parts of the same statute are . . . presumed to
    have the same meaning.’ ” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
    4                 ROBERS v. UNITED STATES
    Opinion of the Court
    Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 
    547 U.S. 71
    , 86 (2006) (quoting IBP,
    Inc. v. Alvarez, 
    546 U.S. 21
    , 34 (2005)). And, if the “prop-
    erty” that was “damage[d],” “los[t],” or “destr[oyed]” was
    the money, then “the property . . . returned” must also be
    the money. Money being fungible, however, see, e.g.,
    Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N. A., 562 U. S. ___, ___
    (2011) (slip op., at 17); Sabri v. United States, 
    541 U.S. 600
    , 606 (2004), “the property . . . returned” need not be
    the very same bills or checks.
    We concede that substituting an amount of money, say,
    $1,000, for the words “the property” will sometimes seem
    awkward or unnecessary as, for example:
    “[I]f return of [$1,000] . . . is impossible, . . . pay an
    amount equal to . . . the greater of . . . the value of
    [$1,000] on the date of the . . . loss . . . or . . . the value
    of [$1,000] on the date of sentencing . . . .”
    §3663A(b)(1)(B).
    But any such awkwardness or redundancy is the linguistic
    price paid for having a single statutory provision that
    covers property of many different kinds. The provision is
    not awkward as applied to, say, a swindler who obtains
    jewelry, is unable to return all of the jewelry, and must
    then instead pay an amount equal to the value of all of the
    jewelry obtained less the value (as of the date of the re-
    turn) of any of the jewelry that he did return. It directs
    the court to value the returned jewelry as of the date it
    was returned and subtract that amount from the value of
    all of the jewelry the swindler obtained. As applied to
    money, the provision is in part unnecessary but reading
    the statute similarly does no harm. And the law does not
    require legislators to write extra language specifically
    exempting, phrase by phrase, applications in respect to
    which a portion of a phrase is not needed.
    The natural reading also facilitates the statute’s admin-
    istration. Many victims who lose money but subsequently
    Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)            5
    Opinion of the Court
    receive other property (e.g., collateral securing a loan) will
    sell that other property and receive money from the sale.
    And often that sale will take place fairly soon after the
    victim receives the property. Valuing the money from the
    sale is easy. But valuing other property as of the time it
    was received may provoke argument, requiring time,
    expense, and expert testimony to resolve.
    We are not convinced by Robers’ arguments to the con-
    trary. First, Robers says that, when a victim has not sold
    the collateral by the time of sentencing, our interpretation
    will lead to unfair results. A sentencing court will have
    only two choices, both undesirable. The court will either
    have to refuse to award restitution, thereby undercompen-
    sating the victim, or have to require the offender to pay
    the full amount lent to him, thereby giving the victim a
    windfall.
    In our view, however, the dilemma is a false one. Other
    provisions of the statute allow the court to avoid an under-
    compensation or a windfall. Where, for example, a sale of
    the collateral is foreseen but has not yet taken place, the
    court may postpone determination of the restitution
    amount for two to three months after sentencing, thereby
    providing the victim with additional time to sell. See
    §3664(d)(5). Where a victim receives, say, collateral, but
    does not intend to sell it, other provisions of the statute
    may come into play. Section 3664(f)(2) provides that upon
    “determination of the amount of restitution owed to
    each victim, the court shall . . . specify in the restitu-
    tion order the manner in which, and the schedule ac-
    cording to which, the restitution is to be paid.”
    Section 3664(f)(3)(A) says that a
    “restitution order may direct the defendant to make a
    single, lump-sum payment, partial payments at spec-
    ified intervals, in-kind payments, or a combination
    of payments at specified intervals and in-kind
    6                ROBERS v. UNITED STATES
    Opinion of the Court
    payments.”
    And §3664(f)(4) defines “in-kind payment” as including
    “replacement of property.” These provisions would seem
    to give a court adequate authority to count, as part of the
    restitution paid, the value of collateral previously received
    but not sold. Regardless, Robers has not pointed us to any
    case suggesting an unfairness problem. And the Govern-
    ment has conceded that the statute (whether through
    these or other provisions) provides room for “credit[s]”
    against an offender’s restitution obligation “to prevent
    double recovery to the victim.” Brief for United States 30
    (emphasis deleted).
    Robers also points out, correctly, that the statute has a
    proximate cause requirement. See §3663A(a)(2) (defining
    “victim” as “a person directly and proximately harmed as a
    result of the commission of ” the offense (emphasis added));
    §3664(e) (Government bears the “burden of demon-
    strating the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a
    result of the offense” (emphasis added)). Cf. Paroline v.
    United States, ante, at 6–11. And Robers argues that
    where, as here, a victim receives less money from a later
    sale than the collateral was worth when received, the
    market and not the offender is the proximate cause of the
    deficiency.
    We are not convinced. The basic question that a proxi-
    mate cause requirement presents is “whether the harm
    alleged has a sufficiently close connection to the conduct”
    at issue. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
    Inc., ante, at 14. Here, it does. Fluctuations in property
    values are common. Their existence (though not direction
    or amount) is foreseeable. And losses in part incurred
    through a decline in the value of collateral sold are di-
    rectly related to an offender’s having obtained collateralized
    property through fraud. That is not to say that an offender
    is responsible for everything that reduces the amount of
    Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)            7
    Opinion of the Court
    money a victim receives for collateral. Market fluctua-
    tions are normally unlike, say, an unexpected natural
    disaster that destroys collateral or a victim’s donation of
    collateral or its sale to a friend for a nominal sum—any of
    which, as the Government concedes, could break the causal
    chain. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25–27, 38–39, 46, 50–51.
    Further, Robers argues that “principles” of state mort-
    gage law “confirm that the return of mortgage collateral
    compensates a lender for its losses.” Brief for Petitioner
    30. But whether the collateral compensates a victim for
    its losses is not the question before us. That question is
    whether the particular statutory provision at issue here
    requires that collateral received be valued at the time the
    victim received it. That statutory provision does not pur-
    port to track the details of state mortgage law. Thus, even
    were we to assume that Robers is right about the details of
    state mortgage law, we would not find them sufficient to
    change our interpretation.
    Finally, Robers invokes the rule of lenity. To apply this
    rule, we would have to assume that we could interpret the
    statutory provision to help an offender like Robers, who is
    hurt when the market for collateral declines, without
    harming other offenders, who would be helped when the
    market for collateral rises. We cannot find such an inter-
    pretation. Regardless, the rule of lenity applies only if,
    after using the usual tools of statutory construction, we
    are left with a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the
    statute.” Muscarello v. United States, 
    524 U.S. 125
    , 139
    (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Having come
    to the end of our analysis, we are left with no such ambi-
    guity or uncertainty here. The statutory provision refers
    to the money lost, not to the collateral received.
    *    *   *
    For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
    is affirmed.
    It is so ordered.
    Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)                     1
    SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 12–9012
    _________________
    BENJAMIN ROBERS, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
    [May 5, 2014]
    JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG
    joins, concurring.
    I join the opinion of the Court. I write separately, how-
    ever, to clarify that I see its analysis as applying only in
    cases where a victim intends to sell collateral but encoun-
    ters a reasonable delay in doing so. See ante, at 5–6 (ex-
    plaining that where a victim “does not intend to sell”
    collateral, “other provisions of the statute may come into
    play,” enabling a court “to count, as part of the restitution
    paid, the value of collateral previously received but not
    sold”). If a victim chooses to hold collateral rather than to
    reduce it to cash within a reasonable time, then the victim
    must bear the risk of any subsequent decline in the value
    of the collateral, because the defendant is not the proxi-
    mate cause of that decline.
    Here, although the banks did not immediately sell the
    homes they received as collateral, Robers did not ade-
    quately argue below that their delay reflected a choice to
    hold the homes as investments.* Such an argument would
    ——————
    * Before the District Court, Robers suggested precisely the opposite:
    that the banks had sold the homes too hastily, at fire-sale prices in a
    falling market. See App. 35 (“The drop in value could have been due to
    the housing market itself, or due to the victim’s rush to cut their losses
    with the properties and take whatever price they could get at a sheriff’s
    sale, regardless of whether the sale price reflected the fair market value
    of the property at the time”). Before the Seventh Circuit, Robers did
    2                    ROBERS v. UNITED STATES
    SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
    likely have been fruitless, because the delay appears
    consistent with a genuine desire to dispose of the collat-
    eral. Real property is not a liquid asset, which means that
    converting it to cash often takes time. See, e.g., 
    698 F.3d 937
    , 947 (CA7 2012) (“[R]eal property is not liquid and,
    absent a huge price discount, cannot be sold immediately”).
    And indeed, the delays here appear to have resulted
    from illiquidity. See App. 70 (one of the two homes was
    placed on the market but did not immediately sell); 
    id., at 89
    (the other attracted no bids at a foreclosure sale).
    Because such delays are foreseeable, it is fair for Robers to
    bear their cost: the diminution in the homes’ value. See
    ante, at 6 (analysis of proximate causation).
    In other cases, however, a defendant might be able to
    show that a significant delay in the sale of collateral
    evinced the victim’s choice to hold it as an investment
    rather than reducing it to cash. Suppose, for example,
    that a bank received shares of a public company as collat-
    eral for a fraudulently obtained loan. “Common stock
    traded on a national exchange is . . . readily convertible
    into cash,” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 
    494 U.S. 56
    , 69
    (1990), so if the bank waited more than a reasonable time
    to sell the shares, a district court could infer that the bank
    was not really trying to sell but instead was holding the
    shares as investment assets. If the shares declined in
    value after the bank chose to hold them, it would be wrong
    for the court to make the defendant bear that loss. As the
    ——————
    suggest that the banks should have sold more quickly. See Brief for
    Appellant in No. 10–3794, p. 35 (“[T]here is no ‘loss causation’ here, . . .
    because the kind of loss that occurred (due to the market, or to the
    victims holding the property longer than they should have in a declin-
    ing market, or to other unknown factors) was not the kind for which the
    defendant’s acts could have controlled or accounted”). But this argu-
    ment does not imply that the banks’ delay reflected a choice to hold the
    homes as investments, only that the banks misjudged the timing of the
    sales.
    Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)              3
    SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
    Government acknowledged at oral argument, a victim’s
    choice to hold collateral—rather than selling it in a rea-
    sonably expeditious manner—breaks the chain of proxi-
    mate causation. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 38–39, 44–45.
    If the collateral loses value after the victim chooses to hold
    it, then that “part of the victim’s net los[s]” is “attributable
    to” the victim’s “independent decisions.” 
    Id., at 39.
    The
    defendant cannot be regarded as the “proximate cause” of
    that part of the loss, ibid., and so cannot be made to bear
    it.
    In such cases, I would place on the defendant the bur-
    den to show—with evidence specific to the market at
    issue—that a victim delayed unreasonably in selling col-
    lateral, manifesting a choice to hold the collateral. See 
    18 U.S. C
    . §3664(e) (burden to be allocated “as justice re-
    quires”). Because Robers did not sufficiently argue below
    that the banks broke the chain of proximate causation by
    choosing to hold the homes as investments, and because
    the delay encountered by the banks appears to have been
    reasonable, it is fair for Robers to bear the cost of that
    delay. I therefore join the Court in affirming the restitu-
    tion order.