Chase Hunter v. Amalia Rodriguez-Mendoza , 623 F. App'x 266 ( 2015 )


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  •      Case: 14-50766      Document: 00513292443         Page: 1    Date Filed: 12/02/2015
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-50766
    Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    December 2, 2015
    CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    AMALIA RODRIGUEZ-MENDOZA, Individually, in her official capacity as
    Clerk of the Travis County District Court in Texas; TRAVIS COUNTY
    DISTRICT COURT CLERK'S OFFICE; CHRISTINA M., Individually and in
    her capacity as Accounting Clerk for Travis County District Court; BROOKE
    DANIEL, Individually and in her capacity as 53rd Court Clerk for Travis
    County District Court,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:14-CV-510
    Before DAVIS, JONES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Chase Carmen Hunter, proceeding pro se, has filed a motion for leave to
    proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s denial of
    her motion to proceed IFP in the district court. To proceed IFP on appeal, the
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-50766      Document: 00513292443    Page: 2   Date Filed: 12/02/2015
    No. 14-50766
    appellant must demonstrate both financial eligibility and the existence of a
    nonfrivolous appellate issue. See Carson v. Polley, 
    689 F.2d 562
    , 586 (5th Cir.
    1982).
    The denial of a motion to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is an
    appealable decision. Flowers v. Turbine Support Div., 
    507 F.2d 1242
    , 1244 (5th
    Cir. 1975), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Thompson
    v. Drewry, 
    138 F.3d 984
    , 985-86 (5th Cir. 1998). Thus, we have jurisdiction to
    consider that decision in the instant appeal. See 
    id. However, because
    Hunter
    did not amend her notice of appeal or file another notice of appeal after the
    district court’s entry of judgment, we lack jurisdiction to consider the district
    court’s denial of her motions to file electronically, for the appointment of
    counsel, and to disqualify the district court judge. See Bowles v. Russell, 
    551 U.S. 205
    , 214 (2007).
    Hunter contends that the district court’s denial of her IFP motion was
    not based in fact or law but, rather, on an unreasonable assumption that there
    was an error in her financial affidavit. She also contends that the district
    court’s decision violated her right to due process, denied her access to the
    courts, and amounted to an act of tyranny and intentional judicial error.
    According to Hunter, the denial of her IFP motion is subject to de novo review
    because of the constitutional and legal issues involved.
    Contrary to Hunter’s contention, we review the district court’s denial of
    IFP status for an abuse of discretion. 
    Flowers, 507 F.2d at 1244
    . A district
    court abuses its discretion when it denies an IFP motion based on arbitrary or
    erroneous grounds. 
    Id. The district
    court’s determination that Hunter was financially ineligible
    to proceed IFP was not an abuse of discretion. See 
    id. Further, there
    is no
    constitutional right to proceed in a civil action without paying the proper filing
    2
    Case: 14-50766       Document: 00513292443   Page: 3   Date Filed: 12/02/2015
    No. 14-50766
    fee. Norton v. Dimazana, 
    122 F.3d 286
    , 290 (5th Cir. 1997). Thus, the district
    court’s refusal to grant Hunter IFP status did not violate her right to due
    process or deny her access to the court system. See 
    id. at 290-91;
    Parsell v.
    United States, 
    218 F.2d 232
    , 235 (5th Cir. 1955).
    Hunter’s contention that the district court’s decision amounted to an act
    of tyranny and intentional judicial error is likewise unavailing.            Her
    allegations of bias and prejudice stem from the magistrate and district court
    judges’ actions in the course of judicial proceedings, and the record does not
    reflect that either judge displayed a deep-seated antagonism against her that
    would have made a fair judgment impossible. See Liteky v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555 (1994).
    Hunter has not shown that “the appeal involves legal points arguable on
    their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 220
    (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly,
    her IFP motion is DENIED, and her appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See
    id.; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
    3