David Loppi v. United Investors Life Insurance Co. ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                                                                 Supreme Court
    No. 2013-340-Appeal.
    (PC 09-6095)
    David Loppi                    :
    v.                       :
    United Investors Life Insurance Co. et al.   :
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
    publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
    notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
    Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
    3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
    corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
    Supreme Court
    No. 2013-340-Appeal.
    (PC 09-6095)
    David Loppi                    :
    v.                       :
    United Investors Life Insurance Co. et al.   :
    Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
    OPINION
    Justice Robinson, for the Court.       The defendant, Marilyn Loppi,1 appeals from a
    declaratory judgment entered in Providence County Superior Court on April 25, 2012, declaring
    that she had no right to the proceeds of a life insurance policy of her late husband, Robert Loppi.
    This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and
    show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After a close
    review of the record and careful consideration of the parties’ arguments (both written and oral),
    we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and that this appeal may be decided at this time.
    For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
    1
    The other named defendant, United Investors Life Insurance Co. (United Investors), filed
    a “Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim and Cross-Claim for Interpleader, to Deposit Funds
    into the Court Registry and to be Discharged.” The Superior Court issued an order on March 6,
    2012, granting the motion filed by United Investors. Thus, after depositing the disputed funds in
    the registry of the Superior Court, United Investors ceased to be a party to this action and,
    accordingly, is not a party to this appeal.
    -1-
    I
    Facts and Travel
    In 2003, Robert Loppi purchased a life insurance policy from United Investors Life
    Insurance Co. (United Investors), in which, the parties agree, he initially named his wife,
    Marilyn Loppi, as the beneficiary. In 2008, Marilyn2 filed for divorce from Robert. On July 19,
    2008, Robert was served with the summons and complaint in that divorce action. However, on
    July 17, 2008, before the service of the divorce summons and complaint, Robert had applied
    (through a signed written request) to United Investors to change the beneficiary on his life
    insurance policy; the new beneficiary was Robert’s uncle, David Loppi, who is the plaintiff in
    this action.3
    On March 27, 2009, in the course of the divorce proceeding, an interlocutory order was
    entered in Family Court ordering that life insurance policies, annuities, and investment policies
    be “cashed in forthwith” and that the cash surrender value be divided equally between Robert
    and Marilyn. That interlocutory order instructed Robert and Marilyn to “execute any and all
    documents as needed to cash in said accounts, inclusive of any and all authorizations necessary
    for the attorneys to obtain information or for the policies to be liquidated and/or powers of
    attorney so that counsel for the parties may do so for the parties.” However, on May 28, 2009,
    before he had complied with that part of the just-referenced interlocutory Family Court order
    relating to the cash value of the life insurance policy at issue and before a final judgment was
    entered in the divorce action, Robert passed away.
    2
    Due to the fact that the persons involved in this case share the same last name, we shall
    refer to them by their first names. In doing so, we intend no disrespect.
    3
    It is important to note that the United Investors insurance policy states that changes in
    beneficiaries “take effect on the date the request was signed[.]”
    -2-
    According to the complaint filed by David in Superior Court, after Robert’s death United
    Investors declined to pay the life insurance death benefit, the face amount of which was
    $375,000, to either David or Marilyn, even though United Investors acknowledged that David
    was the named beneficiary. In consequence, on October 21, 2009, David filed the instant action
    in Superior Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that he alone was entitled to the life insurance
    policy death benefit. On December 1, 2011, Marilyn filed a document which indicated that it
    constituted both an objection to David’s complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and a cross-
    motion for declaratory judgment. On March 8, 2012, David filed a “Motion to Close Record and
    Submit for Decision.”
    On April 17, 2012, the hearing justice issued a bench decision. Subsequently, on April
    25, 2012, final judgment was entered, granting David’s “Petition for Declaratory Judgment” and
    denying Marilyn’s “Cross-Motion for Declaratory Judgment.” The final judgment specifically
    stated that David was “entitled to 100% of the policy proceeds” and that Marilyn was “entitled to
    no portion of the proceeds of the life insurance policy.” Marilyn filed a timely notice of appeal
    on May 11, 2012.
    II
    Standard of Review
    On appeal, Marilyn has opted not to submit a transcript of the April 17, 2012 bench
    decision rendered by the hearing justice in this case. We have previously remarked as follows
    about a party’s failure to provide this Court with a transcript of what transpired below:
    “The deliberate decision to prosecute an appeal without
    providing the Court with a transcript of the proceedings in the trial
    court is risky business. Unless the appeal is limited to a challenge
    to rulings of law that appear sufficiently on the record and the
    party accepts the finding of the trial justice as correct, the appeal
    must fail.” Adams v. Christie’s, Inc., 
    880 A.2d 774
    , 778 (R.I.
    -3-
    2005) (quoting 731 Airport Associates, LP v. H & M Realty
    Associates, LLC, 
    799 A.2d 279
    , 282 (R.I. 2002)).
    While we remain convinced that our “risky business” admonition is well-founded, we are
    satisfied that this particular appeal is the exception to the rule; this case presents us with a pure
    question of law which we are able to address sufficiently on the basis of the Superior Court
    record before us.     See, e.g., In re Estate of Griggs, 
    63 A.3d 867
    , 869-70 (R.I. 2013).
    Accordingly, we shall apply a de novo standard of review, as we customarily do “[w]hen
    reviewing an appeal based on an alleged error of law.” Warwick Sewer Authority v. Carlone, 
    45 A.3d 493
    , 498 (R.I. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Medeiros v. Bankers Trust
    Co., 
    38 A.3d 1112
    , 1117 (R.I. 2012); see also Ashley v. Kehew, 
    992 A.2d 983
    , 987 (R.I. 2010).
    III
    Analysis
    The discrete issue which this Court is tasked with determining on appeal is whether
    Marilyn should be entitled to any portion of the life insurance proceeds at issue.
    Marilyn contends that she has an ownership and equitable interest in the life insurance
    policy, “notwithstanding Robert’s unilateral change of beneficiary.” She posits that the life
    insurance policy was marital property and that its proceeds should therefore be subject to
    equitable division. Additionally, she avers that, had Robert survived, the change in beneficiary
    on the life insurance policy “would certainly have been ruled invalid by the Family Court.”
    Moreover, according to Marilyn, the interlocutory Family Court order requiring a fifty-fifty
    division of the cash value of the life insurance policy is “akin” to an alimony or support order;
    and, on the basis of that predicate, she submits that equity mandates that she be awarded at least
    fifty percent of the death benefit. It is her contention that the Superior Court erred when it did
    -4-
    not give deference to the Family Court’s order concerning the division of the life insurance
    policy.
    In response, David argues that, at the time of the change in beneficiary, the Family Court
    did not have jurisdiction over Robert; David further argues that, at that time, Robert was not
    subject to any automatic court orders prohibiting any altering or alienation of marital assets,
    since he had not yet been served with the divorce summons and complaint. He further avers that
    the divorce action and any interlocutory orders issued by the Family Court during the pendency
    of the divorce action abated upon Robert’s death. Accordingly, he contends that, as the named
    beneficiary, he is entitled to the entirety of the life insurance death benefit.
    This case is by no means one of first impression. In Keidel v. Keidel, 
    119 R.I. 726
    , 729,
    
    383 A.2d 264
    , 266 (1978), this Court held that “it is universally accepted that, divorce being a
    personal action, the death of one of the parties before the entry of the final decree thereon abates
    the action.” In Keidel, we then proceeded to a discussion of interlocutory orders issued during a
    divorce proceeding. 
    Id. at 730-32,
    383 A.2d at 266-67. We began our analysis with the fact that
    it was (and still is) well settled that the Family Court is a “statutory court of special jurisdiction”
    and its authority to act must be derived from statute. 
    Id. at 731,
    383 A.2d at 266; see also Rogers
    v. Rogers, 
    98 R.I. 263
    , 268-69, 
    201 A.2d 140
    , 143-44 (1964). Moreover, the Family Court’s
    jurisdiction over “real and personal property of the parties is ‘ancillary’ and an ‘adjunct to its
    divorce jurisdiction.’” 
    Keidel, 119 R.I. at 731
    , 383 A.2d at 267 (quoting 
    Rogers, 98 R.I. at 268
    -
    
    69, 201 A.2d at 143-44
    ). We also noted in our opinion in that case that there was “substantial
    authority to the effect that the death of one of the parties abates the entire divorce action,
    including all ancillary or interlocutory decrees, orders, etc.”        
    Id. at 730,
    383 A.2d at 266.
    Ultimately, we looked approvingly upon that “substantial authority” and held that “[a]n
    -5-
    interlocutory decree to partition real estate, being ancillary to the court’s divorce jurisdiction,
    must abate when the divorce action itself abates.” 
    Id. at 730,
    732, 383 A.2d at 266
    , 267.
    Several years later, in Centazzo v. Centazzo, 
    556 A.2d 560
    (R.I. 1989), we clarified and
    reiterated our holdings in Keidel. We restated that “[i]n accordance with the maxim actio
    personalis moritur cum persona, the cause of action of divorce terminates on the death of one of
    the parties.”4 
    Id. at 562
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Crucially, we then proceeded to
    address the question of whether the Family Court had jurisdiction over property matters in a
    divorce action when an interlocutory order involving property distribution had been issued but
    one of the spouses died before the final judgment of divorce was issued. 
    Id. We cited
    Keidel for
    the principle that “an interlocutory judgment granting property rights [during a divorce
    proceeding] could not be enforced because the judgment’s temporary nature was statutorily
    prescribed.” 
    Id. at 563.
    Accordingly, we held that the abatement of a divorce petition in Family
    Court results in the abatement of any “action with respect to the division of property” that is not
    encompassed in a final judgment of divorce. 
    Id. When we
    apply our clear precedent to the case before us, we come to the inescapable
    conclusion that the divorce action in the Family Court abated at the time of Robert’s death and
    that any interlocutory orders with respect to the division of property also abated. The instant
    case raises the same question that we answered in Keidel and Centazzo; it has been our
    consistent holding that, when a divorce action abates due to the death of one of the spouses, so
    too do any interlocutory orders with respect to property division. See 
    Centazzo, 556 A.2d at 563
    ; 
    Keidel, 119 R.I. at 732
    , 383 A.2d at 267. Consequently, the March 27, 2009 Family Court
    4
    The Latin maxim quoted by the Court in Centazzo v. Centazzo, 
    556 A.2d 560
    , 562 (R.I.
    1989), may be translated as follows: “A personal action dies with the person.”
    -6-
    order with respect to the division of the cash value of the life insurance policies held by Marilyn
    and Robert abated at the time of Robert’s death, when the divorce action itself abated.
    It is further our opinion that Robert was within his rights when he changed the
    beneficiary of his life insurance policy on July 17, 2008 because he had not yet been served with
    Marilyn’s divorce complaint.      General Laws 1956 § 15-5-14.1(f) prohibits changing the
    beneficiary of a life insurance policy during the pendency of a divorce action, but that section
    does not take effect until service of the divorce complaint on the defendant—who in this case
    was Robert. See § 15-5-14.1(a). In the instant case, service of the divorce complaint on Robert
    occurred two days after he changed the beneficiary of the life insurance policy at issue.
    Moreover, under the terms of the life insurance policy itself, the beneficiary is “as stated in the
    application, unless subsequently changed by the Owner.” The policy requires joint action to
    change the beneficiary only when there is more than one owner. And the crucial fact is that
    Robert is the only listed owner of the policy. Accordingly, his change of beneficiary was within
    his rights as the sole policy owner. Therefore, David is the rightful beneficiary of the life
    insurance death benefit because Robert was completely within his rights to change the
    beneficiary on his life insurance policy at the time that he named David as beneficiary. And, in
    view of the ultimate abatement of the divorce action and of any interlocutory orders relative to
    the division of property, that change in beneficiary was not altered by anything which transpired
    in the Family Court prior to Robert’s death.
    Marilyn contends that the Family Court order which required the liquidation of any life
    insurance policies and the fifty-fifty split in the cash value of any such policies was “akin” to an
    alimony or support order; and, on that basis, she argues that the order did not abate on Robert’s
    death. We need not address whether her contention has a valid legal basis since it does not have
    -7-
    a valid factual basis.   After a thorough review of the May 27, 2009 Family Court order
    addressing Marilyn and Robert’s life insurance policies, we are convinced that it is not, nor was
    it ever intended to be, an order of alimony or support. It is clear on its face that it is an order
    dealing with the division of property; the order addresses the sale of real estate and the cashing in
    of life insurance policies, annuities, and investment policies, but at no point does it reference
    support or alimony. Accordingly, it is our view that Marilyn has advanced no argument which
    convinces us that this case is not governed by our clear precedent. Therefore, we hold that the
    hearing justice did not err in granting David one hundred percent of the life insurance death
    benefit.
    IV
    Conclusion
    For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. We
    remand the record to that tribunal.
    -8-
    RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
    Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
    TITLE OF CASE:        David Loppi v. United Investors Life Insurance Co. et al.
    CASE NO:              No. 2013-340-C.A.
    (PC 09-6095)
    COURT:                Supreme Court
    DATE OPINION FILED: November 16, 2015
    JUSTICES:             Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
    WRITTEN BY:           Associate Justice William P. Robinson III
    SOURCE OF APPEAL:     Providence County Superior Court
    JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
    Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter
    ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
    For Plaintiff: Timothy J. Dodd, Esq.
    For Defendant: Thomas M. Dickinson, Esq.