Buford (Gia) v. State ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    GIA BUFORD, A/K/A JACQUELINE                           No. 66147
    BUFORD,
    Appellant,
    vs.                                                         FILED
    THE STATE OF NEVADA,
    JAN 1 5 2016
    Respondent.
    ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
    This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a
    jury verdict, of five counts of multiple transactions involving fraud or
    deceit in the course of enterprise or occupation, five counts of theft, four
    counts of obtaining money under false pretenses, and one count each of
    attempt to obtain money under false pretenses and racketeering. Eighth
    Judicial District Court, Clark County; David B. Barker, Judge.
    Appellant Gia Buford first argues that the indictment failed to
    provide sufficient notice of the State's theory of racketeering by improperly
    failing to specify two predicate offenses for racketeering liability and
    failing to distinguish which defendant performed what racketeering
    conduct. To provide a defendant with an opportunity to prepare an
    adequate defense, a charging instrument must provide adequate notice to
    the accused of the prosecution's theories by stating the essential facts
    constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language. NRS
    173.075(1); Viray v. State, 
    121 Nev. 159
    , 162, 
    111 P.3d 1079
    , 1081-82
    (2005). Its sufficiency will be determined by practical and not technical
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    (0) 1947A    e
    DUI
    standards.    Laney v. State, 
    86 Nev. 173
    , 178, 
    466 P.2d 666
    , 669 (1970).
    When the indictment is first challenged after all the evidence has been
    presented, a reduced standard of review will be applied, and any defect
    will be disregarded unless it affected Buford's substantial rights by
    impairing her ability to prepare a defense. See State v. Jones, 
    96 Nev. 71
    ,
    76, 
    605 P.2d 202
    , 205-06 (1980). The racketeering count alleged liability
    through specific sections of NRS 207.400(1), the indictment alleged specific
    acts of misconduct involving specific victims, see Lewis v. State, 
    100 Nev. 456
    , 460, 
    686 P.2d 219
    , 221 (1984) ("NRS 173.075(2) permits incorporation
    of the allegations of one count in another count of an indictment"), and
    the racketeering count alleged a course of criminal conduct into which
    these specific acts fit. Buford's predicate-offense argument disregards that
    liability under NRS 207.400(1) may be established without finding
    commission of two or more crimes related to racketeering, such as by
    conspiring to participate in racketeering activity through the affairs of an
    enterprise.   See NRS 207.400(1)(j). Further, the indictment alleged that
    Buford committed far more than two predicate offenses. Unlike the
    indictment in State v. Hancock, 
    114 Nev. 161
    , 
    955 P.2d 183
    (1998), the
    present indictment specifically alleged how Buford participated in the
    charged conduct—through management and supervision in most
    instances—and thus we reject Buford's contention that the racketeering
    count impermissibly grouped the defendants together.       See also Lane v.
    Torvinen, 
    97 Nev. 121
    , 122, 
    624 P.2d 1385
    , 1386 (1981). We conclude that
    Buford had notice of the State's theory of racketeering.
    Second, Buford argues that the district court abused its
    discretion by refusing her instruction on racketeering and providing an
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    2
    (0) 19474    (90414
    improper instruction that allowed the jury to find her guilty of
    racketeering without specifically finding that she committed two predicate
    offenses. We review de novo "whether a proffered instruction is a correct
    statement of the law," Nay v. State, 
    123 Nev. 326
    , 330, 
    167 P.3d 430
    , 433
    (2007), and review the district court's denial of a proposed instruction for
    an abuse of discretion or judicial error, Crawford v. State, 
    121 Nev. 744
    ,
    748, 
    121 P.3d 582
    , 585 (2005). Buford's argument lacks merit and reflects
    a misunderstanding of Nevada's racketeering statutes. Buford's proffered
    instruction was deficient by suggesting that the jury could only find her
    guilty of racketeering under NRS 207.400(1)(c). The indictment alleged
    liability under other subsections of NRS 207.400(1) as well as under NRS
    207.400(1)(c). The relevant instruction provided to the jury included the
    statutory text and allowed the jury to apply the precise language of the
    statute to the facts presented to it. Further, while Buford's conviction did
    not require a determination that she was engaged in two or more crimes
    related to racketeering if the jury found her culpable under a section other
    than NRS 207.400(1)(c), even if it did, she was convicted of 15 offenses
    classifiable as crimes related to racketeering.     See NRS 207.360. We
    conclude that the provided instruction correctly stated the law, and the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defense's proposed
    instruction.
    Third, Buford argues that the legislature intended to repeal
    the statute codifying the common law offense of obtaining money by false
    pretenses when it enacted the comprehensive theft statute and requests
    that this court find the former repealed by implication. Repeal by
    implication is strongly disfavored, and this court will not repeal a statute
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    3
    (0) 1947A 70
    by implication "unless there is no other reasonable construction of the two
    statutes."   Washington v. State, 
    117 Nev. 735
    , 739, 
    30 P.3d 1134
    , 1137
    (2001). We observe that the statutes have subtle distinctions: obtaining
    money by false pretenses presents a different intent element from theft by
    material misrepresentation, namely "intent to cheat or defraud the other
    person" for obtaining money by false pretenses, NRS 205.380(1), and
    "intent to deprive that person of the property or services" for theft by
    misrepresentation, NRS 205.0832(1)(c). Legislative history disfavors
    repeal by implication, as the legislature adopted the text of Arizona's
    statute, but did not follow its example in repealing the prior statute
    proscribing the common law offense of obtaining money by false pretenses.
    Hearing on A.B. 694 Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 65th Leg.
    (Nev., June 13, 1989). Further, each statute has been subsequently
    amended without curtailing the other. See, e.g., 2001 Nev. Stat., ch. 587, §
    1, at 3024-25 (NRS 205.0832); 1999 Nev. Stat., ch. 105, § 2, at 397-98
    (NRS 205.380). As the two statutes do not conflict and the legislature has
    not suggested that it intended to repeal the prior statute, we decline to
    hold NRS 205.380 repealed by implication.    
    Washington, 117 Nev. at 739
    ,
    30 P.3d at 1137.
    Fourth, Buford argues that her convictions for obtaining
    money under false pretenses and theft arising out of the same transaction
    violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. When two statutes
    penalize the same conduct, the Blockburger v. United States, 
    284 U.S. 299
                      (1932), test determines whether each contains an element distinct from
    the other and thereby whether punishment under both statutes violates
    double jeopardy. Jackson v. State, 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 55, 
    291 P.3d 1274
    ,
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    4
    (0) 1947A    me
    1278 (2012). We note that Buford has failed to discuss the elements of the
    contested counts to demonstrate an error under Blockb urger.            Mere
    reference to a codefendant's earlier writ petition is not dispositive. As she
    has failed to provide cogent argument supporting her request for relief, we
    decline to consider this claim.   See Maresca v. State, 
    103 Nev. 669
    , 673,
    
    748 P.2d 3
    , 6 (1987).
    Fifth, Buford argues that the verdict was deficient for failing
    to specify the value that was fraudulently obtained in count 13 (attempt to
    obtain property under false pretenses). If the value of property obtained
    under false pretenses exceeds $250 (as of 2010), then it is a category B
    felony; otherwise, it is a misdemeanor. NRS 205.380(1); see NRS 193.330.
    A fact that must be determined to establish an element of an offense must
    be determined by the jury.    See Sellers v. State, 
    108 Nev. 1017
    , 1018-19,
    
    843 P.2d 362
    , 364 (1992). Buford failed to object to the verdict form below,
    and we review her contention for plain error. Green v. State, 
    119 Nev. 542
    ,
    545, 
    80 P.3d 93
    , 95 (2003). The jury is presumed to follow its instructions
    and here was instructed that the offense of obtaining property under false
    pretenses required the property obtained to be worth $250 or more and
    that the jury must determine the value of the relevant property.          See
    Leonard v. State, 
    117 Nev. 53
    , 66, 
    17 P.3d 397
    , 405 (2001). We conclude
    that Buford has not shown that the verdict form amounted to plain error
    that affected her substantial rights.
    Lastly, Buford argues that the State presented insufficient
    evidence to support the jury's finding of guilt. Our review of the record on
    appeal, however, reveals sufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt as determined by a rational trier of fact.   See Jackson v.
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    5
    (0) 1947A c4611W
    Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); Origel-Candido v. State, 
    114 Nev. 378
    ,
    381, 
    956 P.2d 1378
    , 1380 (1998).
    The record shows that Buford supervised the attendants at
    the club, instructed the attendants on how to dress and how to interact
    with prospective victims, provided the attendants with scripts, and
    oversaw staff meetings during which the club's practices were discussed.
    Buford hired, instructed on how to act, and induced to commit fraud the
    attendants who induced victims to pay money by material
    misrepresentations. Buford intentionally managed and supervised the
    club, and the sole apparent purpose of the club was misrepresenting the
    sale of sexual services and physically removing victims after conducting as
    many fraudulent transactions as possible. Buford engaged in more than
    two crimes of fraud related to racketeering with similar patterns and
    within five years of each other and participated in the club's affairs
    through this racketeering activity.
    The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented
    that Buford committed five counts of theft, five counts of multiple
    transactions involving fraud or deceit in the course of enterprise or
    occupation, four counts of obtaining money under false pretenses, one
    count of attempt to obtain money under false pretenses, and one count of
    racketeering. See NRS 205.0832; NRS 205.377; NRS 205.380; NRS
    205.400. Circumstantial evidence is enough to support a conviction.   Lisle
    v. State, 
    113 Nev. 679
    , 691-92, 
    941 P.2d 459
    , 467-68 (1997), holding
    limited on other grounds by Middleton v. State, 
    114 Nev. 1089
    , 1117 n.9,
    
    968 P.2d 296
    , 315 n.9 (1998). Buford's argument that the indictment did
    not allege her direct participation misapprehends the indictment, which
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    6
    (0) 1947A    e.)
    alleges her supervision, hiring, and instruction of the attendants who
    interacted with the victims—such oversight alleges Buford's participation
    as a principal. NRS 195.020.
    Having considered Buford's contentions and concluded that
    they are without merit, we
    ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
    J.
    Hardesty
    J.
    Saitta
    cc: Hon. David B. Barker, District Judge
    Nguyen & Lay
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Clark County District Attorney
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    7
    (0) 1947A