Larry Owens v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 29 2016, 9:28 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Barbara J. Simmons Gregory F. Zoeller
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Chandra Karis Hein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Larry Owens, January 29, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1505-CR-339
v.
Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana,
The Honorable Linda E. Brown,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G10-1412-CM-56405
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Larry Owens appeals his two convictions for public intoxication, both as Class
B misdemeanors. Owens presents two issues for our review, which we restate
as follows:
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to show
that he harassed, annoyed, or alarmed another person
while Owens was intoxicated in a public place; and
2. Whether the trial court’s entry of conviction on both
charges violated his right to be free from double jeopardy.
[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On December 28, 2014, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer
Charles Tice responded to a call from a manager of a Waffle House restaurant.
Upon arriving at the restaurant, Officer Tice approached the manager, who
informed Officer Tice that he had asked an employee, Owens, to leave the
restaurant, but Owens had refused. During this conversation, Owens “kept
trying to tell [Officer Tice] what was going on . . . .” Tr. at 8. Officer Tice
observed that Owens “was a little unsteady on his feet and when he tried to
interject himself he had slurred speech.” Id. Officer Tice also observed that
“there was a smell of an intoxicating or alcoholic beverage that became worse
as [Owens] slurred his speech . . . .” Id. And Owens had “glossed over[,]
blood[-]shot eyes.” Id.
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[4] After speaking with the manager, Officer Tice spoke with Owens in the
restaurant’s parking lot and instructed Owens to leave the premises. Owens
then walked about twenty to twenty-five feet away from Officer Tice. Officer
Tice “thought we were done,” but Owens then “balled his fist up . . . and said
something” directed at Officer Tice. Id. at 12. Officer Tice could not
understand what Owens was saying, but Owens was “shaking” his fist at
Officer Tice and speaking to him in a “loud,” “angry,” and “forceful sounding”
voice. Id. at 12, 20. Customers of the Waffle House “were coming in and
out . . . and trying not to pay any attention” to the incident. Id. at 13. Officer
Tice then arrested Owens.
[5] The State charged Owens with two counts of public intoxication, both as Class
B misdemeanors. Count I alleged that Owens had committed Class B
misdemeanor public intoxication when he was intoxicated in a public place and
“was harassing, annoying[,] or alarming” others. Appellant’s App. at 11.
Count II alleged that Owens had committed Class B misdemeanor public
intoxication when he was intoxicated in a public place and “breached the peace
or was in imminent danger of breaching the peace.” Id. After a bench trial, the
court found Owens guilty as charged and entered judgment of conviction
against Owens on both counts. The court then sentenced Owens to concurrent
180-day terms. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence
[6] We first consider Owens’ argument on appeal that the State failed to present
sufficient evidence to support Count I, public intoxication, as a Class B
misdemeanor, for having harassed, annoyed, or alarmed another person while
Owens was intoxicated in a public place.1 Our standard of review for
sufficiency of the evidence claims is well-settled. Tobar v. State, 740 N.E .2d
109, 111 (Ind. 2000).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine only the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the
verdict. We do not assess witness credibility, nor do we reweigh
the evidence to determine if it was sufficient to support a
conviction. Under our appellate system, those roles are reserved
for the finder of fact. Instead, we consider only the evidence
most favorable to the trial court ruling and affirm the conviction
unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pillow v. State, 986 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
[7] In order to prove public intoxication, as alleged in Count I, the State was
required to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Owens was in a public place
in a state of intoxication and Owens harassed, annoyed, or alarmed another
1
As discussed below, the State concedes that the trial court’s entry of conviction against Owens on both
Count I and Count II violated Owens’ double jeopardy rights. As such, we need not consider Owens’
additional argument that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support its charge under Count II.
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person. Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3(a)(4) (2012). Owens does not dispute that he was
in a public place while intoxicated. Rather, he questions only whether the State
demonstrated that he harassed, annoyed, or alarmed another person. As our
supreme court has recently explained: “Indiana has historically recognized that
the purpose of the public intoxication statute is to protect the public from the
annoyance and deleterious effects which may and do occur because of the
presence of persons who are in an intoxicated condition.” Morgan v. State, 22
N.E.3d 570, 576 (Ind. 2014) (internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted).
To determine whether one harasses, annoys, or alarms another person, we
consider whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would have felt
harassed, annoyed, or alarmed by the defendant’s behavior. Id. at 577 n.10.
[8] In Brown v. State, 12 N.E.3d 952, 954-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, we
held as follows:
the facts do demonstrate that Brown was harassing, annoying, or
alarming another person per section (a)(4) of the public
intoxication statute. According to Officer McAtee, Brown did
not seem attentive to his surroundings. Brown walked directly
into a woman on the street, and she began yelling at him
immediately. As the trial court described the situation, “[it] was
a little more than just a bumping into. He came out of the bar
and ran into her and she went and got very upset enough to draw
this officer’s attention.” After running into the woman, Brown
continued walking and ignored Officer McAtee’s requests to
stop. The evidence, which demonstrates that Brown was entirely
unaware of his surroundings and that the woman “start[ed] going
berserk” after he walked into her, is enough to allow a reasonable
trier of fact to infer that Brown harassed, annoyed, or alarmed
the woman by bumping into her in his intoxicated state.
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(Internal citations omitted; alterations in original.)
[9] Similarly here, Owens arrived to work intoxicated. He refused to leave when
his manager told him to do so. When Officer Tice arrived and spoke to the
manager, Owens, obviously intoxicated, repeatedly attempted to interject
himself into the conversation. After Officer Tice persuaded Owens to leave the
premises, Owens, from about twenty to twenty-five feet, balled up his fist and
shook it at Officer Tice. He then began to angrily yell at Officer Tice.
Although Officer Tice could not understand what Owens was saying, Owens
was loud enough to attract the attention of customers going to and from the
Waffle House, and those customers were, as Officer Tice observed, “trying not
to pay attention” to Owens. Tr. at 13. A trier of fact was free to conclude that,
on those facts, a reasonable person would have felt harassed, annoyed, or
alarmed by Owens’ behavior. As such, we affirm his conviction under Count I.
Issue Two: Double Jeopardy
[10] Owens next asserts that the entry of judgment against him on both Count I and
Count II violated his right to be free from double jeopardy under Indiana law.
Although the State disagrees with the grounds on which Owens bases his
argument on appeal, the State concedes Owens’ conclusion that the entry of
judgment against him on both Count I and Count II violated Owens’ right to be
free from double jeopardy under the actual evidence test of Article 1, Section 14
of the Indiana Constitution. See Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind.
1999); see also Appellee’s Br. at 11 n.4, 14 (“since these distinct facts supporting
the separate counts were not parsed out for the trier of fact during closing
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argument, an actual evidence issue exists, and the State acknowledges that
remand would be appropriate.”). Having reviewed the record, we agree with
the State’s concession and rationale. As such, we reverse Owens’ conviction for
public intoxication as charged under Count II, and we remand with instructions
that the trial court vacate its judgment of conviction against Owens under that
count.
[11] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
Riley, J., and May, J., concur.
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