Paul M. Camp v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                            Nov 05 2015, 8:36 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Mark Small                                               Gregory F. Zoeller
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Chandra K. Hein
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Paul M. Camp                                             November 5, 2015
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    01A02-1503-CR-143
    v.                                               Appeal from the Adams Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Patrick R. Miller,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    01D01-1310-FD-148
    Bradford, Judge.
    Case Summary
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 01A02-1503-CR-143 |November 5, 2015    Page 1 of 6
    [1]   In 2010, Appellant-Defendant Paul Camp was convicted of dealing in
    methamphetamine. On July 1, 2013, the Indiana legislature enacted a law
    making it a Class D felony for a person to possess pseudoephedrine, a precursor
    used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, within seven years of being
    convicted of dealing in methamphetamine. On multiple occasions between
    August and September of 2013, Camp purchased products containing
    pseudoephedrine and was charged with two counts of possession of a precursor
    by a methamphetamine offender. Camp argued that he did not know that he
    was prohibited from purchasing pseudoephedrine and tendered jury instructions
    that it was a defense that he was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact
    which prevented him from knowingly committing the acts charged. The trial
    court refused to give Camp’s proposed instructions and the jury found Camp
    guilty as charged. On appeal, Camp argues that the trial court abused its
    discretion in declining to give his proposed mistake-of-fact instructions to the
    jury. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On May 14, 2010, Camp was convicted of dealing in methamphetamine. On
    August 15, 2013, Camp purchased a box of “Wal-Phed, twelve hour, twenty-
    count”, a product containing pseudoephedrine, from a Walgreens in Decatur,
    Indiana. Tr. p. 219. On August 26, 2013, Camp again purchased a box of Wal-
    Phed from the same Walgreens. Both transactions were recorded by store
    cameras and logged by the pharmacist in the electronic database of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 01A02-1503-CR-143 |November 5, 2015   Page 2 of 6
    pseudoephedrine purchases along with Camp’s driver’s license information.
    Camp purchased products containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine a total of
    six times between July 13, and September 5, 2013.
    [3]   On October 1, 2013, Camp was charged with two counts of Class D felony
    possession of a precursor by a methamphetamine offender.1 On January 26,
    2015, the case was tried to a jury. At trial, Camp admitted that he went to the
    Walgreens with the intent to purchase pseudoephedrine, and did so, but that he
    did not know it was a crime for him to possess it. At the close of evidence,
    Camp tendered two proposed mistake-of-fact instructions for submission to the
    jury.
    Mistake of Fact – Alternative 1
    It is an issue whether the accused mistakenly committed the acts
    charged.
    It is a defense that the accused was reasonably mistaken about a
    matter of fact if the mistake prevented the accused from:
    [intentionally] [knowingly] committing the acts charged [or]
    [committing the acts charged with specific intent to [knowingly]
    [intentionally]].
    The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
    that the accused was not reasonably mistaken.
    Appellant’s App. p. 80.
    Mistake of Fact – Reasonableness from Accused’s Perspective
    1
    Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-48-4-14.5(h)(1)(A) (2013), a person who has been convicted of dealing
    in methamphetamine is prohibited from knowingly or intentionally possessing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine
    for seven years from the date the individual was sentenced.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 01A02-1503-CR-143 |November 5, 2015           Page 3 of 6
    In determining whether the accused’s belief was reasonable, you
    must determine whether a reasonable person in the accused’s
    position would have had such a belief. This means that you must
    consider all the circumstances, including Defendant’s belief it was
    okay to purchased Sudafed for his mother and himself, in
    deciding whether his belief was reasonable.
    If you have a reasonable doubt whether a reasonable person in
    the accused’s situation would have had such a belief, you must
    give the accused the benefit of that doubt and find that the belief
    was reasonably held.
    Appellant’s App. p. 81.
    [4]   The trial court refused to give Camp’s proposed instructions, finding that his
    argument was actually that he had made a “mistake of law, not [a] mistake of
    fact” and that he had not claimed to be mistaken about any of the factual
    elements of the crime “as to whether it was pseudoephedrine, whether he was a
    convicted methamphetamine offender, and whether or not seven years had
    passed from that conviction and whether or not he intentionally possessed it.”
    Tr. p. 295. The jury found Camp guilty as charged and the trial court sentenced
    Camp to an aggregate 880-day executed term of incarceration.
    Discussion and Decision
    [5]   Camp claims that the trial court erred in refusing to submit his proposed
    mistake-of-fact instructions to the jury. “The manner of instructing a jury is left
    to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Albores v. State, 
    987 N.E.2d 98
    , 99
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) trans. denied. “We review a trial court’s instructions to the
    jury for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion arises when the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 01A02-1503-CR-143 |November 5, 2015   Page 4 of 6
    instruction is erroneous and the instructions taken as a whole misstate the law or
    otherwise mislead the jury.” Isom v. State, 
    31 N.E.3d 469
    , 484-85 (Ind. 2015)
    (citations omitted). “On review of a trial court’s decision to refuse a proposed
    jury instruction, we consider whether the instruction (1) correctly states the law,
    (2) is supported by the evidence, and (3) is covered in substance by other
    instructions that are given.” 
    Albores, 987 N.E.2d at 99
    .
    [6]   The trial court refused to give the two mistake-of-fact instructions offered by
    Camp because Camp did not present evidence to support a mistake-of-fact
    defense. Camp claims that he was ignorant of the law and would not have
    purchased pseudoephedrine had he known of the law. “It is a defense that the
    person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a
    matter of fact, if the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of
    the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-7. We have previously held that a mistake of
    fact defense is available where three elements are satisfied, “(1) the mistake
    must be honest and reasonable; (2) the mistake must be about a matter of fact;
    and (3) the mistake must negate the culpability required to commit the crime.”
    Nolan v. State, 
    863 N.E.2d 398
    , 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Camp’s mistake, even
    assuming it was honest and reasonable, fails to satisfy the second and third
    elements.
    [7]   “A fact is ‘A thing done; an action performed or an incident transpiring; an
    event or circumstance; an actual occurrence; an actual happening in time or
    space or an event mental or physical; that which has taken place.’” Giles v. State,
    
    699 N.E.2d 294
    , 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 01A02-1503-CR-143 |November 5, 2015   Page 5 of 6
    591 (6th ed.1990)). It would be a mistake of fact, for example, if Camp had
    purchased medication which was mislabeled and purported not to contain any
    pseudoephedrine when in fact it did contain pseudoephedrine. In such as case,
    Camp could claim that he was mistaken as to the fact that he had knowingly
    purchased and possessed pseudoephedrine.
    [8]   Here, Camp’s argument is not that he mistakenly purchased or possessed
    pseudoephedrine but that he did not know it was illegal for him to do so. Camp’s
    mistake was not one of fact; rather, he claims he was simply ignorant of the law.
    It is well-settled in Indiana that ignorance of the law is no defense. Dewald v.
    State, 
    898 N.E.2d 488
    , 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Marmont v. State, 
    48 Ind. 21
    , 31
    (1874) (“every man is presumed to know the laws of the country in which he
    dwells;….[I]gnorance of the law excuses no man.”) Therefore, Camp’s alleged
    mistake does not negate the culpability required to commit the crime. Because
    Camp’s proposed jury instructions were not supported by the evidence (i.e. he
    was not mistaken as to any fact) and incorrectly stated the law (i.e. that reasonable
    ignorance of the law is a defense), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    refusing to give those instructions to the jury.
    [9]     The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    May, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 01A02-1503-CR-143 |November 5, 2015   Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01A02-1503-CR-143

Filed Date: 11/5/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2015