J.M. v. K.W. ( 2016 )

J-A14036-16
NON -PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
J.M. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
K.W.
Appellant No. 76 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered December 24, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
Civil Division at No(s): S- 523 -2014
BEFORE: BOWES, OTT AND PLATT,* JJ.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:
FILED OCTOBER 24, 2016
On December 24, 2015, the trial court found K.W. ( "Mother ") in
contempt of a temporary custody order and stripped her of primary physical
custody of the parties' then -four -year -old -son, B.M., and three -year-old
daughter, V.M. In contrast to my esteemed colleagues, I believe that the
sanction was improper. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that aspect
of the majority's decision.
Preliminarily, I agree with my learned colleagues' determination that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Mother in contempt for
surreptitiously relocating with the parties' children from Schuylkill County,
Pennsylvania to Lancaster County. Likewise, I agree with the majority's
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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conclusions that Mother did not contravene an existing court order by
placing B.M. in the daycare of her choice, and that remand is necessary to
re- evaluate the award of counsel fees in light of our reversal of this aspect of
the contempt order. However, I reject the majority's characterization of
Mother's argument, which assails the trial court for modifying an existing
child custody order as a sanction for her contempt, as tantamount to a
"[claim] that challenges the interim custody order." Majority memorandum
at 5.
The majority is correct insofar as it reiterates the well- ensconced
principle that an interim custody order is not appealable. The rationale
behind this precept is that, until the trial court has rendered its best -interest
determination on the merits, an interim custody order is ephemeral and
subject to further modification upon petition.' However, from my
perspective, the instant order is not an interim determination of the
children's best interest, and Mother does not challenge the trial court's
' I observe that Father filed a petition for custody on March 21, 2014, and
the record bears out that as of January 5, 2016, the trial court struck the
case from the trial list and postponed the custody trial, yet again, for the
preparation of updated custody evaluations. Thus, after approximately two
years of litigation, the trial court still has not confronted Father's custody
complaint and no date has been set for a resolution of the custody matter
that will result in a final appealable custody order addressing the children's
best interest. Compare this situation with Pa.R.C.P. 1915.12(b) and (c)
regarding the prompt disposition of custody cases (generally trial should be
scheduled within 180 days of the custody complaint and trial shall
commence within 90 days of the scheduling order).
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determination of custody per se. In reality, the order in the case at bar is a
finding of contempt and a concomitant sanction, which Mother correctly
argues was entered in contravention of our jurisprudence regarding the
modification of custody as a consequence of contempt.
While an order granting temporary or interim custody is interlocutory,
it is beyond cavil that a present finding of contempt is final and appealable
when a sanction is imposed. Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478 (Pa.Super.
2006). Accordingly, I would address Mother's issue relating to the contempt
sanction and find that the trial court's sanction was impermissible.
It is settled that an adjudication of contempt is not a proper basis to
modify an existing custody arrangement. See Clapper v. Harvey, 716
A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa.Super. 1998) ( "a mother's violation of a custody order
may be an appropriate foundation for a finding of contempt, but it cannot be
the basis for an award of custody "); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 504 A.2d
350, 353 (Pa.Super. 1986) ( "A custody award should not be used to reward
or punish a parent for good or bad behavior "). This Court has confronted
several cases where the trial court awarded one party custody as a sanction
for the other party's contumacious conduct. See e.g. Langendorfer v.
Spearman, 797 A.2d 303 (Pa.Super. 2002); and Everett v. Parker, 889
A.2d 578, 581 (Pa.Super. 2005); cf. Steele v. Steele, 545 A.2d 376(Pa.Super. 1988) (noting that it is generally improper for trial court to
modify custody arrangements without petition for modification before it).
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The effect of this jurisprudence is that a trial court's ability to alter custody
as a contempt sanction is restricted to circumstances where the responding
party is given express notice that custody will be at issue during the
contempt proceeding.
Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1915.12(a), a contempt petition must include a
section entitled "Notice and Order to Appear." The rule prescribes the form
and content of the notice and order to appear. Herein, Father's petition for
contempt requested a modification of custody but it lacked the required
notice and order to appear as outlined by Rule 1915.12. As Father neglected
to issue the required notice and order to appear, he did not provide Mother
notice that the existing custody order could be modified as a consequence of
the contempt proceedings. Moreover, both the original scheduling order that
the trial court issued and its revised order failed to mention custody at all.
In Everett, supra at 581, we explained, "When modification of
custody is sought by a custody contempt petitioner, the respondent must be
given particular notice of that objective." In reaching that determination, we
applied the requirement stated in Langendorfer, supra, that when
modification of custody is sought by a contempt petitioner, the respondent
must be given notice of that objective, both in the body of the contempt
petition and in the order to appear. In Everett, a father filed a pro se
contempt petition against the mother who maintained primary custody of his
child. While the third page of the contempt petition requested a change in
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the custody arrangement, the father failed to serve the petition on Mother
properly. Instead, he mailed a copy of the petition to an attorney who
represented mother during prior dependency proceedings and to the family's
CYS caseworker. Neither the mother nor her former attorney, who never
entered an appearance in the custody dispute, appeared at the contempt
hearing. Nevertheless, based upon the caseworker's statement that she had
provided the mother with actual notice of the date and time of the hearing,
the trial court determined that the mother received sufficient notice of the
father's petition. Accordingly, it held the contempt hearing ex parte, found
the mother in contempt, and modified the existing custody order by
awarding the father primary custody of his son. On appeal, we vacated the
contempt order.
As it relates to the issue in the case at bar, the Everett Court
concluded that the trial court violated the mother's right to due process by
modifying the custody order as part of the contempt proceedings because
the mother was denied specific notice that custody would be at stake in the
contempt proceedings. Noting that the mother was not properly served with
the contempt petition that implicated the custody arrangement or with the
notice of the scheduled contempt hearing, we determined that the
caseworker's notification to the mother concerning the time and date of the
proceedings was insufficient. Specifically we reasoned, "Formal notice and
an opportunity to be heard are fundamental components of due process
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when a person may be deprived in a legal proceeding of a liberty interest,
such as physical freedom, or a parent's custody of her child." Everett,
supra at 580.
As noted, we confronted a similar factual scenario in Langendorfer,
supra, wherein the mother, who maintained partial physical custody of her
son during the summer, filed a contempt petition against the father
asserting that he had violated the existing custody arrangement. Notably,
the Mother's contempt petition failed to include any request to transfer
custody and the order scheduling the contempt hearing did not notify either
party that custody would be an issue during the contempt proceedings.
Moreover, there was no indication in the record that the trial court
consolidated the mother's contempt petition with the father's previously filed
motion to temporarily adjust the custody schedule. Following the contempt
hearing, the trial court awarded the mother sole legal and physical custody
of the child. However, relying upon the precept discussed in Choplosky v.
Choplosky, 584 A.2d 340, 342 (Pa.Super. 1990), "without a motion to
modify visitation rights before it, a trial court may not permanently alter the
visitation rights of [the] parties," this Court vacated the custody order on
appeal as violating the father's right to due process. We reiterated the
Langendorfer Court's rationale in P.H.D. v. R.R.D., 56 A.3d 702, 707 -708
(Pa.Super. 2012) and concluded, "As in Langendorfer, Father here had no
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notice that custody was at issue. Neither the contempt petition nor the
notice and order to appear held out the prospect of custody modification."
Thus, as the foregoing discussion of relevant binding authority
highlights, a trial court may transfer physical custody at the conclusion of a
contempt hearing only when the respondent has been given particular notice
of that objective in both the body of the contempt petition and the notice
and order to appear. It is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
transfer custody from one party to the other if the parties lack advance
notice that custody is to be an issue at the contempt hearing.
Instantly, Mother contends that the trial court violated her due process
rights by modifying the custody order concomitant with the contempt
adjudication. The crux of Mother's argument is that Father's contempt
petition provided insufficient notice that custody would be at issue during the
contempt proceedings. She continues that by awarding custody to Father
without affording notice that the existing custody order could be modified,
the trial court denied her the opportunity to defend against modification.
Father counters that Mother had notice that he sought custody as a
result of her alleged contempt. He points out that his petition entreated the
court to grant him custody of their children and the proposed order that he
attached to his petition provided, "Plaintiff is granted primary custody until
further order of court." Petition for Special Relief and Contempt, 9/23/15, at
unnumbered page 2, and attached proposed order. Thus, Father contends
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that Mother had the opportunity to prepare for the contempt proceedings
and to advocate her position vis -à -vis the custody request. While the
majority declines to address this issue, I would reject Father's claim that an
averment in his petition and one line in the proposed order for relief satisfied
the requirements we outlined in Langendorfer, supra and its progeny.
As in Langendorfer, there was no petition to modify custody before
the trial court during the contempt proceedings, Father neglected to provide
the notice and order to appear pursuant to Rule 1915.12(a), and the
scheduling orders that the court issued did not disclose that the trial court
would address the matter of physical custody during the contempt
proceeding. While Father included a custody - related prayer for relief in his
contempt petition and the proposed order that he submitted for the court's
approval, Mother was not provided the requisite specific notice in both the
contempt petition and the attenuate orders directing her to appear that her
custody rights would be at stake. See Everett, supra. As I believe that
Father's notice to Mother that he sought to modify the custody arrangement
during the contempt proceedings was deficient, I would find that, absent
notice of that objective, the trial court erred in modifying custody as a
contempt sanction.
In addition, I disagree with the majority's alternative conclusion that
the trial court issued the interim custody order pursuant to the trial court's
authority under Pa.R.C.P. 1915.13. As a preliminary matter, I agree that,
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under appropriate circumstances, a trial court may modify a custody order
temporarily pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1915.13.2 See Choplosky, supra at 343,
( "special relief' may in some cases be appropriate (and necessary) where
the situation is such that, for example, temporary modification of custody or
visitation rights would preserve the well -being of the children involved while
the parties prepare to resolve more permanently the question of where
and /or with whom the children should remain. "); 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(b) ( "The
court may issue an interim award of custody to a party who has
standing ... in the manner prescribed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure governing special relief in custody matters. "). However, even to
the extent that the majority surmises that the trial court might have
intended to grant special relief pursuant to Rule 1915.13, which it
undoubtedly was authorized to do, the trial court did not enter an order to
that effect.
2
Rule 1915.13 provides as follows:
At any time after commencement of the action, the court may on
application or its own motion grant appropriate interim or special
relief. The relief may include but is not limited to the award of
temporary custody, partial custody or visitation; the issuance of
appropriate process directing that a child or a party or person
having physical custody of a child be brought before the court;
and a direction that a person post security to appear with the
child when directed by the court or to comply with any order of
the court.
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Presently, the certified record demonstrates that the trial court did not
intend to issue special relief pursuant to Rule 1915.13. In fact, contrary to
the majority's supposition, the trial court unquestionably granted Father
shared physical custody as an impermissible sanction for contempt. Indeed,
the court explicitly directed, "[The] appropriate sanction [against Mother] is
to award shared custody until the parties undergo the trial." Trial Court
Order, 12/24/15, at unnumbered page 7.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the
portions of the majority decision that quash the portion of the appeal
relating to the improper modification of physical custody as a contempt
sanction and imply that the custody modification could have been prompted
by Rule 1915.13. I would address the merits of Mother's argument and
vacate the trial court's contempt order as it relates to awarding Father
shared physical custody. I join all other aspects of the majority
memorandum.
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