Pierce v. Canyon Gate Med. Grp., LLC ( 2015 )


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  •                               Appellant Cheryl Pierce appeals the district court's order
    granting respondent Canyon Gate Medical Group, LLC's (CGMG) 1 motion
    to dismiss pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5). The district court dismissed the
    declaratory relief action because it found that the case was not
    appropriate for declaratory relief. 2 We agree. 3
    Standard of review
    If matters outside the pleadings are considered in NRCP
    12(b)(5) motions, "this court reviews the dismissal order as though it were
    an order granting summary judgment."         Witherow v. State Bd. of Parole
    Commirs, 
    123 Nev. 305
    , 307-08, 
    167 P.3d 408
    , 409 (2007); see also NRCP
    12(b). Summary judgment must be granted when the pleadings and
    evidence in the record "demonstrate that no genuine issue as to any
    material fact remains and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
    as a matter of law." 
    Witherow, 123 Nev. at 308
    , 167 P.3d at 409 (internal
    quotations omitted). Orders granting summary judgment are reviewed de
    novo. 
    Id. Here, although
    the district court dismissed the action
    pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), it held a hearing on the motion, indicating
    1 There are multiple respondent parties named in this appeal but
    only CGMG filed an answering brief. This appears to be because "CGMG
    metamorphosed into various entities" over the years. The parties do not
    dispute that CGMG employed Ronald Sparling, M.D. at the time of this
    incident. Accordingly, we collectively refer to the respondents as CGMG.
    2 Thedistrict court also determined that the claim was barred by the
    applicable statute of limitations. Because of our decision regarding
    declaratory relief, we do not reach the statute of limitations question.
    3 Because both parties are familiar with the facts in this case, we
    discuss them only when necessary for the disposition's outcome.
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    that matters outside the pleadings were considered. Accordingly, we
    review this order as one granting summary judgment.
    Declaratory relief is not appropriate
    Pierce requested that the district court determine whether
    CGMG's liability as an employer under NRS 41.130 for damages in a
    separate medical malpractice suit against Dr. Sparling is subject to the
    statutory damage cap of $350,000 under NRS 41A.035. Declaratory relief
    is available pursuant to NRS 30.040, which states in relevant part that
    [a]ny person interested under a deed, written
    contract or other writings constituting a contract,
    or whose rights, status or other legal relations are
    affected by a statute, municipal ordinance,
    contract or franchise, may have determined any
    question of construction or validity arising under
    the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or
    franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status
    or other legal relations thereunder.
    NRS 30.040(1). While Pierce's request is arguably a determination of
    statutory construction, declaratory relief is also subject to NRS 30.080 and
    this court's previous jurisprudence.
    Under NRS 30.080, a district court may refuse to enter a
    declaratory judgment if it "would not terminate the uncertainty or
    controversy giving rise to the proceeding." This court has also held that
    declaratory relief is only available when
    (1) a justiciable controversy exists between
    persons with adverse interests, (2) the party
    seeking declaratory relief has a legally protectable
    interest in the controversy, and (3) the issue is ripe
    for judicial determination. Knittle v. Progressive
    Cas1-1 Ins. Co., 
    112 Nev. 8
    , 10, 
    908 P.2d 724
    , 725
    (1996). However, whether a determination in an
    action for declaratory judgment is proper is a
    matter for the district court's discretion and will
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    not be disturbed on appeal unless the district court
    abused that discretion.
    Cty. of Clark, ex rel., Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Upchurch, 
    114 Nev. 749
    , 752, 
    961 P.2d 754
    , 756 (1998) (emphases added).
    The question before this court is whether "the issue is ripe for
    judicial determination." 
    Id. In Upchurch,
    we concluded that a declaratory
    relief action was appropriate because "resolution of the [damages] issue
    may end the controversy between the parties and could save them from
    undergoing a lengthy and expensive trial."     
    Id. at 753,
    961 P.2d at 757.
    Here, Pierce brought a medical malpractice suit against Dr. Sparling.
    CGMG was not named as a tortfeasor in that lawsuit, and Pierce makes it
    clear that she does not intend to bring a tort claim against CGMG.
    Instead, Pierce filed a separate declaratory relief action against CGMG,
    arguing that CGMG is vicariously liable to Pierce for all damages awarded
    in Dr. Sparling's negligence case, and the damages cap of $350,000 under
    NRS 41A.035 is not applicable to CGMG. We find that unlike Upchurch,
    where this court determined that "resolution of the issue will likely end
    the 
    controversy," 114 Nev. at 752
    , 961 P.2d at 757, resolution of the
    declaratory relief sought against CGMG will not end the controversy
    between Pierce and CGMG.
    Additionally, in Knittle, this court determined that if a
    plaintiffs rights against a defendant in a declaratory relief action are
    "contingent on her successful litigation of a pending tort suit," a plaintiff
    cannot assert a "legally protectable interestS creating a justiciable
    controversy ripe for declaratory 
    relief." 112 Nev. at 11
    , 908 P.2d at 726.
    Here, Pierce's rights against CGMG are contingent on her suit against Dr.
    Sparling. Accordingly, we agree with the district court's conclusion that
    this issue is not ripe for judicial determination. Any such declaration
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    would constitute an advisory opinion. Id.; cf. Personhood Nev. v. Bristol,
    
    126 Nev. 599
    , 602, 
    245 P.3d 572
    , 574 (2010) ("This court's duty is not to
    render advisory opinions but, rather, to resolve actual controversies by an
    enforceable judgment.").
    We conclude that the district court did not err in determining
    that the action should be dismissed because the case was not appropriate
    for declaratory relief. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material
    fact, and CGMG is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore
    ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
    , C.J.
    Hardesty
    1:2432Mr
    Parx:aguirre                              Doug
    Ch                                        Saitta
    Le                       J.
    Gibbons                                   Pickering
    cc: Hon. Nancy L. Allf, District Judge
    Stephen E. Haberfeld, Settlement Judge
    Eckley M. Keach, Chtd.
    Thomas & Springberg, P.C.
    Murdock & Associates, Chtd.
    Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP/Las Vegas
    Kravitz, Schnitzer & Johnson, Chtd.
    Eighth Judicial District Court Clerk
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Document Info

Docket Number: 65832

Filed Date: 12/23/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021